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Abstract
This Species of Property: Slavery and the Properties of Subejcthood in AngloAmerican Law and Politics, 1619-1783
by
John N. Blanton
Advisor: Dr. James Oakes
This Species of Property examines the development of the law and practice of
slavery in the 17th and 18th century Anglo-American empire through analysis of common
law court decisions in England, Massachusetts, and Virginia. The dissertation argues that
there was a long and vibrant debate over the legitimacy of the chattel principle – the
definition of enslaved persons as a type of property – and that enslaved people and their
allies pushed for the recognition of the legal humanity or subjecthood of the enslaved in
colonial and metropolitan courts. This antislavery legal tradition culminated in the
famous Somerset decision, handed down by the Court of King’s Bench in 1772, paved
the way for judicial abolition in revolutionary Massachusetts, and shaped the contours of
early national American antislavery. Defenses of property-in-man that developed
throughout the colonial period to answer these critiques, however, also remained potent,
shaping the development of proslavery thought in Virginia and preventing concerted
antislavery action during and after the American Revolution. By situating the
development of colonial American slavery in an imperial context, This Species of
Property illustrates the ways in which broader political, economic, and social
developments throughout the empire influenced the development of slave law in specific
jurisdictions, and how these local developments redounded back onto the metropole,
shaping imperial policy and the place of slavery in the new American republic. It also
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restores a longue durée chronological approach to colonial history, demonstrating how
Anglo-American slavery developed over time in response to specific local and imperial
contexts. Finally, the dissertation illustrates the myriad ways in which enslaved persons
influenced the development of slavery by taking up the mantle of English and British
subjecthood, making claims on the local and imperial state through the courts and forcing
Anglo-Americans on both sides of the Atlantic to grapple with the contradictions inherent
to property-in-man.
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Introduction – Slavery and the Properties of Subjecthood in Imperial Anglo-America
In May 1772, Francis Hargrave, a young English attorney with a bright future,
stood before the Court of King’s Bench in Westminster Hall to present his arguments in
the Somerset case – it was his first oral argument before an English court. The case
concerned an enslaved man, James Somerset, who had escaped from his owner, Charles
Stuart, while sojourning in London. Stuart claimed Somerset as his property, hoping to
sell his erstwhile slave into hard labor and an early death in a Jamaica cane field.
Hargrave’s task was to persuade the court that Somerset could not be held as a slave in
England, to vindicate the old maxim that the air of England was too pure for slavery.
Drawing on over a century of legal precedent, Hargrave argued that English law
“disapproves of slavery, and considers its operation dangerous and destructive to the
whole community.” Proslavery advocates might argue that the law of servitude or
villeinage allowed for slavery, but the antislavery lawyer pointed out that, although
villeinage “had most of the incidents of slavery,” it did not imply the kind of property
right Stuart claimed – an Englishman might own the labor of a servant or villein, but they
could never own his or her person. Local laws in the colonies might countenance such a
property relation, but Hargrave argued that these only “impliedly authorize the slavery of
negroes in America; and it would be a strange thing to say, that permitting slavery there,
includes a permission of slavery here.”1 Though bound labor was certainly legitimate,
and positive laws in the colonies might allow slavery in their own jurisdictions, no person
could be a slave in England itself. Britons never could be slaves.
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The core of Hargrave’s argument against slavery, one of the most dynamic and
resilient institutions in human history, was his opposition to the chattel principle – the
definition of enslaved persons as a species of property without separate legal personhood
or rights of their own, mere extensions of their masters’ will.2 As Hargrave pointed out,
the chattel principle was a construct, as are all the terms we use to define our world –
property, personhood, rights, agency, law – and was thus, of necessity, a subject of
continuous debate and negotiation. When James Somerset stood before the Court of
King’s Bench in 1772, he was a living reminder of the instability of the chattel principle.
He had demonstrated his personhood by resisting Charles Steuart’s will and asserting his
independent agency, and now he sought to challenge the legitimacy of property-in-man
by claiming the mantle of subjechood and pressing his claims before the highest court in
the British Empire. When Chief Justice Mansfield issued his decision in the Somerset
case, he stated in no uncertain terms that property-in-man was “odious” to English
common law. The kind of dominion Stuart claimed over Somerset, a fellow British
subject, was not “allowed or approved by the law of England” and therefore, whatever
“inconveniences” it might cause, “the black must be discharged.” James Somerset
walked out of Westminster Hall and into the free air of England.3
Though the emancipatory decision they obtained from the King’s Bench in 1772
was certainly a watershed moment in the history of slavery, James Somerset and Francis
Hargrave were not the first Britons to question the legitimacy of property-in-man –
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On the chattel principle as central to human slavery, see Moses I. Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modern
Ideology (New York: Viking Press, 1980); Claude Meillassoux, The Anthropology of Slavery: The Womb
of Iron and Gold (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); David Brion Davis, Inhuman Bondage:
The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Seymour
Drescher, Abolition: A History of Slavery and Antislavery (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2009).
3
1 Lofft 1.
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slavery had long been a subject of intense debate in the Anglo-American world.4 This
debate, however, has been conspicuously absent from much of the scholarship on AngloAmerican slavery. Historians have, quite rightly, focused extensive attention on the
social construction of slavery in the early modern Anglo-American world, emphasizing
the myriad ways in which the institution developed in distinct times and places. The field
has benefited tremendously from this work. We know far more today about the lived
experience of slavery, the often brutal technologies of labor extraction and physical
control employed by slave owners, the modes of resistance and accommodation by which
enslaved people forged meaningful lives in a system that denied their very humanity, and
the social relations that gave rise to and sustained the peculiar institution than we did two
generations ago when the social history revolution remade American historiography. 5
This massive body of scholarship, however, has often tended to downplay the
importance of the broader legal structures and political institutions that gave form to
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Historians have recently lavished attention on the Somerset case and its implications for Anglo-American
slavery. Most, however, take Somerset as a starting point for investigations of American or British
imperial debates over the institution. In doing so, however, they often overlook the long debate over
slavery in the British Empire that lay the groundwork for Somerset. The present study frames the
Somerset case not as a starting point, but as the culmination of a centuries-long debate, constructing a
political and legal genealogy of the pro- and antislavery arguments presented in Somerset. For an
important recent contribution to the literature on Somerset, see the contributions from George Van Cleve,
Daniel Hulsebosch, and Ruth Paley to the “Forum: Somerset’s Case Revisited,” Law and History Review,
vol. 24, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 601-671.
5
Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1998) and Generations of Captivity: A History of African American
Slaves (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Ira Berlin and Philip D. Morgan, eds.,
Cultivation and Culture: Labor and the Shaping of Slave Life in the Americas (Charlottesville, VA:
University of Virginia Press, 1993); Betty Wood, The Origins of American Slavery: The English
Colonies, 1607-1700 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997); Philip D. Morgan, Slave Counterpoint: Black
Culture in the Eighteenth-Century Chesapeake and Lowcountry (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North
Carolina Press, 1998); Sylvia Frey, Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991); Lorena S. Walsh, Motives of Honor, Pleasure, &
Profit: Plantation Management in the Colonial Chesapeake, 1607-1763 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of
North Carolina Press, 2011). While my debt to this scholarly tradition will be obvious throughout, this
study seeks to explicate the legal and political factors that shaped the social conditions in which slavery
developed and in which colonial slaveholders and enslaved Afro-Britons lived.
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colonial labor regimes, delimited and channeled enslaved agency, and shaped the
relations between masters and slaves, opting instead for a close focus on the lived
experience and practice of slavery at the local level. While the benefits of this deep
scholarly attention are manifold, social history, and the cultural turn in American
historiography it spawned, has left us with a number of analytical blind spots when it
comes to the larger imperial structure of slavery, and the political debates that determined
this structure.6
The ways in which various Anglo-American settler societies chose to order their
economic systems, political institutions, social relations, and legal regimes require close
attention if we want to understand how they created, upheld, challenged, and ultimately
destroyed systems of human bondage. As recent scholarship has conclusively
demonstrated, slavery was a distinctly local institution shaped by peculiar local factors
with widely varying potential structural and experiential outcomes in space and time.7 It
was also, however, an imperial institution from its very inception.8 Anglo-American
slavery developed on the shifting terrain of empire, where complex dialectical currents
shaped relations between metropole and colony, sovereign and subject, master and slave.
This reflexive relationship raised crucial questions of law and jurisdiction – local

The present study is framed in part as a response to historian Christopher Leslie Brown’s call for a
renewed focus on the political history of Anglo-American slavery in the context of empire. See
Christopher Leslie Brown, “Slavery,” in David Armitage and Michael J. Braddock, eds., The British
Atlantic World, 1500-1800 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 214-232.
7
Berlin, Generations of Captivity, emphasizes this point.
8
A comparative perspective is implicit in much of the work produced by scholars working in the social
history tradition and, more recently, the field of “Atlantic” history. These works, however, often focus
on comparing specific local conditions to an ahistorical “ideal type” of slavery, typically framed in terms
of 19th century structures, and have been more concerned with demonstrating the varied nature of AngloAmerican slavery in time and space than explaining why this was so. This study seeks to reframe the
debate through close attention to imperial legal structures rather than fluid social or cultural identities and
subjectivities.
6
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concerns were imperial concerns, and metropolitan developments could have dramatic
consequences for the colonial periphery.9 Questions raised in the colonies – what was the
legal definition of slavery?; who could be a slave, or a subject?; what rights and duties
did masters, slaves, and the state owe one another under law? – reflected back to imperial
planners in London, where broader concerns beyond the institution of slavery itself
contributed to policy decisions, often with profound consequences for the lived realities
of enslavement. The answers to these questions mattered deeply to James Somerset and
millions of enslaved men and women like him – they were the difference between life as
a free subject of the English empire and death as a slave in a Jamaican cane field or
Virginia tobacco plantation. Ultimately, the way Britons asked, answered, and debated
these questions shaped the rise and fall of Anglo-American slavery. The purpose of this
study is to recover this long debate over slavery in the early Anglophone empire.
The contours of this debate can be seen most clearly in the development of local
and imperial slave law, broadly construed, as it was hashed out in courtrooms and
legislative halls throughout the empire. Indeed, close attention to the law affords a
number of unique vantage points from which to examine the struggle over slavery.
Particularly in a society as law-minded as early modern England, legal forms and cultures
mediated and shaped the articulation of social, economic, political, and cultural norms.
Law, then, was neither a simple reflection of existing social realities, nor was it able

9

A recent resurgence in imperial studies illustrates the potential benefits of this perspective. See, for
example, Abigail Swingen, Competing Visisons of Empire: Labor, Slavery, and the Origins of the British
Atlantic Empire (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015); Douglas Bradburn and John C. Coombs,
eds., Early Modern Virginia: Reconsidering the Old Dominion (Charlottesville, VA: University of
Virginia Press, 2011); Alison Games, The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of
Expansion, 1560-1660 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); April Lee Hatfield, Atlantic
Virginia: Intercolonial Relations in the Seventeenth Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2004).
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entirely to determine those realities. Law embraces the structures and institutions of elite
power and class control while also providing a forum from which subaltern members of
society could challenge that power. As E. P. Thompson once noted, law was “a place,
not of consensus, but of conflict.” It is this legal conflict that this study seeks to
recover.10
A close focus on legal developments is also essential because, as Francis
Hargrave and his antislavery predecessors recognized, the central problematic of AngloAmerican slavery was the legal construct of property-in-man. What, precisely, this
concept meant in practice in any given time and place, however, had always been hotly
contested. What E. P. Thompson said of law generally is particularly true of slavery:
“what was often at issue was not property, supported by law, against no-property; it was
alternative definitions of property-rights.”11 Indeed, the concept of property itself carried
(and still carries) multiple meanings. In the early modern Anglophone world, ‘property’
was understood both as an object of ownership and a quality or characteristic constitutive
of a person or thing. The possession of specific properties, in both senses of the word,
was among the elements that determined one’s place in early modern England’s social
and political order.12
We might, then, call this bundle of attributes, traits, or possessions, and the rights
and liberties they implied, the “properties of subjecthood” – access to this bundle of
rights marked the boundary of inclusion and exclusion in the Anglo-American world.

10

E. P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975),
258-269. Quote at 261.
11
Ibid.
12
On the contested and developing nature of the concept of property in the early modern world, see John
Brewer and Susan Staves, eds., Early Modern Conceptions of Property (New York: Routledge, 1996);
Michael McKeon, The Secret History of Domesticity: Public, Private, and the Division of Knowledge
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005).
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While enslaved people pursued a number of strategies to assert and protect their
personhood, making claims on the colonial and imperial state pressing for greater access
to subjecthood was always prominent among them.13 For Anglophone slave owners,
slavery was what made them who they were – their possession of one of the most
valuable species of property in the Atlantic world and the economic returns they were
able to wrest from their enslaved laborers made them weighty subjects, worthy of
participation in the political life of their communities by virtue of their position in the
social order. These colonial properties certainly set slave owners apart as a privileged
political class in the English empire, and they consistently used their political and social
power to protect and defend their ownership of other people.
But theirs were not the only properties of subjecthood that mattered – there were
many personal traits that could qualify even non-property-owning persons as subjects.
Whether or not they were among the small class of political subjects or citizens, all
Britons were subjects simply by virtue of their birth within English dominions and the
natural allegiance they owed their sovereign.14 In return, the state owed all subjects

13

Many scholars have framed empire as a site of political and cultural exclusion, where imperial planners
and colonial settlers could deny the basic rights of subaltern peoples. See particularly Anthony Pagden,
European Encounters with the New World: From Renaissance to Romanticism (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1993) and Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain, and France,
c. 1500-1800 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995); Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and
Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1999); Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2004); Jack P. Greene, ed., Exclusionary Empire: English Liberty Overseas,
1600-1900 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). While this was certainly an element of
imperial legal culture, empire could also function as a site of claim-making by subaltern peoples. See
Frederic Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 2005), esp. 12-23.
14
Use of the term ‘subjecthood’ in place of ‘citizenship’ requires some explanation. Citizenship evokes
ideals of active participation in the political life of the state and is, in many ways, a thoroughly modern
concept. Throughout much of the period under consideration in this study, the vast majority of persons
subject to a state’s jurisdiction were not direct participants in high politics or law-making. Numerous
studies hold a modern ideal of active citizenship as their baseline for inclusion, thus overstating the
extent to which specific groups were excluded from society. While most English and British subjects
were not active citizens, all were bound by the law and could expect a degree of protection from the law.
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protection and justice. As the venerable Sir Edward Coke said in his decision as Chief
Justice of King’s Bench in Calvin’s Case (1607), sovereign and subject shared a “duplex
et reciprocum ligamen,” a dual and reciprocal bond. This relationship was understood to
be the natural result of birth within the sovereign’s dominions, and could never be
broken.15 The exact boundaries of English subjecthood were, of course, a matter of
debate, and the specific properties necessary for subjecthood changed over time, as did
the specific rights subjects could claim. The concept of natural allegiance elucidated in
Calvin’s Case, however, remained the basis of most understandings of English
subjecthood down to the American Revolution and beyond.16 Might imperial slaves be
accounted natural subjects under this rubric, and have access to at least some of the rights
guaranteed to English men and women? Were enslaved people simply properties subject
to the ownership of English masters, or might they also possess and enjoy some of the
properties of subjecthood? The conflict over these essential questions is at the very heart
of the history of Anglo-American slavery.
To early modern Britons, then, the opposite of slavery was not “freedom,” an
amorphous and highly contested concept even in our own time, but subjecthood, access
to the rights and protections the sovereign owed all persons living under English

By relocating our emphasis from political participation to civic personhood or subjecthood, new lines of
inclusion and exclusion emerge.
15
James Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870 (Chapel Hill, NC: Univeristy of
North Carolina Press, 1978), esp. chapter 1.
16
Kettner, Development of American Citizenship, chapters 1-3; Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation,
1707-1837 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993); Kathleen Wilson, The Sense of the People:
Politics, Culture, and Imperialism in England, 1715-1785 (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1995); Daniel Statt, Foreigners and Englishment: The Controversy over Immigration and Population,
1660-1760 (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 1995); Robert Colls, Identity of England (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Krishan Kumar, The Making of English National Identity (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Greene, Exclusionary Empire.
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dominion.17 Reframing our analyses of slavery around the access of enslaved persons to
the basic rights of subjecthood removes the ambiguity surrounding the amorphous
discourse of “freedom,” always multivalent and difficult to pin down. Subjecthood,
however, was a clear cut, if contested, reality. One either had access to the rights of
subjecthood or they did not. There were, of course, gradations of subjecthood. The
rights and liberties of English subjects were never absolute, and were often severely
circumscribed. Only a relative handful of Britons attained the properties necessary to fit
them for participation in the governance of the realm – not all subjects were citizens.
Servants, apprentices, vagabonds, wives, children, and even short-term employees were
“unfree” in some sense – their individual rights were limited under law and their labor
power was seen as the “property” of their master, husband, father, or employer – but they
remained subjects. The power of an individual head of household never entirely erased
their legal personhood. Slaves, on the other hand, fell, almost by definition, outside of
this rubric of basic rights and limited authority. Defined as property, enslaved people
could claim no rights and had no way to limit the authority of masters, leaving them
subject to the arbitrary power of slave owners.18

For this reason, this study eschews the use of descriptors like “unfree labor” when discussing slavery,
opting instead for the more precise “bound labor.” Indeed, when considered in light of Marxian
definitions of “free” labor – where workers were understood to be doubly free: free to make contracts for
the sale of their labor power, but also, crucially, freed from direct control over the means of production –
slavery might reasonably be classed alongside indentured servitude, apprenticeship, and dependent
family labor as an early variant form of free labor. See, for example, the contributions from Rodney
Hilton and Eric Hobsbawm in Hilton, ed., The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism (London: Verso
Press, 1976); Robin Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern,
1492-1800 (New York: Verso, 1997) and The American Crucible: Slavery, Emancipation, and Human
Rights (New York: Verso, 2011). See also, Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1998).
18
In a sense, this formulation bares a resemblance to Orlando Patterson’s formulation of slavery as “social
death.” See Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1982). Rather than locating the key site of exclusion in the social, however, this study
seeks to explicate the exclusion of enslaved persons from the legal structures of civic life and, in so
doing, restore the imapct of politics to the equation.
17
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It is in this context that English opposition to the chattel principle must be
understood. When Britons protested human slavery, they were not, for the most part,
criticizing bound labor – most agreed that male heads-of-household should have power
over their dependents and that, as long as it was bracketed by the rule of law, this
authority was perfectly legitimate. What antislavery English men and women opposed
was the concept of property-in-man. Not all subjects were entitled to direct political
participation or even control of their own labor power, but all persons in English
dominions, even strangers, were entitled to some basic protections under common law.
In short, recognition of the legal personhood of the enslaved would make slavery simply
another bound labor status among the myriad forms sanctioned by English law, not a
property relation.19 Though it may ring hollow in our ears, attuned as they are to calls for
more substantive freedoms, this fundamental assertion of legal personhood was, and
remains, a radically moral position. Without the acceptance of this foundational
proposition, calls for a more meaningful equality, for basic human rights, fall to pieces.
In this sense, the debate over slavery was inherently a political debate, touching as
it did on basic questions of inclusion in a community of rights-bearing individuals.
Clearly, not all Anglo-American debates over subjecthood concerned institutional slavery
as it actually existed or was practiced in the empire. The rhetoric of ‘slavery’ and
freeborn rights so often mobilized in Anglophone political discourse is often simply that
– rhetoric.20 But the ways in which specific English colonists and policymakers framed

19

Robert J. Steinfeld, The Invention of Free Labor: The Employment Relation in English and American
Law and Culture, 1350-1870 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991). Cf. Christopher
Tomlins, Freedom Bound: Law, Labor, and Civic Identity in Colonizing English America, 1580-1865
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), which sees colonial slavery as rooted in the English law
of servitude.
20
For a classic statement of the limited meaning of “slavery” as a rhetorical trope, see Bernad Bailyn, The
Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967). For
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and resolved fundamental questions about the relationship between property, legal
personhood, and access to subjecthood did have real consequences for the lived
experience of countless enslaved Afro-Britons. Through a close examination of the
development of slavery in two colonies – Massachusetts Bay and Virginia – and the
dialectical relationship between the local and imperial law and practice of slavery, we
will see how the answers to basic questions about personal and political authority,
influenced by metropolitan concepts and concerns, resulted in distinctive and unique
systems of human bondage in the Bay Colony and the Old Dominion.21
The long Anglophone debate over slavery developed in distinct ways across both
time and space. Chronologically, the broad outlines of the debate follow many of the
traditional markers and turning points of Anglo-American history – the beginnings of
colonization and early ideals of empire, the English Civil Wars and Revolution, the Stuart
Restoration, the Glorious Revolution, the ascendancy of the Walpole ministry, and the
imperial crisis of the late-18th century all left their indelible mark on the institution. Each
of these turning points, however, produced new political, economic, and legal contexts
and lexicons in which the debate over slavery was conducted, bringing forth new
arguments both for and against property-in-man and refining older ones in light of
changing circumstances.

a more recent argument about the mobilization of “slavery” as a rhetorical trope with little impact on the
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In the earliest days of English colonization and into the crisis of the mid-17th
century, the debate over slavery was primarily framed in moral terms, shaped by the
religious turmoil of the age. Linked to emerging discourses of international law and
theological debates over the origins of the human race, most early English colonists
viewed heathen Africans as legitimately enslavable “others” beyond Christian moral
proscriptions on slavery, while others believed that the unity of all persons in God
precluded a property claim in a fellow human. When the Civil Wars, the Restoration, and
the Glorious Revolution moved the political and legal rights of English subjects to the
center of Anglophone discourse, the debate over slavery followed suit, producing a
critique of the arbitrary power of slaveholders linked to revolutionary ideologies of
limited authority and the rights of the subject. The middle half of the 18th century saw
the emergence of a new economic critique of imperial slavery, a response to the
unprecedented wealth attained by slave owners and their mercantile allies. At each turn,
imperial slave owners responded to these criticisms by constructing their own proslavery
ideologies, mirroring the progression from moral to political to economic defense of their
peculiar institution. While none of these arenas ever fully monopolized the debate over
slavery – economic justifications of the institution can be found in the early colonial
period, while moral and political criticisms certainly remained potent down to the
American Revolution and beyond – in broad terms the debate over slavery progressed
from a moral to a political to an economic basis, incorporating and refining earlier
critiques to fit new contexts.
As these debates unfolded over time, they also took on particular inflections in
differing jurisdictions, where local social, economic, political, and religious concerns
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shaped their outcomes. Indeed, throughout the colonial period most imperial observers
agreed that slavery was essentially a local institution, a creature of local, colonial law.22
The choice of Massachusetts and Virginia as case studies, then, is not incidental to the
political and legal debates that shaped the empire and the place of slavery in it. In many
ways, these two colonies can be read as simulacra of evolving Anglophone debates over
slavery and empire. Puritanical Bay Colonists and Cavalier Virginians are not mere
caricatures – they are representative archetypes of the very real conflict between extreme
patriarchalist individualism and corporate civic humanist ideals, between an emphasis on
vested property rights and the natural freedom of humanity. In the broadest terms, it was
this central conflict that provoked the civil wars of the mid-17th century and impelled the
English into two revolutions in a generation. The claims of the early Stuarts to absolute
authority rested on their assertion that society represented an organic, divinely mandated
order, a single body with the sovereign as its head. All legitimate power flowed from
God through the monarch, and could be rightly exercised only in the king’s name.23 The
demands of a modernizing state and expanding empire, however, required that practical
authority be exercised by appointed magistrates and, increasingly, individual heads of
household enacting the monarch’s sovereignty in loco parentis. With this “devolution of

On slavery as a local institution, or what later antislavery activists would call the “municipal theory,” see
Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process (New Haven, CT: Yale
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Especially in Seventeenth-Century England (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Press, 1975); Robert Eccleshall,
Order and Reason in Politics: Theories of Absolute and Limited Monarchy in Early Modern England
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1978); John Miller, ed., Absolutism in Seventeenth-Century Europe
(New York: Macmillan Press, 1990), esp. 21-42; Holly Brewer, By Birth or Consent: Children, Law, and
the Anglo-American Revolution in Authority (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press,
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absolutism” came increasingly absolute claims to property and rights by male heads of
household.24
Perhaps nowhere is this devolutionary process clearer than in early colonial
Virginia, where petty plantation monarchs sought to rule as nearly absolute patriarchs
over those subject to their authority. Enacting the king’s sovereignty through their
colonial state and in their individual households, the planter elite of the Old Dominion
crafted a system of slavery that defined enslaved persons as articles of property and
severely restricted access to the properties of subjecthood. Though justifications for
enslavement were myriad, all shared the assumption that, for slavery to be legitimate, it
could only be applied to “strangers,” defined out of the community of rights bearing
individuals that constituted the English nation by their heathenism, nativity outside the
realm, or lack of allegiance to the sovereign. This is precisely how the first African
slaves to arrive in Virginia were defined under law.25 Already a valuable commodity in
the Atlantic basin, the “twenty and odd Negars” whose importation John Rolfe noted in
1619 were purchased and held as property – as strangers, masters had a legal claim not
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only to the labor of the enslaved, as was the case with all English servants, but their
persons as well.26
These lines of exclusion were porous and fluid, however. Heathen African slaves
might convert to Christianity. Slave owners might free individual slaves. The children of
enslaved African parents were born in the king’s dominions just like those of English
settlers. Might the logic of natural subjecthood transform these strangers into subjects?
To avert this possibility, local legislators and jurists systematically barred AfroVirginians from access to even the most basic properties of English subjecthood, passing
statutes explicitly defining slaves as a form of property under common law, precluding
the possibility of emancipation through conversion to Christianity, breaking with English
legal tradition and mandating that the status of enslaved persons follow the mother, and
closely regulating access to manumission. The seventeenth century thus saw enslaved
Afro-Virginians defined out of the organic social hierarchy upon which absolutist
patriarchalism was based and made subject to the near total authority of slave owners.27
Stuart absolutism and Virginia slavery were natural bedfellows.
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As the recurrent political crises that rocked seventeenth century England and its
empire amply illustrate, however, the absolutist patriarchalism of Stuarts and
slaveholders was far from hegemonic.28 Indeed, we might argue that the entire history of
this tumultuous era is rooted in the fundamental conflict between Stuart absolutism and
the corporate humanism of English Puritans and parliamentarians. Informed by the
dissenting Protestant tradition and the revival of classical republican ideologies, English
anti-absolutism was built on the twin concepts of consent and bracketed authority.
Traditions of limited royal power and the participation of select subjects in the
administration of the realm were augmented in the early seventeenth century by an
emerging discourse of popular sovereignty and civic republicanism. This political
discourse was further supported by similar principles of consent and limited authority
undergirding the English dissenting Protestant tradition. Puritans and parliamentarians,
united in their distaste for popish absolutism, were a real threat to the patriarchalist
pretensions of the Stuarts.
To the opponents of Stuart regime, absolutism was illegitimate because it
precluded the active consent of rights-bearing members of the community of subjects. At
the household level, these magisterial reformers certainly espoused patriarchal hierarchy
– children, women, and those of servile status lacked the properties necessary for the
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exercise of authority – but absolutist patriarchalism as a political system made slaves of
freeborn English men and women by subjecting them to authority without their consent. 29
Indeed, the whole purpose of government, these civic humanists argued, was to ensure
the common good of the entire community – the common wealth – through the
cooperation of all of its members, which could never be rightfully attained without the
consent of at least some subjects. No authority, save perhaps that of God, could be
absolute – to serve its true end, the power of the state must always be bracketed by the
consent of the people, expressed in the common law of the realm.30
When combined with elements drawn from the dissenting Protestant tradition, this
political emphasis on consent and bracketed authority became a truly revolutionary force,
with dramatic implications for the development of slavery in the American colonies.
Practically all dissenting Protestants agreed that consent was a critical element of any true
church. Particularly among the more radical dissenters, like the Separatists and Puritans
who settled New England, all legitimate civil and ecclesiastical authority required the
consent, even if given virtually or indirectly, of those subjected to it. Just as ministers
had no true calling without the consent of the congregation, magistrates had no legitimate
authority without the direct consent of those they governed.31 All of these propositions
were rooted in the fundamental dissenting Protestant belief in the equality of the saints, a
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position that was difficult to square with human slavery, particularly if enslaved Africans
converted to Christianity.
The peculiar combination of Mosaic and English common law that formed the
basis of Massachusetts’ godly republic made the construction of slavery in the Bay
Colony intensely problematic. The 1641 Body of Liberties, the foundational code of law
for the Massachusetts Bay colony, declared that “there shall never be any bond slavery,
villeinage or captivity among us” and, while it contained crucial qualifications that left
the door open to the enslavement of “strangers,” even enslaved settlers would “have all
the liberties and Christian usages which the law of God...doth morally require.”32 As
long as lines of social inclusion and exclusion remained based primarily on Christian
faith, the possibility of manumission and conditional assimilation gave the few Africans
carried to the Bay Colony relatively open access to a form of imperial subjecthood. The
core tenets of reformed Protestant antipatriarchalism took root in the stony soil of the Bay
Colony, and provided an inhospitable environment for the development of chattel
slavery. The air of early colonial New England was too pure for slavery.33
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The fate of slavery in the early English empire, then, largely rested on the
outcome of the decades-long struggle between Stuart absolutism and the civic humanism
of the puritan parliamentarians. With the local development of slavery on the ground in
the colonies largely beyond the direct control of metropolitan policies, decades of chaotic
conflict in the mother country gave each settler society the space and flexibility to
construct their own distinct legal and institutional bases for slavery. The outcome of the
metropolitan struggle, however, also mattered tremendously for the colonies. The brief
triumph of civic humanist republican ideals during the English Revolution introduced
striking new ideals of consent, authority, and subjecthood, and produced what may be the
first direct critique of human slavery in the English language. In a remarkable 1644
pamphlet, Henry Parker, a leading advisor to parliamentary radicals, argued that slave
owners could never claim an absolute property right to persons without depriving "the
Common-wealth, the Society of Mankinde, nay God himeslf" of their "publicke and
sublime propriety" in the persons of subjects. The common weal demanded limitations
on the dominion of masters. Though Parker acknowledged that slavery would be difficult
to abolish "where it is established by publike authority," he argued that "where slaves are
under the protection of other Laws than their lords wills, and where they are truly parts
and members of the State, and so regarded; they cease to be slaves."34 Access to
membership in the English nation – subjecthood – made slavery illegitimate.
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The triumph of radical Puritans and Parliamentarians in the English Civil Wars
seemed to hold out the promise of a broader vision of subjecthood and the corporate
protection of individual rights, but when Charles II was restored to the throne in 1660 and
absolutist politics once again shaped English policy, slavery became increasingly central
to the empire. The restored Stuarts plunged headlong into the trans-Atlantic slave trade,
funneling state funds and their massive household wealth to the newly chartered Royal
African Company. Headed by James, Duke of York – the future King James II – the
RAC made large numbers of enslaved Africans available to Anglo-American colonists
for the first time, with over 138,000 slaves delivered to English colonies during the
Restoration.35 Defined as chattels by metropolitan courts and defined out of subjecthood
by colonial legislatures, the enslaved Africans carried to the New World shored up the
economic foundation of empire and guaranteed an independent source of revenue for the
crown.
Many English subjects, however, chafed under the restored Stuarts’ absolutist
pretensions, and some linked their domestic woes to the expansion of imperial slavery.
Morgan Godwyn, an Anglican cleric who had served as a missionary in the colonies,
argued that the basic problem with the chattel principle was that it put slaves to a “twofold Use, first to Brutifie them; [then] to deprive them of all both Temporal and Spiritual
Rights, which their Manhood, notwithstanding their being Slaves, would otherwise infer.”
To make matters worse, arguments put forward by slave owners, who knew “no other
God but Money, nor Religion but Profit,” made property-in-man a “universally owned
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Principle” and allowed for “Inhumanities of the wrankest kind” to be visited upon the
bodies and souls of enslaved Africans. The solution our commentator recommended was
simple – “some wholesome and good Law” must be passed recognizing “that Right which
we naturally have to be ranked within the Degree and Species of Men” and guaranteeing
“that a Slave hath as good a plea and just claim to Necessaries, both for his Soul and
Body, as his Master hath to his strength and industry.”36 Formerly enslaved persons
would still inhabit a servile status, as many white subjects did, but the law would
recognize them as persons, not property, and they would be restored to their basic natural
rights. Critics like Godwyn linked the danger of political enslavement by Stuart
absolutism to the moral evil of plantation slavery – taking a stand against the former
implied a set of political and social ideals with the potential to destabilize the latter.
When Parliament invited William of Orange, the Dutch stadtholder, and his wife
Mary, daughter of James II, to ascend the English throne in 1688, it effectively destroyed
the political and legal foundation of Stuart absolutism and opened the door to a more
robust critique of colonial slavery. The Glorious Revolution and the settlement it
wrought, drawing on ideals espoused and refined by antislavery Britons like Parker and
Godwyn, delegitimized the patriarchalist ideals that had underpinned the early
construction of colonial slavery. It even appeared, for a brief moment, that the
revolutionary settlement might even remake the social basis of the empire, breaking up
large estates and promoting a more diversified imperial economy. This moment of
antislavery potential was marked most clearly by a series of remarkable decisions by the
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Court of King’s Bench, the highest court in the empire, led by Chief Justice John Holt.
Drawing on English “revolution principles” that stretched back into the early-17th
century, Holt declared that “as soon as a negro comes into England, he becomes free,”
and established that Afro-Britons, at least those at the metropole, were entitled to basic
legal protections since “the common law takes no notice of negroes being different from
other men.”37 Though these decisions were limited to England itself, Holt exemplified
the emancipatory potential of a corporate humanist reading of English revolution
principles.
If the Glorious Revolution and the settlement it wrought finally destroyed the
patriarchalist base of Stuart absolutism, it also brought into being a new dialectical
tension within the “liberal” tradition. To many Britons, particularly those in the
mercantile or independent artisan communities that constituted a nascent bourgeoisie, the
principles so clearly adumbrated by John Locke and other revolutionary Whigs were
perfectly compatible with human slavery – ownership of private property was, after all,
the centerpiece of the liberal tradition, and who could doubt but that enslaved Africans
throughout the empire were comprehended under this definition.38 Others, however,
steeped in the long English tradition of corporate rights and emphasis on the common
wealth, saw the Glorious Revolution as a vindication of limited authority and the natural
rights of all mankind, a position far less hospitable to imperial slavery.39 It was possible,
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of course, to craft both pro- and antislavery arguments from any of these political or
ideological positions. Desire for economic gain, social advancement, or political power
could easily drive Englishmen on both sides of the Atlantic, whatever their politics, to
find justifications for colonial bondage. In general, however, throughout the 18th century
proslavery Britons tended to mobilize a libertarian political and legal discourse
privileging the individual rights of freeborn Englishmen to own and enjoy their property
without state interference, while the antislavery argument often hewed closer to a
corporate humanist understanding of ideal social order where all rights and duties were
reciprocal, necessarily limited by their relational character and actively guarded by the
state.
These debates between Stuart absolutists and Puritan antipatriarchalists, liberal
individualists and corporate humanists, were never isolated to household governance and
political authority, however – they were essentially a contest over the ideal structure of
social relations, and therefore had tremendous implications for the political economy of
England and its empire. The decline of feudal social relations in England itself during the
16th century unleashed forces that would ultimately transform not only England but the
entire global economy. The enclosure of common lands and the rise of manufacturing
called a growing landless class, alienated from direct control over the means of
production, into existence. Alienated from control over the means of production, these
laborers also became consumers, driving increases in agricultural and manufacturing
productivity and creating ever greater demand for finished goods and exotic luxuries. It
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was in this context that the English empire came into existence, and the dictates of
capitalist development at the metropole largely determined the structure of colonial
slavery from the outset.40
Then as now, however, capitalism was no monolith, and the changing contours of
global economic development had an asymmetrical impact in the Anglo-American world.
From its initial agrarian phase where landlords wrung greater productivity from their
estates, English capitalism quickly shifted to a more mercantile form, extracting surplus
value through the transshipment of colonial commodities to serve metropolitan and
continental demand. The very basis of the English imperial project, then, was rooted in
the capitalist transformation at home – the American colonies were, in this sense,
capitalist from birth. Alienated from direct control of the means of production,
increasing numbers of Britons became consumers, and an emergent merchant class seized
the opportunity to enrich themselves by marketing tobacco, sugar, and other New World
“drug foods” on the home market. These merchants cared little who produced these
commodities – the massive returns on colonial produce meant it made little difference
whether they were cultivated by slaves, servants, or free laborers. Colonial planters,
however, found that economies of scale meant higher profits, amassed huge estates, and
sought out the least expensive and most exploitable labor force available in the Atlantic
world – African slaves. Fundamentally agnostic when it came to social relations on the
ground in the colonies, merchant capitalism nonetheless worked to concretize the trend
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toward slave labor – in the 17th century, at least, slavery and capitalist development went
hand in glove.41
As the 18th century progressed, however, a clear critique of mercantile capitalist
empire emerged, stressing internal development and free trade over territorial acquisition,
commodities production, and mercantilist trade policy. This opposition political
economy, linked to a rising bourgeoisie and espoused most forcefully by the Patriot
Whigs of the mid-1700s and adopted by later free traders like Adam Smith, found value
not simply in the transshipment of colonial produce, but in the labor that transformed
those commodities into marketable goods. Rather than a closed mercantilist system,
Patriot political economy hoped to make Britain the premier manufacturing power of the
globe, exporting its finished goods through a system of open trade, drawing hard money
into the British imperial economy and increasing Albion’s standing in the competition for
European economic dominance. This position was clearly not a direct threat to the
plantation complex – indeed the continuing need for raw materials in the manufacturing
sector may even have reinforced slavery as a source of commodities – but its emphasis on
productive labor and the diversification of colonial economies tilted in favor of an
evolving free labor vision.42 Imperial debates over political economy and their
relationship to the development of colonial slavery, then, must be viewed in light of this
shifting and contested terrain. Early mercantile capitalism may have called a new form
of colonial slavery into being but, as the imperial economy developed over the course of
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the 18th century, capitalist dictates also provided fit tools for the destruction of human
bondage.43
Virginia and Massachusetts Bay were, from their very inception, extremely
different in this regard. Huge estates and the monopolization of social and political
power by a tiny planter elite closely connected to the crown typified absolutist
patriarchalist Virginia. The early adoption of tobacco monoculture and commodities
exports as the basis of the Old Dominion’s economy was a direct result of, and greatly
reinforced, the political economic imperatives of absolutist patriarchalism. When civil
war and revolution shook this foundation, Virginia’s planter elite turned to the
“revolution principles” of 1688, particularly the liberal individualist claims to the sanctity
of property and the inviolability of the rights of freeborn English subjects, to protect their
investment in chattel slavery. As metropolitan capitalism continued its development, it
concretized the social relations underpinning commodities production in the colonies –
where the master/slave relation was obviously of crucial importance – reaping substantial
profits for slaveholders while limiting economic opportunity for smallholders and
preventing economic diversification, resulting in near-total reliance of the local economy
on the institution of slavery. Though metropolitan planners, along with a few isolated
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colonists, attempted to alter this system at a number of points in the colonial period, the
system of slavery and the socio-political base that supported it proved remarkably
resilient in colonial Virginia.
In Massachusetts, of course, the social and economic bases of colonial life were
far removed from those of the Old Dominion. Bay colonists, informed by their belief in
the essential equality of Puritan saints, practiced partible inheritance from the very outset
of colonization, subdividing estates with each generation. This system ensured that
Massachusetts estates remained relatively modest, promoting economic diversification
and precluding the kind of economies of scale that made plantation slavery so profitable.
Rather than constructing their local economy on commodities production, Massachusetts
settlers turned to the carrying trades and local manufacturing from a very early date –
Boston and its surrounding port towns were already important centers of shipbuilding by
the 1650s, and much of the labor needed for support industries came from wage laborers
by the end of the 17th century. The Bay Colony, then, imported few servants, and fewer
slaves, largely because they local political economy they created had no need for bound
labor. Indeed, Massachusetts settlers placed high value on labor and sought to regulate
local and colonial labor markets to benefit all participants – master and servant, employer
and wage earner, father and children were all seen as interdependent elements of the ideal
Puritan society.44 Slavery certainly existed in the Bay Colony from an early date, and
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only grew in importance as the colonial period progressed, but its foundation was
distinctive and always contested.
A full appreciation of the shifting and contested contours of slavery, then, requires
renewed attention to the legal and political history of the institution at both the local and
imperial levels, as well as an analysis of how the debate over the legitimacy of propertyin-man was linked to broader political, economic, and social transformations. This
dissertation seeks to point the way toward such an understanding. Though the debates
that follow may at times seem far removed from the lived experiences of enslaved AfroBritons, the ways in which English subjects thought about legitimate political authority,
distribution of resources and labor, and ideal social relations directly shaped emerging
pro- and antislavery ideals and largely determined the meanings of slavery and freedom
in colonial America. Nor were the ways in which enslaved persons themselves navigated
their enslavement ever far from these broader issues – through acts of rebellion large and
small, negotiations with individual masters and claims on the colonial and imperial state,
enslaved Afro-Britons attempted, sometimes successfully, to shape the terms of the long
Anglophone debate over slavery.
All of these issues – slavery and subjecthood; the nature of authority and rights;
ideal forms of social and political-economic organization – ran through the American
Revolution and beyond to shape the institution of slavery in the British Empire and the
new United States. When Britons turned against the slave trade in the 1780s and ‘90s,
and eventually destroyed slavery itself in the early 19th century, they had a long and
vibrant antislavery tradition to draw on. Early republican abolitionists in the United
States also drew on elements of the long English debate over slavery during the so-called
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“First Emancipation” that created a free soil North, which in turn gave rise to a new
abolitionist movement by the 1830s. Anthony Benezet, Thomas Clarkson, William
Wilberforce, William Lloyd Garrison, and Abraham Lincoln all owed much to the
centuries-old debate over the legitimacy of property-in-man in the Anglophone world.45
Just as this debate laid the foundation for British and American abolition, however, it also
provided slave owners and their allies with formidable weapons to oppose emancipation
and retain their iron grip on their human property – Andrew Jackson, John C. Calhoun,
and Jefferson Davis were also heirs to a long and storied English tradition.46 The long
Anglo-American debate over slavery was certainly not settled by the turn of the 19th
century, then, but it had largely determined the contours of the climacteric struggle yet to
come. The study that follows seeks to restore this long debate to its rightful place in the
histories of the British Empire and the American republic it spawned.
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Chapter I – Colonial Slavery, Imperial Subjecthood: The Problem of Freedom in Early
English Colonization, 1547-1641
The case began with an assault. In 1569, one Mr. Cartwright publically and
brutally beat his Russian slave. When hauled before local magistrates on charges of
assault and battery, Cartwright asserted a right commonly claimed by slave owners. He
argued that, since the slave was his personal property, he could use whatever form of
discipline he thought best to enforce his will. We know nothing of Cartwright's slave
other than that he or she had been brought from Russia and was claimed as the property
of an Englishman. Male or female, old or young, European or African, Christian or
heathen – like millions of Africans who would be sold into Atlantic slavery, we can
glimpse Cartwright's slave only obliquely through unofficial, uncorroborated, apocryphal
sources. Yet, for some reason, this particular slave's encounter with the English courts
evoked a full-throated assertion of the almost miraculous nature of English liberty.
Though there are no extant written records of the trial, later commentators all repeat one
phrase in association with Cartwright's case – "That England was too pure an Air for
Slaves to breathe in."1 While rarely cited as precedent, this simple phrase encapsulates a
strong and resilient antislavery sentiment in England that would continue to inform
debates over slavery and subjecthood in the Anglo-American world for centuries.
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Despite this popular assumption about the incompatibility of slavery and English
liberty, England also went on to construct an empire that owed its vitality and
profitability, in no small measure, to the violent enslavement of millions of Africans.
Already in the mid-16th century there were ominous signs that slavery could exist in
English air. Even at the time of Cartwright's case, a short-lived Tudor statute had only
recently sanctioned the use of slavery as a punishment for the early modern English poor.
In 1547, during the short reign of Edward VI, An Act for the Punishing of Vagabonds
stated that those who refused to work “shall be condemned as a slave to the person who
has denounced him as an idler.” Masters would have coercive power to “feed [the] slave
on bread and water,…[and] force him to do any work, no matter how disgusting, with
whips and chains.” In addition, a master could “sell him, bequeath him, let him out on
hire as a slave, just as he can any other personal chattel or cattle.” Slaves, this statute
flatly stated, were a species of property – their labor could be coerced with extreme
violence; they could be bought and sold as any other private property.2 Not only could
slavery exist in English air, Britons themselves could be slaves.
Bound labor, however, was common in late medieval and early modern England.
As feudal serfdom declined, apprenticeship, penal labor, and various forms of servitude
became the norm for many English workers. The masters of these servile laborers also
had vast coercive powers to enforce compliance. Under a statute passed in 1530, for
example, vagabonds displaced from their fields by enclosure and without employment,
were to be “tied to the cart-tail and whipped until the blood streams from their bodies,
and then they are to swear on oath to go back to their birthplace…and to put themselves
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to useful labor.” The punishment for a third offense was death. One source states that
“72,000 great and petty thieves were put to death” during the reign of Henry VIII alone.3
Even putatively free laborers who entered into short-term employment agreements were
subject to physical and legal coercion by employers. With traditional rights to common
lands disappearing through enclosure and access to freeholds severely limited, the vast
majority of Englishmen had few economic options – enter into an indenture or
apprenticeship; take to the roads in search of wage work on farms or in emerging
manufactories; turn to a life of crime and survive by any means necessary – and all were
fraught with very real dangers. Primitive capital accumulation indeed.
Brutally extracted forced labor, however, is not the same thing as slavery.
Servants, apprentices, wives, children, and even short-term hired laborers may have been
compelled to labor by male heads-of-household, with force if necessary. Subordinate
household members were not paid wages directly, and even hired laborers were usually
only paid at the end of an agreed term of service, and often in kind rather than in cash.
According to the common law, masters "had a property in" their servants' labor. If a
servant absconded, misbehaved, or did not complete the agreed term of service, masters
had recourse to the English common law court system to force compliance or gain
restitution for lost labor output.4 English law already granted masters far-reaching
physical and legal power over their servants in mid-16th century England – what more,
then, could the 1547 vagabondage statute really have done? None of these other bound
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labor statuses conferred a property right in the person of a laborer. Unlike servants,
whose labor was owned by a master, defining enslaved vagabonds as "personal chattel"
conferred ownership over his or her person. This is a fine distinction, to be sure, but a
meaningful one nonetheless.5 Had the 1547 statute stood, slavery, an anomalous status in
Western Europe for centuries, would have had a legal foothold on English soil, providing
a statutory exception to popular assumptions about the free air of fair Albion.6
This short-lived Tudor statute, however, was the exception that proved the rule –
Britons never would be slaves. Certainty that they could not be reduced to mere articles
of property did not prevent Englishmen from worrying intently about their political
enslavement though, and the property-owning male heads of household who made up the
political nation engaged in a long contest over the balance between the legitimate
exercise of authority and the rights of subjecthood. If stripped of their cherished English
liberties, any subject might be reduced to slavery, compelled to act against their will by
some arbitrary power. The rights of subjects, then, must be jealously guarded to ensure
that English men and women were not enslaved. How for these rights would extend, and
who might lay claim to them, remained an open question, the subject of continuous
debate.
For early modern Britons, then, the opposite of slavery was not freedom, a
nebulous concept even in our modern world, but subjecthood, access to the rights, duties,
and protections that adhered to all persons born within the English sovereign's dominions.
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From the very outset of colonization, enslaved people were commonly denied access to
English subjecthood. Defined as property, enslaved persons could have no recognizable
legal rights. English common law is divided into two basic and largely separate strands –
the law of persons and the law of property. Enslaved people – obviously persons but
defined as articles of property – problematized this neat division and forced imperial
Britons to reckon with the limits of subjecthood. This issue became particularly acute
when enslaved people gained their liberty. In the interstices of the early English empire,
legal space existed where the “charter generation” of African slaves could gain freedom
and make claims to English subjecthood. The decentered nature of the early corporate
empire created a patchwork of legalities, each suited to the peculiar circumstances of an
individual colony, and allowed local law to diverge in critical ways from English
common law.7 These divergences laid the foundation for centuries of African slavery in
New World colonies like Virginia, where the first Anglo-American slaves were imported
in 1619. Virginians assumed their bound African laborers to be slaves from the outset,
but early slave law also held out the possibility of freedom and subjecthood to enslaved
people. In England’s first New World colony, slavery was simple – Afro-Virginian
freedom and subjecthood were the problem.
This same loose imperial structure, however, allowed for the development of a
very different system of slavery in colonial New England. Motivated by fervent religious
belief and a desire for cultural uniformity, Bay Colony settlers crafted a system of slavery
based on a set of premises wholly different from those of their Virginia cousins. In 1641,
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Massachusetts Bay became the first English mainland colony to explicitly recognize
slavery in statutory law, albeit in a rather tortured, roundabout way. The Body of
Liberties, the first comprehensive code of laws enacted in Massachusetts, outlawed “bond
slaverie, villeinage, or captivitie” among the settlers, yet maintained the status of slavery
for “lawful captives taken in juste warres, and such strangers as willfully sell themselves
or are sold unto us.” The statute also guaranteed that “servitude” would still be available
as punishment for those “who shall be judged thereunto by Authoritie.” Drawing on
Mosaic law, however, Puritan colonists decided that even those lawfully held in bondage
“shall have all the liberties and Christian usages which the law of God established in
Israell concerning such persons….”8 The Body of Liberties may have created slavery in
the Bay Colony, but it was a peculiar institution from the start.
In Massachusetts, despite the statutory legitimation of slavery in 1641, the
institution did not harden into a racially exclusive form of hereditary bondage as it did in
Virginia. In fact, the evidence seems to suggest that early Puritan slavery was meant to
bring strangers more fully into the community of saints. The utopian logic of Puritan
colonization dictated a relative equality among settlers, and Africans were apparently
included in this formula. For Massachusetts Bay colonists, slavery was a tool to enforce
and promote cultural homogeneity. Once slaves served their penance and committed to
Massachusetts' strict Puritan morality, they would be freed and accounted full subjects.
Far from being somehow “preset” for racism, Puritan theology actually worked to
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moderate the law and practice of slavery in early Massachusetts, making ‘slaves’ in the
colony far more like English servants than enslaved persons in Virginia.9
In the crucible of early English colonization a number of distinct factors
combined to produce, by the time of the English Civil War, a legal foundation for slavery
in mainland North America. Chief among these were the political constitution of the
early English empire, the development and adaptation of English common law to novel
frontier conditions, and debates over the rights of English subjects (and the English
sovereign) both in the British Isles and in their fledgling colonies. These forces,
however, operated unevenly across colonial jurisdictions, with local variations in social
structure, legal institutions, religious and political ideology, and economic imperatives
producing divergent systems of slavery in Virginia and New England.
***
The English were no strangers to the concept of slavery when they set out to
colonize the New World. They may have been nearly a century behind the Iberian
powers when they set out into the Atlantic World, but Britons were keen observers of
Spanish and Portuguese forays into Africa and the Americas, and what they saw shocked
them. English observers and imperial boosters emphasized the barbarity of Spain’s
Catholic empire, constructing the so-called “black legend” of Spanish cruelty toward
indigenous Americans and enslaved Africans. Associated as much with anti-Catholicism
as with real concern for Native Americans or Africans, the “black legend” reinforced
religious belief as central to cultural inclusion and exclusion, a tendency reinforced by the
burgeoning travel literature of the late-16th and early-17th centuries. A growing body of
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international law also grappled with the question of slavery and, drawing on these
religious lines of exclusion, began to legitimize the enslavement of non-Christian
heathens. This theistic legitimation of slavery also dovetailed with emerging biblical
exegeses stressing the origins of racial difference in the curse Noah placed on Ham and
his descendants in the book of Genesis. In the English mind, however, slavery was not
yet a strictly racialized institution, and not simply because England lacked contact with
Africa and Africans – Britons, after all, had only recently experimented with the
enslavement of their fellow Christian subjects. Slaves from throughout the Atlantic
world would up in late-16th and early-17th century England, forcing English courts to
grapple with the tricky issues of property-in-man and rightlessness.
As Englishmen set out into the wider world with greater frequency in the late 16th
century, then, they could not help but notice the ubiquity of human bondage in other
societies. And though they were certainly familiar with forms of unfree labor at home,
what English explorers saw in the Spanish colonies, or at least what they related to the
English public, was shocking. Not only did the Spanish doom Native American souls to
hell by converting them to the false Catholic faith, they continued to hold converted
Indians as slaves, working them to death in hellish mines. As numerous scholars have
shown, this "black legend" of Spanish cruelty was widespread in England, and its image
of the dual enslavement of Native Americans provided a justification for an increased
English presence in the Americas.10 The reality of slavery in the Spanish American
colonies was far more complex. Objections from the Catholic Church and colonial
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missionaries like Bartolome de las Cases led the Spanish crown to officially ban the
enslavement of Christianized Indians in 1542. Spanish civil law also provided a number
of routes to freedom for enslaved persons, leading to the construction of free African
communities throughout the Spanish empire.11 English observers could not have failed to
notice the conspicuous presence of both enslaved and free Africans in Spain's New World
empire.
The few early English adventurers who found their way to the Spanish colonies
also worried about their own personal freedom. Tales of Englishmen forced into slavery
in Spanish galleys were widespread.12 The Mediterranean world was also fraught with
danger – Christian captives in the Ottoman empire were often enslaved and, worse yet,
encouraged to convert to Islam. English enslavement in the Muslim world was
widespread enough to require a response from the throne. Public charitable drives to
raise money and emancipate captive Englishmen were common in Elizabethan England,
and by the early 17th century the crown regularly issued proclamations calling for
donations for favored individual captives. As late as 1624, James I initiated a massive
fund raising drive for "fifteen hundred of our loving Subjects, English men, remaining in
miserable servitude" in North Africa.13
Most English subjects, of course, would have no first-hand experience of slavery
or empire. They could glimpse the wider world, however, through the burgeoning travel
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literature of late Tudor and early Stuart England. Slavery played a prominent if
ambiguous role in this body of literature. Richard Hakluyt makes numerous offhand
references to slavery in Principall Navigations, his 1582 collection of European travel
narratives.14 A central figure in the construction of the 'black legend', Hakluyt envisioned
an empire that would empower the English nation at the expense of the Spanish, and
slavery played an important part in this imperial vision. In a memorandum to Elizabeth I,
Hakluyt argued that Indians and Africans in the Spanish colonies would gladly "joyne
with us...most willinglye" in overthrowing the "intollerable yoke" of Spanish slavery. 15
Africans also appear prominently in this early imperial literature, often as slaves but also
as merchants, rulers, and potential allies. Despite small-scale forays into the African
slave trade in the 1590s, many English travelers continued to eschew the practice,
protesting that the English "did not deale in any such commodities, neither did [they] buy
or sell one another, or any that had our owne shapes."16 The competing visions of empire
presented in this early travel literature uniformly stressed the liberating potential of
English colonial expansion, and typically presented Native Americans and Africans as
potential allies in this venture rather than commodities for trade.
Increased European competition in the New World also accelerated the
development of a new body of international law, and the English were active participants
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in this process.17 Alberico Gentili, an Italian Protestant who fled the Inquisition and
settled in England where he became Regis Professor of Civil Law at Oxford in 1580,
considered the legality of slavery in his De Iure Belli Libri Tres, first published in 1582.
Like most early modern commentators, Gentili found the origin of slavery in the taking
of captives in just wars, but limited enslavement to heathens, arguing that "in the wars of
the Christians there was no slavery." Christian wars were "more than civil" and thus
prisoners could "not be held captive perpetually." Wars against non-Christians, however,
were another matter. Captives taken in these wars would "remain a slave continually,
even when the war was ended, if there was no provision" freeing them in peace treaties.
For Gentili, as for most English commentators, slavery was a fate that only outsiders
could legally suffer. Still, slavery was "among the greatest ills" a person could be
subjected to – slaves were "reduced to the condition of a beast," transformed into "a
chattel instead of a person." Slavery, in Gentili's formulation, was "all but death."18
Despite his negative portrayal of slavery, Gentili realized that the institution was
widespread, "common to Christians and infidels," and must therefore be recognized as
"belong[ing] to the law of nations." Because of its widespread usage, slavery must be, to
some extent, "in harmony with nature." Arguing against continental jurists like Jean
Bodin who argued that slavery was contrary to natural law, Gentili asserted that "we are
not created free by nature so absolute that very many of us may not be made slaves." The
prevalence of slavery in the practice of nations proved that it was a natural institution – "a
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thing is natural which is wont to happen always and everywhere."19 Indeed, experience
had proved that even the English could be enslaved once outside the free air of the British
Isles. Despite the recognition that slavery existed in the practice of nations, under the
early modern European law of nations it was a fate reserved for pagans, heathens, and
strangers.
Connections between English Protestantism and ideas about slavery and race,
however, were fraught with ambiguity. As numerous historians have recently noted,
early modern European biblical exegetes provided many religious justifications for
slavery. The Pauline epistles, after all, called on servants to be obedient to their masters,
even unto death, and held that all true Christians were, in a sense, slaves to Christ.
Slavery itself is never denounced directly by Christ in the gospels, and the Old Testament
included explicit sanction for the enslavement of strangers.20 Some exegetes also argued
that the biblical ‘Curse of Ham’ specifically sanctioned the enslavement of Africans.21
Often used by early modern commentators to explain the origins of human racial
difference, the Curse of Ham is drawn from the story of the flood in the book of Genesis.
Ham, one of Noah's sons, shamed his father, who had fallen asleep drunk in a tent, by
exposing his nakedness.22 In response, Noah placed a curse on Ham's son Canaan – "a
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servant of servants shall he be unto his brethren."23 Originally meant to explain the
subjugation of Canaan to the Israelites, early modern commentators faced with the
growth of the trans-Atlantic slave trade increasingly came to identify Africans with the
curse.
Connections between the Curse of Ham and Africans first emerged in England in
the late-16th century, as travel literature describing Africa began to hit English
bookshelves. George Best, a companion of Martin Frobisher on his early voyages, wrote
that God made "a spectacle" of Ham's disobedience by making his son Chus [Cush]
"black and loathsome," and from this curse came "all these blacke Moores which are in
Africa."24 Andrew Willett, a leading biblical commentator in in early 17th century
England, also examined the Curse of Ham in his 1603 Hexepla in Genesin, but unlike
Best he did not connect the curse to Africans. Willett stressed that the type of slavery
created by the Hamitic curse was different from English forms of servitude. Servitude
was a natural state and "a profitable service" that, even without the curse, "should
otherwise have been in the world: as when men for order sake, and their better
preservation obey their merciful and prudent rulers, that govern them as fathers."
Patriarchalist hierarchy, according to Willet, was natural, a product of God's love for his
people. "[T]he slavish life," however, "had its beginning in cursed Canaan" – slavery
was born of sin, not the love of God. Slaves, then, were "more vile than the lowest
servant," analogous to captives taken in war who, "being saved alive...became servants,
being so called, because they were saved." While Willett was willing to accept that
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Noah's curse had created slavery, he was unwilling to take the step that some other
exegetes did in applying this curse exclusively to Africans. Indeed it appears he was
more interested in a confessional limit to slavery than a racial one. The Hamitic curse,
according to Willett, was "so much the more grievous" because Canaan was "subjected to
his bretheren" – enslavement by "strangers" might be "more willingly borne" and could
be condoned.25 But by this logic once a stranger was converted and assimilated, he or she
might continue to be a servant, but could no longer be enslaved.
Nor were English ideas of Africa and Africans limited to travel literature or
biblical exegeses – there were also blacks resident in England itself. Though few in
number, Africans and Afro-Britons were a conspicuous presence in the early Tudor court
as musicians and servants, and a contingent of Moors arrived as part of Catherine of
Aragon's entourage in 1501.26 Five of Shakespeare's plays feature African characters in
prominent roles, portrayed with characteristically Shakespearean attention to the
complexity of the human experience.27 As historian James Walvin has argued, AfroBritons were "securely lodged at various social levels" by the end of the 16th century,
including a small number of black freeholders.28 Most black Britons, however, were no
more able to avoid the uncertainties of the Elizabethan economy than were any other

25

Willett, Hexapla in Genesin and Exodum, 91. Willett's work was popular among early 17th century
English Puritans and was owned by a number of notable New England colonists. See David Whitford,
"A Calvinist Heritage to the 'Curse of Ham': Assessing the Accuracy of a Claim about Racial
Subordination" Church History and Religious Culture vol. 90, no. 1 (2010): 33, n. 26.
26
Folarin Shyllon, Black People in Britain, 1555-1833 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977); Peter
Fryer, Staying Power: The History of Black People in Britain (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 1984), 1-13;
James Walvin, Black and White: The Negro and English Society, 1555-1945 (London: Allen Lane, 1973)
and Black Ivory: Slavery in the British Empire (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001 [1992]).
27
For analyses stressing the centrality of ideas of racial difference in Shakespeare and his era, see Kim F.
Hall, Things of Darkness: Economies of Race and Gender in Early Modern England (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1996); Imtiaz Habib, Shakespeare and Race: Postcolonial Praxis in the Early Modern
Period (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1999).
28
Walvin, Black and White, 8.

43

English subjects. The few Africans who appear in Tudor records lived at the very bottom
of English society, and at least some were certainly enslaved.
In early 1547 James Fraunces (or Jacques Francis) became one of the first African
slaves to appear in an English court. The 20-year-old Fraunces worked as a diver and
was the slave of one Peter Paulo Corso, who had been hired by Domenico Erizo of
Florence to salvage tin from a wrecked ship lying off Southampton. When Corso refused
to deliver the salvaged tin, claiming it was taken from another wreck, Fraunces was
called before the High Court of Admiralty to give testimony in the case. Through his
deposition, given "as he says of his own free will" and translated for the court, we learn
that Corso had purchased Fraunces only two years earlier, and that before his
enslavement he lived "in the Island of Guinea where he was born."29 Though Fraunces'
testimony is otherwise unremarkable, other parties to the case protested that the court
should throw it out because he was "a morisco born where they are not christenyd."
Furthermore, Fraunces was "a slave to the sayd peter paulo," and "therefore...no Credite
nor faithe ought to be geven to his Sayenges as in other Strange Christian cuntryes hit ys
to no suche slave geven."30 As a slave and a stranger, Fraunces’ testimony should be
thrown out.
While it certainly illustrates many of the biases against Africans common in early
modern Europe, the response to Fraunces' deposition cannot be reduced solely to race.
The central objection to Fraunces' testimony was that it came from a heathen, though his
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Christian name hints that Fraunces may have been baptized at some point.31 The
Elizabethan crackdown on the laboring poor may also have played a role. Testimony
from other witnesses describes Fraunces and the multi-ethnic salvage crew he worked
with, including at least one English laborer, as "poore laboryng men...sekyng ther levyng
abowte in sondrye places," much like the wandering poor targeted by the 1547 Vagabond
Act.32 Without local precedent to rely on, objections to Fraunces' testimony cited the
custom of excluding slave testimony in "Strange Christian" nations, likely because there
was no analogous English precedent. Despite all these objections to Fraunces'
deposition, the High Court of Admiralty included it in their considerations – neither his
status as a slave nor his African birth were sufficient cause to reject Fraunces' testimony.
This ambivalence toward slavery in an English courtroom illustrates that African slaves
in Tudor England were still, at least to some extent, considered persons before the law.
Fraunces, after all, gave testimony in the case from his own "free will."
Africans in England were a conspicuous enough presence by the 1590s to draw
Queen Elizabeth's direct attention. Starting in 1596, she made a number of unsuccessful
attempts to expel Africans from England. In a public letter to the Lord Mayor of London,
Elizabeth complained that "divers Blackmoores...of which kinde of people there are all
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ready here to manie," were exacerbating England's already glutted labor market. 33 In July
1596, merchant Casper van Senden arrived in London with a group of Englishmen who
he had redeemed from "great misery and thraldom" in Spain and Portugal at his own
expense. Van Senden asked that the crown repay this act of charity by allowing him "to
take up so many Blackamoores" from England, presumably to sell as slaves on his return
trip to Spain. Elizabeth deemed the offer "a very good exchange," and ordered London's
mayor to assist van Senden. Recognizing the property rights of English masters, van
Senden was required to obtain consent from the Africans' owners before transporting
them. To help convince reluctant masters, Elizabeth asked them to "doe charitable and
like Christians rather to be served by their owne contrymen" than by African slaves or
servants. "Those kinde of people," Elizabeth argued, "may well be spared in this
Realme."34
Despite these requests from their queen, masters were apparently reluctant to give
up their African laborers. Another royal proclamation in 1601 required masters who
"willfully and obstinately refuse[d]" to comply to appear before the Privy Council and
explain themselves or face the consequences.35 While it certainly singled out Africans,
this attempt at expulsion was not entirely out of step with other late Tudor efforts to deal
with vagabondage and unemployment. In the end, the deportation policy failed – masters
"willfully and obstinately" clung to their property rights, the state authorized only a single
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merchant to carry out the policy, and there were simply too many Africans at too many
levels of English society.
Most English encounters with Africans, of course, took place far beyond the
British Isles, and as English subjects began setting out for the New World at the end of
the 16th century they were immediately forced to deal with the place of slavery and
subjecthood in their proposed empire. Indeed the very act of building an empire raised
central questions about the meaning of the English nation. By whom and for whose
benefit would colonization be undertaken? What would be the status of Britons who
settled overseas, and what legal regimes would they live under? Was the empire merely
an extension of England, or could overseas possessions, and the people who resided in
them, be treated differently than native English subjects? The answers to these questions
would provide the foundation upon which imperial slavery would be constructed, and,
from the very beginning, they were hotly contested.
To King James I, chartered corporations were ideal agents of colonization.
Politically, royal charters bolstered his claims to absolute sovereignty by giving him a
venue in which to exercise extraordinary prerogative powers. In his 1598 pamphlet, The
Trew Lawe of Free Monarchies, he laid out a clear claim to the kind of power he would
wield in creating the legal basis for colonization. Quoting the book of Samuel, James
argued that Saul, the first Judeo-Christian king, had been anointed directly by God as the
first King of Israel and that the Israelites had consented to his overlordship. Once made,
however, this holy version of the social contract could not be undone. James’ vision of
absolutism implied limitations on the rights of subjects. Displeased subjects could only
“arme [them]selves with patience and humility, since he that hath the only power to make
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[a King], hath the only power to unmake him.” This biblical exegesis led James to the
conclusion that, as king of Scotland, he was “God’s Lieutenant in earth” and his subjects
were bound to “[obey] his commands in all things...acknowledging him a Judge set by
God over them, having power to judge them, but to be judged only by God, whom to only
he must give count of his judgment.” Having given their consent to the creation of
monarchy, the ancient Israelites, James claimed, need no longer give consent to the
sovereign's decisions. According to James and other theorists of royal absolutism, this
original grant of monarchial power made disobedience to the king not only treason, but
sin as well. If, in the most extreme case, the king violated natural law in his decrees,
subjects could resist them to point out his error, but must also accept whatever
punishments the monarch meted out. This doctrine of passive obedience was the only
form of resistance James' royalist absolutism would countenance.36
James’ argument went beyond scriptural citation, however, to make broader
claims about the basis of “free Monarchy” in a civil law nation like Scotland. To James,
his authority as king of Scotland could not be limited. The crown descended to him from
“a wise King” who “established the estate and forme of government” among the Celtic
“barbares” and “thereafter made laws by himself.” All this, James claimed, preceded the
first Parliaments, laws, or land distributions – “the Kings were the authors and makers of
the lawes, and not the lawes of Kings.”37 The sovereign power of the first Scottish kings
descended with the crown in an unbroken chain of succession under the ancient Roman
civil law. But what of the other jurisdictions that came within James’ imperium when he
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ascended the English throne in 1603? Would his absolute sovereignty extend to
England? James claimed that when William the Conqueror, “the Bastard of Normandie,”
conquered England in 1066, “he gave the Law, and tooke none, changed the laws,
inverted the order of government, [and] set down the strangers his followers in many of
the old possessours rooms.” William had, in James’ view, made himself absolute
monarch of all England, and “his successors have with great happinesse enjoyed the
Crowne to this day” on those same terms.38 Conveniently glossing the limits on
monarchial power imposed by Magna Carta, James laid claim to nearly unlimited royal
prerogative power that, to many English subjects, seemed a violation of their treasured
rights under common law and the ancient constitution.
The absolutist-patriarchalist social and political vision elucidated by James I, and
echoed by political theorists like Robert Filmer, provided much of the ideological
material that would lay the foundation for Anglo-American slave societies.39 Theorists of
absolutism commonly used two analogical models to naturalize absolute patriarchalist
power: the human body and the household. “The proper office of a King towards his
Subjects,” James I argued, “agrees very well with the office of the head towards the
body.” As head of the body politic, the monarch was “the seate of Judgement” from
which “the discourse and direction flowes,” empowered even to “cut off some rotten
member...to keepe the rest of the body in integritie.”40 The most sophisticated and fullthroated exponent of English absolutism, Robert Filmer, relied more commonly on the
household as his model for the absolutist state in Patriarcha, printed in 1680 but written
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in the 1630s and '40s as a defense of Stuart absolutism. God had conferred power on
Adam, the first father, which had descended through an unbroken line of patriarchs. To
Filmer, the king was self-evidently the lord of his dominions just as a father was
unquestionably the head of his household. Wives, children, and other household
dependents could no more question the will of the father as head-of-household than a
subject could actively resist their king – the consent of household members or royal
subjects to the decisions of fathers and kings was philosophically unnecessary and
potentially subversive of social and political order.41
This household analogy, however, could run in the opposite direction as well –
family patriarchs were divinely sanctioned kings within their own household dominions –
and informed the ways in which male heads-of-household in early modern England
thought about the rights and duties of those they oversaw, including their slaves. Just as
subjects need not consent to the decisions of the king, wives, children, and servants were
bound to follow the direction of fathers without giving their consent. The only form of
resistance to which household members had recourse was passive obedience, and even
then they were to meekly accept the punishments that were sure to follow. In this
intensely gendered power structure, fathers as heads-of-household could legitimately
limit the physical mobility of those who lived under them, control property through
coverture and the laws of descent, represent wives and children legally in the courts, and
use physical force to compel obedience from dependent household members.
Theoretically, this authority extended even to the power of life and death.42 As the Stuart
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monarchs worked to expand their power under this royal absolutist-patriarchalist
philosophy, so many heads of household worked to augment their own authority over
wives, children, and servants.43
There was, however, one critical limit to the power of male heads of household.
Wives, children, and servants, despite their subaltern status, remained subjects of the
king, entitled to the basic protections of subjecthood. Though a father was
unquestionably empowered to use physical force to compel obedience from members of
his household, his wife, children, and servants still had recourse to the king's justice for
protection from excessive correction. Though rare, wives could divorce their husbands
for excessive cruelty, and were guaranteed use rights to properties they brought to the
marriage. The legal rights of children were protected by the king as well through the
Court of Wards, where the estates of minors could be held in trust to prevent their misuse
by grasping male relatives.44 Servants could bring suit in the king's courts against
masters who failed to honor employment agreements, and could own separate property,
protected by common law, during their service.45 Despite their theoretically unlimited
authority, the powers of male heads-of-household were bounded by the sovereign power
of the monarch. The legal and philosophical absurdity of imperium in imperio dictated
that ultimate sovereignty, even over individual households, remain in the hands of the
king. Thus, while on one hand absolutist theory bolstered the gendered claims to power
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made by heads-of-household, on the other hand it undercut those same claims by placing
all subjects under the protection of the king.
Furthermore, not all Britons agreed with James I’s or Robert Filmer’s
conceptualization of the king as divinely appointed head or father. Opposition to the
Stuart absolutist vision of empire, however, was far from unified. Most English
dissenters, including the first Puritan settlers of Massachusetts Bay, sought a "magisterial
reformation" in church and state. Men like John Winthrop worried not only that James'
insistence on a hierarchical system of church governance, with bishops appointed directly
by king, corrupted the true churches of English puritans, but also that the political
methods used to suppress the puritan reformation were illegitimate. The persecution of
English dissenters in Star Chamber not only drove many to sin in feigning conformity
with the Church of England against their conscience – it was an abuse of royal power in
the service of Antichrist, a danger that went far beyond theology to threaten the rights of
all English subjects. This is not to say that mainstream puritan opposition to early Stuart
absolutism sought the radical overthrow of monarchy and patriarchy. Indeed, once
ensconced in the Bay Colony, many of the same puritans who opposed James' religious
and political policies would resort to similar tactics in organizing their New World
colony. Rather, most English anti-absolutists wanted merely to restore the element of
consent to government in both church and state. Just as a minister should not be called
without the consent of his congregation, the king should not tax his subjects or abridge
their basic common law rights without the consent of their representatives in Parliament.
This was to be a reorganization of church and state that would keep ministers, elders, and
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magistrates, hopefully in concert with the throne, firmly in control of the communities
they oversaw not a radical experiment in democracy.46
Radical anti-patriarchalist sentiment was not absent from England, however, and
it was closely linked both with radical "separatist" Puritanism and the urban and rural
unrest sparked by England's early 17th-century economic and demographic crises.47
Radical puritans, like those who would form the nucleus of the Leiden separatist
congregation and the earliest migrants to Plymouth, organized their churches on radically
democratic principles, allowed women and unlicensed preachers to debate the word of
God in underground conventicles, and openly disregarded statutes requiring conformity
with the liturgy as proscribed by the Church of England. Debates over church
governance, however, were implicitly debates over political sovereignty – as James I
succinctly put it, "No Bishops, No King" – and hotbeds of religious radicalism also
served as platforms for political organization. Radical puritans believed that their modes
of church organization were closely attuned to those of the first Christian churches, and
that extension of these modes to state governance would hasten the coming of the
Kingdom of Christ. Eventually, as the unlicensed Coleman Street Ward preacher Samuel
How pointed out, when the "wise, rich, noble, and learned" came to know the true gospel,
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they would "make themselves equal with them of the lower sort, the foolish, the vile and
unlearned; for those be the true heirs" of Christ.48
The implications of these anti-absolutist positions were manifold. Although they
differed in specifics, both mainstream puritans and radical separatists agreed that consent
was crucial to the legitimacy of authority in church, state, and household. Their
difference was one of degree, not of kind. Mainstream puritans sought a magisterial
reformation led by the propertied few who had access to political subjecthood where
radicals and separatists hoped for a transformation of the very definition of subjecthood
itself, allowing those without property a political voice in shaping their churches and
communities. While these differences were not insignificant, and would prove crucial in
shaping the contours of society in New England, they did not prevent mainstream and
radical puritans from recognizing their shared enemy – Stuart absolutism.
Implicit in this anti-absolutist critique was the belief that the most basic rights of
civil subjecthood could never be abridged. The rule of law was an essential component
of the opposition to Stuart absolutism. When Englishmen lost their access to the courts,
legal protection from arbitrary imprisonment or physical violence, or the sanctity of their
properties and families, they would no longer be subjects. To increasing numbers of
commentators in the early 1600s, this loss of the most basic rights of subjecthood was
tantamount to slavery. The solution was clear – guarantee that all subjects have access to
basic civic rights, and ensure that those with a stake in society retain the ability to
participate in the political life of the nation. While the logic of this position did not
necessarily call for a broadening of the political nation, in practice it represented a serious
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challenge to James' absolutist program by asserting the inviolability of civil subjecthood
and envisioning a more active role in governance for political subjects. Early Stuart antiabsolutism, then, was not inherently democratic or anti-patriarchalist, but its fundamental
insistence on a subject's access to basic civil rights would play a crucial role in shaping
colonial ideals of subjecthood and slavery.
In the context of New World colonization, James’ Scottish civil law background
and absolutist leanings proved particularly important. When framing charters and
planning overseas settlement, English monarchs looked to the ancient civil law for
guidance, not the relatively provincial English common law. Civil law had the benefit of
international recognition and a stable corpus of texts upon which to base claims to
sovereignty.49 Within England, James used his ordinary prerogative powers much as his
Tudor predecessors had. The appointment of crown offices, calling and dissolving
Parliament, and trying cases in the prerogative court of Star Chamber were, by the early
17th century, regularly used if not wholly accepted crown powers. These powers were,
however, limited in a number of important ways. They could be exercised only within
England and resistance to their unfettered use was growing.50 Parliament or the common
law courts could challenge James’ domestic ambitions, but the colonization of terra
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nullis proceeded through his extraordinary prerogative power and was largely beyond the
reach of local English institutions.51 For James, colonization provided a venue for
independent royal action and bolstered royal supremacy.
Relatively late arrival to New World colonization did not mean that the English
faced a wholly novel situation in structuring their expanding empire. In fact, English
colonial planners had ample and recent precedent to draw on. As numerous scholars
have recently argued, English campaigns for subjugating the native Celtic Irish and
“planting” Ulster with “new English” provided one model for New World colonization.
Under this model, new colonies could be treated as conquered territories and their people
governed directly by the crown.52 Union between England and Wales during the reign of
Henry VIII provided another possible organizational model whereby the colonies would
be wholly absorbed into a nascent ‘Britain’ and governed directly by English laws and
institutions, including Parliament and the common law courts at Westminster Hall.53 The
succession of James VI of Scotland to the English throne as James I in 1603 provided yet
another model – the composite monarchy of England and Scotland.54 The two British
realms were both unquestionably within James the VI and I’s imperium, but retained their
own distinct courts, parliaments, and ecclesiastical organization.55

51

For the differences between ordinary and extraordinary prerogative powers, see MacMillan, Sovereignty
and Possession, chapter 1.
52
Audrey Horning, Ireland in the Virginian Sea: Colonialism in the British Atlantic (Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina Press, 2013).
53
On the evolving nature of ‘Britain’, both as a territorially bounded polity and an object of subjects’
identity, see Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1992).
54
James VI and I’s ascension to the throne in 1603 raised the question of subjecthood in a new way.
Would Scots now be considered full English subjects? This question was largely settled by Calvin’s
Case (1608), discussed in more detail below.
55
On the concept of empire in early modern England and its application both within Britain and in the
colonial context, see David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2001).

56

Each of these models was attractive for a variety of reasons, but the limitations of
the early Stuart state apparatus, the economic imperatives of settling a new colony in the
American wilderness, and the political leanings of the Stuart monarchy dictated that
colonization proceed, at least initially, through royally chartered corporations.
Examining the debate over the structure of the early English empire illuminates the
articulation of legal and political authority both within individual colonies and between
the metropole and its new empire. The resulting structure of the early English empire
played a key role in laying the legal foundations for American slavery.
Economic factors, linked closely to absolutist political ideology, also influenced
English plans for structuring the growing English empire. James I and his councilors
hoped that private individuals would finance risky colonial ventures out of their own
pockets while the state offered support through short-term customs exemptions, trade
incentives, and generous patents that often licensed privateering by English ships.56
Ideally, the investors’ initial outlay would be recouped quickly when American mines,
agriculture, and fisheries began to generate the profits expected by optimistic imperial
planners. James, of course, would supplement his royal treasury by taking a twentypercent cut of all mining profits while colonial trade would augment customs and tonnage
duties controlled directly by the crown.
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Widespread ownership of private property was anathema to James I’s imperial
vision. Under the terms of Virginia’s first royal charter, all property rights in the colony
were held by the Virginia Company’s appointed Council back in London. All land was
granted directly by James, to be held “as of our Manor of East-Greenwhich, in the
County of Kent, in free and common Soccage only, and not in Capite.” The wording of
this royal land grant was crucial, and would recur again and again in later colonial
charters. Holding land in “free and common Soccage” gave the Virginia Company a
freehold tenure in all colonial real estate. Under this increasingly popular form of tenure,
property owners were released from many of the feudal obligations that encumbered
estates held in capite or knight’s service.57 Unlike older feudal tenures that required
payment of annual fees or performance of service to the crown, freehold estates carried
only the obligations of fealty and relief. Freehold estates could also be devised and were
alienable. Granting tenure in free and common socage gave Virginia Company investors
an additional economic incentive for colonization by ensuring that they would not be
subject to feudal fees and guaranteeing that all revenue gained from colonial property
would flow to the Company.
In turn, James I was freed from the burden of creating a new and cumbersome
state apparatus for collecting feudal dues in a far-flung empire. Under these generous
terms, the select group of thirteen royal favorites and investors who sat on the Virginia
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Council had the power to “GIVE and GRANT” all “Lands, Tenements, and
Hereditaments” to “such Persons, their Heirs and Assigns” as they saw fit. Successive
charter revisions in 1609 and 1611 confirmed this structure of property ownership and
cemented the authority of the Virginia Council.58 Although empowered to grant land to
colonists, in the first years of English colonization it made little sense for the Council to
distribute their property to individual settlers. The expected profits of Virginia’s
extractive economy were to accrue to select royal favorites and the crown itself, not
individual settlers.
Other Britons, however, saw colonization as a critical phase in the unfolding of
sacred history. Particularly to Puritans and reform-minded Anglicans, English settlement
would counter the malign influence of antichristian papists in the New World, ushering in
an age of conversion to true religion and speeding the second coming of Christ. Perhaps
the most conspicuous booster for the religious mission of colonization was Samuel
Purchas, a reformed Anglican cleric and compiler of travel narratives. While Purchas,
like King James, recognized the potential economic benefit of American settlement, he
criticized the “self-love” and “Covetousnesse” of many Britons, which led them to forget
that “they are planting a Colony, not reaping a harvest, for a public and not (but in
subordinate order) private wealth.” Rather, it was “Religion...[that] inviteth us there to
seeke the Kingdome of God first” – all other concerns were subordinate to spreading
Christianity. This religious mission, along with “Humanity and our common Nature
forbids to turne our eyes from our owne flesh...[and] commands us to love our
neighbours as our selves.” Speaking specifically of Virginia, Purchas insisted that the
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true purpose of colonization must be “to recover [Native Americans] if possible, as by
Religion, from the power of Sathan to God; so by humanity and civility from Barbarisme
and Savagenesse to good manners and humaine polity.”59 Economic benefit would
surely follow, but could not be the sole aim of colonization – Britons had a sacred
responsibility to spread true religion and civil order to all humanity.
Civil order, however, was as hotly contested as true religion and, in this politically
charged context, the exact definition of the English subject and the balance of rights and
duties a subject could claim took on a special salience, especially in the colonies. If the
English were to successfully “plant” their new colonies, settlers would have to make the
dangerous trans-Atlantic voyage and lay down roots in the New World. But would these
distant settlers be considered full English subjects? Would they have access to the rights
of Englishmen and, if so, how far would those rights extend? Would separatist and
puritan settlers be accorded the rights of subjects, despite their ambivalence, if not open
hostility, to the established order in church and state? And what of strangers or heathens
like the "20 and odd Negroes" who arrived in Virginia in 1619? In 1608, a special
tribunal made up of the leading English jurists of the day handed down a landmark
decision in Calvin's Case, also known as the Case of the Post-Nati, that began to answer
these thorny questions. Calvin's Case arose when Robert Calvin, a Scot born after James'
ascension to the English throne, brought suit against Richard and Nicholas Smith for
disseising Calvin's freehold estate in the parish of St. Leonard, Shoreditch, England. The
Smiths claimed that, as a Scot, Calvin was an alien and could hold no real estate under
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English law. The essential question was whether the rights guaranteed to English
subjects under common law would extend to all persons born within James I's
dominions.60
The eminent Sir Edward Coke's report of the case laid down the definitive
statement of the doctrine of natural allegiance that came out of the court's decision.
Coke, who participated in the case as Chief Justice of Common Pleas, recorded the
court's decision that Calvin was entitled to his real property because he was born after
James' ascension to the English throne, but Scots born before the ascension, the ante-nati,
remained aliens under English common law. Only naturalization by the king's grace or
Parliamentary grant could extend the protections of English common law to ante-nati
Scots. Post-nati Scots, on the other hand, were born into a community of allegiance
delimited by the sovereignty of the king's person. Because "power and protection
draweth ligeance," all persons born within the king's dominions entered into "duplex et
reciprocum ligamen," a double and reciprocal bond, with their sovereign.61 The king was
bound to extend his protection to all subjects, and all subjects owed the king fealty and
allegiance in return. The ruling in Calvin's Case thus viewed subjecthood as a natural
relationship between subject and sovereign and reflected an organic, patriarchalist view
of society. Subjecthood was an immutable status determined by birth into the community
of allegiance and defined by a reciprocal relationship with the sovereign.
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English ideals of subjecthood and citizenship would continue be shaped by
Calvin's Case well into the 19th century, but the 17th century political debate between
royalist absolutists and puritan Parliamentarians played a critical role in defining who
could claim the rights of subjecthood in practice. The imperatives of Stuart absolutism
dictated that access to political subjecthood be tightly limited, and that the political power
of elites tied to the royal court always exceed that of the commons. In their drive to
bolster royal power, James and his court also worked to limit the access of many English
subjects to even basic civil subjecthood, trying dissenters in prerogative courts like Star
Chamber and imprisoning political opponents without due process. Even to most of
James' opponents, however, direct resistance to these policies was unthinkable. The
majority of opponents to early Stuart absolutism sought only to guarantee that the power
of the king remain subject to the limitations of the English common law and the forms of
the ancient constitution. These were not radical Levellers or proto-republicans –
magisterial reformers simply believed that male property owners, as heads of their own
households, should be allowed to give their consent to certain government actions. Their
intent in opposing James' absolutist moves was not to bring all English subjects into the
political nation, but to restore the rights of political subjecthood that James sought to
revoke.
When transposed into a colonial context, this ongoing debate brought new and
pressing questions about the limits of subjecthood to the fore. Would “strangers” who
emigrated to the colonies be granted English subjecthood and if so on what terms? What
about the Native Americans who planners knew settlers would encounter, or the Africans,
enslaved and free, who were so ubiquitous in the Atlantic World? English law provided
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procedures for naturalization and endenization that provided a legal template for
conferring subjecthood. An alien could become an English subject through a special
royal grant or a Parliamentary bill, but this procedure could be expensive and
cumbersome. Naturalization had two baseline requirements – an alien must swear an
oath of allegiance to the king and be a member of the established church. Though later
adaptations would liberalize this naturalization procedure somewhat by loosening the
sacramental requirement, allegiance to the king and membership in a Protestant church
remained the twin pillars of English subjecthood well into the 18th century.
In the colonies, however, the pressing need for labor dictated a looser, more
informal procedure for naturalization. The Virginia Company's charters reflected the
concept of natural allegiance as elucidated in Calvin's Case and guaranteed that
subjecthood would follow English migrants across the Atlantic. English colonists would
"HAVE and ENJOY all Liberties, Franchizes, and Immunities of Free Denizens and
natural Subjects within any of our other Dominions to all Intents and Purposes, as if they
had been abiding and born within this our Realm of England, or in any other of our
Dominions." The charters also welcomed "any other Strangers, that will become our
loving Subjects, and live under our Obedience" to settle in Virginia.62 Left unsaid was
when and where these strangers would become subjects. Imperial planners apparently
assumed that non-English migrants to the English colonies would be naturalized or
endenized in England before making their Atlantic crossing, but aliens were often
endenized and possibly naturalized by colonial officials in the New World.63
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Officials in the colonies also pushed planners back in England to liberalize
naturalization requirements. In 1624, the Governor and Council in Virginia petitioned
the Privy Council to expand the endenization of one Monsieur Beaumont. Beaumont, a
Huguenot merchant, had received a royal patent of endenization, but “onely [as] a free
denizen of Virginia, and not of England.” This stipulation would have hampered the
Frenchman’s planned voyages between Virginia and the metropole by limiting
protections for his property within England. The Governor and Council asked that the
patent be expanded to make Beaumont an English denizen as well, “as other undertakers
have formerly been.” They also asked that Beaumont be exempted from customs duties
usually required of foreigners, making him, in economic terms at least, “a naturall borne
subject.” The Privy Council was pleased to grant all of these requests.64 Beaumont may
have received special treatment as a vital contributor to the survival and profitability of
the Virginia colony, but the relative liberality of colonial naturalization procedures and
the economic necessities of maintaining early colonial settlement allowed for relatively
open access to naturalization and endenization for “strangers.”65
Whether in Virginia or Massachusetts, settlers were welcomed into the king's
protection as long as they met the dual requirements of allegiance and Protestantism.
Property ownership also conferred the rights of political subjecthood, a status all the more
easily attained in the American colonies where land was readily available. Any colonists
born in the colonies would, of course, be considered natural subjects, since they were
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born in the king's dominions. The determination of whether or not these principles would
be applied to enslaved people, however, would be made not in the halls of imperial power
in London, but on the frontiers of English settlement in the distant American colonies.
***
In August 1619, Virginia colonist and pioneering tobacco planter John Rolfe
noted the arrival of a significant group of settlers to his fledgling colony. In a letter to the
treasurer of the Virginia Company back in London, Rolfe described how the White Lion,
its supplies nearly exhausted, docked at Point Comfort, the Jamestown colony’s main
port. According to Rolfe, they had “not brought any thing but 20 and odd Negroes,” a
cargo that the colony’s governor and leading planters “bought…at the best and easyest
rate they could.”66 In dire need of fresh labor, early Virginia colonists eagerly grabbed
up able bodied laborers, of whatever race, to tend the tobacco crops that were rapidly
becoming the colony’s main cash crop. The “twenty and odd Negroes” were made slaves
by virtue of their capture in West Central African wars. They were laded as property into
the cargo hold of the Portuguese merchant ship Sao Joao Bautista in Luanda, the capital
of Portuguese Angola.67 They were claimed as property under Dutch letters of marque
issued to English privateer John Colyn Jope, captain of the White Lion. They were sold
as property when they arrived at Point Comfort and protected as property under English
common law. English colonists in Virginia did not have to construct a system of slavery
– they made no decision, unthinking or otherwise, to create a novel institution. The
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centuries-old concept of property-in-man, the very essence of slavery, was imported
along with the first "twenty and odd Negroes."68
The exact status of these “20 and odd Negroes,” however, has been a point of
considerable debate among historians for generations. Many slaves of this “charter
generation” would go on to gain their freedom through various means, some even
becoming freeholders and slaveowners in their own right.69 Relatively high rates of
manumission were a common feature of most early modern slave societies, and the first
decades of English colonial slavery were no exception.70 Africans in Virginia continued
to gain their freedom, own property, write wills, sue and be sued in court, and contest the
authority of their white neighbors well into the mid-17th century – in short, they retained
many of the properties of subjecthood. This was certainly not the kind of behavior one
would expect from a slave. Once they emerged from slavery in to freedom, early AfroVirginians acted like, and were sometimes recognized as, subjects of the early English
empire.
Early Afro-Virginians’ access to the basic rights of subjects has led many
historians to claim that the first Africans brought to English America were likely
indentured servants, not slaves. These analyses, despite their importance in stressing the
treatment or lived experience of enslaved people, have distracted scholars from the one
element that makes slavery unique among other forms of bound labor – the fact that
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slaves were defined as the property of their owners. Much of this confusion stems from a
tendency among scholars to project later English slave law onto early 17th century
Virginia, searching for the black-letter positive law that created slavery in the Old
Dominion.71 This search, however, has ultimately proved fruitless because early
Virginians understood a basic truth that historians have long ignored – unlike Mansfield
and most modern scholars, Chesapeake colonists started from a presumption of slavery,
not freedom, when it came to the first "twenty and odd Negroes." By taking early
Virginians on their own terms, we can better understand both what slavery meant in the
early 17th century English colonies, and the processes by which English colonists defined
exactly who could be enslaved in their new, peculiar institution. Slavery meant to early
colonial Britons what it had meant throughout much of human history – property-in-man.
As important as it is, however, the debate over the status of the first AfroVirginians has obscured another crucial development in colonial Virginia, one that
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directly facilitated the definition of the first African slaves as a species of property. In
April, 1619, Sir George Yeardley, the colony’s newly appointed governor, issued a
proclamation stating that the “cruel laws” of military rule imposed by Sir Thomas Dale
seven years earlier were abrogated. Henceforth, Virginians would be ruled by “those free
laws which his Majesty’s subjects live under in England.” This same proclamation freed
all servants who had been in the colony for at least three years, encouraged them “to
possess and plant” parcels of land, and called Virginia’s first elective assembly.72 As
their economy turned toward tobacco exports, Virginians found the constancy of the
English common law, with its settled procedures for adjudicating claims and protecting
private property, essential to their rapidly commercializing society.73 With so few settlers
in the colony, this new economic logic also likely informed the emancipatory impulse in
Yeardly’s proclamation. English common law privileged the property rights of
freeholders over those of servile status – turning servants into freeholders would promote
the production of export commodities and ground their property rights in the ancient rules
of common law. Thus, 1619 marks not only the beginning of Virginia slavery but also
the ascendancy of English common law in defining property rights and the liberty of the
subject in the Old Dominion – the temporal coincidence of these events illustrates the
deep interconnectedness of Anglo-American slavery and colonial variants on English
law, and the importance of specific imperial structures in defining the limits of property
ownership and subjecthood. When faced with the problem of slavery, English colonists
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adjusted the law in crucial ways to address fundamental questions about the boundaries
of subjecthood in their settler societies.
From the outset, Virginia society was a strange reflection of the traditional
English systems of property ownership, subjecthood, and personal status. The Virginia
Company's original charter guaranteed that political and economic power would be
concentrated in the hands of the appointed Council back in London and their delegates in
the Chesapeake by granting them rights to all Virginia property. The charter also gave
Virginians a great degree of leeway in framing their local law, requiring only that
colonial statutes not be "contrary" to English law. The Virginia Company’s 1609 charter
confirmed not only their authority to “make, ordain, and establish all Manner of Orders,
Laws, Directions, Instructions, Forms and Ceremonies of Government and Magistracy, fit
and necessary for…the Government of [Virginia],” but also to “abrogate, revoke, or
change [local law]…as they in their good Discretion, shall think to be fittest for the Good
of the Adventurers and inhabitants there.” The Adventurers, Virginia’s elite investors,
would have “Power and Authority to correct, punish, pardon, govern, and rule
all…subjects” according to the orders of the Company Council back in London. If these
orders were insufficient to local circumstances in the Chesapeake, the charter also
allowed for local alterations “according to the good Discretions of the…Governor and
Officers,” as long as the law remained “as near as conveniently may be” to the laws of
England.74 This allowance for divergence from English law would be confirmed in
successive charter revisions throughout the colonial period, giving colonists a substantial
degree of leeway in framing local statutes to meet the needs of colonization.
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It was this jurisprudential eclecticism that allowed for the brutal martial law
imposed by Governor Thomas Dale in 1611. The Lawes Divine, Moral and Martial,
commonly known as Dale's Code, imposed capital punishment for a variety of crimes and
required strict work discipline from all settlers. Enlarging on traditional remedies
available to masters, colonists who "continued...unfaithful and negligent" of their labors
could be "condemned to the galley for three years" for repeated offences.75 Colonists
complained that Dale’s regime resulted in “continuall whipping, extraordinary
punishments, [and] working as slaves in chains for terms of years.”76 Even after
Governor Yeardley's proclamation in 1619, this strict work discipline remained in effect.
The instructions Yeardley carried with him across the Atlantic empowered him to bind
out idle Virginians to local masters and to deal with drunkenness and vagabondage with
"such severe punishments as the Governor or Council...shall think fit," including bond
servitude.77 Virginia planters later complained that Dale's Code had resulted in nothing
less than "the slaughter of his Majesty's free subjects by starving, hanging, burning,
breaking upon the wheel and shooting to death." One colonist was chained to a tree and
left to starve for stealing food. To Englishmen accustomed to a degree of protection,
even for unfree workers, Dale's “Tirranous Government” was "noe way better than
Slavery."78
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Governor George Yeardley's proclamation of April 1619, however, substantially
altered this equation. First, Yeardley freed all colonists present from “publique services
and labors, which formerly they suffered” and declared that Dale’s “cruell Lawes” were
abrogated. Colonists, many of whom had been forced into company servitude by Dale’s
Code, were freed with a stroke of Yeardley’s pen, and encouraged to “make choice of
their Dividents of Lande” and to “possesse and plant uppon them.” Furthermore, these
new estates would not be subject to the capricious whim of a faraway corporate Council
in London – colonial property would now be protected by “those free Lawes, which his
Majesties subjects live under in Englande.” To give colonists “a hande in the Governinge
of themselves,” Yeardley’s proclamation also decreed the creation of a new “generall
Assemblie,” Virginia’s House of Burgesses. The Governor, his Council, and two
Burgesses from each plantation, “freely to bee elected by the inhabitants thereof,” were to
meet regularly to “make and ordaine whatsoever Lawes and orders should by them be
thought good and profitable for [the colony’s] subsistence.”79
The Burgesses quickly set about cementing the substance of Yeardley’s
proclamation in statute law. Laws passed in 1623 confirmed that the Governor could not
divert Virginians “from their private labors to any service of his owne” without the
consent of the Council and Assembly, ordered that all existing estates be surveyed to
avoid “petty differences,” and decreed that “there be an uniformity in our Church as near
as may be to the Canons in England, both in substance and circumstance.”80 According
to one colonist, the changes wrought by Yeardley’s proclamation brought “such
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incouragement to every person here [to follow] their perticuler Labors with singular
alacrity and industry” that within three years the colony “flowrished with many new
erected Plantations…comfortable for the releife and succor of all.”81
By granting their "long desired freedom" to colonists who had served more than
three years as colony servants and guaranteeing that Virginians would be "governed by
those free Laws, which his Majesty's subjects live under in England," Yeardley
guaranteed that all English subjects in Virginia would have access to the protection of the
common law. 82 Virginia colonists recognized the significance of this shift. In 1624, as
the Old Dominion began its transition from a corporate to a royal colony, Virginia's elite
requested that the king give them "assurance of ye continuance...of their several estates &
possessions."83 The "ould Planters" begged that "they may have no such
contracts...forced upon them" to labor for the colony, "but that they may have Liberty to
make the best of their own labors, and may live under the same laws that the king's
Majesty's subjects do here in England, and other his Dominions."84 The requests of the
Virginia planters did not fall on deaf ears – the reorganization of Virginia as a royal
colony in 1624 confirmed all titles to property and guaranteed the access of subjects to
the common law.
Stabilized by the protections of English common law, Virginia’s economy and
social structure underwent a dramatic transformation in the generation between 1619 and
the outset of the English Civil War. Tobacco production in the Chesapeake grew nearly
twenty percent annually – by 1640, Virginia planters exported over one million pounds of
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tobacco to England each year.85 Fueling this tobacco boom was the exponential growth
in Virginia’s population. High mortality and conflict with the Powhatan Confederacy
had culled the English colony to fewer than 400 settlers by 1623 but, despite the risks,
thousands of colonists arrived over the next generation. By the outbreak of Civil War in
England, Virginia’s population had exploded to well over 10,000 settlers. Of course
relatively few of these settlers enjoyed the benefits of the rapidly developing Chesapeake
economy – by 1640 close to fifty percent of Virginia’s population were bound laborers,
either indentured servants, apprentices, or slaves.86
The early dominance of Virginia’s “ould Planters” was due in no small part to
patterns established early in the colony’s history. What Moses Finley once said of
ancient Greece holds true for colonial Virginia – “as always, the starting-point is the
land.”87 Under the terms of the Virginia Company’s charter, all property was held
directly by the company. The few patentees who obtained grants from the Company and
seated themselves on large estates were the only true freeholders at first. After Governor
Yeardley’s proclamation extended the protection of common law and the reorganization
of Virginia as a royal colony confirmed existing estates, the size of tobacco plantations
grew prodigiously, but the number of Englishmen who owned them did not. Probably no
more than twenty-five percent of Virginians were freeholders by 1640, and large estates
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were far less common.88 Beginning in 1618, these few great planters got an additional
boon for importing bound laborers – the headright system guaranteed 50 acres of land to
colonists for each servant they transported to the colony.89
Bolstered by the protections of common law, Virginia’s elite worked to
consolidate its economic and political dominance by guaranteeing that large estates
remained intact. The most important weapons in their arsenal were primogeniture and
the entail. Both legal constructs worked to ensure that estates were passed down intact
from generation to generation. While scholars have illustrated that the entail was rare in
the first generations of Virginia settlement, historian Holly Brewer has argued that the
accumulation of estates in tail throughout the colonial period kept a majority of available
land in the hands of a small number of elite families, connected through intermarriage.90
Furthermore, early Virginia legislation also dictated that the estates of Virginians who
died intestate would descend to the eldest male heir through primogeniture. Even among
planters who did leave wills the general practice was to grant lifetime use rights or cash
subsidies to younger heirs rather than devising estates.91 This early emphasis on
consolidating large estates would continue as Virginia’s plantation economy grew and
flourished in the second half of the 17th century.
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Keeping tobacco revenue flowing into the royal treasury and the pockets of
Virginia investors, however, required a massive investment in human capital. Most early
Chesapeake colonists made their Atlantic crossing as indentured servants, contractually
bound to work for their masters, usually for five to seven years, in return for passage to
the New World, basic food, shelter, and clothing while employed, and the payment of
“freedom dues” at the end of their indenture. During the time of their indenture, the labor
of indentured servants was understood to be the property of the master. Masters could
use moderate physical coercion to extract labor from servants and could turn to the
common law courts to enforce labor contracts. Even oral contracts were enforceable
under common law. In England, settled procedures existed for the creation of indentures
and the policing of both master and servant.92
Virginia's distance from England and the difficulty in verifying oral contracts on
the ground, however, created problems from the start. In preparation for a Quarter Court
session in November 1622, a committee of Virginia Company investors met to hash out a
process for registering indentures. The committee worried that "divers ungodly people
that have onely respect of their owne profitt" were lured into oral contracts in England.
They also acknowledged that Virginia masters were wont to "make his service of the
longest and harshest nature...either by faire or fowle meanes." For their part, servants
showed a marked tendency to "pretend their time of service to be shorter than indeed it is,
or else challenge greater reward and wages then was promised and generally Demaund
all such beifitte as the most advantageable condicons of service that they can heare of
enjoyeth." To protect the interests of both masters and servants, the Virginia Company

92

Robert J. Steinfeld, The Invention of Free Labor: The Employment Relation in English and American
Law and Culture, 1350-1870 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).

75

proposed that an officer be selected to register all written indentures so that "upon
complaint of wronge either by Mr or Servant right and Justice might be done."93 Despite
the exigencies of frontier settlement, then, Virginia planners certainly intended for
servants to retain access to the courts for redress of grievances.
Their degraded status notwithstanding, indentured servants appear with striking
regularity in Virginia courts as witnesses, plaintiffs, and defendants, and the range of
grievances they brought before the courts illustrate the protections English servants
expected from their sovereign and his colonial representatives. In October 1624, for
example, the General Court looked into the violent deaths of two of Mr. John Proctor's
servants, Elizabeth Abbott and Elyas Hintone. According to testimony, Abbott was
severely beaten at Proctor's command after attempting to run away, one witness claiming
she had received at least 500 lashes from William Nayle, another servant of Proctor's. In
his testimony, Nayle claimed that Proctor had ordered him to "whip [Abbott] from the
waist to the hand wrists & fleay her or ells his Mr wold flay him." Another witness, after
seeing Abbott's "most grievous" wounds, entreated with Proctor to "send for A Surgeon
to looke to her otherwyse she must needs p[er]ishe." When another neighbor, Alice
Bennett, asked Proctor "to pardon [Abbott] for that fault and not to Corect her," Proctor
refused and handed down another severe beating, likely leading to the servant's death.
Continuing his violent streak, Proctor also severely beat his servant Elyas Hintone about
the head with a rake. After the beating, Hintone told a fellow servant that "he was very
ill and yt his M[aste]r had so beaten him yt he shuld dye, and he wold laye his death to
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his M[aste]r." A few days later, Hintone's body was found in the woods near Proctor's
farm.94 The brutality of Virginia masters was clearly not reserved for slaves.
Proctor's violent outbursts, however, brought him to the attention of Virginia
magistrates, and he was brought before the General Court in October 1624 to answer for
his crimes. A number of witnesses, including indentured servants, testified that Proctor
"never ymmoderately" chastised his servants, limiting whippings to "20 or 30 lashes at
atyme." Besides, Abbott had "often tymes rann away" and Hintone "was a very
stubborne and desperat fellowe" – he "oftimes" threatened to "shoote himselfe wth a
pistoll" rather than continue in bondage to Proctor.95 To Proctor and masters like him,
servants Abbott and Hinton required strong management and English common law
allowed for a degree of physical force to compel labor. Despite their servile status and
the powers granted to masters, however, servants remained persons under the law, and
such vicious assaults on the king's subjects required the intervention of local officials.
Sadly, justice was not forthcoming for Elizabeth Abbot or Elyas Hintone – Proctor was
cleared of all charges. Still, this case and many others like it illustrate that Virginia
courts would have to monitor interactions between masters and servants in order to
protect the rights of both, at least as long as the servants were English subjects.96
English settlers were a distinct minority in Virginia, however, and debates over
the nature of subjecthood were deeply influenced by the conspicuous presence of Native
Americans. In hindsight it seems inevitable that Chesapeake Indians would become
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permanent outsiders in their own land, defined out of civilization by rapacious English
colonists intent on driving them from valuable tidewater real estate. The reality on the
ground in the first decades of settlement was far less straightforward. Jamestown was
settled precariously in the heart of the powerful Powhatan confederacy, and its survival
was far from guaranteed. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that in the first years of
colonization, English policy dictated, and some colonists earnestly desired, the
acculturation and assimilation of Virginia natives as English subjects. Christianization of
natives was an important element of the English colonial vision, and it appears that at
least some early Virginia colonists took their mission seriously.
Perhaps no Virginia colonist better exemplified the desire to convert Chesapeake
natives than George Thorpe, a gentleman of the Privy Chamber and former Member of
Parliament for Portsmouth, who sat on the governor’s council in Virginia. Upon his
arrival at Jamestown in 1621, Thorpe threw his energies into the Henrico College, an
institution meant to instruct young Native Americans in English Christianity and
civilization. Powhatan leaders were encouraged to send their children to Henrico to be
educated. These students were certainly captives in some sense, but their experience fit
with both Native and English precedents. Europeans and North African Muslims had
long used captivity as a means to convert their foes, and for many Native Americans
captivity was a route to assimilation into a new group, as the famous experience of John
Smith illustrates.97 English colonists and Chesapeake natives both had experience with
the assimilatory potential of captivity. The end result, Virginians like George Thorpe
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hoped, would be the creation of new loyal Native American subjects of the English
empire.98
Within a year of Thorpe’s arrival, however, events would prove just how difficult
building an empire of multiracial subjects could be. Colonists who hoped to Christianize
and assimilate natives faced an uphill battle – most Virginia colonists, Thorpe noted, had
“nothinge but maledictions and bitter execrations” for Indians. Many Chesapeake natives
shared this view of their new neighbors – in the famous “massacre” of 1622, Powhatan
warriors descended on the English settlements and killed hundreds of colonists, including
Thorpe, and nearly destroying the fledgling colony. Virginia colonists responded in kind,
using their “uttermost and Christian endeavors in prosecuting revenge against the bloody
Salvages” and claiming title to Powhatan lands “by right of Warre, and law of Nations.”99
In the wake of this bloody conflict, Englishmen began forcing Indians captured in war
into “servitude and drudgery,” a common fate for military captives throughout the early
modern world. Indians who resisted acculturation violently were no longer the targets of
an English Christianizing mission – by the time of the Anglo-Powhatan War of 1644,
captives taken in wars with local natives were routinely sold to West Indian planters.100
Despite this escalating violence, however, the goal of Christianizing and assimilating
local natives persisted among some Virginians. Following in the footsteps of George
Thorpe and the failed Henrico College, a number of private individuals took up the
mission of Christianizing and acculturating Indians. London merchant Nicholas Farrar,

Owen Stanwood, “Captives and Slaves: Indian Labor, Cultural Conversion, and the Plantation
Revolution in Virginia,” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 114, no. 4 (2006): 434463.
99
BNA, CO 1/3/21.I.
100
Guasco, Slaves and Englishmen, 172-192.
98

79

for example, left a £300 legacy in his will for the Christianization and education of native
children. Virginia planter George Menefie took in a young native who was literate and
had been "well instructed in the principles of religion."101 Interactions like these,
however, were the exception in early colonial Virginia.
Whatever the intentions of would-be civilizers like Thorpe and Menefie, relations
between Virginia settlers and local Native Americans took on a warlike footing from an
early date. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of references to Natives Americans in
records before 1641 involve preparations for war – not a single Indian appears as a party
to a case or a witness in any Virginia courtroom in this early period of colonization. To
most early Virginians, the heathen natives who surrounded them could not be fellow
subjects. Indeed, at a General Court in April 1628, Governor Francis West and his
advisors decided to make a temporary peace with the Pamunky to provide the colony
with a "better opportunity to be revenged on them...not to make any peace or
dishonorable treaty." As part of this policy, the Court ordered that "none of them should
come to our Plantations."102 Virginia planters, facing a serious military threat, hoped to
keep contact with natives to a minimum.
Those few encounters that did take place were likely to be violent, and at least a
few ended in captivity and, possibly, slavery. Captain William Epps appeared before the
General Court in October 1626 with a "Weanoke Indian" who was "taken last spring at
Shirley-Hundred," likely captured in a raid on the plantation. Epps, a resident of
Virginia's Eastern Shore, was required to post a bond for the Native's good behavior if he
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brought him to his estate in what was then the frontier of Virginia settlement.
Furthermore, if Epps returned to Jamestown he was to deliver the Native to the governor
"to be imployed uppon any service."103 The record contains no other details about Epps'
native captive's status, but it is likely that he was understood to be a slave. The West
Indian natives brought to the colony in October 1627 by one Captain Sampson were
almost certainly slaves, but the General Court did not see them as Sampson's absolute
property. These Caribbean slaves, the Court believed, were a danger to the colony and
Sampson was "noe way or means to dispose" of them in Virginia. They had already
"stollen away divers goods, & attempted to kill” some English colonists. Perhaps fearing
a Spanish incursion, the Court even worried that these few Caribbean slaves "may
hereafter be a means to overthrow the whole Colony." These unfortunate native captives
were hanged without trial – they were clearly not subjects.104
Many of the same questions that had been raised regarding the possibility of
Native American slavery and subjecthood were raised by the arrival of the first Africans
in Virginia. The “twenty and odd” were purchased as slaves, the product of the growing
trans-Atlantic trade in Africans, but early English colonial slavery was remarkably
porous, based at least partially on the Christian mission to catechize and acculturate
strangers. Englishmen in Virginia, then, did not question whether the Africans they
bought were slaves – they assumed slavery to be a species of property, protected by
common law. The problem for English colonists was not slavery, but access to freedom
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and the rights of subjects. Once a slave was Christianized and freed, the logic of natural
subjecthood and early English colonialism seemed to dictate that Afro-Virginians should
be treated as fellow subjects of the empire, entitled to the basic protections of common
law. The famous cases of Anthony Johnson105 and Antonio Longo, free African
landowners in the 1640s, illustrate this potential for manumission and subjecthood in
early Virginia. Longo was so confident of his status that he actively contested the
authority of white colonists, even after he was summoned to testify in a suit between his
neighbors. “A Shitt of your warrant,” Longo declared, whereupon he physically
assaulted the men bearing the warrant for his appearance.106 Longo was behaving much
like any other English subject would – contesting judicial authority was a time-honored
English tradition – and was punished for contempt of court, just as any other subject
would be. Once slaves became freemen, the possibility of black subjecthood in the New
World collided with the social and economic imperatives of settler colonialism.
The court records of early Virginia are replete with African subjects like Johnson
and Longo. These early cases, before the outset of the English Civil War, illustrate the
importance of Christianization in attaining subjecthood and the extent of the legal rights
Afro-Virginians could claim. In the 1624 case of “John Phillip, a Negro,” Virginia’s
General Court ruled that Phillip was able to testify in court because he had “been
baptized in England twelve years since.” Despite his race, John Phillip was “qualified as
a free man and a Christian to give testimony” on the same basis as any other subject in
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Virginia.107 Black Virginians were also involved in one of the most common issues
facing early Virginia – fornication. Hugh Davis, a white colonist, was convicted of
“abusing himself to the dishonor of God and shame of Christianity by defiling his body in
lying with a negro.” To atone for his crime, Davis was “soundly whipt before an
assembly of negroes & others,” a typical punishment for fornication in early modern
England.108 The extant record does not specify Davis’ status, nor that of his African
lover – indeed one scholar hints that Davis’ real violation may have been engaging in
homosexual intercourse.109 Whatever the exact circumstances of their encounter, Davis
and his African lover were dealt with under the traditional English law of fornication.
Furthermore, the whipping of a white man before a crowd of “negroes and others”
illustrates the extent to which Africans could be integrated into the colonial community.
The public disciplining of a white colonist would have reinforced English behavioral
norms and promoted the further acculturation of black onlookers.110 Before long, such a
sight would be unimaginable in Virginia.
This is not, however, to say that all manumitted black Virginians were treated
with equality under law. In 1639, the Burgesses declared that “all persons except
Negroes” would be provided with arms and ammunition at the colony’s expense.111
Despite the continued threat of conflict with local natives, Virginia’s colonial legislators
apparently felt they could not rely on African strangers to assist in the community’s
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defense. The link between the right to bear arms and subjecthood was made even more
explicit in 1640, when the Assembly declared that only black freeholders could own
guns. Of course, most Afro-Virginians were slaves, and as such they received different
treatment than both white servants and free blacks. Re Emmanuel, heard by the General
Court in July 1640, decided the fates of seven runaways, six white and one, Emmanuel,
black. The physical punishments meted out to the runaways were common in English
law – Emmanuel and Christopher Miller, the Dutch servant who led the escape, were
required to wear shackles for one year; Peter Wilcocke, Richard Cockson, and Emmanuel
were publicly whipped and branded with an “R” on the cheek. In addition, the white
servants were sentenced to “serve the colony” for terms ranging from two to seven years.
Emmanuel’s sentence, however, did not include an extension of service, suggesting that
he was already a slave for life and could not make satisfaction for lost labor by addition
of time.112 Though he was likely a slave, Emmanuel was punished under the traditional
remedies provided by the English common law of master and servant – the fact of his
appearance in court suggests that even enslaved people were not subject solely to the
discretionary power of masters.
Another case heard by the General Court in the same month, re John Punch,
further illustrates both the cross-racial alliances typical of early Virginia runaways and
the tendency among Virginia elites to identify Africans with lifetime slavery. Punch had
absconded with Victor, a Dutch servant, and James Gregory, a Scot. Victor and Gregory
had a year’s service added to their original indentures and were required to serve the
colony three years. Punch, on the other hand, was sentenced to “serve his said master or
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his assigns for the time of his natural Life here or elsewhere” – he was a slave for life.113
Two intriguing elements emerge from this case. First, the extension of his service to his
natural life implies that Punch was not a slave before he ran away. Perhaps he had
entered into a contractual agreement with his master for a specific term of service. Or
maybe Punch had entered Virginia as a slave, been manumitted by his owner, and been
forced back into servitude by the limited economic opportunities available to early AfroVirginians. Either way, it appears that before his escape attempt he had enjoyed at least
some protection under common law – why else would his case have appeared before the
General Court and not been dealt with directly by his owner as later slave law would
allow? Second, re John Punch suggests the early tendency among Virginia elites to
identify African-ness with slavery. The court’s decision revoked Punch’s tenuous
freedom and transformed him from a rights-bearing subject into a heritable form of
property that would descend to his owner’s heirs. No Africans had been punished in this
way before in Virginia. To elites eager to make a fortune in the emerging plantation
economy, confirming African slaves as heritable properties was a crucial step in
stabilizing the labor force necessary for producing marketable Atlantic commodities.
Into the early 1640s, however, manumission was more common than it would
later become, and early Afro-Virginians clung tenaciously to their subjecthood. Even
after re Emmanuel and re John Punch, Afro-Virginians continued to appear as subjects
before the courts. In an October 1640 case, Robert Sweat was brought before the court
for fathering a child with the “negro woman servant” of one Lieutenant Robert Sheppard.
The details of Sweat’s dalliance are obscured by time – there is no way to know whether
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Sheppard’s black servant was a willing participant in their sexual encounter, nor the exact
details of her personal status – but the outcome of the case clearly illustrates that some
Afro-Virginians were still subject to English common law. Sweat’s black lover was
publicly whipped and required to “do public penance” before the congregation of James
City church, “according to the laws of England in that the case provided,” and Sweat
received similar punishment.114 In this case, the General Court explicitly invoked
English law in dealing with a breach of morality, and applied it to a white man and black
woman alike. Whether the female African servant in this case was a slave or not, she was
clearly being tried, convicted, and punished much as an English subject would be.
Perhaps the clearest illustration of the continued importance of black subjecthood
in early Virginia is a March 1641 case, re Graweere. In this case, John Graweere, a
“negro servant unto William Evans,” begged the court’s permission to purchase his child
from Lieutenant Sheppard, arguing that the child would “be made a Christian and be
brought up in the fear of God and the knowledge of religion taught and exercised by the
church of England.” Graweere likely knew that at least some of Virginia’s judges would
be sympathetic to his plea – it fit the lingering imperial mission of Christianization and
acculturation perfectly. He, at least, felt confident enough of his rights under common
law to approach the bench with his request. The General Court granted his petition,
ruling that “the said child shall be free from the said Evans or his assigns and to be and
remain at the disposing and education of the said Graweere.”115 As a free member of the
Church of England living within the English sovereign’s dominions, Graweere’s child
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would have been accounted a full subject, with all the rights and duties that subjecthood
implied. The sanctity of Graweere’s family, another right accorded to subjects, was also
confirmed by the decision. Perhaps Graweere’s relative prosperity – Sheppard confirmed
his ownership of several hogs to “make the best benefit thereof to himself” – convinced
the court that he was a contributing member of colonial society, deserving of protection
under law. Whatever their logic, the outcome of the case was clear. On the eve of the
English Civil War, at least some black Virginians could leave slavery and gain the rights
of an English subject.
For early Virginia colonists, then, the liberated slave became a subject, with
access to the rights, duties, and protections that adhered to all persons born within the
English sovereign's dominions. Despite the assumption that Africans imported to
Virginia were slaves, and thus a species of property, the logic of natural allegiance as
elucidated in Calvin’s Case dictated that all subjects, even manumitted slaves, lived
under the protection of the king’s justice. Regardless of personal status, subjects had the
right to appeal to the English courts for protection of their property and person. While
the rights that attached to a freehold or a royal liberty were certainly more extensive than
those claimed by servants and most former slaves, all Englishmen, at home and overseas,
were subjects. In the interstices of the early English empire, legal space existed where
the first generations of enslaved Virginians could gain freedom and make claims to
subjecthood. As England fell into a generation of Civil War and Revolution the question
of slavery would take on new urgency – freedom, subjecthood, and the claims that
accompanied them, would be increasingly contested by black and white Virginians. Five

87

hundred miles to the north, English colonists in Massachusetts faced similar questions of
slavery, subjecthood, and social order.
***
Just under a year after the first African slaves arrived in Virginia, another storied
group of migrants first set foot on the stony shores of Massachusetts. The Pilgrims, like
their fellow Puritans who would later settle the Massachusetts Bay colony, had their own
ideas about property ownership and the rights of English subjects, different from those of
the Virginia elite. The errand into the New England wilderness was a holy endeavor, a
utopian religious experiment in puritan social order. In the community of saints, all of
the elect would live in relative equality so long as they observed the strict code of
Calvinist morality. The Puritan founders of the New England colonies, hoping to enforce
the cultural uniformity that was essential to their utopian social vision, turned to the rule
of law to keep settlers in line – they were Englishmen after all.
To the Puritan elect, the true source of all just law was scripture, and they quickly
set about creating local courts, often citing Mosaic Law alongside common law in
policing their Calvinist utopia. Biblical injunctions informed the punishment of
fornicators, the regulation of wages and prices, and interactions with local Native
Americans. While Christian morality was certainly a crucial element of New England
settlement, Puritans also grappled with many of the same issues of property distribution,
personal status, and political subjecthood that Virginians faced. In contrast to Virginia's
absolutist, patriarchalist society, however, the "godly republicanism" of the
Massachusetts colonists dictated that all members of the community of saints share in the
governance of their holy community. Early puritan Massachusetts was, in many ways, a
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remarkably democratic society, a hothouse of anti-patriarchal thought, often to the
chagrin of more moderate magistrates like John Winthrop.116 The collision of puritan and
radical separatist ideologies of church governance, civil society, and the rights of subjects
in Massachusetts had profound implications for the future of slavery in New England.
Pilgrims and Puritans, however, were not the first to arrive in New England -- the
contours of early settlement were shaped by similar economic imperatives to those
driving the colonization of Virginia. West Country fishermen had been exploiting the
rich fisheries of the New England coast since the mid-16th century, often coming ashore
to dry their catch and truck with local natives. In 1606, merchants from Bristol and
Plymouth organized alongside their London counterparts and obtained a charter as the
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Virginia Company of Plymouth. They quickly set about constructing a settlement near
the Kennebec River that, they hoped, would capture a share of the booming fur trade
from the Dutch at New Amsterdam, the French in Canada, and their competitors in the
Virginia Company of London. Thanks in no small part to the efforts of Sir John Popham,
Lord Chief Justice of King's Bench, in acquiring royal patronage, the Plymouth Company
erected a trading fort at Sagadehoc, but a lack of investment from West Country
merchants and slow initial returns dogged the colony from the start. In 1608, the few
settlers who remained at Sagadehoc returned to England. By 1614, New England
settlement was isolated to a few short-term visits by fishing fleets at Monhegan Island
and the old Sagadehoc trading fort. According to Sir Ferdinando Gorges, one of the
primary planners of New England colonization, this first attempt at English settlement
was entirely "fruitless" – the Plymouth Company investors had no choice but to "sit down
with the losse [they] had already undergone."117
Gorges and other colonial planners, however, still hoped to reap a profit from the
North Atlantic fisheries and the growing fur trade, and moved to reorganize the Plymouth
Company as the Council for New England in 1619. As a number of scholars have noted,
Sir Ferdinando Gorges and the other Councilors hoped to construct a "feudal principality"
in the New World and to channel mercantile energies into "medieval institutional
forms."118 These feudal pretensions may have done much to shape the vision of men like
Gorges, but the structures of political and economic governance that were actually
established in early New England bore a striking resemblance to the absolutistpatriarchalist society of Virginia. Much like the earlier Virginia Company, whose charter
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placed authority in the hands of an appointed board of joint-stock investors, the Council
for New England was to be composed of 40 appointed nobles and gentlemen, who would
parcel out trading rights to local joint-stock companies in major West Country ports.119
The Council was granted power to install and remove "all and singular, Governors,
Officers, and Ministers" at will, and to "make, ordaine, and establish all Manner of
Orders, Laws, Directions, Instructions, Forms, and Ceremonies of Government and
Magistracy fitt and necessary for and concerning the Government of the said Collony and
Plantation," including the imposition of martial law.120
As in Virginia, the only stated limitation on the legislative power granted to the
Council by King James was a requirement that New England law "be not contrary to the
Laws and Statutes of this our Realme of England." Officials in New England were
empowered to "correct, punish, pardon, governe, and rule all...Subjects" in the king's
name and according the Council's instructions. In cases where instruction was lacking,
local magistrates were to proceed at "the good Discretions of the said Governors and
Officers...in Cases capitall and criminall, as civill, both maritime and others." The
charter asked only that these "Proceedings" remain "as near as conveniently may be" to
the "Laws, Statutes, Government and Policie of this our Realme of England," but did not
explicitly require the importation of English common law.121
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Significantly, and unlike even Virginia's 1619 charter revision, the Council's
charter did not call for a local assembly or representative body. The closest the Council
for New England came to authorizing such a body was a statement that colonial
householders might gather to "frame & make such lawes, and constitutions as by the
major part of ye assembled shall be thought fitt for the more peaceable Government of
those under them." These laws, however, were "all to be subordinate to ye Genl
Governmt & state there to be established" and would be in effect only "till other order
may be taken."122 Gorges and the other councilors clearly hoped that limiting access to
political subjecthood would keep ultimate political power back in the metropole, while
giving settlers enough legal leeway to generate their expected economic returns.
As had been the case in Virginia, the economic hopes of King James and the
notables on the Council for New England shaped property relations in early New
England. The 1620 charter gave the Council a monopoly in all fisheries and trade to New
England. Though the Council actively farmed out its mercantile monopoly to smaller
joint-stock companies, the terms of the charter guaranteed that much of the profit
generated by colonial trade would flow to the coffers of king and council. All colonial
property rights were vested directly in the Council "as of our Manor of East Greenwich,
in our County of Kent, in free and common Soccage and not in Capite, nor by Knight's
Service" as they had been in the earlier Virginia charter.123
Despite this initial denial of feudal encumbrances on property, however, the
predominance of nobles and gentry on the Council gave a decidedly aristocratic tinge to
social relations in early New England. The Council for New England hoped to farm out
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much of the real work of colonization to smaller mercantile companies in the major West
Country ports and to retain tight control over colonial property. Settlers already on the
ground were often given generous lease terms to compensate for the costs of settlement.
In 1631 for example, John Stratton was granted two thousand acres at Cape Porpus "in
respect that he had been in New England these 3 yeares last past and had espended £1000
in transporting of cattle and maintaining of servants." This grant, however, was not a
freehold as it was understood in English law, but a lease – Stratton would pay "11d. for
every hundred acres of Land in use by the yeare, when it shall be demanded by the RentGatherer," and could not "alyen ye same without consent full had and obtained."124
Gorges and his fellow councilors were absentee landlords, holding on to their rights to
valuable colonial properties granted by the crown while delegating the work of
colonization to merchants and settlers on the ground.
To promote the settlement of their lands, the Council was also empowered to
transport "all such and so many of our loveing Subjects, or any other Strangers that will
become our loving Subjects, and live under our Allegiance" to New England. The
notable exceptions to this liberal transportation policy were those who adhered to the
"Superstition of the Chh of Rome." No Catholics were to migrate to New England.
Indeed, the charter required that all persons migrating to New England take the Oath of
Supremacy acknowledging the Church of England, and empowered the Council to
administer the oath to colonists.125 The charter also empowered the Council to
"distribute, convey, assigne, and sett over" lands to "our loveing Subjects, naturally borne
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or Denisons, or others, as well Adventurers as Planters."126 While the Council rarely
conveyed land directly to settlers as freeholds, the terms of the charter itself were
relatively liberal in extending property rights, and the possibility of subjecthood, to
settlers other than natural born subjects. In England, denizens could not own freehold
property outright – the estates of endenized Englishmen reverted to the crown at death.
Unlike in Virginia after its 1619 rechartering, however, few "strangers" were naturalized
in New England and the estates of endenized foreigners reverted to the Council upon
their deaths.
This was all perfectly in keeping with the vision Gorges and his fellow councilors
had laid out for New England colonization. By maintaining tight control over colonial
property rights and limiting the access of on-the-ground settlers to political authority,
they hoped to build not the feudal society posited by some scholars -- that was already an
anachronism back in England – but a hierarchical, absolutist, patriarchalist colony that
would both enrich and empower the king and his favorites. Had Gorges and the Council
succeeded in settling a viable colony in New England, their political and economic vision
may have created a colony much like Virginia, with relatively few property owners and
widespread use of bound labor. Few settlers made their way to New England under the
Council's auspices, however, and many of the new settlers who did begin to arrive in the
1620s and '30s did not share the imperial political vision of King James, Ferdinando
Gorges, and the Council for New England. These Pilgrims and Puritans would prove to
be a persistent challenge to the Council's plans, and repeated conflicts between their
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imperial visions would play a crucial role in determining the boundaries of slavery and
subjecthood in Massachusetts.
The Leiden separatists who would go down in history as the Mayflower Pilgrims
did not initially set out to colonize Massachusetts, and only a series of unlikely events
brought them to Cape Cod in 1620. Seeking a safe place to practice their peculiarly antiauthoritarian brand of Calvinist Christianity, they first relocated to Leiden in the
Netherlands. By 1617 a variety of factors left some of the English separatists dissatisfied
with the Low Countries, and they began to investigate options for relocating to Virginia.
James I's reservations about the separatists' loyalty, ongoing debates within the Virginia
Company over corporate restructuring, and the reluctance or penury of many potential
settlers nearly scuttled the venture, but in 1620 the Leiden separatists finally received a
patent from the Virginia Company of London to settle the northern region of the colony,
in what is today New Jersey. The would-be Pilgrims would be employees of the Virginia
Company, laying the initial groundwork of a new settlement that, investors hoped, would
soon siphon off some of the fur trade flowing to Dutch New Amsterdam. At the close of
seven years, the Company would take a half share in all developed properties as
compensation for the initial funding of the colony. In return, the few sympathetic
puritans on the Virginia Council would work to divert suspicion or hostility from the king
and his supporters among the shareholders, allowing the Pilgrims a degree of toleration in
church governance and practice.127
As circumstance would have it, all of this trouble was for naught – the Pilgrims
landed not in Virginia but New England. There they settled on the shores of Cape Cod,
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dubbing their colony New Plymouth. Without a patent from the Council for New
England, the Pilgrims' legal claims to settlement were as shaky as their prospects for
survival in the earliest years at Plymouth. The Council, however, seems to have
welcomed the presence of settlers who planned to stay in New England permanently.
Perhaps they hoped, as the Virginia Company had, that the Pilgrims would serve as a
conduit to the fur trade. Either way, Gorges and the council did not challenge their
presence, nor scrutinize their religious practice closely enough to raise any objections.
When William Bradford finally obtained a patent from the Council for New England in
1629, the Council for New England praised the efforts of the Pilgrims in "soe pious a
worke which may especially tend to the propagation of religion and the great increase of
trade." The Plymouth settlers were empowered to "frame, and make orders ordinances
and constitucons...for the better governmente of their affairs," and to take whatever steps
they deemed necessary for the "preservacon of the peace [and] suppressinge of tumults,"
but the Council reserved the power to hear "matters of justice by appeal uppon spetiall
occasion." The patent required only that laws made in Plymouth "be not repugnante to
the lawes of England."128
This perfectly typical patent masked the radical religious and social program the
Pilgrims were already implementing in Plymouth. The famous Mayflower Compact,
signed as the Pilgrims sat anchored off Cape Cod, stated that the settlers agreed to
"covenant and combine...together into a civil Body Politick" vested with authority to
"enact, constitute, and frame such just and equal Laws, Ordinances, Acts, Constitutions,
and Officers" as would most promote the "general Good" of the settlement, all of which
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was confirmed and legitimated by the 1629 patent. Despite their claims to be "Loyal
Subjects of our dread Sovereign Lord King James," however, the structures of
governance in church and state erected by the Pilgrims ran directly counter to early Stuart
policies.129 As early as 1625, poor economic returns and allegations that the settlers
"condemned all other churches, and persons but [themselves]" had convinced a number
of investors to withdraw from the Plymouth Company. These charges against the
Pilgrims were well founded – Plymouth church members refused their consent to a
minister sent to them by the Company because he believed the Church of England was a
true church, that it was "lawfull, and hee would not renounce it."130 Charges of nonconformity and sedition would continue to dog the Pilgrims and even the more moderate
Puritans who followed them throughout the early 17th century.
The differences between the Massachusetts Bay colonists and the Pilgrims
mirrored those between moderate, magisterial reformers and radical Puritans back in
England. While these were mainly differences of degree rather than of kind, they would
have myriad implications for structures of governance in church and state, the orientation
of settler communities toward local Natives, and ideals of subjecthood and social
inclusion. Much like the Virginia and Plymouth colonies, Massachusetts Bay began as a
corporate colony. The Massachusetts Bay Company received a patent from the Council
for New England to settle a colony between the Merrimack and Charles Rivers on
Massachusetts Bay in late 1628 and immediately sent a handful of settlers to secure their
claim. Leading planners were worried about conflicting grants, however, and applied to
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Charles I for a new charter, which they received in April 1629. The charter issued to the
Massachusetts Bay colonists was identical in nearly every way to those granted to the
Virginia and Plymouth colonists: land was granted to the company "as of our Mannor of
Eastgreenwich, in the County of Kent, in free and comon [sic] Socage, and not in Capite,
nor by Knightes Service"; the governor, deputy, and assistants were to be "elected and
chosen out of the Freemen of the saide Company"; four General Court meetings were to
be held annually for the "handling, ordering, and dispatching" of all Company business;
and the Company was empowered to "make Lawes and Ordinnces...for the Government
and ordering of the saide Landes...and the People inhabiting" them, so long, of course, as
these laws "be not contrarie or repugnant" to the law of England.131
Very quickly, however, it became apparent that the Massachusetts Bay charter
was unique, not in its language but in its location. Shortly after obtaining their patent, the
directors of the Massachusetts Bay Company voted to transfer the seat of company
governance to New England and, crucially, to bring their patent with them to
Massachusetts. The planners of the Massachusetts Bay colony, after all, intended to
frame their ecclesiastical government in ways that were explicitly "contrarie" to English
law.132 They were also well aware of the increasingly anti-Puritan inclinations of their

131

Thorpe, Charters, III:1846-1860.
An impressive roster prominent Puritans and opponents of Stuart absolutism came to New England
during this first wave of the Great Migration, including the weighty Puritan merchants Sir Richard
Saltonstall, John Endecott, and Theophilus Eaton; future Fifth Monarchist learder William Aspinwall;
and Sir Henry Vane, the future regicide and leader of the Independents during the Long Parliament. As
this list of prominent Massachusetts settlers suggests, it was clear from the outset that the Massachusetts
Bay colony would not conform strictly to Anglican practice. John Winthrop wrote of the colony's first
minister, George Phillips, that he was "acquainted with the way of church discipline, since owned by
Congregational churches." The colonists' choice of Phillips as their minister illustrates that they intended
to erect non-conformist churches from the very outset of colonization. See John Winthrop, History of
New England, James Kendall Hosmer, ed. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1908), I:37 [hereinafter
cited as Wintrhop, Journal]. See also Winship, Godly Republicanism, for the influence of radical
separatist ideology on early Massachusetts church governance.

132

98

new monarch, Charles I. Since taking the throne in 1625, Charles had outstripped even
his father's absolutist pretensions, dismissing judges who displeased him without cause,
quashing Parliament's Petition of Right in 1628, implementing his own personal rule by
dismissing Parliament in 1629, and imposing the reviled Ship Money tax on inland towns
to fill his royal treasury. Worse yet, Charles' new Archbishop of Canterbury, William
Laud, inaugurated a new era of religious persecution, dragging non-conformists before
the High Commission and Court of Star Chamber. Puritans, as John Wintrhop put it, saw
"some evil days to come upon England," and fled in the Great Migration of the 1630s, in
which thousands of Puritans followed the Massachusetts Bay charter across the Atlantic
to the New World.133
The society these migrants hoped to create was based on a radical vision of
Christian fellowship. To the Puritans, the ultimate goal of their city on a hill was to
construct a viable society based on the primitive Christian church, where all visible saints
would have a share in church governance.134 This was not, however, solely a religious
vision, and Massachusetts colonists structured property relations in the colony to mirror
the general equality of their churches. Unlike their Virginia cousins and most
Englishmen, Massachusetts Puritans generally practiced partible inheritance rather than
primogeniture. Under this system, all male heirs received an equal portion of the estate,
"according to the law of God," with a double share reserved for the eldest son.135 This
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had the dual benefit of providing more men with the qualifications for political
subjecthood, enabling them to participate fully in church governance, and establishing a
strong material basis for the moral life Puritans hoped to live.136 The Plymouth
separatists codified their use of partible inheritance in 1635, and Massachusetts Bay
followed suit with their own statute in 1636.137 Within individual households, of course,
fathers retained authority over their wives, children, and servants, but relatively
widespread access to property meant that many individuals would go on to build
independent households of their own and participate fully in church and state
governance.138 Especially in comparison with the social basis for Stuart absolutism in
England, and the patriarchalist colonial state under construction in Virginia,
Massachusetts fostered a degree of political and social equality rarely seen in the early
modern world.
The Puritans' rough social equality found expression in early modes of political
governance. Under the terms of their patent, the General Court of the Massachusetts Bay
Company was empowered to legislate for the colony and hold courts to police colonists'
behavior and settle disputes. The Council for New England, however, likely assumed
that the Massachusetts Bay Company would oversee the colony from England, where the
king and Council could supervise its activities. With the charter removed to New

"Primogeniture and Entailed Estates in America," Columbia Law Review, vol. 27, no. 1 (January 1927):
24-51.
136
T. H. Breen and Stephen Foster, "The Puritans' Greatest Achievement: A Study of Social Cohesion in
Seventeenth-Ceuntury Massachusetts," Journal of American History, vol. 60, no. 1 (June 1973): 5-22.
137
Morris, "Primogeniture and Entailed Estates," 28-34. The Plymouth statute also guaranteed widows
use-rights to one-third of their husband's estate, and outright ownership of one-third of his personal
property.
138
See Morgan, The Puritan Family; Cornelia Hughes Dayton, "Was There a Calvinist Type of
Patriarchy?: New Haven Colony Reconsidered in the Early Modern Context," in Christopher L. Tomlins
and Bruce H. Mann, eds. The Many Legalities of Early America, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North
Carolina Press, 2001), 337-356.

100

England, however, Massachusetts colonists began to interpret their royal grant in
innovative ways. The patent's clause empowering the General Court to "choose,
nominate, and appointe, such and so many others as they shall thinke fitt" to be freemen
of the Company – standard language included in most charters to allow new investors to
join the company – bolstered the colonists' broad view of subjecthood. Rules for
company elections were laid out in boilerplate language, but with the charter in
Massachusetts and so many freemen admitted to full political subjecthood, they became
the basis for an unprecedented experiment in participatory, consent-based governance.139
In 1631 and 1632, repeated disputes arose between Governor John Winthrop and
the locally elected Assistants over the proper limits to the power of the governor and
General Court. Deputy Governor Thomas Dudley, who wished to see the Assistants
vested with more power, alleged "in [a] passion" that Winthrop "had no more authority
than every assistant," and had attempted to "make himself popular, that he might gain
absolute power, and bring the assistants under his subjection." Winthrop countered that
the company patent "gave him whatsoever power belonged to a governour by common
law or the statutes," and pointed out that he had already proposed a measure in the
General Court that would limit the powers of the governor.140 While Winthrop and some
of his allies were wary of extending the sphere of political subjecthood too far, the
influence of radical separatist church organization and the rough social equality of the
settlers made them confident that the visible saints among them were capable of
participating in making, or at least giving their consent to, political decisions.
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At the local level, governance took the form of the famous New England town
meeting, where all freemen (adult male property-owning church members) assembled in
the town's church or meetinghouse to participate in the selection of assistants, election of
ministers, and resolution of disputes.141 The town meetings were notoriously democratic
affairs. Each town's militia elected its own officers. Labor was tightly regulated, and
towns retained the power to “warn out” uninvited settlers to prevent a drain on town
resources and prevent competition with town born workers on the local labor market.
The local freemen also had control over their town's land, and were responsible for its
distribution to settlers. This function of local town governance was of the utmost
importance, especially given Massachusetts settlers' preference for partible inheritance.
Each new round of generational estate descents would subdivide existing landholdings,
so control over access to new lands was hotly contested.142
Even here, however, the democratic culture of early Massachusetts is evident. On
11 December 1634, when the first Boston selectmen were chosen, for example, many
worried that "the richer men would give the poor no great proportions of land." Though
Winthrop and newly appointed minister John Cotton persuaded the "inferior sort" to
accept the election of local notables, including Winthrop, they did so from a particularly
Puritan logic. Winthrop argued that "it would be very prejudicial to the commonwealth"
if some land were not held aside for future immigrants while others held property they
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could not fruitfully use, "more than to please the eye with it."143 While Winthrop's
magisterial vision convinced him that it was best not to allow Massachusetts society to be
come too democratic, the ultimate aim of this accretion of power was to lay a solid
foundation for future participation by the broad mass of settlers.
Almost immediately, this innovative social and political system came under attack
both from within and without. Internal problems arose when the magisterial vision of
moderate puritans like John Winthrop collided with more radically democratic forms of
church governance coming from the Pilgrims at Plymouth and radicals in the parishes at
Watertown and Salem. The first clash came in February of 1632, when the Watertown
congregation refused to contribute to a general levy for colonial fortifications. "The
ground of their error," said Governor Winthrop, "was, for that they took this government
to be no other but as of a mayor and aldermen, who have not power to make laws or raise
taxations without the people." For their part, the Watertown congregants feared that, if
they passively obeyed the General Court, they would bring "themselves and posterity into
bondage."144 To make matters worse, "some indiscreet persons" among the colonists
were writing letters back to England describing the prevailing sentiment "against the
church government in England" and describing in detail the methods of church and state
governance employed in New England.145 Though allies back in England were able to
keep this incident from raising too much negative attention, it was but a glimpse of the
turmoil to come.
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Historians have long noted how the arrival of radical Puritans, commonly referred
to as antinomians, raised prickly theological questions and challenged the authority of
local magistrates over church governance.146 What has less commonly been emphasized,
however, is the political nature of the antinomian controversy. From his arrival in 1631,
Roger Williams was a persistent political threat to the magisterial vision of Winthrop and
his supporters. True, the crux of the issue was theological – Williams opposed the power
of civil magistrates to dictate forms of church governance and charged that moderate
Puritans communed with a false church by not sufficiently denouncing the Church of
England – but the implications of the antinomian critique for civil governance were
manifestly political. Williams' criticism of Massachusetts’ colonial state ran the gamut:
he argued that elected magistrates had no power to enforce the Sabbath or tender oaths to
the "unregenerate"147; he questioned the legitimacy of the settlers' patent, arguing that
"they could have no title, nor otherwise, except they compounded with the natives"148; he
openly condemned Massachusetts congregations that did not "make a publick declaration
of their repentance" for communion with the Anglican Church.149
All of these positions directly threatened the existence of the Bay Colony,
especially given Charles I's increasingly anti-Puritan policies. Winthrop and his
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supporters were in a tricky position – in spirit, they were at least mildly receptive to much
of the antinomian critique, but they knew that unsympathetic eyes back in England were
fixed upon their city on a hill. Williams' allegation that the settlers’ patent was
illegitimate directly called into question the power of the king to dispose of his dominions
as he saw fit. His denunciations of the Church of England stoked fears back in England
about Massachusetts' theological heterodoxy. His critique of the magistracy suggested a
radically democratic view of political society that, royalists suggested, was ascendant
throughout New England. It is in this light that Winthrop's response to settlers like Roger
Williams must be understood. He was forced to navigate between the Scylla of local
antinomian opposition and the Charybdis of royalist threats to Massachusetts' continued
existence.150
Before long, the rising chorus of complaints about heterodox Massachusetts
governance caught the ear of Ferdinando Gorges and the Council for New England.
Thomas Morton, who had settled in the Massachusetts Bay under the aegis of the Council
for New England, despised the growing power of the Puritans, and had been banished
from the colony by the General Court, leveled a string of serious accusations against the
Puritan colonists. Morton alleged that the colonists "inten[ded] rebellion." They had
willfully "cast off [their] allegiance" and were "wholly separate from the church and laws
of England." The ministers in New England, according to Morton, "continually rail
against the state, church and bishops" in England, the very crimes for which many
English Puritans found themselves dragged before Laud's High Commission.151 The
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Massachusetts colonists, according to their detractors, were not behaving like English
subjects, and had therefore abrogated the protections subjecthood afforded them.
Luckily, the Massachusetts colonists had able allies as well. Edward Howes was sensible
that Puritan colonists could use "some hearty and able friends at court," and told John
Winthrop, Jr. that he would undertake the study of law at the Inns of Court to support
"the good and welfare of your plantation and state."152 Other friends back in England
advised the Puritans "that the prayers for our king not be neglected in any of your publick
meetings" and "that [they] differ no more from [the Church of England] in church
government" than absolutely necessary.153
Emboldened by internal divisions in Massachusetts and the string of charges
being leveled against the Puritan colonists, Ferdinando Gorges and the Council for New
England, who Winthrop believed "aimed at the general government of New England,"
sought to vacate the Massachusetts patent in April 1634.154 Gorges claimed that the
Puritan colonists, though "presenting the name of honest & religious men," had
"surriptitiously gotten...other lands" than those confirmed in their patent. Worse yet, they
"wholy excluded themselves from the publique Governmt of ye Countrie...and made
themselves a free People." The Puritans were seditious innovators who "framed unto
themselves both new laws & new concepts of matters of Religion & forms of
ecclesiasticall & temporall Orders & Governmt." All this, Gorges argued, they had done
"partly through other pretences though indeed for no other cause save only to make
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themselves absolute Masters of the Country."155 The solution was clear – King Charles
must void the settlers' charter and take direct control of the colony. Charles and his
Council were more than happy to cast their support with Gorges against the dangerous
Puritan settlement and sent orders for the return of the charter to England, but events
would illustrate just how far Massachusetts' settlers were willing to go to protect their
utopian society.
When the news of the council's order calling in their charter arrived in July 1634,
Winthrop and his allies, demonstrating their commitment to local consent, decided that
"it should not be done but by a General court," which would not meet until September.
Just before the Court met, rumors swirled that a new governor was to be sent by King
Charles to govern the colony in his name. John Cotton responded to this threat with a
rousing sermon, declaring that it was "the people's duty and right to maintain their true
liberties against any unjust violence."156 On September 18th, the General Court
announced the dreaded news – a new Commission for Regulating Plantations had been
created by the king, chaired by the reviled Archbishop Laud, "to call in all patents, to
make laws, to raise tythes and portions for [Anglican] ministers, to remove and punish
governours, and to hear and determine all causes, and inflict all punishments, even death
itself." Letters accompanying the orders assured the settlers that this innovative
extension of absolute royal authority was "intended specially" to punish recalcitrant
Massachusetts Puritans. A force was being assembled to "compel [Massachusetts], by
force, to receive a new governour, and the discipline of the church of England, and the
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laws of the commissioners."157 To Massachusetts settlers, with their firm belief in
consent-based governance, this order stripped them of their rights as subjects. In
response, the Bay Colony geared up for war. New fortifications were built to protect
settlements and St. George's cross, the king's ensign, was removed from the colors that
flew over the forts.158
While they prepared for a fight on the one hand, Winthrop and his allies also
hoped to appease the new commission by a show of their loyalty. It was precisely during
this imperial constitutional crisis that the moderate crackdown on Williams and the
antinomians ramped up. While tacitly approving of the defacement of the king's colors,
Winthrop wrote back to England expressing his "dislike of the thing," promising to seek
out and punish the offenders, but hedged by arguing that the use of a cross in an ensign
was "very unlawfull."159 When Roger Williams was finally banished from Massachusetts
in October 1635, after numerous failed attempts by Winthrop and other moderate leaders
to bring him to heel, it was as a last resort. Williams, who in Winthrop's eyes had
become "very dangerous," was not banished because his beliefs were wildly out of step
with those of most other Massachusetts settlers – indeed, Winthrop himself came to
approve of removing St. George's Cross from the imperial standard and hewed far closer
to Williams' position in church and civil governance than he could safely admit. Instead,
Roger Williams was banished because his unwillingness to compromise on principle
endangered the future of Puritan settlement in Massachusetts.160
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In the event, the ship that was to carry the new governor to the colonies
foundered, and Massachusetts was saved, at least for the moment. In theory, all of
England's colonial possessdions were to be consolidated into twelve provinces, each
ruled over by a proprietor back in England. But, as Winthrop noted with relief, "the
project took no effect. The Lord frustrated their design."161 Though the immediate threat
had passed, Winthrop was aware that Massachusetts remained a target because of its
heterodox religious and political positions. Though Roger Williams himself was gone,
his opinions lived on in the Bay Colony. Winthrop and other magistrates continued to
grapple with antinomian opposition to their power but, as long as their opinions were not
"scandalous" and did not attract unwanted attention from imperial planners, the
moderates and radicals ought "to bear each with other."162 Leading Puritans knew that
they walked a fine line between being true to their consciences and open rebellion to the
king, and did everything in their power to protect their holy society both from internal
dissension and absolute imperial control.
It is in this political and social context that the position of both radical and
moderate Puritans toward slavery becomes intelligible. Despite recent claims that
Puritanism was somehow "preset for racism,"163 there was a strong egalitarian strand in
Calvinist thought that militated against permanent racial slavery.164 To Puritans, the
litmus test for social inclusion was not race but religiosity. Though they differed in
modes of organization for their individual churches, the Pilgrims and Massachusetts Bay
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colonists agreed that all of the saved should have the ability to participate in true
churches, and saving souls was the prime animating force behind their colonial project.
New England Puritans, despite their eventual failures, seem to have genuinely hoped to
convert local Natives and, to some extent, to assimilate them into their religious and
social experiment. Though there were very few Africans in New England before 1640,
there is no evidence to suggest that Puritans would have excluded anyone who converted
and conformed to strict New England morality on purely racial grounds. This is not, of
course, to say that Massachusetts colonists disregarded all distinctions of rank, or that
race played no role in the development of New England society. Individual households
continued to be patriarchally organized, and only property-owning male church members
could participate fully in colonial politics.165 But patriarchy on the household level or the
racism of individual settlers did not necessitate patriarchalism in social organization –
partible inheritance, consent-based forms of political organization, and widespread access
to legal subjecthood combined to make Massachusetts one of the most democratic
societies on earth in the 1630s.166 And while individual settlers certainly exhibited a
great deal of hostility toward Native Americans, and later Africans, these individual
biases would not become institutionalized, as they were in Virginia.
Still, under Massachusetts' peculiar brand of Puritan patriarchy, heads-ofhousehold and magistrates were to play a crucial role in policing behavior and morality.
This close invigilation of individual behavior began even before the settlers disembarked
in the New World. A servant who tricked a young migrant out of his rations and sold
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them to other servants on board had his "hands...tied up to a bar," had "a basket with
stones [hung] about his neck," and was forced to do public penance on the Arbella's deck
for two hours.167 One Phillip Ratcliff, a servant sent over by former company governor
Matthew Craddock, was convicted of "scandalous invectives" against Massachusetts'
government and churches and was punished with whipping, ear cropping, and
banishment.168 One servant was so terrified of the possibility of punishment for stealing
from his master that he "went and hanged himself" with a fishing line – sadly, a letter
from his father bearing money to purchase his freedom arrived that very day. 169
For particularly recalcitrant Puritans, Massachusetts had an especially harsh
punishment – penal bondage. Those who continued in a life of sin, despite the best
efforts of ministers, magistrates, and masters, were to be bound out to local church
members. Ideally, the example of god-fearing Puritan families would awaken the sinner
to his or her faults and, once they proved that they could walk in the path of
righteousness, their bondage would end and they would rejoin the community of saints.
In 1638, for example, William Androws was sentenced be whipped and bound out "to
whom the Court shall appoint" for an unknown offense. Only a year later, however, he
was released from penal bondage for "good carriage" and voluntarily entered into an
indenture with a new master.170 In the 1639 case re Dickerson, the General Court
sentenced a settler to penal bondage for theft until double restitution was made.171 A year
later one Thomas Savory was whipped and sentenced to bond servitude for theft.172 In
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each case, the goal of penal bondage was to rehabilitate the sinner, holding him in
bondage only until he or she proved their fitness for inclusion in Puritan society.
Episodes like these, however, seem to have been the exception rather than the
norm. Massachusetts' early economy had little need for widespread use of servitude.
Most settlers migrated in family groups and, because landholdings were typically small,
could profitably run their farms without employing servants. Of the approximately
twenty one thousand migrants who came to Massachusetts during the Great Migration,
only about one-quarter came as servants, compared to a clear majority in the
Chesapeake.173 The few servants who did arrive in the colony were often familiar with
the families they served – many were sons and daughters of fellow Puritans back in
England who could not afford their own passage. The evidence suggests that most
Massachusetts servants, unlike their cousins in Virginia, survived their indentures and
were absorbed into Massachusetts society. Indeed, Puritan masters saw many
"testimonies of the Lord's gracious presence" in the good behavior of their servants. One
fourteen year old boy who for years had gone about "mourning and languishing" for fear
of his sins, came to have a conversion experience and was received into his local
congregation. John Winthrop noted that, since his conversion, the lad "went cheerfully in
a Christian course, falling daily to [his] labour."174 This was, ideally, the path that even
the most recalcitrant Massachusetts servants would take – come to know the saving
power of God through the example of the families they served, live an upright life and
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serve faithfully in their calling, and eventually become church members and participate in
the community.175
The impulse to conversion and inclusion seems to have guided New England
settlers' early interactions with Native Americans as well. Both the Plymouth and
Massachusetts Bay colonies' charters included clauses indicating that the "principall
Effect" expected of colonization was "the Conversion and Reduction of the People in
those Parts unto the true Worship of God and Christian Religion."176 Given the holy aim
of their colony, there is little reason to doubt that settlers earnestly desired the conversion
of local natives. The actions of many of the leading figures in Plymouth and
Massachusetts Bay toward the Indians certainly indicate that they initially desired
peaceful relations that would, in time, lead to conversions. Edward Winslow for
example, one of the Mayflower Pilgrims and future governor of Plymouth, built a strong
relationship with Massasoit, sachem of the Wampanoag, and steadfastly worked to
improve relations between settlers and local natives.177 Almost immediately upon his
arrival in Massachusetts, John Winthrop also worked to put English/Native relations on a
peaceful footing. In March 1631, for example, Winthrop met with a local sachem named
Chickatabot. The governor gave Chickatabot a suit of English clothes, dined with the
sachem and his entourage, and left the meeting impressed. Chickatabot, Winthrop
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thought, "behaved himself as soberly...as an Englishman."178 The Puritan governor had
reason to be optimistic about future relations – at their third meeting, Chickatabot "would
not eat till the governour had given thanks, and after meat he desired him to do the
like."179 These early encounters likely reinforced the Puritans' belief that local natives
would convert to Christianity and become willing partners in English colonization.
Even before the growth of John Eliot's famous "praying Indian" towns in the
1640s, there were indications that some local Natives were at least somewhat interested
in learning about Christianity. When a terrible epidemic of smallpox decimated local
native populations in the fall and winter of 1633, some Indians turned to the English for
help. John Sagamore, an important go-between for Winthrop and local native leaders,
was one of those who fell ill. Sagamore "desired to be brought among the English" and
asked that Mr. Wilson, minister of the Boston church, care for his son in the event if his
death. He promised that, if he survived his illness, he would "live with the English and
serve their God," and when he finally succumbed on December 5th, Sagamore "died in
persuasion that he should go to the Englishmen's God." Other of John Sagamore's people
also "confessed that the Englishmen's God was a good God" and promised to convert if
they recovered. Few survived the terrible epidemic, but those who did were, according to
Winthrop, moved by the actions of the English who, "when their own people forsook
them...came daily and ministered to them." Many of the survivors were children who
were taken in by English families, including one, christened as "Know-God" who lived
with Governor Winthrop and his family.180 At least some early Massachusetts colonists,
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then, were genuinely committed to the Christianization of local natives and hoped to
build positive relationships that would lead to conversion.
In return for their cooperation, natives were generally treated with relative
equanimity in Massachusetts courts, and local Indians often turned to English law to
press claims on the settler state. Indeed, the case of Thomas Morton that drew the
attention of Ferdinando Gorges and caused so much trouble for Winthrop began when the
Massachusetts governor protected the rights of local natives. Morton, who stole a canoe
and many valuable trade goods from local natives, was severely punished by the General
Court. He was banished from the colony, his goods seized to repay the Natives and
defray the cost of his transportation back to England, and his house was "burnt down to
the ground in sight of the Indians, for their satisfaction for many wrongs he has done to
them." Winthrop, ever ready to display the righteousness of his colony to local natives,
assured them that "the habitation of the wicked should no more appear in Israel."181
Morton, of course, was a political enemy of the Puritan colony, and his banishment was
likely a foregone conclusion. Still, the lengths to which Winthrop was willing to go to
satisfy local natives is noteworthy, especially when compared to relations between
Natives and English settlers in Virginia.
Morton's punishment, while perhaps extreme in its severity, suggests that local
Native Americans were often treated as relative equals under law by Massachusetts
colonists, at least in the earliest days of settlement. For their part, Natives came to
understand that they could sometimes protect themselves from grasping colonists by
making claims in Massachusetts' courts. Perhaps they heard about the reverence of
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Englishmen for the law from Jack Straw, a local Indian who had travelled with Sir Walter
Raleigh and spent time in England.182 Whatever their introduction to English courts,
natives quickly learned to use them to redress grievances with Massachusetts colonists.
In September 1631, for example, a young man was publically whipped for "soliciting an
Indian squaw to incontinency." The woman and her husband had "complained of the
wrong" to Massachusetts magistrates and were present for the trial and punishment, with
which they were "very well satisfied."183 Later that same month a settler named Josias
Plaistowe was censured by the General Court along with two of his servants. The men
were found guilty of stealing corn from Chickatabot, Governor Winthrop's ally.
Plaistowe was required to pay dual restitution to Chickatabot, fined £5 by the court, and
"degraded from the title of a gentleman." The servants were whipped while Chickatabot
and his men looked on.184
Puritan justice was exacting, however, and Natives were also charged with crimes
by Massachusetts authorities. Despite their heathenism, it seems early colonial courts
dealt with Indians in much the same way as they did Puritan settlers. In June 1631, for
example, John Sagamore and Chickatabot "made satisfaction" for "injuries" done to a
settler's cattle – another native was ordered to pay one beaver skin in restitution for
shooting a colonist's pig.185 Winthrop and other leading Puritan colonists hoped that
treating local natives with equanimity would build peaceful relations and lead at least
some natives to conversion, and the just treatment of natives in early Massachusetts
courts was a crucial element of this strategy. True, they did not go as far as Roger
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Williams, who claimed that natives retained all rights to land in New England unless they
agreed to sell it to English settlers, but they could not yet imagine treating natives as
unredeemable others incapable of coexisting with Puritan colonists.186
Unfortunately for local Native Americans, this initial peace was not to last. Part
of the problem was internal to Puritan colonization. To ensure that as many church
members as possible would have access to land, in 1633 the General Court ruled that any
land not cultivated by local natives was open to any who would settle and improve it.187
As estates were subdivided through partible inheritance the land crunch grew even more
severe, and pressure on settler/native relations increased. Inter-tribal native politics
exacerbated the problem. As scholars have recently pointed out, English colonists
stepped into a tense and fractious native political scene when they arrived in
Massachusetts.188 Local tribes looked to the English as key allies in longstanding
conflicts with powerful native enemies, like the Pequots and Narragansetts to the south,
and the powerful Mohegans to the north. When these conflicts erupted into open
violence, the Puritans were placed in a difficult position. In April 1632, there was "a
broil" between English settlers and a party of Narragansett Indians, who attacked the
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settlement at Sowamset where they believed the English were sheltering Massasoit, their
enemy.189
As tensions built throughout the summer and rumors of a Narragansett attack on
Massachusetts swirled, colonists began to turn on local Natives. Massachusetts settlers
were prohibited to sell or trade arms and ammunition with natives – one colonist who
violated this order was publicly whipped and branded.190 The terrible smallpox epidemic
in 1633-4 and a treaty with the Pequot Indians in November 1634 seemed to settle things
for the moment. The Pequots, who were "now in war with the Naragansetts...and
likewise the Dutch" seemed natural allies to the Puritans, who feared the nearby
Narragansetts and hoped to quash Dutch claims in the region. The treaty stated that
Massachusetts and the Pequot nation would "be at peace...and as friends to trade" but did
not require the English settlers to join the war against the Narragansetts.191 Under the
terms of this treaty, Massachusetts colonists were able to broker a peace between the
Pequot and Narragansett that, while it ended one round of intra-native conflict, ultimately
led to the Pequot War.
This peace brokered by the English settlers between the Pequot and Narragansett
set in motion a series of events that culminated in the Pequot War of 1637. Throughout
1635, the Pequot, despite their treaty with the Massachusetts colonists, proposed that the
Narragansett join them in a pan-Indian alliance against the English. Instead the
Narragansett, seeing an opportunity to destroy their long-time enemy, joined in an
alliance with the English settlers to wage war against the Pequot nation. When it finally
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arrived in March of 1637, the Pequot War was a bloody affair on all sides. Raids on the
Connecticut frontier killed at least five percent of the English population there, and the
combined English-Narragansett-Mohegan force that attacked the Pequot settlement at
Fort Mystic killed between 300 and 700 men, women, and children.192
Many of the Pequot who were not killed outright in the war were claimed as
slaves. European law had long recognized the theoretical right of victors to enslave war
captives and, since the Pequot captives were heathens, proscriptions against enslaving
fellow Christians would not apply.193 Over 300 Pequot natives, mostly women and
children, were taken captive during the 1637 campaigns. Many were quickly transported
to Providence Island, a Puritan-financed plantation in the West Indies, where they may
have been exchanged for African slaves.194 Others were sold to Puritan families.195
While their labor certainly supplemented household income, Indian captivity also
provided more pious Puritans with a captive audience for their proselytizing efforts, and
at least some of these efforts were successful. A tract published in London, New
England's First Fruits, claimed that many Pequot servants were "very inquisitive after
God and his ways," while others were so devoted to their new faith that they would
"weep and cry when detained by occasion from the Sermon."196 Though likely an
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exaggeration meant to paint the embattled Massachusetts colonists in the best possible
light, New England's First Fruits nicely encapsulates the ideal end result of bond
servitude in Massachusetts. Though the presence of native servants and slaves would
continue to pose difficult questions about the rights of "strangers" in Puritan society,
subsequent efforts to Christianize and assimilate New England natives would continue to
reflect this ideal throughout much of the 17th century.
It is likely that the first African slaves arrived in Massachusetts as a direct result
of the Pequot War. The first reference to African slaves in Massachusetts is a brief entry
in John Winthrop's journal for 12 December 1638. Winthrop noted the arrival of the
Salem ship Desire, which brought “some cotton, and tobacco, and negroes” from
Providence Island and Tortuga – like the first “twenty and odd” brought to Virginia, these
enslaved people would have been considered property under international law.197 The
way that these first Africans were treated once in Massachusetts, however, must remain a
topic of speculation. If the same logic that informed the governance of English servants
and native captives applied to Africans, and the evidence suggests that it did, then it is
likely that attempts were made to Christianize the first African slaves and that they had
access to at least some basic rights. There is no official record of Africans in Bay Colony
courts until 1642 when Mincarry "the blackmore was admonished, and dismissed."198
This painfully terse entry can tell us nothing about Mincarry except that he was an
African; that he had, like so many other settlers, committed some offense that brought
him to the attention of the Massachusetts Court of Assistants; and that he was apparently
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treated by that court much as other English and native colonists were – "admonished, and
dismissed."
By 1640, Massachusetts' settlers must have marveled at the progress their
embattled colony had made. They had attracted thousands of new settlers, faced down
Charles II and Archbishop Laud during the charter revocation crisis, and emerged
victorious from their first large-scale war with the Pequot nation. But troubling signs
remained – the Puritans had not seen the natives converted en masse as they had hoped,
their own communities seemed permeated with unrepentant sinners, and the presence of
African and Indian slaves raised difficult questions about how far their radical experiment
in godly republicanism would go. Still threatened from without and unsure of their
authority within, Massachusetts colonists realized that they needed a uniform code of
laws to police the internal morality of their settlement and shore up their claims to
sovereignty. Even more radical members of the community supported this move, worried
that without "positive laws" to guide them magistrates might "proceed according to their
discretions." In March 1635, the General Court appointed a committee "to frame a body
of grounds of laws, in resemblance to a Magna Charta."199 The resulting document
entitled Moses His Judicialls, a clear reference to the "grounds" upon which
Massachusetts law would be built, was debated and amended for nearly five years but
was eventually approved in 1641. These fundamental laws, the Body of Liberties,
included the first explicit sanction for slavery in any English colony.200
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Though the Body of Liberties was the first colonial statute to give full legal
sanction to slavery, it did so in a decidedly roundabout way. Section XII of the
document, "On the Rights of Strangers," stated that “neither bond slaverie, villeinage, or
captivitie” would exist in Massachusetts society. Despite this apparent denunciation of
slavery, the Puritan authors of the Body of Liberties went on to justify the enslavement of
“lawful captives taken in juste warres."201 This clause, in keeping with the emerging
European international law tradition, legitimated the taking of captives in the Pequot War
and guaranteed that the same practice could be repeated in the future.202 The Body of
Liberties also allowed for the ownership of "such strangers as willfully sell themselves or
are sold to us.” Slavery could also legitimately be used as a punishment for those “who
shall be judged thereto by Authoritie.” All three of these forms of slavery – of Native
captives, of Africans presumably "sold" to the settlers, and of settler convicts – were
already practiced in Massachusetts when the Body of Liberties was penned. How, then,
could its authors possibly believe that they were prohibiting "captivitie" or "bond
slaverie"?203
The answer may lie in another qualification. Immediately following its list of
legitimate forms of slavery, the Body of Liberties guaranteed that slaves would “have all
the liberties and Christian usages which the law of God established in Israell concerning
such persons doth morally require.” Mosaic law, then, would govern the usage of slaves,

201

William H. Whitmore, ed., The Colonial Laws of Massachusetts, Reprinted from the Edition of 1661,
with the Supplements to 1672, containing also The Body of Liberties of 1641 (Boston: Rockwell &
Churchill: 1889), 53.
202
Cf. Parent, Foul Means, 111, claiming that rooting enslavement in international law gave the institution
legitimacy “above state prohibitions” and guaranteed that “those justly enslaved could not seek
freedom.” As we shall see, this fundamental law neither precluded local regulation of slavery nor
prevented enslaved persons from making legal claims to their freedom in Massachusetts courts.
203
Whitmore, Colonial Laws of Massachusetts, 53.

122

who would retain “all the liberties” of subjecthood. Slavery as practiced by the ancient
Israelites was a tool of cultural assimilation; its goal was the conversion of slaves and
their eventual absorption into Hebrew society. Nor was Mosaic slavery always heritable
– the children of converted slaves were no longer “strangers” and thus could not be
enslaved.204 In addition, by 1641 Africans in Massachusetts were already being baptized.
John Winthrop recorded the baptism of a "negro maid" in April 1641, and there is every
reason to believe that Puritan masters eagerly sought the conversion of resident
Africans.205 As practiced by Puritan settlers in the earliest days of Massachusetts
colonization, then, slavery was a temporary condition meant to facilitate the conversion
of heathens and the redemption of sinners. This conceptualization of slavery meshed
nicely with the structure of Massachusetts society, the imperatives of radical Puritan
theology, and the broad access to subjecthood implied both by Calvin's case and
Massachusetts' godly republicanism.
Still, despite their protestations that “neither bond-slaverie, nor villeinage, nor
captivitie” would exist in their city upon a hill, by 1641 Massachusetts Bay Puritans had
created the first statutory justification for slavery in the English New World.206 The
peculiar logic of human property was clearly not limited to the Chesapeake. The early
charters that established New England settlements were framed in much the same way as
the Virginia charters, and could have created a similar society based on limited access to
landed property and widespread use of unfree labor. The utopian vision of the Plymouth

204

David M. Goldenberg, The Curse of Ham: Race and Slavery in Early Judaism, Christianity, and Islam
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); David Brion Davis, Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall
of Slavery in the New World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 64-69.
205
Winthrop, Journal, II: 26.
206
Massaschusetts Body of Liberties quoted in Moore, Notes on the History of Slavery in Massachusetts,
12-13.

123

separatists and Massachusetts Bay puritans, however, when actualized in the loose legal
context of the early English empire, militated against such a society. Rather, the religious
radicals planting settlements in New England sought a more egalitarian society that,
despite its confessional exclusivity, allowed for the assertion of full civil subjecthood by
strangers, including free, and possibly even enslaved, Africans.
***
By late 1641, the fears of these radical Puritan migrants that "some evill times"
were approaching in England proved prescient. Opposition to Charles I's personal rule,
which had been growing steadily for over a decade, had reached a fever pitch, and radical
Puritans were at the forefront of this anti-absolutist resistance. Charles became, if
anything, even more intransigent as this opposition grew, claiming absolute authority to
rule within his dominions and ruthlessly suppressing all dissent. The simmering conflict
between royal absolutism and Puritan-tinged consensual government was soon to explode
into civil war, revolution, and regicide.207 The effects of this explosion were not limited
to the British Isles – they would be felt deeply in the maturing English colonies along the
Chesapeake and Massachusetts Bays as well. The English empire that emerged from this
half-century of turmoil would be transformed in many critical ways, but the social,
political, and economic foundations laid in Virginia and Massachusetts by 1640
continued to exert a powerful influence on the development of slavery and subjecthood.
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Chapter II – "Publicke and Sublime Propriety": Slavery and Subjecthood in the
Imperial English Revolution, 1641-1660
On the afternoon of April 13th, 1641, Thomas Wentworth, recently made the first
Earl of Strafford by Charles I, stood beneath the vaulted wooden ceiling of Westminster
Hall. This was to be the final day of his trial under a bill of attainder issued by the
Commons for “high misdemeanors” committed as Lord Deputy of Ireland, where he had
“govern[ed] like a king” since 1633. Strafford's trial was in many ways a test case for the
Parliamentary argument against absolutist prerogative power.1 The charges against
Wentworth included “endeavouring to subvert the ancient and fundamental laws and
government of His Majesty's realms of England and Ireland, and to introduce an arbitrary
and tyrannical government against law in the said kingdoms." Rehearsing charges that
would later be leveled at Charles himself, Parliament accused Strafford of "exercising a
tyrannous and exorbitant power above and against the laws of the said kingdoms, over
the liberties, estates and lives of His Majesty's subjects.”2
Strafford's closing speech in his defense dwelt on first principles, on the nature of
the ancient English constitution and its implications for the deepening conflict between
king and Parliament. “I thank God for it,” said Strafford, his voice straining to be heard
through the cavernous hall, “by my master’s favor and the prudence of my ancestors I
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have an Estate which so interests me in the Commonwealth that I have no great mind to
be a slave, but a subject.”3 The favor shown him by the monarch, and the property he
had accumulated as a result, made Thomas Wentworth not only an English subject – all
persons born in the king's dominion were naturally subjects – but a peer, the Earl of
Strafford. Yet to strip him of the privileges granted by the king's majesty, to deny him
even the basic rights of an English subject, was to reduce him to slavery.4 Taken
together, the charges leveled by the Commons and Strafford’s response illuminate many
of the fundamental issues at stake in the conflict between king and Parliament in
revolutionary England – arbitrary government against the ancient law of the realm; royal
prerogative above and against the liberties, estates, and lives of Englishmen; slavery
against subjecthood.
But Strafford surely knew he would never be physically enslaved. As numerous
scholars have suggested, the deployment of ‘slavery’ as a rhetorical trope during the
English revolution was often just that – rhetoric. ‘Slavery’ worked well as a polemically
charged term in early modern anti-tyranny discourse – the Earl of Strafford was using the
term in this way to protest what he saw as the tyrannical abuse of power by upstart MPs
in the House of Commons, bent on subverting the ordained social order.5 As we have
seen, however, the construction of the early empire was bound up with real, human
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slavery from the outset. The experience of revolution and civil war both at home and
throughout the empire made many Englishmen acutely aware of the presence of slavery
in their American colonies. When Virginia’s royalist governor William Berkeley
protested Parliament’s 1650 Plantation Act, saying it would force Virginia planters into a
“slavish life,” or former Massachusetts Bay governor Henry Vane, Jr. criticized Protector
Cromwell’s policy of transporting the idle poor and political prisoners to the colonies as
“slaves,” they knew of what they spoke.6 Multitudes of Englishmen had firsthand
experience with coerced labor during this tumultuous period, men like royalist officer
Major Ogilvy, who complained to Charles II in 1674 about being “twice sold as a slave”
to Virginia and Barbados by the Interregnum state.7 Of course, Englishmen like Major
Ogilvy were never truly enslaved, as thousands of Africans were during the same period,
but their experience has much to tell us about the intersection of revolutionary
transformations in social order, the ideal of English subjecthood, and the expansion of
African slavery throughout the empire.8 The questions raised by the "slavery" of political
prisoners during the English revolution forced a reevaluation of the role of bound labor in
the empire, with revolutionary potential for the future of slavery in the colonies.
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The English revolution was a critical moment in the development of the American
colonies.9 Cavalier Virginians and Massachusetts Roundheads are more than mere
caricatures – they were, to an extent, representative archetypes of the competing
ideologies that underpinned the English Civil Wars and Revolution, and their colonies
were key battlegrounds where royalists and parliamentarians sought to prove the right of
their cause. In this colonial context, the political rhetoric of slavery so prevalent in
Westminster Hall and the radical publications of the Levellers came face to face with the
reality of human slavery, with dramatic results. When Fifth Monarchist revolutionaries
rose up against Charles II in 1661, led by former Massachusetts Bay colonist Thomas
Venner, they hoped to vindicate the “rights of men” by ushering in “the Visible Kingdom
of our Lord Jesus Christ.” Influenced by his experiences in New England, Venner argued
for a true godly “democracy” in the state and the destruction of the “yokes of the inward
and outward man” through the “anointing holy spirit, the myrrh of liberty.” There was no
place for bondage in this radical Christian utopia – “man-stealers” were to be executed.10
This aversion to human bondage was not isolated to fringe radicals, however. More
moderate Parliamentarians also took up the struggle against slavery – men like
Massachusetts Bay colonist Richard Saltonstall, who drew on a number of strands of
revolutionary thought to engineer the first legal challenge to the African slave trade in
English history.11
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The debate over whether or not an Englishman might hold another human as
property raised fundamental questions at the very heart of the revolutionary contest
between king and Parliament. Could an Englishman own another person, and if so on
what terms? What authority should a monarch have over his subjects, or a master over
his servants or slaves, and what was the ultimate basis of this authority? What were the
rights and duties of subjecthood (or subjugation), and what attributes must one possess
(or lack) to be accounted a subject (or a slave)? Far more than rhetoric was at stake, for
just as English subjects forcefully asserted the inviolability of their traditional liberties,
they also fashioned the legal and political institutions that would bind millions of
Africans to racial slavery over the next two centuries. The absolutist imperial vision of
the early Stuart monarchy and the increasing commodification of English economic life
certainly provided viable material for the construction of slave property regimes in the
colonies. Puritan revolutionaries also realized the economic potential of unfree labor and
seized the opportunity to expand the scope of their empire in the Western Design, an
endeavor the restored Stuarts continued to promote after 1660. Simultaneously, however,
the English Civil War and Revolution also produced a legal argument that was at best
genuinely abolitionist, at worst racially exclusive and jingoistic, but always opposed to
the most basic characteristic of slavery – the definition of persons as property.
***
The English Civil Wars and Revolution were brought on by many issues and
fought on many fronts, but at the heart of this transformative era was a fundamental
conflict between competing, and to some extent mutually exclusive, visions of an ideal
social order. Stuart absolutist patriarchalism and the "godly republicanism" typical of
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English revolutionaries and New England saints could not coexist peacefully. The events
in which this conflict played out between 1641 and 1660 are so well known as to bear
only a brief summary here.12 Charles I, ruling without Parliament and claiming absolute
authority over church and state, attempted to impose Anglican worship on his Scottish
kingdom.13 The Scots resisted this imposition and rose in rebellion against Charles in
1638 in what has become known as the Bishop's War.14 To fund this military expedition,
Charles called the Short Parliament in early 1640, then quickly dissolved it when the
Commons, led by reformers like John Pym who were sympathetic to the Puritan cause,
refused to vote funds without redress of a series of grievances with Charles' rule
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stretching back to the controversy over the Petition of Right in 1628.15 After a disastrous
attempt by the Earl of Strafford to subdue the Scottish rebels in the summer of 1640,
Charles was forced to call Parliament again. This time, however, the king's need for
money overcame his natural distrust of Parliament, and he was forced to assent to a series
of reforms aimed at bolstering Parliament's role in the government of the realm.
Parliament quickly dissolved the hated prerogative courts of Star Chamber and High
Commission, passed the Triennial Act guaranteeing that Parliament would be called at
least every three years, guaranteed the right of prisoners to habeas corpus, required that
Parliament be allowed to give consent to its own dissolution, and hauled the Earl of
Strafford before the assembled houses to answer for his "tyrannical rule" in Ireland with
his life.16
Both king and Parliament hoped that these reforms and Strafford's execution
would resolve their disagreements and restore stability to the realm, but it was not to be.
Irish rebels rose up against the forced imposition of Anglican worship and military rule in
1641, and Parliamentary leaders worried that Charles had similar designs for his English
dominions.17 When the king himself stormed uninvited into the Commons in January
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1642, hoping to arrest five Parliamentary leaders for treason, he was rebuffed by William
Lenthall, Speaker of the House, who claimed that he had "neither eyes to see nor tongue
to speak in this place but as the House is pleased to direct me, whose servant I am
here."18 This ringing statement of Parliamentary independence from royal prerogative,
and the increasingly violent popular protests outside Westminster Hall, shook Charles'
resolve – fearing for his safety, the king and his household fled London for the north
country.19
Though even radical Parliamentarians still proclaimed their loyalty to the king,
laying the blame for the growing conflict on a coterie of corrupt advisors, open warfare
was all but inevitable and English subjects began choosing sides. As in all civil wars, the
majority of Britons hoped to avoid direct participation in the conflict, but cadres of
committed leaders on both sides pushed events inexorably onward toward military
confrontation. A series of indecisive battles in 1642 and early '43 was broken by the
military leadership of the Earl of Essex at the Battle of Newbury (20 September 1643)
and Oliver Cromwell's resolute stand at Marston Moor (2 July 1644). The reorganization
of the Parliamentary forces into the ideologically committed and battle-hardened New
Model Army under the command of Sir Thomas Fairfax and Oliver Cromwell led to the
decisive victory at Naseby in the summer of 1646. By late in the year, Charles was a
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prisoner of Parliamentary forces, bringing the first phase of the English Civil War to a
close.20
Parliament's success and the growing power of the New Model, however, exposed
the fissures within the parliamentarian movement. While most leading figures within
Parliament hoped for basic reform in the English state, along the lines of the magisterial
reformation envisioned by John Winthrop and other Puritan reformers21, the presence of
many Levellers in the New Model Army, and the appeal of their revolutionary ideology
to many English subjects, pushed more radical critiques of absolutist patriarchalism into
the center of political discourse.22 Magisterial reformers, men like John Winthrop and
Oliver Cromwell, sought merely to guarantee the traditional right of English male
property owners to give consent to decisions made by the state, so that magistrates
chosen by the godly might better usher in the reforms necessary to a commonwealth of
saints. Levellers like John Lillburne and former Massachusetts Bay preacher Hugh Peter,
on the other hand, envisioned a far more radically democratic revolution, one that would
abolish monarchy and hereditary privilege and delegate specific sovereign powers to a
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more representative Parliament "inferior only to theirs who choose them," and reserve to
all people a number of specific rights including freedom of conscience, freedom from
military impressment, political freedom of speech, and equality before the law.23
Despite their many differences, however, Leveller radicals and magisterial
reformers held many basic assumptions in common: that the English were a "free-born
people" who were, simply by birth, subjects of the English state and its ancient
constitution; that English subjects could not be bound by state authority without the
consent of at least some subjects, and that this principle of consent was central to the
governance of both church and state; that all legitimate authority should be limited by the
rule of law as expressed by the representatives of the English people and reformed
common law courts; and that the state should use its power to transform English society
into a true godly republic. Crucially, Parliamentarians and Levellers both started from
the assumption that all English subjects came under the protection of the law, and this
central ideological premise of reformed Protestant anti-absolutism was, as we shall see,
directly opposed to the concept of property in man.
In December 1648, with this Leveller/Puritan anti-absolutism at its peak
influence, the radicals and committed magisterial reformers who controlled the "Rump"
of the Long Parliament took the dread step of charging their sovereign, Charles I, King of
England, Scotland, Ireland, and a growing overseas dominion, with high treason.24
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Charles denied the authority of the specially created High Court of Justice to sit in
judgment over even "the meanest man in England," never mind the monarch himself. In
his argument against Parliamentary authority, Charles used much the same language his
judges had leveled against him throughout his troubled reign. "How can any free-born
Subject of England call life or any thing he posesseth his owne, if power without right
daily make new, and abrogate the old fundamentall Law of the Land," the king asked
without a hint of irony. The "true Liberty" of English subjects, Charles reminded the
court, "consists not in sharing the power of Government, but in living under such Lawes,
such a Government as may give...assurance of their lives and propriety of their goods."
Charles presented his case just as any other subject protesting unjust imprisonment
would. His brief captivity narrative emphasized that he had been willing to compromise
with Parliament, and had even made many concessions in a recent treaty at Newport,
before he was "surprized, and hurried from thence as a prisoner...against my will." Just
as countless Puritan preachers and political radicals had protested the legitimacy of
Charles' prerogative courts a decade earlier, the king, when faced with this "lawlesse
unjust proceeding," hoped that "the ancient Lawes and Liberties of this Kingdome"
would vindicate his cause.25
As even Charles recognized, however, the verdict in this case was a foregone
conclusion. On January 26, 1649, the fifty-nine commissioners of the High Court of
Justice found King Charles I guilty of treason. The sentence was death by decapitation.
A committed divine right absolutist to the bitter end, the deposed king faced his death
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resolutely, wearing two shirts to keep from shivering in the bitter cold and declaring that
as a "Martyr" he would exchange "this corruptible Crowne of Misery, [for] an
incorruptible Crown of Glory."26 As soon as Charles Stuart was executed on January 31,
1649, questions of subjecthood and allegiance moved to the very center of English
political debate. Under the monarchy, the doctrine of natural allegiance laid down in
Calvin's Case had provided a clear definition of the nature and origins of English
subjecthood.27 With the king dead, however, this traditional formulation was
destabilized.
Parliament now claimed the mantle of sovereignty. Most regicides, and indeed
most Parliamentarians, argued from the old medieval doctrine of the king's "two bodies"
– the first, a physical and mortal body, died with the king's person; but the king's other
body, the body politic, was made up of the whole people of England, font of all
legitimate sovereign power.28 As a 1648 pamphlet argued, "The Parliament is in the
King...and the King is in the Parliament...so that what the King does according to Law,
we virtually do it, because our consent is in it."29 Parliamentarians could thus argue that
they had always shared the sovereign power of the state as "king in Parliament." When
Charles Stuart was convicted as a traitor, the sovereign power of the monarchy reverted
to its original source, the English people. This formulation allowed for a degree of
stability in the definition of subjecthood by substituting the Commonwealth for the

26

His Majesties Speech On the Scaffold at White-Hall..., (London, 1649).
Sarah Barber, Regicide and Republicanism: Politics and Ethics in the English Revolution, 1646-1659
(Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 1998); Jason Peacey, ed., The Regicides and the Execution
of Charles I (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).
28
Ernest H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1957).
29
Anon., Salus Populi Solus Rex, The Peoples Safety is the sole Soveraignty, or The Royalist out-reasoned
(London, 1648)
27

136

monarch and retaining the concept of natural allegiance to the body politic, the English
people.30
But who were the English people? As numerous scholars have noted, issues of
identity and allegiance were increasingly framed in terms of "Englishness" during the
Interregnum, but the term itself was fraught with contradiction and ambiguity.31 There
were simply too many competing definitions of Englishness circulating during the
revolution. Leading figures in the Commonwealth hoped to work a fundamental
transformation in the English state, and many hoped that a strong dose of godly reform,
similar to the program enacted in New England, would purge the body politic of its
vestigial absolutism and pave the way for a republic of saints, a vision of Englishness that
would exclude large numbers of Britons. Putting Puritan godly reform into action
conflicted with England's increasing religious diversity and raised new questions about
the limits of subjecthood. For royalists the problem was easily solved. The moment
Charles I lost his head, his son, Charles II, immediately became king, and all true
Englishmen owed him their allegiance. Those who denied the truth of the younger
Charles' divine right were traitors who ceded the rights and protections of subjecthood in
their open disobedience to Stuart rule – they ceased to be truly English.32 To
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Parliamentarians, the exact opposite was true. The Leveller-influenced Agreement of the
People recommended that any who had shown "forcible opposition" to the Parliamentary
cause be disfranchised, and even the more conservative Instrument of Government that
created the Cromwellian Protectorate in 1653 barred royalists from voting or holding
office.33
Despite their belief that the body politic had survived the regicide and their
agreement that royalists could legitimately be barred from the political nation, factions
within the Parliamentary cause disagreed over the exact definition of Englishness and
continued to debate access to subjecthood. With the abolition of episcopacy in 1646,
religious conformity as a workable basis for subjecthood became untenable. The
Levellers and some Independents called for total freedom of conscience and religious
worship, Puritan leaders hoped to establish a godly ecclesiastical order similar to New
England Congregationalism, large numbers of influential Presbyterians in the military
leadership hoped for an English equivalent to the Scottish kirk, while the majority of
English subjects quietly practiced private "prayer book" Anglicanism or openly argued
for the return of the bishops. Faced with such diversity and resistance, the Interregnum
state had no choice but to extend a qualified religious toleration to English subjects,
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replacing episcopacy with a watered-down Presbyterianism it was unable to enforce, and
removing many limits on the rights of nonconformists.34
With religious qualifications for subjecthood destabilized, allegiance to the
Commonwealth increasingly became the basis for defining Englishness, but again the
diversity within the British Isles made the issue problematic. All agreed that only those
who swore an oath to support the Commonwealth should partake in the governance of the
realm, but beyond that there was little common ground. Some of the more thoroughgoing
Puritan revolutionaries in Parliament hoped to see political authority vested in a few
godly magistrates as in New England, but religious toleration for most Protestants made
this impossible in practice. In place of testamentary qualifications, many gentry
Parliamentarians hoped to substitute higher property requirements. Like the magisterial
reformers in New England, mainstream Parliamentarians had no desire to see the world
turned upside-down. Where all anti-absolutists agreed was their belief in the
fundamentally "free-born" nature of the English people, the wellspring from which all
forms of consent flowed. While only a qualified few subjects would exercise direct
consent through participation in the governance of the commonwealth, all English
subjects, and increasingly in the thought of the period all persons everywhere, were
naturally free, despite the mediation of their consent through various levels of household
and state governance.
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Henry Parker, a barrister at Lincoln's Inn and "privado" or advisor to many
leading figures in Parliament, made these assumptions about natural liberty and the
limited nature of authority explicit in his discussion of the popular basis for sovereignty
in a remarkable 1644 pamphlet, Jus Populi.35 These ideological assumptions, shared by
many Parliamentarians, became a clear anti-slavery argument in Parker's work.36 In
refuting royalist arguments about the divine origins of absolute monarchy, Parker drew a
clear separation between "order" ordained by God, coeval with natural law, and
"jurisdiction" or "government" instituted by sinful man. "Servile subjection," in Parker's
analysis, was a function of "humane policy...not itself from Nature." In response to
absolutist arguments that "if the major part [of the people] bee not condemned to slavery,
and poverty...the weale of the whole is exposed to great hazard," Parker asserted that
authority was a mere function of "jurisdiction" – the divine "order" mandated that "every
man be left free, and not abridged of his own consent, or forced by any Law of God to
depart from his freedome."37 Upon this foundation of self-ownership and consent, Parker
constructed a compelling argument for popular sovereignty and an inclusive republican
vision that bore a striking resemblance to Massachusetts-style godly republicanism.38
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There was nothing remarkable about these assertions – many Parliamentarians shared
Parker's vision.
Like most moderate Parliamentarians, Parker also agreed that some forms of
"milde subjection" comported well with divine "order."39 Husbands, parents, brothers,
and magistrates might all legitimately exercise limited power over individuals within
their household without violating divine mandate, as long as this power was used for the
good of the family or body politic. Where he differed was in his explicit extension of this
rubric to slaves. Drawing on classical formulations of slavery, he defined a slave as a
person with "no propertie remaining in himselfe: he only lives, or hath a being to his
Lord; but is dead, nay nothing to himself" – "the very definition of it leaves the slave
utterly disinherited of himself." The "Despoticall" power of slave owners originated in
an "absolute, arbitrarie interest in the slave" but, in Parker's formulation, this interest
could be supported neither by "jurisdiction," because "it proposeth no ends of Justice in
itselfe," nor by "Nature," which would admit of no such "violent, noxious, unvoluntarie
inequalitie, or restraint."40
Slavery not only violated the basic revolutionary tenet of natural freedom, but
also deprived "the Common-wealth, the Society of Mankinde, nay God himeslf" of their
"publicke and sublime propriety" in the persons of subjects. All individual proprietary
rights were mediated by an overarching state interest in the common weal. Servitude
might be allowable under the right circumstances, but even the most degraded servant
retained his or her legal personhood – "If thou may'st tyrannize over him as he is thy
servant, yet thou may'st not as he is man: If the misery of one capacity have exposed him
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to thy cruelty, the priviledge of the other capacity ought to recommend him to thy favour:
If the more base relation of servant entitle thee to domineer, yet the more noble relation
of man checks the insolence of that title." Even those sentenced to "slaverie" as
punishment for a crime were still subjects – to grant a property right in their persons
would be "unjust and excessive," and English law made this impossible by guaranteeing
that only the labor of a servant could be owned, "wherein neither the right of the
Delinquent [to his own person], nor the right of the State is wholly lost and
relinquished."41 Self-ownership and the public interest of the commonwealth in the
bodies of subjects were perfectly compatible to Parker.
This distinction mattered greatly because lack of self-ownership and the
protection of the law exposed slaves to the violent caprice of individual masters.
Recounting a vignette from imperial Rome where the excesses of a brutal slave owner
were checked by the imperial state, Parker recognized the "grace" of the state's action but
went even further, arguing that the Romans would have been better served had they
"dismist all the slaves...for the same reason, or so curbed the power of the lords, that they
might not have been any longer incited thereby to such prodigious degrees of
inhumanity." Where Rome had failed, Parker hoped the English commonwealth would
succeed. While he recognized that slavery was tolerated "where it is established by
publike authority" and thus could not be "repealed by private persons," Parker also
asserted that "where slaves are under the protection of other Laws than their lords wills,
and where they are truly parts and members of the State, and so regarded; they cease to
be slaves." The question then became whether the Commonwealth regarded slaves as
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property under the dominion of an individual owner, or as persons protected by English
law. The stakes were high, Parker argued, for if England had no "interest in slaves," she
would lose nothing, but if she insisted on legitimizing property-in-man, "how [could]
such mis-improvement...be answered to God, or justified in Policie?" Slavery, to Parker,
was "a thing fit to be antiquated for many equitable reasons" and history illustrated its
gradual decline. He pointed to laws passed "to free all Christians from slaverie," a result
of the "piety [and] equity" of God's chosen people. Parker hoped that a revolutionary
transformation of the English state would usher in a new era of fraternal love and
equality, one free of the inhuman stain of slavery.42 This explicit antislavery stance,
while perhaps unique to Parker in English revolutionary thought, was a function of his
fundamental belief in the limited nature of all legitimate authority and the access of all
persons to the protection of a just and equitable law, beliefs shared by practically all
Parliamentary anti-absolutists.
Whether these English revolutionaries would succeed in building a reformed state
after the regicide, and the form that state might take, remained an open question. Unlike
Massachusetts magistrates who could reinforce godly rule through their Congregational
establishment, Cromwell and Parliament faced an increasingly fractured religious and
political landscape. Emerging in tandem with the radical ecclesiastical positions of
nascent Baptists and Quakers were potentially revolutionary new concepts of consent that
loomed large in debates over political participation. Many Levellers and leading figures
in the New Model called for a broad franchise and the reform of the "rotten borough"
system in Parliamentary representation. The New Model Army's Agreement of the
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People (1649) had called for a dramatic increase in the number of MPs, the "indifferent"
apportionment of seats, and the admission of all native-born or endenized male "housekeepers" to the suffrage, except known royalists, servants, and those "receiving wages"
from another.43 More radical political movements, like the "Diggers" at St. George's Hill,
went even further in their communal ownership of property and assertion of the complete
equality of all persons.44 Tellingly, all of these radical re-imaginings of subjecthood
assumed the self-ownership of the "free-born" English people.
Despite their many philosophical commonalities, the political radicalism of the
Leveller and New Model Army programs drove a wedge between them and most leading
Parliamentarians and paved the way for Oliver Cromwell's rise as Lord Protector in 1653.
The Instrument of Government that created the Protectorate turned against the radical
Leveller position and imposed a £200 freehold requirement for suffrage. The ability to
consent would be limited to (hopefully god-fearing) English property owners – those
without a stake in society were excluded. To the horror of many, the Commonwealth and
Protectorate also turned to coercion to enforce their godly republican vision. Puritans in
Parliament hoped to use the power of the state to work a moral transformation, famously
banning the theater, gambling, and even Christmas as tools of Antichrist. Moral
infractions were severely punished, and those who refused to submit to godly authority
were subject to public chastisement, imprisonment, banishment, and even death.45 All
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Englishmen owned their own persons, but the state retained much of its coercive power
over their bodies.
Some Leveller critics and religious radicals urged further reform and charged that,
as far as they were concerned, Parliamentary rule was "the same it was in the Kings
dayes, onely the name is alter'd." The Commonwealth was drifting dangerously close to
tyranny. Only by ushering in "true and free Common-wealths Government" would
English subjects "gain your Crown, and keep it, and leave peace to your Posterity."46
Royalists agreed that Parliament's coercive tactics were lapsing into tyranny. The
English people had lived "miserably and slavishly" under their "false and abominable
masters the Members of Parliament" since Charles I's execution.47 Opposition to the
levels of coercion necessary to implement godly republican rule made for strange
bedfellows, and widespread opposition made the full implementation of Massachusettsstyle social reform practically impossible in Interregnum England.48
Coercion was also crucial in bringing the colonies to heel, a central goal of
Commonwealth and Protectorate policy. The New England colonies lent various levels
of support to the Parliamentary cause, while most of the other Anglo-Atlantic settlers
hoped, like many Englishmen back home, to avoid the disruptions of civil war as much as
possible. When Cromwell launched his Western Design in 1656, he was confident
enough of New England's support to request that a number of Massachusetts divines
emigrate to Jamaica to speed its projected godly reformation.49 A few colonies however,

46

Anon., A Declaration of the Commoners of England, to His Excellency the Lord General Cromwell...
(London, 1651), 3, 8.
47
Anon., The Mystery of the Good old Cause Briefly unfolded... (London, 1650),
48
Derek Hirst, “The Failure of Godly Rule in the English Republic,” Past and Present, no. 132 (August,
1991): 33-66
49
Pestana, English Atlantic, 179.

145

Virginia conspicuous among them, refused to recognize the Commonwealth and had to
be subjugated by force of arms. These colonies were "reduced" by the Commonwealth
navy in 1651-2, their governors dismissed and replaced with more reliable men, their
charters and patents revoked. Royalist or Parliamentarian, all colonies were bound by the
Navigation Acts of 1651. This new policy promoted free trade by dismantling chartered
monopolies and opening imperial markets to all English merchants, while also laying the
foundation of mercantilist policy by barring unauthorized commerce with foreigners and
subjecting all trade to central taxation and oversight.50 Fighting costly wars had drained
the Commonwealth's treasuries, and a tighter grip on the empire would ensure that the
state would get its share of the profits from Atlantic trade. The Navigation Acts also set
an important precedent that any legislation passed by Parliament specifically naming the
colonies would be binding on them, providing further support for imperial
centralization.51
This centralized imperial vision also led to calls for increased trade with Africa.
The acquisition of Jamaica during the Western Design and the difficulty of recruiting
demobilized soldiers as plantation labor certainly led to an increase in demand for bound
labor,52 but the evidence suggests that Interregnum imperial planners hoped to force
captured royalists, Irish rebels, and unruly political dissidents into plantation labor, not
African slaves. Despite assertions to the contrary, little evidence suggests that Cromwell
and other Parliamentary leaders made any more concerted effort to tap the African slave
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trade than had their early Stuart predecessors. During the Civil Wars themselves, English
merchants made 46 documented slave-trading voyages to Africa.53 The peak of wartime
English participation in the slave trade came in 1645 and '46, when direct confrontation
between king and Parliament drew attention away from Atlantic trade and allowed
independent merchants to disregard the Guinea Company's royal monopoly. The
Commonwealth period, on the other hand, was the nadir of English slave trading, with
only nine slaving voyages recorded between 1649 and 1653. The resurgence of the
English slave trade from 1656 to 1658 was likely due more to the success of Cromwellian
free trade policies than any deep commitment to the nefarious traffic by the
Protectorate.54 While English merchants carried nearly 20,000 African slaves into the
Middle Passage on their seventy-seven slaving voyages between 1640 and 1660, these
already shocking numbers would soon be dwarfed by the deep investment of the
Restoration Stuarts in the slave trade.55
Thus in 1649, a group of London merchants could appeal to the Council of State
for an increased focus on the Africa trade without once mentioning slaves. Noting the
"private benefit" accruing to the Guinea Company, a monopoly chartered by James I, the
authors of A Remonstrance...for...the Trade of Affrica argued that the profits from trade in
"Wood, Elephants teeth, and Hides," as well as "such small quantityes of Gold, as the
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Blackmoores bring in," should accrue to "the sole benefit of the State." These imperial
boosters requested that the Africa trade be entrusted to a committee of five merchants,
whose "chiefest care" would be "to discover the certaine places from whence the Gold is
brought" and gain more direct access this most precious of African commodities. English
involvement in this lucrative West African trade, however, would have to rely on the
willing participation of Africans themselves. Recognizing that "our English bodyes are
not fitted" for the West African climate, these mercantile planners knew that, at least
initially, their access to valuable exotic woods, ivory, and gold would depend on the
assistance of local leaders. Betraying extensive knowledge of West African geography
and politics, they counseled that if merchants brought "fitt presents" for the "petty Kings"
of specific villages in Senegambia, they would be "given liberty to plant where we will"
and could gradually move up the Gambia toward "Tombatu," the supposed source of
Africa's gold. This projected alliance with African chieftains would also help protect
English merchants from "the straggling Portugals" who continued to dominate trade in
the region. Within a few years, this trade with Africa could be expected to enrich the
Commonwealth's treasury to the tune of £300,000 to £600,000 annually, and make the
English, in time, "the Masters and Comanders of the Countrey."56
The petitioners' omission of slaves in their list of potential commodities to be
obtained in West Africa is telling. Perhaps they worried that engagement in the slave
trade might endanger alliances with the local chieftains English merchants relied on for
access to gold, ivory, and other exotic commodities. Perhaps some still held to Richard
Jobson's belief that the English did not buy and sell "those who have our own shapes," or
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saw permanent enslavement of Africans as anathema to their godly vision of a reformed
polity. Perhaps they hoped the demand for bound labor in the colonies could be met by
the transportation of undesirable elements within English society. Or perhaps they
simply assumed that the slave trade, heretofore dominated by the “straggling Portugals,”
would continue under English auspices and felt no need to justify the traffic in African
bodies. Whatever the reason, the Council of State agreed that an increase in trade with
Africa would be a boon to the English empire, and implemented many of the petitioners'
recommendations. The old Guinea Company continued to operate but its monopoly was
ended – trade with Africa was opened to all English merchants under the free trade
provisions of the Navigation Act.57
What being "Masters and Comanders" of the Gambia would mean for the slave
trade, however, remained unclear. English imperial planners certainly knew that African
slaves were valuable commodities in the Atlantic littoral -- the "straggling Portugals"
who dominated trade in the region were deeply engaged in slaving, and earlier English
merchants like John Hawkins had made small-scale forays as well.58 The well-financed
Guinea Company continued to dominate African trade, and instructions to company
captains and trading factors often emphasized their desire to obtain "lusty negroes"
alongside other valuable commodities.59 The dislocations of the Civil War years
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certainly allowed some interloping slavers to cut in on the Guinea Company's monopoly,
and doubtless some merchants took advantage of Cromwellian free trade policies to
independently engage in slaving. As the Africa merchants' petition suggests however,
not all Englishmen approved of or promoted the slave trade. At least some merchants
and imperial planners believed that England could enrich itself through trade with Africa
without deep engagement in slaving. This belief would ultimately prove short lived –
within a generation the Restoration Stuarts' support for the newly chartered Royal
African Company would lead to sustained English participation in the Atlantic slave trade
– but in the heady days of the Commonwealth it was possible to envision an alternative
relationship with Africa that would enrich the state while largely eschewing the trade in
African slaves.
The godly reformers shaping England's empire during the Interregnum had
another bound labor source in mind for their colonial plantations anyway – the many
royalists and other malcontents who resisted their authority. First under the
Commonwealth and increasingly under Cromwell's Western Design, political prisoners,
rebellious soldiers, and poor criminals were transported to the colonies as bound laborers.
Crucially these groups had, at least in the minds of imperial planners, ceded some of the
protections of subjecthood and given tacit consent to their servitude when they committed
their treasons or crimes. In the colonies, it was hoped these wayward Englishmen would,
in keeping with Puritan hopes for moral reform, be regenerated by their labor and repent
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of their sins under the oversight of godly masters.60 While it is also true that increasing
numbers of poor young men and women were being "spirited" or "kidnapped" into
indentured servitude during this period, their bondage was not legal and commissioners
were appointed to search outbound ships and approve indentures.61 Prisoners and
criminals deported to the colonies, despite the hard life that awaited them, always labored
under an indenture. Indeed, this was a central problem with colonial transportation as a
solution to England's political problems – indentured bondservants would be freed after a
period of years, and their years of labor would do little to lessen their hostility to the
Commonwealth when they regained their full subjecthood.62
In the rhetorically charged environment of the Interregnum, the forced servitude
of English subjects, despite the formal legality of their indentures, blurred the line
between "free-born" Englishness and slavery and by the late 1650s a chorus of voices
rose to denounce the policy. In March 1659, Marcellus Rivers and Oxenbridge Foyle,
two royalist rebels, presented Parliament with a petition asking for the redemption of
royalist prisoners held as "slaves" in Barbados. Rivers and the other prisoners were
captured during the royalist Salisbury Rising of late 1654 and, despite acquittal by a
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grand jury, were held as prisoners at the Lord Protector's order to await transportation to
the colonies as bond servants. A printed broadside of the petition, entitled England's
Slavery, or, Barbados Merchandize, described how the prisoners were sold "as the goods
and chattels" of Martin Noell, a leading London merchant and prominent Member of
Parliament. To be defined as property in this way was a "most deplorable (and as to
English-men unparallel'd,) condition." Rivers claimed that because he and his fellow
captives were "not under any pretended conviction of Law," their transportation by
"Merchants that deal in slaves and souls of men" violated the rights of "the free People of
England." To remind Parliament of its professed commitment to godly reform, and the
consequences for those who transgressed God's commands, England's Slavery
prominently displayed a passage from Exodus on its title page that, as we shall see, was
also invoked in debates over slavery in New England – "He that stealeth a man and
selleth him...He shall surely be put to death."63
Such a scathing indictment of leading Parliamentary figures could not go
unanswered, but justifying the bond servitude of English dissidents was a difficult matter
– Sir John Coplestone acknowledged the political "disadvantage [to] any man" who
spoke out against the petition. Captain Hatsell, present when Rivers and his fellow
prisoners were shipped from Plymouth, testified that far from being coerced, he "never
saw any go with more cheerfulness." A number of MPs flatly stated that the petition
should never have been accepted in the first place because "they come before you by the
name of Cavaliers," and hearing the petition would only encourage further intransigence,
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kindling “such a fire as you will hardly quench." Those who rose up in rebellion against
the duly constituted authority of the Commonwealth abrogated the right of English
subjects to petition Parliament. Defending the legitimacy of forced labor, Captain Adam
Baynes, MP for Appleby, argued that rebellion was tacit consent and "so a man may be
sent to the galleys, or any place of banishment." "That those that have fought against
you, should be taken into equal freedom with you, I understand not," said Samuel
Desbrow, MP for the Scottish Sheriffdom of Midlothian.64 This readiness to disregard
the traditional rights of English subjects was precisely why critics of the Protectorate
worried so intently about their own potential enslavement.
Arguing for the inviolability of the petitioners' rights, however, was Henry Vane,
former Massachusetts governor, who claimed that the petition was not "a Cavalierish
business; but...a matter that concerns the liberty of the free-born people of England." The
"barbarous treatment" of the petitioners in being "sold...for 100l" set a dangerous
precedent. Vane warned the Parliament not to be "cozened by popularity" into
abandoning servitude as a punishment, but to "take occasion from these ill precedents to
make good laws" that would guarantee that all subjects, even those in a degraded status,
retained their free-born English rights. Other MPs rose to support Vane's position.
Invoking Magna Charta, Arthur Annesley, MP for Dublin, asked, "If he be an
Englishman, why should he not have the benefit of it[?]" "I would not have your doors
shut to any complaints," urged Major Robert Beake of Coventry. Without recourse to the
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rights of subjects, Hugh Boscawen of Cornwall complained, the lives of Englishmen
would be "as cheap as those negroes." Boscawen's solution was not only to reexamine
the Rivers petition's merit, but also to request that Parliament "consider the trade of
buying and selling men" in a future session.65 Whatever their past crimes, many in
Parliament agreed that bond servants still retained the basic rights of English subjects.
The lives of English subjects should never be held as “cheap” as those of African slaves.
Martin Noell, specifically named as one of the merchants involved in spiriting
Rivers and his fellow bond servants, rose to defend himself against the charge of
enslaving his countrymen. Noell called the claims made in England's Slavery "false and
scandalous." While he admitted to a role in the transportation of political prisoners,
Noell explained that he "abhor[red] the thought of setting 100L upon any man's person."
All servants sent to the colonies were indentured – as Noell explained, "none are sent
without their consent."66 Here Noell made two important legal distinctions. First, while
defending his right to own and sell the labor of bondservants like Rivers, Noell denied
that he had ever purchased "any man's person" – he had never enslaved anyone. Second,
bondservants, even those forced into bondage as political prisoners, legally gave their
consent to labor arrangements through indentures. Whether Rivers himself ever
voluntarily signed an indenture was irrelevant in this case. He gave tacit consent to be
sold as a prisoner when he took up arms against Parliament, the sovereign representative
of the English people, knowing full well what consequences would follow.67
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Furthermore, the claims of ill treatment made in the petition were unfounded.
Servants were worked hard, but "not so hard as is represented." The deadliest plantation
labor was "mostly carried on by the Negroes."68 Here Noell hit upon another key
distinction between the bond servitude of English subjects and the enslavement of
Africans, hundreds of whom Noell sold into bondage over the course of his career.69
Regardless of their treatment, Rivers and other political prisoners remained persons
before the law, subjects of the English state. Without access to these rights, the English
would become, as Hugh Boscawen put it, "miserable slaves." The very presence of the
Rivers petition in Parliament is testimony to the resilience of English subjecthood –
despite their treasonous acts against the state and their degraded servile status, a petition
drafted by bond servants in far away Barbados was considered by the highest tribunal in
the English empire. While one can safely assume that the twenty-five thousand African
slaves then in Barbados, whose lives Hugh Boscawen accounted so "cheap," detested
their forced labor just as much as Rivers and Foyle, the English state could safely turn a
blind eye to their condition because, as slaves, they held no standing as persons before
the law.
Slavery, then, was not simply a disembodied rhetorical trope in the English
Revolution. It was a meaningful way for men and women of all political stripes to
denounce the attempts of their opponents to deprive them of their rights as "free-born"
English subjects. Neither was the rhetorical choice "free-born" accidental – it reemphasized the fundamental traits all subjects shared, regardless of personal status: self-
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ownership and protection under the rule of law. Despite these foundational principles,
English revolutionaries constructed a robust imperial state that retained much of its
coercive power. Even as the world turned upside down, many English subjects continued
to believe that only the propertied few were fit to give their explicit consent to the social
or political arrangements under which they lived. Some were made to rule, others to
serve and obey. Still servants, wives, children, and others of degraded personal status, as
"free-born" English subjects, could never be reduced to articles of property. Regicide and
ecclesiastical disestablishment shook the foundation of English identity, however, and the
reality of transported English laborers working alongside African slaves blurred the lines
of subjecthood. The response of the Interregnum state to the shocking rise of bound labor
in the colonies was not to immediately and fully embrace African slavery, but to double
down on the natural freedom and access to legal protection of all English subjects.
Whether or not African slaves might share in that proposition would largely be
determined in the American colonies.
Across the Atlantic, settlers of the fledgling English colonies along the
Chesapeake and Massachusetts Bays were no more able to avoid the currents of change
than their Old World kin. Indeed the conflicts at the heart of the English Civil War and
Revolution took on a special salience in the New World, where social order was tenuous
at best and the political and legal institutions that provided stability at home were only
just coming into existence. Virginia and Massachusetts colonists grappled with the same
questions of social order and political inclusion that swept England into Civil War, but
crucial local differences steered the two colonies in fundamentally different directions.
Orientations toward political authority, property relations, slavery, and the rights of the
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subject both shaped and were shaped by the particular legal cultures of Virginia and
Massachusetts.
***
Settlers in Massachusetts Bay were keenly aware of the revolution unfolding back
in England. Throughout the Civil War years, Massachusetts' leaders continually
promised to "yeild subjection to the state of England," which to Bay Colonists meant
Parliament, and pledged their "allegiance and fidelity to that state."70 In 1646, the
General Court declared Massachusetts to be "brethren by nation" with England.71
Throughout the 1640s magistrates mandated a number of official days of fasting and
"publique humiliation" to ponder "ye weighty occasions in hand" back in England.72 The
rise of Cromwell to the Protectorate was the occasion of an official day of thanksgiving
for the "hopefull establishment of government in our native countrie...that the Lord's
kingdome and people will be cherrished, the peoples liberties preserved, and the peace of
the nation setled."73 Massachusetts saints hoped that sympathetic leaders in Parliament
and the Protectorate would complete the reformation of England by establishing both
Puritan religion and godly republican civil government. Recognizing their shared
interests with neighboring Puritan settlements, Massachusetts colonists worked to create
the United Colonies of New England, a mutual-defense confederation that brought

John Winthrop, History of New England, James Kendall Hosmer, ed. (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1908), II:345. [Hereinafter cited as Wintrhop, Journal.]
71
“Reply of the Massachusetts Bay General Court to Robert Child’s Remonstrance,” in The Prince Society,
The Hutchinson Papers, (Albany, NY: Joel Munsell, 1865), I: 245. [Hereinafter cited as Hutchinson,
Papers.] See also Pestana, English Atlantic, 164-166.
72
Nathaniel B. Shurtleff, Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England
(Boston: William White, 1853), II: 84. [Hereinafter cited as MBC Recs.[
73
MBC Recs, IV.i: 200.
70

157

Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven together as a united front in
support of Parliament.74
Many Massachusetts colonists, seeing the hand of Providence at work in the
transformation of their homeland, returned to England to contribute to the revolution.
Hugh Peter, former preacher of Salem's Puritan church, returned to England as an agent
for the Bay Colony in 1641. Peter became a man of some influence during the war and
under the Commonwealth – he is credited with contributing to the radicalization of the
New Model Army as a chaplain in Warwick, Fairfax, and Cromwell's units, and was
appointed to the Hale Commission for legal reform in 1652.75 Peter was also an
important booster for the New England way in revolutionary England, publishing a
glowing description of the colony's attempts at Indian conversion in New England's First
Fruits (1643) and recommending English adoption of many New England practices.76
Former Massachusetts Bay governor Henry Vane was one of the leading figures in the
Long and Rump Parliaments, and maintained a regular correspondence with John
Winthrop and a number of other New England colonists.77 Despite his squeamishness
with regicide, Vane continued to exert a powerful influence in Parliament where, as his
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participation in the Rivers petition debate illustrates, he often made arguments that would
have sounded familiar to Massachusetts colonists. Peter and Vane were merely two of
the most prominent New England settlers to return and join their Old World compatriots
– thousands of other colonists were part of this reverse migration as well, and each of
them carried their experience of godly republicanism back to England with them.78 If
ever there was a moment when Massachusetts seemed poised to fulfill its promise as a
'City on a Hill', this was it.
At just this moment, however, internal dissent began to shake Massachusetts and,
in tandem with metropolitan pressure, led to an intense debate about the nature of
subjecthood in the colony that ultimately made it an unsuitable model for a reformed
English state. In May 1646, the Bay Colony's religious qualifications for political
subjecthood came under attack from non-Puritan settlers, led by Presbyterian minister Dr.
Robert Child and Samuel Maverick, an Anglican royalist aligned with Ferdinando
Gorges. Turning the radicalized language of English subjcethood against the
Massachusetts saints, the petitioners asked that "civil liberty and freedom be forthwith
granted to all truely English [settlers], equall to the rest of their countrymen," regardless
of religious affiliation. Without this broadened body politic, non-Puritan settlers would
be doomed to "a non certainty of all things we enjoy, whether lives, liberties or estates."
The petitioners particularly hoped to establish that "the bodyes of us and ours...may not
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be impressed" or subjected to "greater punishments" than allowed under English law.
Without these protections, nonconformist colonists would be "in a worse case here [than
in Englnad] and lesse free than the natives amongst whom we live, or any aliens."79
Though the petitioners claimed benevolent, disinterested motives – "those who
are under decks," after all, could best "perceive those leaks" which might scuttle
Massachusetts' ship of state – they also warned that their "brethren of England [were] not
ignorant" of their situation and they would appeal their case to Parliament if necessary.80
The General Court roundly dismissed the petition, compiling meticulous lists of English
common law principles and the "fundamentall law" of Massachusetts to illustrate their
congruence. The magistrates cited their charter as the basis of their authority, but were
quick to point out the checks against arbitrary government built into their godly republic
and dared Child and Maverick to "produce any colony or commonwealth in the
world...where hath been more care and strife to prevent all arbitrariness." Besides, the
magistrates argued, the true test of a "freeborne English subject is his interest in the
lawes," not the "right of election of publick officers" – despite their lack of direct political
participation, even "non-freemen," those who were not members of a Congregational
church, still had "justice...equally administred to them with the freemen," an "equall
share" of town lands, and "freedom of trade and commerce."81 Though they limited
political participation to the godly, Massachusetts magistrates recognized that all English
settlers retained their subjecthood and were protected by common law.

79

"A Remonstrance and Petition of Robert Child, and others," in Hutchinson, Papers, I:215-223.
Ibid. On the use of appeals to metropolitan authorities as a way to challenge local authority in New
England, see Mary Sarah Bilder, The Transatlantic Constitution: Colonial Legal Culture and the Empire
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), esp. chapter 4.
81
"A Declaration of the General Court...concerning a Remonstrance and Pettion...by Doctor Child...," in
Hutchinson, Papers, I:223-247.
80

160

This debate provoked unwanted scrutiny back in England. John Child, brother
of the embattled Massachusetts physician, published much of the 1646 remonstrance
debate in a pamphlet entitled New Englands Jonas Cast Up at London, exposing the
fissures within New England society. Child argued that the treatment of dissenters by
New England's godly republic betrayed "a deep and subtle Plot against the Lawes of
England, and Liberties of English Subjects." Like English Independents in Parliament,
New Englanders merely sought to replace monarchy with an "Arbitrary government of
their own" – indeed, Child argued that the Puritans were "growing into a Nation...which
makes them usually term themselves as States, all the people there Subjects." If they
succeeded in their plot, New England saints would "stop the Currant of the greatest
Liberty of English subjects" by imposing their republican vision on other colonies, on
Ireland or Wales, even on England itself, limiting political participation to the godly
few.82
Edward Winslow, Mayflower Pilgrim and former Plymouth governor, was in
England as Parliamentary agent for the United Colonies at the time, and defended New
England against Child's accusations. Winslow began by reassuring English readers that
he, like all true puritan New Englanders, could never “oppose the Law of England: nor
ever stand against the liberties of the subject.” Indeed, Winslow argued, “next to the
word of God [Massachusetts colonists] take the Law of England for their pre[ce]dent
before all other whatsoever.” Distance, circumstance, and godliness, however, made
strict adherence to English law impossible. Just as “the Garments of a growne man
would rather oppresse and stifle a childe if put upon him,” Winslow believed that the full
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body of English law would be “too unweldy” for early colonial Massachusetts. Besides,
the whole point of the Puritan errand into the wilderness was precisely to escape Charles
I’s patriarchalist organization of church and state, and the terms of the colony’s charter
allowed for variation in local law, so long as it “goe as neare the Lawes of England as
may bee,” an injunction the Puritan colonists “punctually follow so neare as wee can.”
Winslow did admit that, when it came to political participation, “there are many that are
not free amongst us,” but this was also true of the “many thousands in this kingdome
[England] who have not libertie to choose.” In addition, Child was a known malcontent
who had “no proprietie or knowne proper estate” in Massachusetts. To admit him to the
franchise would imply that “any English man may volens nolens, take his habitation in
any Government, bee as free as the best...thus breaking all Order, Charters, and peace of
Societies.” Child’s petition had no merit. Massachusetts’ linked civil and ecclesiastical
governance was a model of godly republicanism, and Winslow claimed that, if
Parliamentarians could only see how well ordered the colony was, “they would close with
our practice.”83 Unlike in revolutionary England, where the vast majority of residents
actively opposed godly republicanism, Massachusetts constructed and effectively policed
its American commonwealth along explicitly Puritan lines, equating political subjecthood
with godliness.
Ultimately, partly because of this exacting Puritan definition of the body politic,
Massachusetts would prove a poor model for revolutionary England, and Bay Colony
magistrates moved to protect their commonwealth from metropolitan corruption.84 As
Winslow warned in his New England’s Salamander, “if the Parliaments of England
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should impose Lawes upon us having no Burgesses in their house of Commons,...then
wee should lose the libertie and freedome I conceived of as English indeed.”85 Though
they steadfastly supported the revolutionary English state, Bay colonists jealously
guarded their relative local independence. By the late 1650s, relations between New and
Old England had soured, and days of thanksgiving were replaced once again by fast days.
As early as 1646 the General Court worried that the colony was "so subordinate to the
parliament, as they might countermand our orders and judgments," perhaps fearing the
imposition of a new ecclesiastical order by the Westminster Assembly then sitting back
in London. Others worried about pressing their claims for independence too far –
Massachusetts colonists relied on their English subjecthood for the security of their land
tenure, physical protection, and "the continuation of naturalization and free liegance" –
but still believed they might be "independent in respect of government," at least for local
issues.86 Like colonists throughout the English empire, Massachusetts settlers worried
about the implications of the Navigation Acts for their local economy, skirting
prohibitions on trade with the nearby Dutch colonies, and even censuring a captain who
brought a Dutch ship to Boston as prize under the acts because it might lead to "a
confronting of this government, and...the infringing of our liberties [and] discouraging of
trade."87 Being a city on a hill, it turned out, could be a liability.
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These few squabbles aside, Massachusetts generally received preferential
treatment from the Commonwealth and Protectorate governments. The authority of the
Massachusetts Bay governor and legislature was extended to New Hampshire and control
over Maine was confirmed, much to the chagrin of Ferdinando Gorges and his allies.88
Bay Colony merchants were exempted from many of the customs duties levied on less
cooperative colonies after the Navigation Acts were passed, and imperial officials
generally looked the other way as Massachusetts colonists violated restrictions against
trading with other European colonies.89 Cromwell considered appointing a governorgeneral for New England in the mid-1650s to better enforce the Navigation Acts, but the
presence of influential former Bay Colonists in the Protector's councils squashed the
idea.90
The result was a boom in the New England economy, as Massachusetts-built and
manned ships took a larger share of the carrying trade between England and its staple
producing colonies. This new economic vitality was due largely to the Cromwellian
reorganization of the empire. With former New England residents scattered throughout
the English Atlantic, like former Plymouth governor Edward Winslow, sent first to
London as agent for the United Colonies then installed as governor of Barbados, and
allies like Henry Vane and Hugh Peter advocating for them back in London, Boston
merchants could draw on ties within this Puritan diaspora to build new mercantile
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connections.91 Massachusetts leaders recognized that Cromwell was "the fountaine
whence all these streames of bountie have been derived," and lavished praise on the Lord
Protector to ensure his continued support.92 Cromwellian free trade, despite worries
about imperial centralization, was an unqualified victory for New England merchants.
In this period of economic growth, a few Massachusetts merchants were drawn
into the trade for one of the most profitable of all Atlantic commodities – slaves. Yet Bay
colonists were not free to ply this nefarious trade as they saw fit. Massachusetts law
followed them onto the high seas and governed their acquisition of slaves. A 1646 case
heard by the General Court, Smith v. Keyser, is illustrative. On a Sunday in early 1645,
James Smith of Boston, captain of the Rainbow, and his first mate, Thomas Keyser, broke
with the customary practice of the slave trade and directly incited a war between two
villages on the Guinea coast. Smith and Keyser were participants in the ensuing battle,
killing roughly 100 people and taking others as slaves. Most of these slaves were
exchanged for casks of wine at Madeira, and others likely sold in Barbados, where Smith
and his first mate fell out over the division of their cargo. Keyser sailed the Rainbow
back to Boston without her captain, and upon his arrival sold the two remaining Guinea
slaves, one to Francis Williams of Pascataqua, an Anglican and supporter of Ferdinando
Gorges. When Smith returned to Boston and learned of the sale, he sued for damages to
regain the value of his lost slave property.93
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Smith's suit, however, exposed the questionable means by which the slaves were
obtained and drew the attention of Richard Saltonstall, a stalwart defender of popular
government and individual liberties who had been selected as assistant for Ipswich in
1637. Saltonstall, arguing that the end of Massachusetts' government was "dispensing
justice equally and impartially according to the laws of God and this land," brought a
petition in the General Court to free the slaves and return them to "Ginny" at public
charge. "Stealing negers," Saltonstall argued, was contrary to "the law of God and the
law of this country," a reference to the Body of Liberties' requirement that slaves be
captives taken in "just warres."94 It is likely that Saltonstall would have discussed the
case and its relation to Massachusetts law with Nathaniel Ward, author of the Body of
Liberties, who was minister to the Ipswich congregation. The case was a tricky one,
involving overlapping questions of jurisdiction, property rights, and godly reform, and
Saltonstall's petition was carefully framed to address each of these issues. For Saltonstall
and Ward, the godly dictates of Massachusetts law followed residents beyond the
boundaries of the Bay Colony, governed their conduct in trade, and denied that Puritan
colonists could make property out of innocent men and women. Participating in a
legitimate slave trade might be condoned, but kidnapping and murdering faultless
Africans, especially on the Sabbath, and selling them as property, to a non-Puritan
household nonetheless, violated the central tenets of Massachusetts law. Rather than
using servitude as a way to spread Puritan morality, Smith and Keyser stole and sold
Africans to enrich themselves.
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When Smith v. Keyser came before the General Court in October 1645, the
magistrates recognized Smith’s right to the Rainbow's legitimate cargo, and awarded him
£90 compensation for the Madeira wine and a further £50 damages for defamatory
statements made by Keyser in Boston and Barbados. The Rainbow's human cargo,
however, was a different story. The General Court "[thought] meet to alowe nothing" in
compensation for the "negars" because they were "none of his, but stolen."95 They
further ordered that Mr. Williams of Piscataqua return his slave to the court – the
unfortunate slave had been "fraudulently & injuriously taken" from Africa, and they were
resolved to return him home at public expense "without delay."96 The court did not stop
there, however. Stirred by Saltonstall's petition, the magistrates went on to register their
“indignation against ye haynos and crying sinn of manstealing.” Purchasing a slave was
one thing – the Body of Liberties allowed for the slavery of those “sold unto us” – but this
was something else entirely. Smith and Keyser must have shuddered to recall that
Mosaic law, the basis of Massachusetts’ colonial legal code, severely punished those who
illegally enslaved another: “he that stealeth a man, and selleth him…he shall surely be
put to death.”97
Following this maxim, the court indicted Smith and Keyser for man-stealing,
stating that “the act of stealing negers, or taking them by force (whether it be considered
as theft or robbery) is...expressly contrary both to the law of God, and the law of this
country.” Furthermore, “the act of chaceing the negers...upon the sabbath day (being a
servile worke...) is expressly capitall by the law of God.”98 Smith and Keyser had not
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only broken Massachusetts restrictions on the acquisition of slaves by violently attacking
African villages, they had done so on the Sabbath. In the end, the General Court did not
punish Smith or Keyser, but ordered that the Africans be returned to Guinea at public
expense “by the first opportunity.”99 The court also prepared a letter for the freed
Africans to carry back home with them to express "ye indignacon of ye Courte
thereabouts, & [the] justice thereof."100 Bay Colonists were entering into the slave trade,
but this did not free them from the obligations of Puritan morality. While recognizing the
legality of slave property for the purposes of trade, Massachusetts magistrates put local
regulations on participation in the slave trade that tried to balance property claims with
the moral and social mandates of their godly republic.
The Massachusetts General Court's decision came at an important juncture in
imperial development. At a moment when New England's saints were streaming back
across the Atlantic, and before English revolutionaries abandoned Massachusetts'
commonwealth as a model, Smith v. Keyser may have influenced the ways English
subjects thought about slavery, not only as a rhetorical trope to denounce monarchy, but
as an economic system and a lived experience. John Winthrop noted in his journal that
"the Londoners pretended a just revenge" for the General Court's decision, so it is likely
that word of the case crossed the Atlantic.101 In England, former colonists Henry Vane
and Hugh Peter kept up a regular correspondence with their former neighbors in the
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colonies, and both men occupied prominent positions during the Commonwealth.
Parallels between the Massachusetts court's decision regarding African slaves and
Commonwealth policies certainly suggest that, even if there was no direct influence, the
magistrates in control of both polities worked from many of the same basic premises.
Most basic was their presumption that liberty was natural to England and its dominions –
human bondage could exist only in closely regulated circumstances.
As the continued presence of penal slaves in Massachusetts and political
bondservants transported from England illustrates, Puritan reformers had no qualms
about forced labor, but they balked at the concept of property in man. Englishmen might
own the labor of their bondservants, even without their consent if the servants were
royalist prisoners or convicts, but servants remained persons before the law with access to
the basic rights of subjecthood. English merchants could legitimately purchase slaves
from others, but only if the slaves were heathens and had been acquired through legal
channels. If Puritan slavery in Massachusetts is any indicator, even these legally
acquired slaves could still find various ways to freedom and membership in the
community of subjects. And as Smith v. Keyser made clear, merchants who flaunted the
conventions of the slave trade by "man-stealing" would be hauled before the courts, if not
executed as Exodus required, and any slaves acquired illegally would be freed. All of
these propositions proceeded from the fundamental assumption of the natural freedom of
English subjects, and were expressed by godly reformers on both sides of the Atlantic.102
This is not to say, of course, that New England Puritans abandoned bound labor
entirely. As the Body of Liberties had declared, bond servitude was a perfectly legitimate
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punishment and Massachusetts magistrates continued to use penal slavery to enforce
Puritan morality. Just as they had in the late 1630s, Bay Colonists continued to "enslave"
criminals and religious dissidents. Marmaduke Barton, an English colonist, was
sentenced to bond servitude in 1642 until further court order.103 Quakers, who bore the
brunt of Puritan hostility during the Interregnum, were viciously persecuted in
Massachusetts, many of them "enslaved" or banished from the colony.104 Despite this
brutal treatment, even bondservants remained persons under the law. In 1651, John
Cotton assured Lord Protector Cromwell that Scottish captives sent to New England were
not "sold for slaves to perpetuall servitude, but for [a term of] years, as we do our
owne."105 By the mid-1650s, however, the Bay Colony Puritans' insistence on church
establishment and their use of such harsh punishments for offenders came into conflict
with the Commonwealth's official policy of religious tolerance and provoked a negative
response from some in Parliament. On the ground in New England, where
nonconformists continued in their defiance to Congregational establishment, magistrates
were increasingly hesitant to impose harsh penalties like bond servitude that were likely
to draw unwanted attention from the metropole.106
In May 1659, the Massachusetts General Court sentenced its last European
colonists to bond servitude. Members of the Southwicke family, recent converts to the
Society of Friends, had taken to proselytizing in the area around Salem and Ipswich in
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violation of a 1658 statute banning Quaker preachers. Daniel and Provided Southwicke,
fined in Salem and Ipswich for their Quakerism, refused to satisfy their fines, and the
court, "on perusall of the lawe," resolved to "sell the said persons to any of the English
nation at Virginia or Barbadoes." The rest of the Southwicke family were banished from
the colony on pain of death.107 Provided Southwicke was not cowed by the court's
verdict – in November she appeared in court again and was sentenced to ten lashes for
her continued proselytizing. In the end, none of the Southwickes were actually sold out
of the colony because "none were willing to take or carry them," perhaps an indicator of
the lack of enthusiasm for bond servitude in the waning days of the English revolutionary
Commonwealth, or the equally strong aversion to Quakerism in much of the English
Atlantic.108 Perhaps the Southwicke family took advantage of the General Court's grant
of "liberty to goe for England" in October 1660, or emigrated to another colony with less
rigid expectations of religious conformity – whatever their fate, they disappear from
Massachusetts records by 1661.109 Even if they had been sold to Barbados or Virginia,
however, the Southwickes would have retained their basic subjecthood, just as royalist
prisoners transported from England did. But the forced bond servitude of English
subjects, even the reviled Quakers, had become increasingly difficult to justify in
Massachusetts – as the Rivers-Foyle petition debate illustrated back in England,
assertions of the fundamental self-ownership of English subjects made bond servitude
seem dangerously close to slavery – and the Bay Colony subsequently abandoned
servitude as a punishment for English colonists.
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While the bond servitude of English subjects was fast disappearing from
Massachusetts, Native Americans continued to be held as 'servants' in Puritan society.
This servitude, however, was geared primarily toward conversion and conditional
assimilation, and the increasing presence of christianized Natives in Puritan households
also contributed to debates about slavery and subjecthood. It was in the 1640s that
Puritan efforts at Indian conversion really got underway, and servitude was considered a
useful tool in the conversion process. The leading figure in the Puritan mission to the
Natives was John Eliot, minister to the gathered church of Roxbury. Despite early
failures in preaching to local Natives, Eliot persisted, and by 1647 his efforts began to
bear some fruit. Governor Winthrop noted that a sermon preached by Eliot was wellattended by “very attentive” Natives, many of whom were “seriously affected” and
“ready to reform whatsoever they were told to be against the word of God.”110 By 1652,
construction of a new meetinghouse and a special school for “teachable Indians” at
Harvard was underway, and Eliot’s effort to convert local natives was making real
headway.111
As Massachusetts ships plied the Atlantic in greater numbers, Africans began to
appear in Massachusetts as well, and the evidence suggests that their bondage followed
the same Puritan norms that influenced treatment of other bond servants. There were
certainly a number of prominent colonists who thought African slavery could benefit
Massachusetts. Emanuel Downing, John Wintrhop's brother-in-law, called for a "just
warre" against the Pequot in 1646 that would provide Indian captives to be exchanged for
African slaves in Barbados. Downing asserted that slaves could be kept for one-twentieth
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the cost of an English servant, and argued that the Bay Colony's economy could not
compete in the Atlantic economy "untill we gett...a stock of slaves sufficient to doe all
our business."112 Despite Downing's recommendation, very few African slaves were
brought to Massachusetts during the Interregnum, likely less than a hundred. These few
slaves are difficult to find in colony records, partly because their numbers were so small,
and partly because Massachusetts masters nearly always used the term 'servant' to
describe their bound laborers. In April 1646, for example, Winthrop noted that “A negro
maid, servant to Mr. Stoughton of Dorchester, being well approved by divers years’
experience for sound knowledge and true godliness, was received into the church and
baptized.”113 Once she proved her godliness, this unnamed African woman was admitted
to the central institution of Bay Colony life.
The use of the term ‘servant’ does not appear to have been a mere sop to
squeamish Puritan sensibilities – the surviving evidence illustrates that Africans were
considered persons, not property, under Massachusetts law. One of the Africans stolen
by Smith and Keyser had apparently learned some English and served as a translator
during the proceedings, implying that the General Court took testimony from the
Rainbow Africans themselves during their investigation.114 When Massachusetts Bay
enacted a new ratings system for taxation in 1646, "every male wthin this jurisdiction,
servant or other," over age 16 was counted for assessing each household. The poor and
infirm were exempted from paying, though they were still counted as polls, as were "such
s'vants & children as take no wages," whose masters or parents would pay for them.115
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Servants were defined as persons, not property, under this taxation system, and there is
no evidence to suggest that African 'servants' were an exception to this rule. In 1653,
New Plymouth governor William Bradford and two Assistants resolved a dispute
between John Smyth of Plymouth and his neighbor's "neagar maide servant." After
"whatsoever could bee said on either side was heard," both parties were admonished and
dismissed.116 Like the God they served, New England magistrates were no respecters of
persons – all were equal before the law, regardless of their race or status.
Like so much about Massachusetts during this period, its uniquely Puritan system
of bondage may have served as a model for English imperial planners. Godly reformers
on both sides of the Atlantic shared a set of assumptions about self-ownership and the
rights of subjects that made the outright ownership of another person unthinkable. The
unprecedented centralization of the empire under the Protectorate meant that this unique
form of servitude might be implemented in the rest of the empire as well. Perhaps this
was what Henry Parker had in mind in Jus Populi or what Hugh Boscawen wanted when
he asked Parliament to consider enacting a law prohibiting "the buying and selling of
men."117 Cromwell knew what he was doing when he sent Edward Winslow, Mayflower
Pilgrim and former governor of New Plymouth, to serve as the new governor of Barbados
in 1655, carrying New England assumptions about slavery with him.118 While perhaps
not enraptured with every element of the imperial settlement, most Massachusetts Bay
colonists must have felt a sense of vindication, even pride, at the transformations wrought
by the English revolution and their role in bringing them about.
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***
Virginia was another matter entirely. When civil war engulfed England in 1642,
Virginia, like most colonies, hoped to stay above the fray. Despite their general
unwillingness (or inability) to participate directly in the royalist cause back in England, it
was clear where Virginia's allegiance lay. Charles himself simply assumed that Virginia,
a royal colony under the direct control of the throne, would support his cause. When, in
1642, an attempt was made to re-impose corporate governance in the colony under a
board of directors with Puritan sympathies, the Virginia burgesses took the opportunity to
assure Charles of their devotion. They would not tolerate the "unnatural...distance" that
company rule would place between colonial subjects and their sovereign. To replace
Charles' "clemency and benignity" with a "popular and tumultuary government
depending on the greatest number of votes" would shake the basis of their subjecthood -Virginians worried that the end of royal rule would cause them to "degenerate from the
condition of [their] birth, being naturalized under a monarchial government." Despite
their distance from the king's person, Virginians saw themselves as "a branch of his own
royal stem" – they held their rights directly from the monarch himself. To override the
royal claim to sovereignty in Virginia would "prove the illegality of the king's
proceedings," calling all royal grants into question.119 As resistance to Charles erupted
into war back in England, when push came to shove, most Virginians stood firm for
monarchy.120
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A small Puritan minority, concentrated in Isle of Wight, Nansemond, and Lower
Norfolk counties, where they wielded considerable influence, complicated this royalist
commitment. Wealthy London merchant Edward Bennett and a number of other English
Puritans received land grants from the Virginia Company in 1621, settling hundreds of
dissenting families on Virginia's southern frontier. By the outbreak of civil war, the
Bennett family alone owned over ten thousand acres in Nansemond County, and Richard
Bennett, Edward's nephew, had risen to political prominence, even serving on the
Virginia Council in the early 1640s.121 Other prominent Puritans settled in the region as
well. Daniel Gookin, who would soon remove to New England and work closely with
John Eliot in converting New England's Indians, and John Hill, who had mercantile ties
to John Wilson, minister of Boston's First Church, increased the political visibility and
economic viability of this small Puritan community.122
The religious lives of these tidewater Puritans, however, were less secure,
especially as hostility to Puritanism in Virginia grew apace with the violence back in
England. Already in 1642, William Durand, a Nansemond puritan, wrote to John
Davenport in New Haven, describing Virginia as "swoln...great with the poison of sin, as
it is become a monster, and ready to burst." Durand recognized that the colony, tainted
by "blind Idoll shepards" and "false worship," might not take naturally to Puritanism, but
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hoped that the "prosperous proceedings of the present parliament in England" would
make straight the path to godly reform in the Chesapeake.123 Accordingly, Richard
Bennett and other Virginia Puritans asked their New England brethren to supply them
with three ministers "selected, nominated and Commended" by Massachusetts divines.
These ministers were to be "faithful in purenes of doctrine, and integrity of Life," their
"preaching and Government" to comport with "the institution of Christ." If these
nominees were found suitable, Bennett and the Virginia Puritans would "subject
[themselves] to their Teaching and discipline."124 John Winthrop described the three
ministers sent from Massachusetts to Virginia as "seed sown, which would bring us in a
plentiful harvest" by bringing Tidewater puritans into conformity with the New England
way, further increasing the godly influence of Massachusetts throughout the empire.125
Whether religious orientation shaped Virginia Puritans' political and economic
life is less certain. The accumulation of large estates by the Bennetts and other prominent
Puritan settlers was certainly out of sync with New England partible inheritance
practices. While these Eastern Shore Puritans certainly held bound Africans, the terms of
their bondage remain unclear, and may have tilted closer to the practice of Massachusetts
than Virginia’s planter elites. Whatever their individual household arrangements, this
fledgling Puritan community, with its connections to religious and political radicals in
Old and New England, posed a threat to Virginia's old planter elite. Insisting on
conformity with the Anglican establishment, the House of Burgesses disallowed the

123

Jon Butler, ed., "Two 1642 Letters from Virginia Puritans," Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical
Society, 3rd ser., vol. 84 (1972): 99-109. Quotes from "To the Reverend Mr. John Davenport Pastor of
the Church of Christ at Quilopyacke, Present These: In New England," 107-109.
124
Ibid., "To the Pastors and Elders of Christs Church in New-England and the Rest of the Faithful," 105106.
125
Wintrhop, Journal, II:74.

177

payment of tithes to any minister who refused to use the Book of Common Prayer in
1642. In 1648, with Charles I a prisoner of Parliamentary forces, persecution of Virginia
saints increased, forcing Bennett and many other Puritan settlers into exile in Maryland
where they founded a new settlement, aptly named Providence, on the Severn River.
Lord Baltimore's Catholicism ironically necessitated a tolerant ecclesiastical climate,
allowing the exiled Puritans a degree of religious freedom in Maryland. With this
troublesome Puritan minority purged, Berkeley moved to cement Virginia's royalist
commitment, describing the regicide as "high and horrid, monstrous, impious and
hereticall" treason, and immediately declared Charles II the rightful sovereign.
Virginians would sooner submit to "the Turks, or our neighbor Savages" than to the
"perjured Traytors" in Parliament, and Berkeley began raising a force to resist the
anticipated Parliamentary invasion.126
In its first session after Charles' execution, the House of Burgesses lost no time
voicing its agreement with Berkeley's assessment. Declaring regicide an "unparalal'd
treason" against their "most excellent and now undoubtedly sainted king," the Burgesses
worried, despite their earlier purge of Puritans, that some disaffected settlers might work
toward the "accomplishment of their lawless and tyrranous intentions." If English
revolutionaries could divest Charles of the rights "inherent to his royall line" in violation
of "the law of nature and nations and the knowne lawes of...England," what was to
prevent a like transformation from sweeping across Virginia? To forestall this potential
disaster, the Burgesses declared that any "stranger or inhabitant" who defended the
regicide, questioned the "undoubted & inherent right" of Charles II to ascend the throne,
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or spread "false reports and malicious rumors...abroad...tending to change of
government" would be "adjudged an accessory post factum" to the regicide itself and
"suffer such censure and punishment as shall be thought fitt by the Governour."127 The
purged tidewater Puritans, relatively safe in Commonwealth-aligned Maryland, must
have counted themselves lucky to escape royalist Virginia with their lives.
Virginia maintained its royalist stance, in defiance of Commonwealth claims to
sovereignty. In August 1650, Parliament enacted the Rebel Plantations Act, which put an
embargo on Virginia and the other defiant royalist colonies, called in their charters, and
declared Parliament's ability to legislate for the empire as a whole. In March 1651, when
word of Parliament's act reached the colony, Berkeley used it to drum up further royalist
support. Despite threats to invade and subdue the colonies, Berkeley assured Virginians
that "not a ship goes...but to beg trade" – if Virginians quailed and submitted to
Parliament's "paper bullets" they would be no better than "slaves by nature." The only
options were to "resist their Imperious Ordinance" and the "heavy chains" it sought to
impose, or become "their worships slaves, bought with their money."128 The Burgesses
agreed that "excluding us the society of Nations, which bring us necessaries for what our
Country produces" would "rob us of all we sweat and labour for" and declared that
Virginians were not such "slaves by nature as to be awed with the iron rods held over
us."129 The Old Dominion prepared for war.
Virginia retained this defiant stance through January 1652, when a Parliamentary
fleet under the command of William Claiborne arrived to "reduce" the colony to
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obedience. Berkeley and the Burgesses already knew that Claiborne had successfully
brought Barbados to heel after a brief military engagement, dampening their prospects for
success, and in early March the thousand-odd men mustered to defend the colony were
dispersed before a shot was fired.130 The articles of capitulation negotiated by Claiborne,
the recently returned Richard Bennett, and the deposed governor and council were, all
things considered, relatively generous, and Virginia officially capitulated to the
Commonwealth on 15 March 1652.131 Berkeley and his council were given one year to
"sell and dispose of theire estates" and "transport themselves wherever they please,"
exempted from the new loyalty oath, and their estates and access to "equall and free
justice" were guaranteed. In keeping with Commonwealth principles, the House of
Burgesses would continue to meet, at least once a year, as the Grand Assembly of
Virginia. The articles of capitulation also allowed Virginians to "[speak] well of the
king...in their howses and private Confines," granted a general indemnity to any residents
"of what qualitie or Condicon soever that have servd the king here or in England," and
allowed Virginians to travel into England for up to six months without "any trouble or
hindrances of arrest or such like."132 Perhaps Parliament hoped to quiet Virginians' fears
of a draconian settlement, or recognized the difficulty of imposing harsh terms from
across the Atlantic. Whatever the reasoning, these generous terms at the surrender
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masked a real desire by Parliament and Virginia's returned Puritan exiles to bring the Old
Dominion into line with godly republican practice.
The movement to implement Commonwealth reforms began almost immediately.
When the Burgesses met again in April 1652, Richard Bennett was elected governor and
a number of other prominent merchants and Parliamentary supporters were appointed to
the new Council of State. Virginia's old planters were conspicuously underrepresented in
this provisional government. Under the Council's close supervision, the Burgesses
passed a series of laws aiming at nothing less than a total transformation of Virginia
society. Much as Parliamentarians had done when they gained control of the English
state, the new government recommended a wholesale revision of existing law. They
repealed statutes requiring Anglican conformity and left local churches "to theire owne
orderinge and disposall." They banned activities "tending to the profanation" of the
Sabbath and mandated that "Servants, and others" attend religious services. A litany of
moral infractions, including the "odious Sinns" of drunkenness, blasphemy, swearing,
fornication, bigamy, and "Scandalous Liveinge," would be "severelye punished."133
Most Virginians were unwilling to abide by this new Puritan order. By 1656, godly
reform had made little progress – many parishes still had no qualified ministers to preach
the gospel or enforce church discipline, and the Burgesses offered £20 to any colonists
who would bring ministers to the colony.134
The political reformation of Virginia fared little better. Though Bennett and
others sympathetic to the Commonwealth were able to wrest control of the colony from

133

Warren M. Billings, "Some Acts Not in Hening's 'Statutes': The Acts of Assembly, April 1652,
November 1652, and July 1653," The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 83, no. 1
(January, 1975):22-76, quotations 31-32.
134
Henintg, SAL, I:399-400, 418.

181

Virginia royalists, they met resistance from the outset. When the Burgesses bet in March
1653, their first act was to expel vocal royalists John Hammond and James Pyland,
elected to represent Isle of Wight County, for their "scandalous...libell and other illegall
practices."135 Again in July 1653 the Burgesses had to deal with various residents who
spoke against the legitimacy of the new government before taking up their legislative
agenda.136 At this same session, the Burgesses empowered Bennett and the Council to
"go over to Accomack...for the settlement of the peace of that countie, and punishinge
delinquents." Conciliar oversight was extended to Northampton County as well, with the
governor empowered to "appoint all officers for peace and warr [and] the division of
[the] county."137 Faced with a reluctant populace, Bennett and the Virginia Council of
State, much like the Commonwealth and Protectorate governments back in England, were
more than willing to use coercion in the service of their godly republican vision.
Perhaps nowhere did Virginia's Interregnum government face more resistance
than in the enforcement of the Navigation Acts. The assembly passed token legislation
for enforcement of the acts in November of 1654, requiring all incoming ships to register
with the governor before engaging in trade, but this policy was honored mainly in the
breach.138 When one of their own was embroiled in a legal controversy over the
Navigation Acts in early 1653, the Burgesses wasted no time registering their distaste for
metropolitan trade restrictions. Prominent James City merchant Walter Chiles' ship, the
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Fame of Virginia, was returning from Rotterdam laden with cargo and bound for Brazil,
when it was taken by Captain Richard Husband on the "pretext" that Chiles did not have
a Parliamentary license to trade outside the restrictions of the Navigation Act. The case
was to be determined by the Assembly in its upcoming session, and when Chiles was
subsequently elected speaker by the burgesses, Governor Bennett, attempting to enforce
the acts, asked that his candidacy be set aside until the dispute was settled. The
Burgesses, denying the right of Parliament to regulate their trade or the governor to set
aside their speaker, seated Chiles anyway before giving him leave to tend to his "private
affairs."139 While the fate of the Fame of Virginia is not mentioned in the record, Chiles
was later awarded another ship, the Leopold of Dunkirk, that had been confiscated "by
the grand assembly of this country" in violation of the same Navigation Act, a boon of
some £400.140 If the Navigation Acts were going to be enforced in Virginia, the
Burgesses wanted to be sure it was on their terms, and to their benefit.
What Virginians really wanted was free trade, but not the kind offered by the
Protectorate. Especially after chafing under a Parliamentary embargo for nearly three
years while they refused to submit to Commonwealth rule, Virginia's merchants wanted
not just the dissolution of old trading monopolies and an open trade for all English
subjects within the empire – they wanted total freedom of trade with all nations. In
March 1655 the Burgesses passed a sweeping free trade law that established trading posts
in every county, repealed a law forbidding profits in excess of fifty percent in mercantile
transactions, and allowed Virginians "all ffreedom of trade" with "all merchants and
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traders." Newly elected governor and well-connected merchant Edward Digges gladly
approved of the measure, despite its questionable legality under the Navigation Acts.141
Perhaps some of this desire for free trade stemmed from Virginians' growing demand for
African slaves. Calls for free trade in Virginia certainly increased after the First AngloDutch War ended in 1654, when Dutch slave traders were barred from trading with
English colonies. In March 1658, the Burgesses passed an act reopening trade with
Dutch merchants, by that point the leading carriers of African slaves in the Atlantic, as
long as they paid customs duties on any exported tobacco.142 Adherence to the
Navigation Acts, or lack thereof, was certainly one of the main concerns of imperial
planners, but distance and concerted resistance from Virginia residents made full
enforcement difficult and allowed for continued slave importations to the Chesapeake.
Still, the Commonwealth reform program did leave a visible imprint on Virginia.
In keeping with English republican principles, the suffrage was extended first to all
"house keepers, whether ffreeholders, lease holders, or otherwise tenants," and later to all
free men.143 The colony's law code was compiled, digested, and reformed along the lines
recommended for England by the Hale Commission, and new parliamentary procedures
were introduced into the House of Burgesses.144 Supporters and opponents of
Commonwealth reform all came to cherish the robust role afforded their burgesses in
colonial governance and the local autonomy representative government provided. Raised
repeatedly during the metropolitan civil wars, the question of who had the power to
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adjourn the colonial assembly became a point of contention between Commonwealth
governors and Virginia burgesses. A debate over this power broke out in the spring of
1658 when governor Samuel Mathewes attempted to "dissolve" the assembly. John
Smith, the Speaker of the House, replied that the Burgesses were "not dissolvable by any
power yet extant in Virginia but our own," and claimed sole authority to appoint officers
for themselves.145 An order from the Council of State back in London in late August may
have been a response to this independent streak in the Virginia assembly. Lamenting the
colony's "loose, & distracted condicon." Cromwell and the Council resolved to "[settle]
the government there," but the Lord Protector died before definitive action could be
taken.146 Though Virginians may have balked at many elements of Commonwealth
reform, popular sovereignty and legislative independence were not among them.
Despite the uneven reception of metropolitan reforms, the debates over
subjecthood and self-ownership that raged during the Revolution wrought meaningful
changes in Virginia's unfree labor system. Virginians abandoned servitude to the colony
as a punishment in 1658, perhaps a function of lingering memories of draconian company
rule under Dale's Code, but certainly in keeping with contemporaneous developments in
Massachusetts as well.147 As a destination for many transported English bondservants,
Virginia practice was also influenced by Commonwealth ideals of servitude. As we have
seen, English royalists and criminals transported to the colonies, despite their fears of
enslavement, remained persons under law with access to the courts for redress of their
grievances. To protect the rights of servants, the Burgesses passed statutes requiring the
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registration of all indentures and banned the distribution of headright grants to any
masters who could not "prove their title or just right."148 Even statutes setting longer
terms for Irish servants brought without an indenture set limits on the length of service,
and were in keeping with the Commonwealth policy of transportation.149 While Virginia
planters certainly made extensive use of bound English labor during the Interregnum, all
servitude in the colony was to be of limited duration and could only be imposed through
consent – all Virginia servants, even the Irish, retained their legal personhood.
Acquisition and use of Native American servants was also altered by
Commonwealth reforms, though recognition of separate Indian sovereignty and
continued conflict between settlers and local tribes complicated the attempted conversion
and assimilation of Virginia's Natives. The settlement treating Chesapeake Natives as
strangers under English law continued to hold in Virginia into the 1640s, and relations
between settlers and Indians were primarily arranged through treaties. Though the
Second Anglo-Powhatan War (1644-1646) proved the instability of these treaties, the
settlement of the conflict reinforced the tendency to see Natives as foreign nationals
living within English dominions. The articles of peace that ended the war in 1646 stated
that Necotowance, the Powhatan chieftain, held his kingdom from "the King's Ma'tie of
England," required payment of regular tribute to the English, and defined the boundaries
between Powhatan land and the colonial settlements. Both Indians and English were
enjoined to respect these new boundaries, and Necotowance agreed to assist in the return
of any English servants or African slaves who attempted to escape to Powhatan
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territory.150 Colonists were prohibited from trade with local natives, especially for
weapons or ammunition.151 Despite numerous peace treaties with local Native
Americans, Virginians remained on a decidedly warlike footing.
A treaty relationship could also have its benefits for Natives, however. Virginians
were also bound by the terms of these agreements, and the new colonial government
established after Virginia's surrender took steps to ensure that Indian treaties were
enforced. In 1653, the Burgesses ordered the removal of any English settlers living on
Pamunkey or Chickahominy lands, and a year later Northampton County settlers were
required to "proceed justly and to have the consent" of local Indians before purchasing
more tribal lands.152 A 1658 statute required that no further English settlers be given land
grants along the Rappahannock until "the Indians be first served with...fiftie acres of land
for each bowman."153 The Burgesses worried that continued attempts by colonists to
settle on Indian lands were "contrary to justice, and the true intent of the English
plantation in this country, whereby the indians might by all just and faire waies be
reduced to civility and the true worship of God." To prevent future conflict and,
hopefully but rather unrealistically, promote conversion, the assembly confirmed the
Indians' right to lands they currently held, prohibited English settlement on Indian lands
without tribal consent, and voided all patents "contrary to the sense" of the act.154 These
Natives who retained their separate sovereignty were protected in their rights through
treaties, but, as the Burgesses' 1658 acts hinted, some Interregnum Virginians hoped that
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godly reform would lead to Indian conversion and conditional assimilation as well, as it
seemed to be doing in Massachusetts.
This complicated dual policy toward Virginia Natives made the outright
enslavement of Indians difficult to justify. Native captives taken in war were certainly
liable to be enslaved under traditional European law, but enslaving people who the
Commonwealth hoped to convert was bad policy and might well lead to further armed
conflict. Indian enslavement would also have run contrary to Commonwealth practice, at
least as it was being implemented in John Eliot's 'praying Indian' towns in New England.
In Virginia, despite the failure of George Thorpe's Henrico College a generation earlier,
the goals of conversion and assimilation still held some potency.155 Though the legal
reform implemented by Bennett and the purged Burgesses left the treaty basis for Native
relations relatively unaltered, there were a number significant alterations made to the
status of Indians as servants in settler households. The Burgesses had learned of the
"perfidious dealing" of many Virginia residents who attempted to "steale, and Conveigh
away some...Indians Children" as slaves, to the "great Scandall of christianitye, and of the
English nation." Worried that this practice would make "the name of Englishmen odious
to [the Natives]," the Burgesses passed an act prohibiting the purchase or sale of
Indians.156 Earlier statutes allowing English settlers to kill any Native they believed to be
committing a crime were repealed, requiring legal proof that a Native had committed a
felony for the killer to be exonerated.157
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A 1656 act further refined Virginia's Indian policy. Acknowledging their
complicity in recent conflicts, owing to "our extreame pressures on [the Natives]," the
Burgesses declared their new policy for "civilizing them and...making them Christians."
Virginia would introduce the Indians to concepts of private property by offering them
bounties of livestock in exchange for wolf pelts, which it was hoped the Indians would
use in developing settled agriculture, and confirming their legal ownership of tribal lands.
To promote the Christianization of Native youth, the Burgesses declared that Virginians
would "not use [Native children] as slaves, but do their best to bring them up in
Christianity, civility and the knowledge of necessary trades." Financial incentives were
offered to those who "really intend the bettering of the children."158 Another statute
passed in 1658 barred the sale or transferal of any Indian children held as servants by
English settlers, and stipulated that they be "free and at [their] owne disposall at the age
of twenty five yeares."159 While reformation of Indian policy in Virginia was not as
complete or successful as it was in Massachusetts, the changes wrought by
Commonwealth reforms still made a visible impact, and always stressed the legal
personhood of Indians.
Whether these revolutionary reforms had much impact on African slavery is
harder to determine. As had been the case since 1619, African slaves were considered
property not persons under law, and rarely appear in Virginia records. Certainly they
continued to be bought and sold, rented to smaller planters, and bequeathed in wills, but
their absence as persons in courts of law is conspicuous. The overwhelming majority of
Virginia's small black population remained enslaved, outside the bounds of subjecthood.
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Some, however, challenged their bondage in ways that clearly resonated with
Interregnum Virginians. As in Massachusetts, conversion to Christianity problematized
the definition of enslaved people as outsiders subject to the cold logic of the chattel
principle. Mihill Gowen, an enslaved African who had converted to Christianity,
exploited this opening by having his son William baptized in 1655 – three years later
father and son were both emancipated on the grounds that slavery was incompatible with
Christianity.160 Elizabth Key, the mixed-race daughter of white planter Thomas Key and
one of his enslaved women, gained her freedom in 1655-56. Elizabeth had been bound
out by her father in 1636 on a nine year indenture, but was then sold to John Mottrom, a
prominent settler in Northumberland County. When Mottrom died in 1655, Elizabeth
and her attorney, William Greensted, initiated a suit for her freedom in the county court,
arguing that her decent from a free English subject, her Christianity, and the terms of her
indenture all made her continued servitude illegal. Though there was some jurisdictional
wrangling over the case, in the end Key won her freedom and ended up marrying
Greensted.161 Both Ferdinando and Elizabeth Key successfully challenged their bondage
and joined the ranks of Virginia’s growing free black population.
This growing population of free Africans illustrates that race, as separate from
slavery, had not yet hardened enough to exclude a free Virginia resident from the rights
of English subjecthood. Indeed, the 1640s and '50s are, in many ways, the high water
mark of colonial Virginia's free black community. While their numbers remained small,
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these Afro-Virginians, most of them former slaves, clung tenaciously to the rights they
could claim as English subjects. The presence of this free black community would
ultimately prove a serious threat to the continued existence of slavery, and the rights so
cherished by Johnson and Longo would soon be revoked. As long as they retained their
legal personhood, however, there was nothing in the logic of English law to place free
Africans outside the community of subjects, especially not under the relatively broad
conceptualization of subjecthood promoted by the Commonwealth.
While the lack of surviving evidence from the period makes a definitive analysis
of impact of Commonwealth reforms on Virginia slavery difficult, there are hints in the
historical record that the ideological dominance of self-ownership in the revolutionary
English empire began to chip away at the legitimacy of property-in-man. A 1658 statute
passed in the House of Burgesses classed "all negroes imported whether male or
female...however procured" among the tithables to be counted for household taxation. In
Virginia legal usage, only persons were counted as tithables -- property was assessed and
taxed differently -- and all Africans "however procured" were included under the act,
collapsing the distinction between newly imported slaves and the small colonial free
black population.162 The same statute also categorized "negroes imported" under the
same terms as "Indian servants," implying that limitations on sale and treatment might
have applied to both groups. The interposition of state power into the domestic relations
of individual masters – the limits on sale of servants and registration of indentures, or the
allowance of servants' legal claims by colonial courts – certainly fit Henry Parker's
definition of legal personhood in Jus Populi. Even the increased usage of 'servant' as a
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descriptor for bound laborers in Virginia may be significant. Reformers in England and
Massachusetts certainly knew the difference between slavery and servitude, and it is not
inconceivable that reforming Virginians like Richard Bennett consciously avoided the
term 'slave' as well. Language mattered. This fundamental difference between property
and person, between slavery and self-ownership, had a real impact on the treatment
afforded free Africans, Native Americans, and European servants under law throughout
the Anglo-American world.
***
Historical change is glacial, in a very tangible sense. Envision a plateau, flat and
featureless, being shaped by a glacier. When this massive sheet of ice spreads and
retreats, it transforms the natural landscape, carving deep gorges and raising up new
moraines. Not every new gorge cuts fully through the plateau, however -- some leave
behind a series of incomplete valleys, dead ends, evidence of a transformative force that
could not fully shape the earth below it. In much the same way, the terrain of the past is
etched deep with the fits and starts of change, the tantalizing remains of what might have
been that continue to shape historical change long after their original moment has
passed.163 The imperial English revolution was one of these moments of unfulfilled
historical possibility. What might the English empire have looked like if revolutionary
reform were successfully imposed by the Commonwealth state? How would slavery
have coexisted with a regime based on a fundamental assumption of self-ownership?
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Henry Parker's Jus Populi illustrated the anti-slavery potential of English revolutionary
ideology, and Massachusetts practice suggests that many colonists hoped to construct a
polity based firmly on Commonwealth principles and rooted in the assumption of selfownership. The fact that these anti-slavery principles were not fully enacted throughout
the empire, that they are a historical glacial dead end, should not prevent us from
recognizing their significance.
Perhaps if the Commonwealth had endured, the halting reforms underway in
Virginia would have taken root. Land usage patterns might have developed that favored
New England partible inheritance rather than the development of massive plantations
through primogeniture and entail, and agricultural reform efforts might have moved
Virginia away from cash crop monoculture. The legal premise of natural freedom and
limited servitude that informed the definition of Virginia servants – European, Indian,
and perhaps even African – as tithable persons rather than chattel properties might have
become dominant in the colony, destabilizing the very foundation of human slavery. The
access of Afro-Virginians to subjecthood and the common law courts might have
continued, bolstering the position of the colony's free black population. Perhaps a
reformed Virginia would have taken steps to regulate participation in the African slave
trade, as Massachusetts did in Smith v. Keyser, or debate the legitimacy of holding
another human as property, as Parliament did in 1659. And perhaps if England itself had
been more like New England -- relatively uniform in religious and political views, with
the coercive power to enforce magisterial reformation and godly republican rule -- such
reform could have been implemented throughout the empire.
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Of course this alternate possible history was not to be – the restoration of Charles
II to the English imperial throne in 1660 overturned much of the Commonwealth's
revolutionary reform program, led to heavy royal and state investment in the Atlantic
slave trade, and saw the rise of a new slaveholding West India interest in English politics.
By 1688, free Afro-Virginians had lost nearly all the common law rights they
traditionally had access to, and African slaves were explicitly defined as property, not
persons, under law. It is difficult to imagine the revolutionary Commonwealth, or even
the Protectorate state, enacting such measures. Without the Stuart restoration and the
creation of the Royal African Company, would the English state have invested so heavily
in the slave trade? Would Jamaica or the Carolinas have developed so rapidly into
plantation-based slave societies? The construction of a plantation empire based on
African slave labor, then, was largely contingent on the uncertain outcomes of political
contests back in England, and the reception of a new political settlement in the colonies.
In spite of the Stuart counter-revolution, assumptions of self-ownership and the
inviolability of basic rights, forged in civil war and regicide, persisted in the minds of
many English subjects, and made the debate over the growth of chattel slavery in
Restoration England far more contentious than has commonly been recognized.

194

Chapter III – "A Terrible Master": Slavery and the Human Tragedy of the Stuart
Counterrevolution, 1660-1687
The apparently placid surface of the Restoration era belies deep currents of
dissatisfaction with the monarchial absolutism of the latter Stuarts and the extreme modes
of coercion they mobilized to enforce their vision of English society. As one historian
has recently noted, at its heart "Restoration history is the story of human tragedy." This
assertion is certainly true of the British Isles, where Charles II ruthlessly tracked down
and executed the regicides that had beheaded his father, brutally repressed
nonconformists after a brief experiment with religious toleration, and crushed any hint of
direct resistance to the throne. Throughout Charles II's three kingdoms, many of the
traditional rights of subjects seemed under attack again as the de facto religious tolerance
of the Interregnum gave way to new Conformity and Test Acts, as requirements to call
regular parliaments were ignored, and as thousands of religious dissenters and political
dissidents perished in prison cells or colonial plantation fields. When a new Whig
opposition consolidated during the Exclusion Crisis of 1679-1681, they stood not only
against the abstract concepts of “tyranny and popery,” but also against the real, concrete
human tragedies perpetrated by an increasingly absolute and Catholic-leaning monarchy.1

1

Tim Harris, Restoration: Charles II and his Kingdoms (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), is an
indespensible recent work on the Stuart Restoration. Quote at 424. See also James Rees Jones, ed., The
Restored Monarchy, 1660-1688 (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1979); Ronald Hutton, The
Restoration: A Political and Religious History of England and Wales, 1658-1667 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985); Tim Harris, Politics under the Later Stuarts: Party Conflict in a Divided
Society, 1660-1714 (New York: Longman, 1993); Melinda Zook, Radical Whigs and Conspiratorial
Politics in Late Stuart England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999); Jonathan Scott,
England’s Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2000); Alan Houston and Steve Pincus, A Nation Transformed: England after the Restoration
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); George Southcombe and Grant Tapsell, Restoration
Politics, Religion, and Culture: Britain and Ireland, 1660-1714 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010);
Jacqueline Rose, Godly Kingship in Restoration England: The Politics of the Royal Supremacy, 16601688 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Kevin Sharpe, Rebranding Rule: The Restoration
and Revolution Monarchy, 1660-1714 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 2013). On the resilience
of the social formations underlying monarchial society more broadly, see Arno Mayer, The Persistence

195

Nowhere was the human tragedy of the Stuart Restoration more evident, however,
than in England's growing empire. The English Atlantic colonies weathered waves of
political unrest, repeated rounds of bloody warfare with neighboring Native Americans,
and unsettling instances of resistance from bound laborers.2 The dramatic growth of
African slavery, however, was certainly the most shocking development of the age. One
of Charles II's first acts after taking the throne was to grant the Company of Royal
Adventurers Trading to Africa a new charter, giving them monopoly rights to the Africa
trade. Company ships made nearly twice as many slaving voyages in their first decade of
operation alone than had been made during the entire Civil War and Interregnum – after
being rechartered as the Royal African Company in 1672, the number of voyages
undertaken would more than double again in the following decade. All told, English
merchants made nearly 650 successful slaving voyages in the Restoration era, delivering
well over 160,000 enslaved Africans to the American colonies, primarily in the
Caribbean but increasingly on the mainland as well.3 Considering the relatively tepid
engagement of the English state in the slave trade during the Interregnum, this massive
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commitment to slavery and the slave trade represents a stunning volte face in imperial
policy.4 The ownership of persons as property, heretofore of limited importance to the
English empire, was “Transmuted into a Vertue” by the restored Stuarts.5
This combination of repressive absolutist policies and increasing reliance on
colonial bound labor provoked sustained political and legal debate about the place of
slavery and the rights of subjects in English imperial society. As one scholar has recently
noted, the “legal-constitutionalist discourse” of Restoration England “opened up [new
space] for debate” over the proper place of royal authority in the English empire, and the
limits that should be placed on the monarch’s absolute power.6 While largely contained
by the coercive apparatus of the Restoration state, these debates often threatened to
degenerate into outright rebellion – the Fifth Monarchist risings of the early 1660s, a
rebellion of Scottish Covenanters in 1679, revelation of an alleged “Popish Plot” to
murder the Protestant king in 1676, the organization (and covert militarization) of the
Whig opposition during the Exclusion Crisis of 1679-81, the Rye House plot of 1683,
Argyle’s and Monmouth’s Rebellions in 1685, and finally, the greatest ‘rebellion’ of
them all, the Glorious Revolution of 1688.7 At each step along the way English subjects
worried that some malign force, whether popish Catholics, fanatical Protestant dissenters,
or their own dread sovereign, plotted their reduction to a state of abject slavery. As one
commentator worried in 1683, the openly Catholic James, Duke of York, Charles II’s
younger brother and heir, with his admiration for French-style absolutism and deep
investment in colonial slavery, would be “a terrible master, once he gets all into his
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hands.”8 Faced with such obvious danger, English subjects faced a stark choice: resist
Stuart absolutism, or become the rightless slaves of an absolute tyrant.
The restored Stuarts’ American empire was no more quiescent. Indeed, one might
safely describe the Restoration in the colonies as an age of rebellions. Increasing English
encroachments on Native lands sparked King Philip’s War in New England, and conflict
with local tribes famously played a major role in Bacon’s Rebellion in Virginia. The
masses of indentured laborers and enslaved Africans who marched under Nathaniel
Bacon’s standard, burning Jamestown to the ground, were a stark reminder of the tenuous
hold colonial masters had over their bound labor force. Perhaps most startling, however,
were the well-organized rebellions staged by African slaves. At least 200 Coromantees
rose up against their masters in St. Anne’s Parish, Jamaica, in 1673, escaping from
bondage to join the growing Maroon community of the island’s leeward highlands.
Augmented by further runaways and small-scale rebellions, the Leeward Maroons
continued to raid colonial sugar plantations until the English were eventually forced into
signing a treaty recognizing the Maroons’ autonomy, though requiring them to return
runaway slaves, in 1739. In 1675, plans for a rebellion by recently arrived male slaves on
“most of the plantations” in Barbados, apparently in the works for some three years, were
uncovered just in time to prevent the uprising.9 Much as the increasingly absolute power
of the Restoration Stuarts provoked dissent and rebellion in England, claims by slave
owners to absolute property ownership and absolute mastery, and the apparatus

8
9

Quoted in Harris, Restoration, 359.
For details of the Jamaica and Barbados rebellions, as well as rumors of other slave insurrections in the
West Indies, see W. Noel Sainsbury, ed., Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series: America and West
Indies, Preserved in the Public Record Office (London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1893-), IX: 661, 682,
690, 712, 741, 793, 820, 822, 862, 985. [Hereinafter cited as CSPC. All citations are to document
numbers.]

198

constructed to enforce those claims, came under attack from those forced to bear the
heavy yoke of bondage.
As one scholar has recently noted, this spate of violent resistance by Native
Americans, slaves, and indentured servants provoked a “paranoid” reaction from elite
colonists, leading to the adoption of increasingly repressive police laws to prevent further
“conspiracies” by hostile Indians and bound laborers.10 While the reaction to growing
subaltern resistance was certainly severe, emphasizing white settlers’ paranoia occludes
the very real threats they faced. Nor were the sources of these threats limited to servants,
slaves, and Natives – the increasingly close oversight of the imperial state also threatened
to intrude on the liberties of colonial settlers. Freedom of trade, local self-government,
and the distinctive patterns of property ownership and ecclesiastical organization that had
developed in the first generations of settlement were all now subject to the whim of a
monarch who claimed absolute sovereignty over the empire. Of course some colonists,
the newly consolidated Virginia gentry or a small but growing number of well-connected
Massachusetts merchants for example, benefited tremendously from this imperial
arrangement, and looked to the reinvigorated monarchy to protect their interests. Others,
like the Massachusetts colonists who chafed at the imposition of royal governance under
James II’s Dominion of New England, were not simply being paranoid when they
worried about becoming the slaves of a monarch who was personally responsible for the
physical enslavement of tens of thousands of Africans – James’ absolutism and consistent
support for chattel slavery both flowed from the same ideological wellspring.
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This confluence of factors forced the question of slavery into political debate,
calling forth new pro- and antislavery arguments and leading to the first explicit sanction
for slave property in English law. Butts v. Penny, heard by the Court of King's Bench in
1677, recognized that slaves were a form of "Merchandize" sanctioned by "the custom of
merchants," and were therefore protected as property under English law. Antislavery
tendencies forged in the Interregnum were still present, however, and informed the legal
argument against the total commodification of enslaved persons. Slave property might be
protected as "merchandize," as a commodity exchanged in an international market, but
baptism would "Infranchize" a slave in England, bringing him or her under the protection
of the law and into the community of subjects.11 Many of the underlying premises of this
antislavery argument drew on aspects of Whig anti-absolutism.12 Although few figures
in the Whig opposition openly expressed uneasiness with the growing slave trade or
colonial slavery, their emphasis on the fundamental equality of subjects and open access
to the protection of the law could also be used to revive rightless slaves from social
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death.13 Despite the growth of colonial slavery, some believed that English air remained
too pure for slaves to breathe.
The colonies, of course, were a different matter. Virginia planters must have
applauded the court’s decision in Butts v. Penny that slaves were a protected form of
property. They desperately needed more laborers, and hoped that an increased English
slave trade would solve this problem.14 Besides, they had only recently passed a statute
guaranteeing that baptism would not free a slave, precluding the enfranchisement the few
Africans who had somehow managed to be baptized. Virginia statute, however, also
classified slaves as a special mixed form of property, more closely akin to real estate than
chattels. Would English law reach into Virginia and override this local statute? And
what of Massachusetts, with its peculiar local form of slavery – did Butts v. Penny force
Bay Colonists to recognize their slaves as "merchandize," or would local regulations
defining slaves as persons before the law continue to hold? If quo warranto proceedings
to recall the Massachusetts charter, attempts at restructuring of land ownership patterns,
and the imposition of royal governance through the Dominion of New England are any
indicator, Bay Colonists certainly had cause to fear for the future of their peculiar
settlement. The future of slavery in the American colonies hinged on the outcome of
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continuing legal and jurisdictional wrangling and the array of political forces in both the
center and periphery of the Restoration empire.
Restoration-era policies touching slavery and subjecthood in England and its
growing empire were received and implemented very differently in Virginia and
Massachusetts. Debates over subjecthood and the rights of English subjects under late
Stuart absolutism had real implications for the political construction of slavery in the
colonies, and positions honed in the continuing battle over absolutism also shaped
arguments for and against chattel slavery. In Virginia, a spate of legislation passed
immediately following the Restoration defined slaves as a special form of property and
systematically closed off the possibility of legal personhood for Afro-Virginians, firmly
riveting the chains of slavery on black laborers.15 In Massachusetts however, despite
increasing participation in the slave trade and a growing black population, Bay Colonists
were hesitant to embrace chattel slavery, and the evidence suggests that slaves continued
to be treated as persons before the law. Though driven underground by the Stuarts'
repressive tactics and the overwhelming political momentum of the Tory Reaction,
concepts of natural liberty and consent forged in civil war and revolution, and now linked
to the Whig critique of royal absolutism, continued to inform debates about the growth of
slavery, even in the midst of the human tragedy of the Restoration.
***
On his 30th birthday, 29 March 1660, Charles II ascended the throne his father had
so ingloriously lost eleven years earlier, and English subjects turned out in droves to
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celebrate this symbolic rebirth of monarchy. Buoyed by this reception, Charles quickly
moved to reassert the centrality of monarchy to the English state. The political
radicalism so prevalent during the Civil Wars and Interregnum was driven underground
by a combination of harsh repression, deft political maneuvering, and a new campaign to
mobilize popular support by Charles and his Tory supporters.16 Though Charles was
briefly able to effectively reassert royal absolutism throughout his dominions, particularly
in the first decade of his rule, opposition to absolute monarchy remained a potent political
force, especially in Scotland, Ireland, and the American colonies.17 When James, Duke
of York, Charles' brother and heir, publicly converted to Catholicism in 1673, an
emerging 'Country' faction argued for his exclusion from the royal succession, and the
Whig opposition that emerged from the Exclusion Crisis of 1679-1681 continued to argue
for limitations on monarchial power and guarantees for the basic rights of English
subjects throughout the Restoration era.18
Despite continued opposition to royal absolutism and the fear during times of
crisis that “’41 was come again,” Charles II never faced the same level of opposition that
his father had. Much of this apparent quiescence may be attributed to the political terms
upon which the Stuart Restoration was predicated. Many Britons were placated by
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Charles’ Declaration of Breda, made before his official return to the throne, which, while
theoretically maintaining the absolute nature of English monarchy, promised that the
restored king would rule according to English law. To more radical English subjects,
Charles promised indemnities for Interregnum treasons and a new ecclesiastical
settlement that would comprehend loyal dissenters. Constitutionally, the Stuart
Restoration made a handful of minor concessions to revolutionary Parliamentarians,
including an act requiring triennial meetings of Parliament and another placing
restrictions on the use of prerogative courts. These concessions aside, England’s
constitutional clock was wound back to 1641 – officially, the interregnum had never
happened. This arrangement had the virtue of allowing English subjects of various
political stripes to work toward reconciliation without recrimination, but left unaddressed
many of the basic structural issues that had torn the kingdoms asunder a generation
earlier.
Despite the initial quiescence of the restoration, many of Charles’ promises soon
proved hollow. Despite hopes of a more general amnesty and the relatively generous
terms of the Indemnity Act, the brutal crackdown on Interregnum radicals quickly proved
that while England may have officially returned to the status quo ante bellum, the
memories of nearly two decades of violent civil war could not easily be erased. Oliver
Cromwell’s corpse was disinterred and mutilated – the former Lord Protector’s rotting
head gazed over Westminster hall from atop a spike for the next 25 years.19 Former
Massachusetts divine Hugh Peter, despite his refusal to sign Charles I’s death warrant and
open uneasiness with the king’s beheading, was executed for treason and regicide in
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October 1660.20 Even moderates who had initially welcomed the Restoration quickly
found much to dislike about the Stuart monarchy. Hopes of a broad church settlement
that would comprehend most Protestant sects were dashed by the so-called Clarendon
Code which reinstated Anglican uniformity, banned dissenting conventicles, and required
all magistrates and freemen to take an oath of allegiance and supremacy.21 Though the
Triennial Parliaments Act was honored in the breach, Charles proved more than willing
to prorogue and dissolve his great council when he could not guarantee its compliance to
the royal will. Furthermore, alliance with the Catholic French against the Reformed
Dutch, and the open conversion of James, Duke of York to the church of Rome,
exacerbated persistent English fears about a drift to popery, tyranny, and slavery.22
When a nascent Whig coalition came together to protest James’ claims to the
throne, much of the political impetus behind this Exclusion Crisis hinged on a
redefinition of Englishness. Adding to the discourse of “free-born” Englishness that had
emerged during the Civil Wars, proponents of James’ exclusion argued that England’s
innate love of liberty precluded Catholics, particularly French-style absolutist Catholics
like the Duke of York, from ascending the English throne. Linked to traditions of
English freedom, anti-Catholicism became a potent political weapon that could be used to
narrow the scope of the English imperial subjecthood.23 This tendency, however, also
opened up new understandings of subjecthood itself. Given the prominence of dissenters
among the early Whigs and their supporters, a narrow definition of the English nation as
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adherents to the Anglican Church was deeply problematic, as illustrated by repeated calls
for increased religious tolerance for all Protestants. Furthermore, allied to a growing
Protestant International, Britons came to see themselves as part of a broader anti-Catholic
bloc, committed to blunting France’s march toward universal monarchy. In such a
context, with Protestant refugees from the Continent pouring into the British Isles, the
narrow definition of subjecthood as applicable only to those of English birth became
increasingly difficult to support. In place of these older, narrow definitions, a more
capacious understanding of Englishness defined by access to basic legal rights began to
emerge. When linked to the political opposition against restored Stuart absolutism, this
changing ideal of subjecthood had the potential to redraw the boundaries of the English
nation. At its most comprehensive, this new definition of English subjecthood might
even include enslaved people.
This, of course, was exactly what the restored Stuarts feared. Without a narrow
definition of subjecthood and limits on access to basic rights, absolutism simply could not
function effectively. To meet the emergent Whig challenge, political theorists worked to
bolster the legitimacy of absolute monarchy. As absolutist theorists like Robert Filmer
and Thomas Hobbes argued, an absolute monarchy was the only political system that
could contain the violent, capricious passions of the state of nature within the bounds of
civil society. In addition, at least to many supporters of the Stuart regime, the divine
origin of European monarchy conferred absolute, theoretically indivisible sovereignty on
the king. In practice, of course, the monarch was incapable of directly overseeing his
dominions, and so the practical application of absolute rule fell to the jurists, magistrates,
and heads-of-household who ruled in loco parentis over the mass of the population. As
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literary scholar Michael McKeon has argued, this “devolution of absolutism” from the
monarch to more and more subjects over the course of the 17th and 18th centuries shaped
modern conceptions of property, interiority, and family structure.24 In the context of
Stuart absolutism, this devolutionary process also enabled increasingly absolute claims of
authority and dominion by representatives of the absolute state. Ormonde and Tyrconnell
in Ireland, like Berkeley and Andros in the American colonies, claimed grants of
authority from the king’s sovereign prerogative in their often bloody attempts to bring the
dominions into line with the Stuarts’ absolute vision.25 For slave owners, this devolution
of absolute sovereignty enabled and legitimated their claims of absolute dominion over
the enslaved. Slaves, as uncivilized heathens outside the bounds of civil society, were
defined as property, not persons, and as such were subject to the absolute control of petty
plantation monarchs. Imperium in imperio was not particularly problematic in this
instance – slave owners merely enacted the divine and indivisible absolute sovereignty of
their monarch in its basest form.
Theoretical questions aside, slavery and the slave trade became spectacularly
profitable investments in the late-17th century as the West Indian plantation complex
matured. This economic potential quickly drew the attention of the Restored Stuarts.
When domestic revenue extraction proved politically difficult, Charles moved to tap the
massive economic potential of his American empire through prerogative taxation on
colonial trade. The passage of the first Navigation Acts during the Interregnum had
illustrated the economic potential of an increasingly centralized imperial structure, and
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Charles quickly came to realize that robust imperial policies could be made to bolster
royal absolutism and economic clout at home. Through centralized control of imperial
trade, the Restoration state could extract revenue from trade without having to rely on
domestic taxation and vexatious Parliaments. Unlike Charles I and the series of regimes
that succeeded him, the reorganized empire gave Charles II a substantial source of
revenue and, thus, substantial room for political maneuver.
A productive English empire, then, was a crucial fiscal asset to the monarchy
during the Restoration. Charles’ attempts at imperial centralization aimed at extracting
revenue from his American colonies, but in order to maximize the empire’s profitability
continued shortages of labor in the colonies had to be addressed. As we have seen,
Charles continued the Interregnum policy of transportation and bond servitude for
English dissidents and political prisoners but found, much as the Commonwealth and
Protectorate regimes had, that transportation could neither stem the tide of political
opposition nor sate the demand for plantation labor.26 Another source of bound labor was
needed and, increasingly over the course of the Restoration, African slaves were used to
fill this void. The relatively meager English slave trade of the 1640s and ‘50s, however,
had proved insufficient to meet colonial demand – state action would be necessary to
guarantee a sufficient bound labor supply and, thus, a steady flow of customs and excise
duties into the royal exchequer.
Charles immediately moved to provide just such support. One of his first acts as
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king was to charter the joint stock Company of Royal Adventurers Trading to Africa,
granting them exclusive trading privileges along the African coast. The royal family was
the largest single investor in the Company – among those listed as shareholders in 1663
were “Royal Consort Queen Katherine, Mary the Queen, our mother, our dearest brother
James, Duke of York, our dearest sister Henrietta Maria, Duchess of Orleans, [and]
Prince Rupert, Duke of Buckingham.”27 The Company was an immediate economic
success. Its initial capital stock of £120,000 more than doubled to an estimated £273,807
by 1665. The company’s president, James, Duke of York, took a special interest in the
day-to-day management of the slave trade. Under his guidance, slaving voyages rose to
well over 40 per annum, carrying at least £160,000 in exports and “furnish[ing] all the
plantations with negro servants.”28
The late Stuart monarchy provided legal and political support for colonial slavery
in other ways as well. In 1664, the newly created Council for Foreign Plantations
recognized that slaves, who they described as “perpetual servants,” were “the most useful
appurtenances of a Plantation” and pledged their support for the growing English slave
trade.29 The Privy Council regularly accepted and acted on petitions from the Company
of Adventurers and its successor, the Royal African Company, reaffirming the
Company’s monopoly privileges and issuing orders against independent merchants. 30 In
1677, the Privy Council declared that slaves would be classified as commodities under
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the terms of the Navigation Acts, throwing the full weight of the royal prerogative behind
the growing slave trade.31 Still, it appears that the Privy Council remained somewhat
reticent in extending this commodification of slaves to English soil. A 1679 order in
Council declared that, while slaves were certainly considered property for purposes of
trade, Africans were not to be counted or taxed like other commodities brought into
England.32 While recognizing the existence of slave property in the empire, orders
issuing from the Privy Council and Council for Foreign Plantations did not explicitly
extend this property right to England itself, a decision that would have dramatic
consequences for the future development of imperial slave law.
Given the explosive growth of the slave trade, however, it was only a matter of
time before questions of slave property ownership made their way into the English courts,
where royally appointed justices handed down a series of proslavery decisions. The first
English common law decision regarding slavery was handed down in June 1677 when
Butts v. Penny came before the Court of King’s Bench at Westminster Hall.33 At issue
were “10 Negroes and a half” purchased by a Mr. Butts in the West Indies.34 Somehow,
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these Africans found their way into the hands of a Mr. Penny, who refused their return to
Butts. Butts brought an action in trover, a common law writ seeking compensation for
improperly seized chattel properties, in hope of recovering the value of his lost slaves.35
As proof that he had “a property in” his 10 ½ Africans, counsel for Butts argued that he
had “bought [them], and was in possession of them until the Defendant took them.” They
had been purchased as slaves, as property, and Butts’ uninterrupted possession was
offered as sufficient proof of ownership. Besides, “the Negroes were Infidels, and the
Subjects of an Infidel Prince, and are usually bought and sold in America as
Merchandise.” As heathens, outside the protections of Christian baptism and the rights of
the English subject, these Africans were classed as “Merchandise,” chattel property, and
recognized as such by the “Custom of Merchants.” Purchased and held as chattels, trover
must lie for African slaves.36
A Mr. Thompson, solicitor for Penny, countered with a simple and
straightforward position: “there could be no Property in the Person of a Man sufficient to
maintain Trover,” citing as precedent the eminent Sir Edward Coke’s assertion, in his
Commentaries upon Littleton, “That no Property could be in Villains but by Compact or
Conquest.”37 It might be possible to have some form of property in man, Thompson
argued, but the property relation would be limited by the common law of villeinage, and
villeins were not the absolute property of their master. They retained access to the king’s
justice, they could marry, and they were not subject to the unlimited physical power of
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their master. In short, villeins were considered people under the law. Coke's assertion
that villeinage was essentially a contractual relation – a lord's property in his villeins
originated through "Compact" – implied that an English subject's self-ownership could
only be limited by their own consent. Even then, villeins were tied legally to a landed
estate and were not saleable as chattels. In other words, villeinage implied the ownership
of a person's labor output, not their person, and villeins remained legal persons, subjects,
under the law.38
Thompson’s argument, then, was simple but powerful – villeinage was the closest
thing to property-in-man sanctioned by English law; the Africans at issue were clearly
not villeins; therefore Butts could have no property in them. Besides villeinage as an
institution had, for all intents and purposes, been dead for nearly a century. Thompson
also addressed the international norm of enslaving non-Christians, arguing that the slaves
in question should "go to [an] administrator until they become Christians; and thereby
they are infranchized."39 Here Thompson acknowledged the traditional link in European
international law between heathenism and liability to enslavement but also, in a crucial
turn, reaffirmed the emancipatory power of Christianity and English air. The implication
of these arguments was clear – property in man, the essence of slavery, could not exist
under English common law.
Thompson’s argument, however, did not carry the day. The justices of King’s
Bench, led by the eminent Sir Richard Raynsford, Chief Justice, found for the plaintiff,
Butts, in a special verdict. Raynsford, a confirmed royalist and former MP in the
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Convention and Cavalier Parliaments, handed down a decision that must have pleased
Charles II – no small matter as Raynsford held his seat as Chief Justice in bene placio, at
the king’s pleasure.40 Accounts of the court’s decision in Butts vary, but essentially
Raynsford and his fellow justices agreed: “there might be a Property in [the Africans]
sufficient to maintain Trover.” Since Africans were “bought and sold among Merchants,
so [they are] Merchandise, and also being Infidels,” the slaves were “by usage tanquam
bona [as goods].” This decision seems to confirm precisely what generations of
historians have taken as received wisdom: slaves were classified as property under
English law, legally equivalent to any other chattels, and ownership of this peculiar form
of property was protected by English common law courts.41
Yet upon further inspection the decision in Butts v. Penny becomes far less
straightforward. Both extant reports of Butts register a degree of ambivalence on the part
of the king’s justices. Creswell Levinz’s account records the court’s decision that “there
might be a Property in [slaves] sufficient to maintain Trover.”42 This uncertainty is also
reflected in the qualification of the court’s verdict. The judgment was registered “for the
Plaintiff, nisi Causa, this Term.” Nisi Causa was a juridical qualification to allow for
new arguments to be presented by the defendant – the verdict would stand unless cause
was shown to change it within the court’s term.43 Apparently cause was not found to
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change the verdict, and the fate of the slaves at issue, in the end, is unknown – Butts,
Penny, and the disputed African slaves are not mentioned again in the record.
Regardless of the specific outcome for any particular party to the case, however,
the court’s definition of the slaves as “Merchandize” hints at another interesting
qualification. Slaves might be considered chattels for purposes of trade – it was, after all
the “custom of merchants” that seems to have swayed the King’s Bench – but their status
within any specific jurisdiction was left unclear by the court’s decision. It was, after all,
the slave trade that most directly touched the royal interest. As long as marketable
commodities continued to flow from the colonies, augmenting the royal revenue through
customs and excise, the crown seems not to have cared much about the specific legal
status of bound laborers in any particular colonial jurisdiction. As long as the court’s
decision greased the wheels of imperial commerce, Charles would be pleased.
Furthermore, the (admittedly brief) statement of the facts of the case does not specify
where the slaves in question were held at the time of trial. If they were in a colonial
jurisdiction, which seems likely, then the lex loci of that particular colony would
determine their ultimate status, not the “custom of merchants.”44 To be sure, all English
colonies had legalized some form of slavery by 1677 but, as we have seen, broad
variation existed in the precise definition of slaves as property or persons under law in
individual colonies.
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In England itself, the significance of Butts is even less clear – defining slaves as
“merchandize” for purposes of trade did not necessitate a continuation of that property
status in English air, as the Privy Council orders discussed above illustrate. The logic
behind this jurisdictional division was clear – unlike in the colonies, in England a master
might own the labor of a slave or servant, but not his or her person. Under the relatively
inclusive vision of subjecthood still dominant in England at the time, all persons were
understood to have at least basic access to the king’s protection so long as they met the
dual qualifications of Christianity and allegiance, qualifications which defined them as
persons under the law. This is precisely the logic Thompson relied on in his antislavery
argument about baptism and enfranchisement. To be sure, this understanding of slavery
was fundamentally challenged by English participation in the slave trade and the reliance
of the colonial plantation economy on bound labor, but the presence of Thompson’s
argument illustrates that, in spite of the Restoration monarchy’s commitment to African
slavery, anti-slavery tendencies had not completely disappeared.
In addition, the usage of trover in disputes over slaves rather than writs of
replevin, in which an owner sought the actual return of specific chattels, provides further
insight into both the legal rights afforded to masters and the lived reality of enslavement.
Butts’ decision to initiate his suit with a writ of trover may have been an
acknowledgement that, as commodities in a lucrative Atlantic market, the slaves in
question had likely already been sold off or worked to death in a West Indian cane field,
and could not be returned without great personal cost and disruption to the imperial
economy. Trover perfectly suited the legal assumption that slaves were interchangeable
commodities, not persons, under law – witness the designation of the enslaved child at
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issue in Butts as “½” for example. One can also imagine this usage of trover redounding
to the benefit of enslaved persons, however. Were a slave to be improperly taken, or
were he or she to abscond from service, and somehow become free, perhaps by reaching
English soil, actions in trover would guarantee compensation for the former owner but
not the return of the specific slave in question to bondage, as a replevin would require.
Though recognizing their status as chattel properties, the use of trover also implicitly
acknowledged that slaves retained human agency.45
In a legal world where the substance of justice was embodied in the procedures of
its administration, the specific writs or forms of action used to initiate suits mattered
greatly.46 The use of trover to initiate suits over slaves was certainly the norm in late
Stuart courts but, as Sir Thomas Grantham’s Case (1687) illustrates, the English common
law writ system could also, even if inadvertently, recognize the humanity of colonial
bound laborers. Sir Thomas Grantham, a naval officer and tobacco trader who helped put
down Bacon’s Rebellion in Virginia before establishing an English colonial toehold at
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Mumbai, “bought a monster in the Indies” – a young man named Shackshoon with “the
perfect shape of a child growing out of his breast.”47 Grantham brought his Indian
captive to England and “exposed [him] to the sight of people for profit.” At some point,
the young man was baptized and “detained from his master.” Grantham’s Indian
“monster,” it seems, had sympathetic English allies who hoped to end his public
exploitation. Sir Thomas, however, was unwilling to let such a prized possession go
without a fight and brought a writ de homine replegiando in the Court of Common Pleas.
A local sheriff executed the writ and “replevied the body,” returning the unfortunate
young man to his master, but did not include an acknowledgement of Grantham’s
proprietary interest in his official return. It was this technical question of usage that
brought Grantham’s Case before the Court of Common Pleas, where Lord Chief Justice
Edward Herbert, a staunch royalist who would soon flee the country with James II after
the Glorious Revolution, handed down the court’s decision.48 The sheriff was ordered to
redraft his return to explicitly affirm that “Sir Thomas claimed a property” in the body of
his Indian “monster.”
At first glance, Grantham’s Case once again illustrates the commitment of the
English legal system to the property rights of masters. The use of homine replegiando to
initiate suit, however, does not sit easily with this analysis. Homine replegiando, literally
‘man in distress,’ was a legal writ similar to habeas corpus, most commonly used to
bring a person held in prison or by another private subject before the court.49 In this
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sense, and especially in comparison to the rising use of trover in cases touching slave
property, the use of homine replegiando in Grantham’s Case implied recognition of the
humanity of Grantham’s Indian “monster.” It is likely that this was the how the English
allies who baptized and protected the young man viewed the situation – Solicitor
Thompson had argued in Butts v. Penny that Christianity would “Infranchize” slaves, and
later anti-slavery activists would certainly turn to forms of action like homine
replegiando and habeas corpus to challenge property-in-man. Though in this specific
case the person in question was returned to his master, the court did not rule that
Grantham’s “monster” was a slave. The property right Sir Thomas claimed was in the
labor value of a legal person, in this case the public display of a physical deformity for
profit, not in the person himself.50 Clearly this was an exploitative employment relation,
but Grantham’s Indian “monster” remained a person under law who, at least in theory,
could expect state intervention to protect his basic rights as a Christian and an English
subject.
Perhaps the most stinging criticism of Restoration-era colonial slavery, and
obliquely of late Stuart absolutism, came from Morgan Godwyn, an Anglican minister
who spent time in Barbados in the late 1670s. Godwyn’s 1680 treatise The Negro’s and
Indian’s Advocate offered a clear and cogent defense of the humanity of African slaves,
called for their conversion to Christianity, and asked that the English state limit the power
of masters over their slaves and facilitate conversion to Christianity. The Negro’s and
Indian’s Advocate also sheds light on new pro-slavery arguments denying even the basic
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humanity of slaves, arguments that appear to have emerged for the first time during the
Restoration.51 Colonial slave owners, Godwyn tells us, subscribed to the “disingenuous
and unmanly Position” that “the Negro’s though in their Figure they carry some
resemblances of Manhood, yet are indeed no Men.”52 These “wild Fancies and absurd
Positions” allowed masters to argue for “their Negro’s Brutality; justifie their reduction
of them under Bondage; disable them from all Right and Claims, even to Religion it self;
pronounce them Reprobates, and upon a sudden (with greater speed and cunning than
either the nimblest Jugler, or Witch) transmute them into whatsoever substance the
exigence of their wild reasonings shall drive them to.”53
The motivation for the planters’ actions was clear – they knew “no other God but
Money, nor Religion but Profit.” Nor was this spirit isolated to Barbados. Godwyn
claimed that individual economic gain had become the “most operative and universally
owned Principle...of the whole Plantations.”54 The main objection Godwyn encountered
when trying to convert slaves to Christianity was that it would be “destructive to [the
planters’] Interest, tending to no less Mischief than the overthrow of their Estates, and the
ruine of their Lives, threatening even the utter Subversion of the Island.” Clearly, despite
the King’s Bench ruling in Butts v. Penny and colonial laws decoupling Christianity and
emancipation, planters still worried that baptism would imply legal personhood, limiting
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their ability to extract labor from their African slaves. Worse yet, Godwyn complained,
the English state was actively supporting the dehumanization and continued heathenism
of Africans. Making the linkage between slavery and absolutism explicit, Godwyn
leveled a scathing critique aimed in equal parts at colonial planters and the domestic
policies of the Stuarts. The connection of the Stuart court to colonial slavery led the
monarchy to extend its absolute power “even...to the Lives and Fortunes of Freemen,
whom (no less than slaves) they can without scruple divest of all Right...And no wonder
that they who hold and practice such Principles concerning Freemen, should prove no
less fierce sticklers against the Right of Slaves.”55 Were this tendency toward absolute,
arbitrary power to continue, “all Subjects and subordinate Governors would be Men but
in part; but yet by so much the more, by how much they approached nearer to
Absoluteness. And in all the Grand Seignior’s spacious Domains, where there are none
but Slaves, there would not be so much as one Man besides himself; not excepting the
very Christians. The evil consequences of which Belief, the Authors thereof may sooner
feel, than they are willing to understand or see.”56 Prophetic words indeed.
The result of this coordinated imperial choice to define Africans out of legal
humanity, Godwyn argued, was increasingly inhumane treatment from masters. The
definition of slaves as property rather than persons allowed masters a “two-fold Use, first
to Brutifie them; and...to deprive them of all both Temporal and Spiritual Rights, which
their Manhood, notwithstanding their being Slaves, would otherwise infer.”57 As we will
see, these two intellectual moves – the definition of slaves as brutes, the legal equivalent
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of domesticated animals, and the removal of all access to rights – map perfectly onto the
construction of Virginia slave law during the Restoration. Without access to these rights,
enslaved people had no way to legally resist the arbitrary brutality of their absolute
masters. It was this “two-fold Use” that allowed a master to starve or beat their slaves to
death – if the slave were defined as a legal person, such acts would make the master a
“Murtherer, and amongst more vertuous Christians, [he] would certainly be Arraigned
for one.”58 It was this definition that reduced the holy institution of marriage to “direct
Fornication”; that accounted for so many of the mixed-race children conspicuous in
planters’ households; that allowed for the use of brutal instruments of torture on enslaved
bodies.59 All of this inhuman brutality, Godwyn argued, was “an effect...of their
believing Negro’s to be Brutes.”60
The solution was clear – Englishmen must reaffirm “the Negro’s Humanity, and
to shew that neither their Complexion nor Bondage, Descent nor country, can be any
impediment thereto.”61 Much as Henry Parker had done during Interregnum debates over
slavery, Godwyn made a clear distinction between legitimate servitude and the
illegitimate concept of property-in-man.62 Taking aim at the first element of the slave
owners’ “two-fold Use,” Godwyn flatly denied “that Servitude should be attended with
such dismal effects, as of Men to transform them into Brutes.”63 In Godwyn’s analysis,
the concept that humans could be defined as “beasts,” “brutes,” or “Cattells,” was
ridiculous. It was obvious that Africans, equally with all other humans, were “endued
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with a reasonable and immortal Soul, which alone constitutes him a Man.” Without this
basic human trait, Africans “could neither be subject to Laws or Discipline, nor capable
of Rewards or Punishments separated, a grege brutorum...Above whom he is only
advanced by that Prerogative of Reason implanted in his Soul.”64 Why else would
masters place slaves as “Governours and overseers” on their own plantations?65 How
else could Africans have “arrived to an ability of Understanding, and discoursing in
English equal with most of our own People[?]”66 “How should they otherwise be capable
of Trades, and other no less Manly imployments...or shew so much Discretion in
management of Business; eminent in divers of them...were they not truly Men?”67 Of
course Africans, like English subjects, might be legally reduced to some form of
servitude, but nothing could deprive them “of that Right which we naturally have to be
ranked within the Degree and Species of Men.”68
Thus, enslaved Africans remained human and as such their “Servitude is no such
forfeiture of Right, but that a Slave hath as good a plea and just claim to Necessaries,
both for his Soul and Body, as his Master hath to his strength and industry in those
Works, about which he is imployed.”69 Echoing Henry Parker’s 1641 tract Jus Populi,
Godwyn called on the English state to intervene in and regulate the master/slave relation.
He hoped “the Government at Home” might make “some wholesome and good Law”
both to check the “Inhumanities of the wrankest kind” perpetrated by slave owners, and
to guarantee enslaved Africans’ access to Christian baptism and education. The ancient
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Greeks and Romans had passed such laws. Even the hated Spaniards had “most
graciously released” their slaves from the absolute control of masters by regulating
treatment and allowing baptism. According to Godwyn, these laws were explicit
acknowledgements of “a Right in the Party, on whose behalf they were made” – even the
Spaniards of the Black Legend recognized their slaves as humans and protected their
basic rights.70 The anti-slavery implications of this line of argument should be clear:
using the power of their centralized imperial state, the English could, if they so chose,
legally interpose state power between master and slave, recognize the humanity of
enslaved persons, and guarantee their access to certain basic rights, especially Christian
baptism. Were these steps to be taken, African slaves would be legally indistinguishable
from English servants.
Obviously, the English imperial state did not enact such legislation during the
Restoration. Indeed, the economic and political dictates of late Stuart absolutism made
such an anti-slavery position all but unimaginable in the halls of government. Nor were
the Virginia gentry planters or New England merchants who controlled their colonial
governments any more sympathetic to Godwyn’s message. As we shall see, their
economic success and political dominance relied on the same intellectual and legal
foundations as the absolute monarchy itself – they came to see themselves as absolute
masters of their own little monarchies. The overweening power of these petty absolutists,
however, could never completely erase the essential humanity of enslaved persons, nor
could it fully silence the many critics who saw clear parallels between their own plight
and that of African slaves. The battle between the essential liberty of humanity and the
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absolute property rights of slaveholders that would determine the future of millions of
Africans would not be fought in the free air of England, but in the plantation fields,
merchant houses, and courtrooms of the colonies.
***
Perhaps no single moment in the history of American slavery has been so closely
and thoughtfully examined as the “transition” from white indentured servitude to the
enslavement of Africans in colonial Virginia. Whether its cause was an increase in the
supply of slaves due to the growth of the slave trade, a realization that European bound
labor could not meet the demand of a developing plantation complex, or increased
rebelliousness and demands for greater political rights from British servants, most
scholars agree that the period between 1660 and 1688 saw the emergence of the English
empire’s first true slave societies.71 The minute attention given this transitional moment
has greatly enriched our understanding of the demographics and lived experience of
African slaves – we know more today about the African origins of enslaved Virginians,
their experience of the slave trade, the labor regimes under which they toiled, and the
lives they built for themselves under slavery than Edmund Morgan knew in 197672 – yet
we still lack a coherent narrative of how and why specific changes were made in the legal
structure of slavery in Restoration Virginia. A closer inspection of the precise legal
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status of bound labor in Virginia, and its relation to broader imperial legal-constitutional
discourse, may point us toward such an understanding.
Something had changed after 1660, but what? As we have seen, Virginia masters
had no qualms about defining bound African laborers as property from the very outset of
colonization. The Commonwealth and Protectorate regimes, however, had begun to
implement a number of reforms in imperial structure and colonial law that, if continued,
might fundamentally challenge many of the underpinnings of the slave regime. What the
Virginia gentry accomplished in the “transition,” then, was not the construction of a new
slave society or the reception of older bodies of slave law, but the legal reestablishment
of extant local practice and its protection (indeed unprecedented promotion) by the
imperial state. In other words, they put local Virginia law to Morgan Godwyn’s “twofold Use” – statutes explicitly defined the precise form property-in-man would take and
stripped both enslaved and free Afro-Virginians of all access to the rights of English
subjects. In so doing, Virginia planters made themselves increasingly absolute masters,
ruling over their plantations as petty monarchs and denying the African and AfroVirginian laborers subject to their authority even the barest recognition of a common
humanity.
Before they could execute their design, however, the Virginia gentry needed to
consolidate their political power. The old guard of pre-civil war planters fell in line
behind the restored Governor Berkeley and quickly turned back Virginia’s constitutional
clock. In March 1660, even before receiving official word of Charles II’s return to the
throne, the Burgesses repealed all Interregnum legislation, declared any residents who
spoke out against the new regime “enemies of the peace,” and unleashed a brutal wave of
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repression against Quakers and other dissenters.73 Their political clout was further
augmented by the arrival of more royal favorites during the early Restoration.74 Indeed,
the roster of great families that would dominate the Virginia gentry in the 18th century
was largely in place well before the Glorious Revolution cemented the political stability
of the Old Dominion.75 Marriage and inheritance patterns ensured that this central cohort
of great planting families retained their grip on the choicest tobacco lands and most
influential political positions.76 Continued royal favor and imperial protection of the
tobacco trade tied the consolidated Virginia elite closely to the Stuart regime, which
relied on the customs and excise duties on colonial exports to fund its increasingly robust
imperial state apparatus.77
The dominance of the Restoration’s great planting families was quite literally
inscribed on Virginia’s landscape – it is to the decades just after 1660 that the Old
Dominion’s first great tobacco plantations date. Leading Virginia families, including the
Ludwells, Lees, Randolphs, Tayloes, Masons, Carters, and Byrds, entered the colony
during the Restoration and quickly parlayed political influence into massive estates. Of
the hundred or so great planters comprising the Virginia gentry, not one owned fewer
than two thousand aces, and most had much larger estates. William Fitzhugh, for
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example, owned well over fifty thousand acres by the turn of the 18th century. Not
surprisingly, these great planters were also the colony’s largest slave owners – Fitzhugh
employed dozens of enslaved people on his home plantation on the Northern Neck alone.
William Byrd I once filed headright patents for one hundred imported slaves in a single
year.78 Freed from the meddlesome reform efforts of Puritans and commonwealthmen,
Virginians got right back down to business.
To ensure the stability of the plantation regime, the Burgesses officially readopted
English common law in 1662, guaranteeing that division and descent of real property
would follow known guidelines and privilege the integrity of landed estates.79
Increasingly, the gentry turned to the entail to protect plantations from division and
alienation in perpetuity.80 These tactics were so successful that by the 1670s Virginia’s
great planters owned hundreds of thousands of acres of prime tidewater real estate. In
this economic context, there was little opportunity for former servants to become
independent freeholders. In 1673, Thomas Ludwell noted that at least a quarter of all
freed servants owned no land at all, and with little demand for wage laborers, this
landless class was both an economic and political liability.81 Without meaningful
economic incentives to bring them to the Old Dominion, then, the influx of indentured
servants from England was already slowing well before Bacon’s Rebellion.
This unequal distribution of productive tobacco land inevitably led to a severe
land crunch, sparking the great turning point of Virginia’s colonial history, Bacon’s
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Rebellion.82 Nathaniel Bacon, a well-connected settler with gentry ambitions, felt he
could not gain access to sufficient property to sate his economic and political desires, and
led a small army of poor freeholders, indentured servants, and about 250 Afro-Virginians
– ten percent of the colony’s enslaved population – into war against the Pamunkey
natives in April 1676. Governor Berkeley, under royal orders to prevent an expensive
conflict with the Natives if possible, condemned the raid and called out the militia to
quash the rebellion. The militia was routed by Bacon’s rag-tag band, which then
proceeded to march on Jamestown and put England’s first permanent American
settlement to the torch, leveling the rudimentary statehouse and few ramshackle homes
that made up the colonial capitol. Though eventually quelled by a contingent of troops
sent from England, among them Sir Thomas Grantham, Bacon’s Rebellion was clearly a
shock to the Virginia gentry. The continued restiveness of the colony’s bound laborers –
the last of Bacon’s rebels to be suppressed were 80 Afro-Virginian slaves and 20 white
servants – convinced the planters and Burgesses that further steps were needed to cement
their absolute authority.83
Scholars have traditionally pointed to this historical moment as the key turning
point in the development of Virginia’s colonial history. In order to placate restive
indentured servants and smallholders, the Burgesses constructed a fully racialized form of
slavery, creating a permanent underclass upon which discontented white laborers could
vent their frustrations while simultaneously extending more rights to the broad mass of
white settlers. And indeed there is much to recommend this line of reasoning. New
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statutes were passed during the Restoration era to protect the rights of white servants.
One statute limited the terms of service of all “Christian” servants to no more than seven
years, and guaranteed that any persons forced to labor beyond this period would be paid
“competent wages” for their “overserved” time.84 The property rights of white servants
were also confrimed by the Burgesses. Servants who brought moveable property with
them would retain “the propriety in their owne goods” and could use them “for their
future advantage.” Servitude as a punishment for white settlers convicted of serious
crimes was abolished, and reined in the “barbarous usage” of “cruell masters” by
explicitly granting the right of servants to petition the courts for mistreatment.85
Bacon’s Rebellion had a far less sanguine impact on the Pamunkey and other
Virginia natives. Native American tribes, which had previously been understood as
separate sovereign nations in a tributary relation to the English throne, were now defined
as conquered peoples and restricted to reservations. Without protection under English
law, even these reservation lands were subject to a slow attrition. The few limited
attempts made to Christianize and assimilate local natives before 1660 ended almost
completely after Bacon’s Rebellion. A handful of Native Americans who remained and
continued to toil as servants after 1677 were among the last to live among white settlers
for a generation, the last gasp of a never very potent assimilative English civilizing
mission to the Virginia Natives.86 Defined out of English law and without access to
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Christian baptism, Natives were treated as permanently hostile and omnipresent enemies,
subject to the full coercive power of Virginia’s absolute colonial state.
The effect of Bacon’s Rebellion on Virginia’s enslaved African population,
however, is less clear. Indeed, the Africanization of Virginia’s labor force began almost
immediately with the Restoration in 1660. This unprecedented growth in the enslaved
African population predates any significant decrease in the availability of white
indentured labor. As we have seen, the restored Stuarts continued to use colonial
transportation against political and religious dissidents, providing a small but steady
influx of laborers, and voluntary migration of servants continued at a relatively robust
pace. Indeed, the availability of English indentured labor remained relatively steady in
Virginia until the opening decades of the 18th century.87 The apparent transition to
enslaved labor, then, was due more to the increased supply of African slaves from the
Royal African Company than to any substantive change in the attitudes of Virginia
planters toward their bound labor force. The events of 1676 did not cause the Old
Dominion to become a slave society – if anything Bacon’s Rebellion was a consequence
of the increased use of slave labor on growing plantations by the Virginia gentry.88
Virginia planters had always wanted slaves, but before the Restoration and the rise of a
state-supported slave trade they had been unable to get many into their hands.
Despite continued demand for slaves and a noticeable uptick in slave imports, the
Royal African Company largely ignored Virginia as a potential market, preferring instead
to send their cargoes to the more robust slave markets in the West Indies. Only twenty-
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two recorded slaving voyages disembarked their cargo in the Old Dominion, delivering
3,445 enslaved people to labor-hungry Virginia planters. While this certainly represents
a vast increase over Virginia slave imports during the Interregnum, it was hardly the
solution to persistent labor shortages gentry planters had hoped for.89 With direct access
to the official slave trade limited, some Virginians turned to illegal smuggling to obtain
slaves, and all ramped up importation through the coastwise slave trade.90 Even with
their access to new slaves limited by the RAC’s preference for West Indian markets, the
enslaved population of the Old Dominion grew rapidly during the Restoration era. By
1670, before Bacon’s Rebellion, there were already approximately two thousand enslaved
Africans in Virginia, comprising nearly five percent of the total colonial population, and
at least twenty-five percent of the bound labor pool. Bacon’s Rebellion, then, may have
accelerated the trend toward slave labor in Restoration-era Virginia, but the pattern was
already evident well before 1676.91
As slavery became more and more central to the tobacco plantation economy,
Virginia law was forced to deal with questions about the precise status of slaves as
articles of property. As we have seen, Virginians assumed slaves to be a form of property
from the arrival of the first “twenty and odd” Africans in 1619.92 Restoration-era
legislation made this assumption explicit, first in a 1670 statute defining all non-Christian
servants who “come in by sea” as “slaves for life,” and again in 1682 when all imported
non-Christians were termed “slaves for life.”93 Imported Africans were clearly
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understood to be a species of property but this general assumption did not sit well with
the specificity of common law, and so the Restoration also saw increased attention to the
specific forms slave property would take. The issue was clearest in cases of descent.
Planters who left a will, of course, could bequeath their slave property in whatever way
they saw fit, and used a variety of strategies to best exploit their investments. Some
treated their slaves as realty, attached to specific plantations, while others willed their
slaves as moveable property, disbursing them among several heirs or selling them off to
cover debts.94 A few even entailed their slaves, guaranteeing their decedents a sufficient
bound labor force.95 Planters who died intestate, however, were another matter. How
should the colonial state treat their slaves when dividing up estates?
A 1671 statute solved the problem by giving county courts maximum flexibility –
slaves were classified alongside “sheep, horses, and cattle” and could be “apprized, sold
at an outcry, or preserved in kind” at the court’s discretion in the interest of the
“preservation, improvement or advancement of the estate.” Slaves had to be treated as a
special, mixed form of property because “the difficulty of procureing negroes in kind”
and “the value and hazard of their lives” made it nearly impossible to guarantee that heirs
would receive the specific slaves in question when they came into their estates.96 In a
sense, this statute conferred a kind of equity jurisdiction on local courts, allowing them to
depart from the strict rules of common law descent. This novel definition of slave
property, of course, provided no equity to the slaves themselves – justice to heirs and the
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dictates of a plantation economy required that enslaved Africans be recognized only as
property under law.97 With a stroke of the pen, the Burgesses enshrined their
longstanding assumptions about slaves in statute law and completed the first element of
Godwyn’s “two-fold” definition of slavery. However they had been legally defined
under the custom of merchants or in other jurisdictions, once in Virginia slaves were no
more than “brutes” or “beasts” under law, more akin to livestock than legal persons.
All that remained, then, was to remove all access to the rights and protections of
English subjecthood – the second step in Godwyn’s “two-fold Use” of slave law. As
Thompson’s argument in Butts v. Penny and Godwyn’s Negro’s and Indian’s Advocate
illustrate, conversion to Christianity was a potent reminder of enslaved Africans’
humanity and provided a firm basis for claims to legal personhood. This was not simply
a theoretical question. In 1665 for example, an enslaved man named Manuel petitioned
the General Assembly for his freedom, claiming that, as a Christian, he could not be held
as a slave. Manuel’s purported owner, William Whittacre, argued that a clear chain of
property ownership illustrated that Manuel was “a Slave for Ever.” The assembly ruled
that such a property claim was inconsistent with Christianity, however, and decreed that
Manuel should “serve as other Christian servants do.” Another enslaved man named
Fernando petitioned the Lower Norfolk Court for his freedom two years later, arguing
that, as a Christian and previous resident of England, he must be afforded the same legal
rights as any other English Christian servant. The court disagreed, declaring Fernando to
be “a slave for his life,” whereupon the embattled slave appealed the decision to the
General Court. Though the final disposition of Fernando’s suit is not known, the fact that
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he was accorded basic legal rights – petition and appeal – by a Virginia court illustrates
just how powerful claims to freedom based on Christianity could be.98
In this context, then, it is little wonder that most Virginia masters showed little
interest in converting their slaves. Even small numbers of conversions raised “some
doubts” about whether the “charity and piety” of devout owners would lead to legal
freedom for enslaved Afro-Virginians. In 1667, the Burgesses settled the issue with a
statute declaring that “baptisme doth not alter the condition” of those who were “slaves
by birth.”99 Anticipating the King’s Bench decision in Butts by a decade, the Virginia
gentry fully severed the traditional connection between Christianity and English
subjecthood. Though the Burgesses claimed humanitarian motives in the statute, hoping
that by dispelling doubts about the emancipatory power of baptism they might encourage
masters to convert their slaves, there is little evidence that the 1667 law led to any
meaningful change in planters’ behavior – mass conversions of slaves did not follow, and
Godwyn could still lament Virginians’ disinterest in conversion well into the 1680s. The
intent of the statute, then, was not to ease tender consciences and clear the way to
Christianization, but to bar Africans from a crucial element of European legal personhood
and further protect slave property.100
Birth into the community of subjects, another traditional source of legal
subjecthood, also became nearly impossible for Afro-Virginians during the Restoration.
An infamous 1662 statute dispelled any doubts about whether “children got by any
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Englishman upon a negro woman should be slave or ffree,” stating that “all children
borne in this country shalbe held bond or free only according to the condition of the
mother.”101 Historians have crafted many explanations for this statute, the first of its kind
in the Anglophone Atlantic. One important line of reasoning focuses on the extreme
patriarchy of colonial Virginia. Guaranteeing that slave status followed the mother rather
than the father inverted the traditional patriarchal logic of English descent, thus allowing
Virginia masters unlimited sexual access to enslaved women and bolstering the gendered
claims to power so important to gentry identity.102 Others have emphasized the
disruptive impact of the principle partus sequitur ventrem on enslaved families in erasing
any legal claims enslaved men had to their own children.103 Perhaps most important for
our purposes, however, the 1662 statute ensured that the children of enslaved women
could have no claim on the rights of English subjecthood. Whether the father was free or
enslaved, the children of enslaved women would be defined solely as property and were
entirely barred from legal personhood under Virginia law.
The introduction of partus sequitur ventrem also bore a striking congruence to
Hobbesian theories of natural pre-civil slavery. As we have seen, Hobbes’ pre-social war
of all against all produced an ideal foundation for concepts of enslavement – only through
submission to powerful monarchs could humanity exit this natural condition and find
safety in their subjection to the absolute state. Those who had not entered into this social
contract, however, still inhabited the nasty and brutish state of nature, and were thus
liable to enslavement. The power of life and death conferred on captors in this war
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slavery doctrine was a crucial intellectual underpinning of Atlantic slavery. As Mary
Nyquist has recently pointed out, however, it was the mother who held the power of life
and death over children in Hobbes’ state of nature. Indeed, Nyquist argues it was this
very trait of pre-civil motherhood that necessitated the erasure of women from Hobbesian
civil society and the construction of an all male body politic.104 In the context of
Virginia’s slave society, in which Hobbes himself had been an early investor, partus
sequitur ventrem served both to reaffirm the pre-civil brutishness, and thus enslavability,
of Africans and to transfer the power of life and death upon which European war slavery
doctrine was based from pre-civil enslaved mothers to absolute English masters. While it
is unlikely that the Burgesses had Hobbes’ subtle theorizations in mind when
constructing their 1662 statute, the congruence between partus sequitur ventrem and a
gendered Hobbesian pre-civil state of nature is striking.
To further mark slaves as a separate population within Virginia society, the
Burgesses enacted a series of laws meant to drive a wedge between enslaved Africans
and white indentured servants. As Bacon’s Rebellion had shown, the potential for crossracial alliances remained alive and well in Restoration Virginia. It did not take a
rebellion for Virginia planters to recognize the danger of this situation, however, and
preventative laws were put in place immediately after Berkeley and the planter gentry
regained control of the House of Burgesses. A 1660 act mandated that any English
servants running away with “negroes who are incapable of makeing satisfaction by
addition of time” would owe additional labor to make up for the African slaves’ lost
time.105 Two years later, this statute was expanded dramatically. English servants would
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now be responsible for “double their [own] times of service soe neglected” – in
“extraordinary” circumstances, local magistrates could even extend this term of service
“proportionable to the damage the master shall make appear he hath susteyned” – in
addition to serving double the lost time of their African fellow runaways. If any slaves in
interracial runaway attempts died or succeeded and escaped, the white servants would
either be fined 4,500 pounds of tobacco or, in the likely event they were unable to pay
such a hefty sum, forced to serve the escaped slaves’ masters for four years “for every
negro so lost.”106 While such legislation clearly did not put an end to interracial runaway
attempts, the price of failure was exceedingly steep. When combined with the increasing
physical separation of white servants and black slaves in the plantation labor force, these
statutes reinforced an increasingly racialized divide between white indentured servants as
subjects and enslaved Africans as property.
Specifically defined as articles of property and placed beyond the pale of legal
personhood, slaves were subjected to increasingly brutal local police law as well. Indeed,
rather than interposing its authority between master and slave as Henry Parker and
Morgan Godwyn advocated, Virginia’s colonial state systematically removed itself from
the master/slave relation and granted unprecedented powers to slave owners. A series of
new police measures passed in 1680 are illustrative of this trend. Physical mobility, a
right typically guaranteed to free subjects which could only be limited by the state for
specific causes, came under the direct purview of masters. A 1680 statute barred slaves
from leaving their master’s plantation without a written pass, and two years later the
Burgesses limited slaves’ sojourn on any plantation but their owner’s for more than four
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hours.107 While similar laws limited the mobility of white indentured servants, they at
least retained access to the courts to challenge excessively coercive masters and
benefitted from local laws regulating treatment. African slaves, of course, could expect
no such state intervention on their behalf.
Perhaps most shocking, though, was the 1669 “Act about the casuall killings of
slaves,” which conferred unlimited coercive power on slave owners. Since the traditional
punishment for refractory servants, addition of time, could not logically be imposed on
slaves, and since a slave’s “obstinacy” could only be suppressed by “violent meanes,” the
Burgesses declared that “if any slave resist his master...and by the extremity of the
correction should chance to die...his death shall not be accompted a felony, but the
master...be acquit from molestation.” The logic behind this statute was clear – “it cannot
be presumed that prepensed malice (which alone makes murther ffelony) should induce
any man to destroy his own estate.”108 Why would anyone willfully destroy his own
property? This statute clearly took no notice of slaves as legal persons. In 1680, the
Burgesses went even further and declared that any white colonist could legally kill a
runaway slave who resisted recapture. Any slave who even lifted a hand against a white
Virginian would be subject to torturous punishment.109 The absolute coercive power of
life and death had devolved from the absolute monarch to the absolutist colonial state to
increasingly absolute individual masters and now to all white male Virginians – without
state intervention to protect the persons of slaves, the arbitrary and capricious whim of
Virginia’s slave owning gentry unleashed brutally repressive violence on the enslaved
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population.110 This was precisely the situation Henry Parker had feared in Jus Populi and
Morgan Godwyn so fervently decried in the Negro’s and Indian’s Advocate.
The human tragedy of the Restoration meant the death knell of Afro-Virginian
subjecthood. Indeed, Virginia legislators specifically targeted free black families with
new punitive statutes. The 1668 tax assessments, for example, classed free black women
as tithables – unlike white women, who were seen as dependent and subordinate
members of patriarchal households, black women were taxed as productive laborers and
“ought not in all respects...be admitted to a full fruition of the exemptions and impunities
of the English.” This taxation scheme put undue economic strain on free Afro-Virginian
households and contributed dramatically to their decline.111 Forceful assertions of
traditional English liberties by black Virginians, so evident in the Interregnum examples
of Anthony Johnson and Antonio Longo, disappear almost entirely from the record by
1688. At Johnson’s death in 1670, a probate court seized his estate on the grounds that
the prosperous Afro-Virginian was an alien, not a subject. Stripped of their patriarch’s
hard-won estate, Johnson’s family left their home on the Eastern Shore and moved to
Maryland, where repressive legislation had not yet been passed to the same extent. While
demographic data for colonial Virginia is notoriously incomplete, it appears that many
other free Afro-Virginians followed the Johnsons’ lead and left the colony. In
Northampton County between 1664 and 1677, somewhere around twenty percent of
African residents were free heads-of-household. This relatively robust presence was
largely a function of the porous nature of early Virginia slavery and represents the high
water mark of colonial Virginia’s free black population – by 1700 free black households
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had all but disappeared.112 The access of black Virginians to the courts also appears to
have waned substantially.
One of the few records of an African in the court records of Restoration Virginia
appears in Re Warwick (1669), where Hanna Warwick, a white servant, had her case
“extenuated because she was overseen by a negro overseer.”113 This painfully terse entry
is emblematic of the conspicuous absence of African voices in the record of Restoration
Virginia. Hannah Warwick’s African overseer was worth mentioning only to mitigate
her (we must imagine) criminal acts – even a lowly white female indentured servant
should be spared the indignity of being disciplined by a less-than-human slave. The
reclamation of power by Berkeley and the rising gentry, aligned closely with an
increasingly absolute monarchy, firmly reestablished Godwyn’s “two fold Use” in local
law – slaves were defined as a flexible form of property that would find explicit
protection in Virginia courts, and access to even basic rights was systematically
eliminated. In the earliest years of settlement, legal space existed for African men like
Anthony Johnson to gain their freedom and press claims on the colonial state – in the
human tragedy of the Restoration, the Virginia gentry made sure that this window was
firmly and decisively closed.
***
Unlike the Virginia gentry and many Englishmen back home who welcomed
Charles II’s return, Massachusetts colonists were quick to recognize the tragic potential
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of the Stuart Restoration and moved to insulate their godly republic from absolutist
influence. The first action of the General Court that met on 30 May 1660, the first to
meet after Charles’ restoration to the throne, was to denounce the “horrid blasphemies &
wickednesses” back in England that had caused the “utter frustrating of those hopeful
beginings” of the Commonwealth. The assembled delegates declared their hope that the
“unsetlements & overturnings in church & state” sure to follow the Restoration would not
undo Interregnum reforms but would instead advance “the kingdome of the Lord Jesus, &
setting up of his throane in that land.”114 Bay colonists were right to worry – the
Restoration era saw continued royal attempts to radically restructure Massachusetts’
distinctive forms of church and state organization, culminating in James II’s creation of
the Dominion of New England in 1685. Fears of losing access to their basic rights and
being made “the slaves of rulers imposed upon them” were not simply paranoia or
rhetorical hyperbole.115
Shifts in imperial policy were keenly felt in Massachusetts. The establishment of
direct royal governance raised the specter of new religious Test Acts in Puritan New
England and exacerbated growing fears of a spiritual “declension” from the region’s
initial godly mission.116 The unique landholding patterns that underpinned
Massachusetts’ godly republic came under direct attack from the metopole through
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repeated revisions of local law and the revocation of the Massachusetts charter, shaking
the very foundation of Puritan society. Continued hopes for Native conversion dimmed
after 1660, and were nearly dashed once and for all when an increasing land crunch
sparked King Philip’s War in 1675. As it had earlier during the Pequot War, the eruption
of conflict with local Native Americans raised crucial questions about enslavement,
subjecthood, and the legal status of Indians in a Puritan society surrounded by
increasingly hostile enemies.117
In addition, the growing volume of the English slave trade, and the involvement
of more and more Massachusetts merchants and vessels in slaving voyages, brought
substantial numbers of African slaves to the colony for the first time, another worrying
trend associated closely with the Stuarts. By the 1680s, Bay Colonists had grown
increasingly fearful of potential rebellions by enslaved Africans, and began instituting
new police measures to oversee this potentially combustible population.118 Despite, or
perhaps because of, their fears of slave rebellion, Indian war, and royal absolutism,
however, Massachusetts colonists refused to recognize their bound Indian and African
servants as non-human articles of rightless chattel property. For many in Massachusetts
Bay, slavery could be “transmuted to a Vertue” not through unlimited and absolute
ownership of enslaved persons, but by the recognition of Africans’ essential humanity,
and the protection of their bodies and souls through access to colonial courts and
churches. These competing imperial and local impulses resulted in a hodge-podge of
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colonial legal decisions regarding slaves, some recognizing slaves as property, others as
persons under law.
To many colonists, the hand of Providence was clearly at work in the Restoration.
The destruction of England’s godly commonwealth was the punishment decreed by a just
God for his wayward people, and many Puritans looked to redouble their already strict
policing of morality in a violent wave of collective expiation. Bay Colony magistrates
cracked down on religious nonconformists like Quakers and punished moral infractions
severely in an attempt to prevent declension from their spiritual mission. Most, however,
also recognized their marginal position in the English empire and meekly if
unenthusiastically acknowledged that Charles was the rightful king of their “Brittish
Israel.” Somewhat disingenuously, the General Court claimed to have played only “a
passive part” in the late civil wars and hoped that Charles would allow them the
continuance of their “civil privileges” and their “libertye to walke in the faith of the
gospell.”119 Bay colonists asked only to “stand as a shrub among cedars, growing up on
their own root, and not be forced to be the slaves of rulers imposed on them contrary to
the rule of their charter.” Besides, Massachusetts was fast becoming a key hub in the
colonial carrying trades, and a stable transition to royal rule would guarantee “the great
advance of his Majesty’s customs.”120 Charles’ initial response to Massachusetts’
entreaties appeared favorable and the overwhelming popularity of the Restoration back in
England, combined with conspicuous displays of local authorities’ renewed loyalty,
muted opposition from the more radical saints. When it finally proclaimed Charles II the
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rightful monarch on 8 August 1661, well over a year after he had ascended the throne in
England, the Massachusetts General Court was effusive to an almost farcical level in
addressing “the best of kings,” one of the divinely anointed “gods amongst men,” a
“savior.”121 Bay colonists clearly knew what Charles wanted to hear from his loyal
subjects.
Had Charles been in Boston to observe his official proclamation as king, however,
he might have had ample cause to doubt the General Court’s sincerity. Unlike the
bacchanalia of bonfires and revelry that greeted the Merry Monarch in England, the
Stuart Restoration in Massachusetts was a sober affair – drinking toasts to the king’s
health was explicitly forbidden and settlers were advised to keep the day as one of prayer
and quiet reflection, more akin to a fast day than a celebration.122 Even before Charles
was proclaimed in the colony, a number of petitioners from Ipswich, Newbury, Sudbury,
and Boston questioned the wisdom of submitting to royal authority.123 Following the
restoration, a spate of sedition cases came before the General Court – that speech against
the crown often went unpunished is a testament to continued uneasiness with royal
rule.124 Not surprisingly, anti-monarchial sentiment circulated through trans-Atlantic
print networks as well, leading to the suppression of John Eliot’s Christian
Commonwealth, a radical tract that came dangerously close to advocating Fifth
Monarchist revolution.125 Whatever their public proclamations, Massachusetts colonists
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only grudgingly gave their allegiance to the restored Stuarts.
For his part, Charles II was no more trusting of Massachusetts’ Puritan colonists
than they were of him, and with good reason – Englishmen with ties to the Bay Colony
were a persistent thorn in the restored monarchy’s side. Hugh Peter, former Salem
minister and leading Independent during the civil wars, was specifically exempted from
the Indemnity Acts and publicly hanged, drawn, and quartered at Charing Cross in
London on 16 October 1660 for inciting regicide.126 Thomas Venner, a former
Massachusetts colonist and Fifth Monarchist radical, led a band of discontented former
New Model soldiers in rebellion against the king in early January 1661.127 Though the
General Court hoped to reassure Charles that “Diabolical Venner” was “not of us,” the
rebellion only served to reinforce Massachusetts’ reputation as a hotbed of antimonarchist radicalism.128 Edward Whalley and William Goffe, two of the commissioners
who had signed Charles I’s death warrant, fled to Boston where they received a warm
welcome from Governor Endicott in July 1660. When official orders to apprehend the
regicides and return them to England for trial arrived in June 1661, the General Court
officially pledged to execute the king’s warrant “diligently & faithfully,” but Whalley
and Goffe escaped to New Haven, where they lived under assumed names with John
Dixwell, another regicide, under the protection of well-connected minister John
Davenport. Though Charles continually sent instructions to all the Puritan colonies to
apprehend and deliver the regicides, all three eluded capture and remained in New Haven
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until their deaths.129
Given this level of resistance to the restored monarchy, it should come as no
surprise that Massachusetts came under increasingly close scrutiny by imperial planners
back in London. Though Charles initially agreed to confirm the original Massachusetts
charter, complaints from Anglicans and Quakers about religious persecution and
continued suspicions of disloyalty led him to appoint an official commission to
investigate civil and ecclesiastical order in Massachusetts in the summer of 1664.
Regular negotiations between royal commissioners and the General Court continued
throughout the 1660s and ‘70s, but bore little fruit. Bay colonists continually argued that
their charter allowed the distinctive forms of civil and ecclesiastical governance that had
developed over the first generations of settlement and jealously guarded their juridical
autonomy. They consistently denied the ability of claimants to appeal cases to royal
courts in London, defended limiting the freemanship to church members, continued
issuing writs in the name of the Commonwealth rather than the king, and even claimed
exemption from elements of the Navigation Acts on the grounds that colonists were not
represented in Parliament. By the late 1670s, it was clear that as long as the
Massachusetts charter remained in force, Charles would have little success in bringing his
wayward Puritan colonists to heel.
Vacating the Massachusetts charter, however, is likely what Charles had in mind
from the very outset. Though the colony had been under close metropolitan scrutiny
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since 1660, the ascendance of the Tory reaction in the late 1670s bolstered the crown’s
political power and sparked renewed efforts to reorganize the empire under tighter royal
control. Indeed the move to finally revoke Massachusetts’ charter by quo warranto was
only one element of a thoroughgoing effort to reorganize chartered boroughs and
corporations throughout the Stuart dominions.130 In 1684, with the status of
Massachusetts’ charter still uncertain, the crown issued a writ of scire facias in Chancery
voiding the charter entirely, apparently without notifying the colonial government – the
General Court was shocked to receive news of the revocation in January 1685. The Bay
Colony was reorganized as part of the larger Dominion of New England, its local
political autonomy limited and the power of the crown reinforced by the presence of
royal governor Edmund Andros.
All this legal uncertainty shook the very foundation of Massachusetts society.
Ongoing fears of charter revocation threw issues of land tenure into disarray. If the
charter were revoked, would the Bay Colony’s distinctive patterns of land ownership
change? Would Puritan magistrates be able to guarantee a competency to all god-fearing
households? As we have seen, it was this broad, relatively egalitarian access to landed
property that undergirded the Puritans’ godly republic, shaping demand for labor and the
role of slavery in Massachusetts society. Combined with increasing land shortages
brought on by a growing population and generations of partible descent within families, it
is no wonder that questions of land ownership and distribution dominated the General
Court’s time – only the ongoing conflict with the metropole received as much attention.
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Bay colonists were becoming more property conscious, while the political and economic
policies of the Stuarts chipped away at the social structures underpinning their godly
republic.
Given this context, the widespread fear that Massachusetts’ initial godly mission
was slipping into declension was well founded. Fearing that their children were straying
from the New England way, Puritans adopted the Half-Way Covenant in 1662,
esablishing that partial church membership could be inherited and dealing a blow to the
active attempts at conversion that marked the earliest years of settlement. The cultural
compromise of the Half-Way Covenant both recognized the changing context of
Restoration-era Massachusetts and sought to maintain the authority of the Congregational
Church by keeping membership numbers high, even if members were not particularly
devout. Rather than opening up further access to Christianity and membership in society,
however, fears of declension pushed Africans and Native Americans further outside the
bounds of New England society. As one literary scholar has recently noted, making the
covenant between God and the Puritans heritable called into question the status of
converts and “circumscribed...the Christianity and humanity” of converted Africans and
Native Americans. “Through the Half-Way measures,” according to Zubeda Jalalzai,
“blood quite literally united the chosen people.”131
Blood may have carried new power in the Bay Colony, but conversion to
Christianity still played an important role in determing the status of residents, and the
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success of earlier conversion drives made the total exclusion of Christians of color
difficult. John Eliot’s “praying Indian” towns, for example, were growing by the year,
and residents of these towns had at least some access to Massachusetts law.132 In 1661
Eliot brokered a land deal between the Christian Natives of Patucket and the English
settlers of Chelmsford, and the General Court followed their usual procedures in laying
out the grants.133 Separate “Indian courts” headed by prominent English settlers heard
cases involving Christainized Natives, but, as we shall see, Native Americans also had
access to the regular courts of justice in Massachusetts if their claims involved a white
settler.134 When the Native settlement at Quabacook was attacked by a group of hostile
Mohegans, Wassamegin, the sachem of the Quabacook Indians, petitioned the Bay
Colony government for assistance. The General Court laid down an ultimatum to Uncas
– either return all captives and make restitution for “the goods...taken from our...subjects”
or face a war. English troops were stationed at Quabacook to protect the Natives from
further Mohegan incursions, but the General Court hoped to avoid war and assured Uncas
that any crimes committed by “our said subjects” – meaning Wassamegin or his people –
could be tried in Bay Colony courts.135 They may not have been on an equal footing with
English settlers, but Native Americans under Massachusetts’ jurisdiction, particularly
those who had converted to Christianity, were clearly considered subjects.
The terrible bloodletting of King Philip’s War shook the Puritan mission to local
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Natives to its very core. As had been the case in the earlier Pequot war, numerous
captives were sold into slavery in 1675 and 1676. One Bay Colonist reported in July
1676 that his unit had “lately killed abundance of [Natives] & taken as many Captives” –
he had himself taken 9 captives, six of whom he sold into slavery in Jamaica.136 John
Eliot warned that such measures were sure to prolong the war, provoke further enmity
from local Natives, and scuttle his fledgling missionary project. “The terror of selling
away...Indians, unto the Ilands for perpetual slaves, who shall yeild up themselves to your
mercy,” Eliot argued, would produce “evil consequences, upon all the land.”137 The
missionary’s warnings had little effect however – Puritan magistrates throughout New
England construed their conflict with Philip and his people as a just war, and enslavement
was perfectly legal in such cases.138
Still, there was ambiguity in Indian slavery in Massachusetts. There was already
a long history of captivity as a tool of conversion in the Bay Colony, and it is possible
that colonists who kept Native American servants captured in the war saw Indian slavery
in this light. When this earlier tenency came into conflict with the view of Natives as
enslavable outsiders, Bay Colony magistrates responded in contradictory ways, leaving
the question of Indian slavery open. A 1674 case, Re Indian Hoken, a Native American
man who had been convicted as “an incorrigable thief” and subsequently escaped from
prison was sentenced to be “sold or sent to Barbadoes...to free the colonie from so ill a
member.”139 That same year, another case, Re Indian Tom, saw a Native man convicted
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of rape and sentenced to death. When he begged the court for mercy, they declared that
rather than suffer execution, Tom would be “sold for a slave for ten yeares” and
transported to “the English living in some parts of the West Indies.” Clearly, Tom was
no longer seen as a target for conversion and assimilation but his term of bondage was
still limited by the court, though one wonders whether a West Indian plantation owner
would abide by a distant Massachusetts court’s restrictions or if Tom would even survive
ten years of hard labor in the sugar fields.140 Starting in 1677, however, lifetime bondage
was imposed on a number of Natives. In Re Indian Popanooie, for example, Popanooie
and his entire family were sentenced to perpetual slavery for their “great crewlty” toward
the Bay colonists. Another group of Natives were sentenced to slavery for life after they
were convicted of stealing a mere 25 from English settlers. Unlike Tom and Hoken,
however, these enslaved Indians remained in the colony, bound out to local residents.141
As the Puritan mission to the Natives waned, a new definition of Indians as enslavable
began to take its place. Still, this new institutional form of penal slavery sat, often
uncomfortably, alongside the definition of praying Indians as subjects and made Indian
slavery a particularly ambiguous practice.
There was one group of Bay Colonists who, at least under the terms laid down in
Butts v. Penny, could be considered chattel property – newly purchased and imported
slaves direct from Africa. To be sure there were precious few African slaves in the
colony as yet. In a 1676 report to the Lords of Trade, Edward Randolph claimed there
were “not above 200 slaves in the colony, and those are brought from Guinea and
Madagascar” and Governor Bradstreet estimated only “about one hundred or one hundred
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and twenty” Africans in 1680.142 Though their numbers may have been small, African
slaves were a conspicuous presence in many Boston households. A French refugee
scouting for a potential Huguenot settlement remarked “there is not a House in Boston,
however small may be its Means, that has not one or two [slaves]. There are those that
have five or six, and all make a good Living.” The Frenchman also noted a number of
local protections for the institution – residents could “own Negroes and Negresses,” local
settlers and Natives gladly returned attempted fugitives, and anyone who attempted to
“take them off” would be “rigorously punished” for their “open Larceny.”143 As Butts v.
Penny had established, slaves were property, at least under mercantile custom, and the
tiny number of Africans trickling into the colony certainly seemed to fit this definition.
This small but growing African population was a direct result of Bay Colonists’
increasingly direct participation in the slave trade. A 1678 voyage financed by a
consortium of Boston merchants delivered 45 Malagasy slaves, “most women and
children,” to Massachusetts, where they found a ready market and sold for between £10
and £20 each.144 Governor Bradstreet claimed in 1680 that only “one small Vessell” had
ever brought slaves directly to the colony “since the beginning of this plantation,” in
addition to “two or three Negroes” occasionally “brought...from Barbadoes...and sold
here.”145 Though Bradstreet was right that few slaves were imported directly to
Massachusetts, the ships, merchants, and capital of the Bay Colony were drawn into the
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profitable smuggling trade, despite the Royal African Company’s monopoly. John
Saffin, a wealthy Boston merchant and Speaker of the colonial assembly who had lived in
Virginia and cultivated extensive business ties in Jamaica; John Usher, who would serve
as treasurer under the hated Dominion government; Edward Shippen, a Quaker merchant
with ties to the influential Penn family; and Andrew Belcher, who would be appointed to
the Massachusetts Council after the Glorious Revolution – all funded a number of slaving
voyages. They were likely involved in the 1678 voyage discussed above, and may also
have financed another 1679 voyage that delivered 126 enslaved persons to Jamaica – an
additional twenty three souls perished in the middle passage of that voyage.146
All were investors in the 1681 voyage of the Elizabeth, which brought 155 slaves
to New England. In keeping with the centralizing initiatives of the Tory Reaction, local
enforcement of the Royal African Company’s monopoly was increasingly stringent,
making direct slave importation by a Massachusetts ship dangerous. Saffin sent Captain
William Welstead to intercept the Elizabeth before she reached Swansea, her original
destination on the Massachusetts-Rhode Island border, where imperial officials intended
to seize her and her cargo. Instead, Welstead was to take “such negroes...of o’rs” and
deliver them “in the night...wth what privacy you can” to Saffin’s associates at Nantasket
near Boston. Whether this secrecy was necessitated by local enforcement of the RAC’s
imperial monopoly, increased attention to New England violations of trade law by
metropolitan overseers, or fears about the local legitimacy of slave trading remains
unclear, as does the final fate of the Elizabeth’s human cargo.147 What is clear is the
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increasing participation of Massachusetts settlers in the transatlantic slave trade and their
assumption, especially after Butts v. Penny established the imperial chattel principle in
1677, that their slave property was legitimate and legally saleable in Massachusetts.
Despite this increased and largely licit participation in the slave trade, the precise
legal status of African slaves within Massachusetts remained unclear. Under imperial
law, at least, there was no question that the handful of Africans noted by Governor
Bradstreet in 1680 were slaves – nearly all of them were imported directly from Africa or
the West Indies, where local and imperial law defined them as property. In addition,
there were “very few blacks borne here, I think not above [five] or six at the most in a
year” so birth into English imperial subjecthood was a minor issue. Unlike in Virginia,
however, the status of the few black Bay Colonists born in the colony followed that of
their fathers under a 1670 statute, so birth into the community of free subjects was at least
theoretically possible.148 Christianity as a basis for legal personhood also seemed
unlikely for most Massachusetts slaves – Governor Bradstreet claimed that “none [were]
baptized” as far as he knew.149 Imperial law defined Massachusetts slaves as property,
and they possessed none of the properties of English subjecthood. Why, then, do
Africans appear with such regularity in Massachusetts records, almost always as persons,
not articles of property? Much of the extant evidence suggests that, for the most part,
Massachusetts colonists continued to view slavery as a coercive labor status, not a
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property relation, and accorded Africans the same basic rights that any person living in
the colony could expect.
John Endicott, Jr. may have been motivated by this ideal when he sold two
Africans into a specifically delimited term of servitude in Virginia in May 1678. In
keeping with the chattelizing logic of Butts v. Penny, Endicott noted that he had every
right to sell Antonio, a “Spanish Mulatto...for his lifetime,” but at the urging of another
Massachusetts settler, opted instead to sell Antonio to Richard Medlecott of Middlesex
County, Virginia “But for Tenn yeares from ye day that he shall Disembarke.” After this
period of servitude ended, Antonio would be “a free man to goe wherever he pleaseth.”
Inscribed beneath this fairly typical transfer of a servant was another crucial detail –
Antonio himself noted his “consent to ye above pr’misses.”150 If Africans were entering
Massachusetts as chattel slaves, as Antonio all but certainly did, not all of them retained
that status – there would be no need for Endicott to obtain consent before selling an
article of his property. This conceptual separation between ownership of the persons and
labor of African servants was even more evident later that same year, when Endicott sold
another “mulatto Serv’t named Anthonio” to Ralph Wormeley, scion of a rising Virginia
gentry family. Anthonio was to “serve, dwell, and abide” with Wormely for a term of ten
years, but would then be “free & wholly at his own dispose.” Anthonio would serve
Wormeley, but would not be owned by him.151 Both of these transfers follow, almost to
the letter, the procedures for transferring the labor of indentured servants, not the legal
mechanisms for alienating chattel properties.
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One wonders, however, how much creedence Wormeley and other settlers in the
plantation colonies gave to Massachusetts’ local practice. With increasing numbers of
slaves entering the colony through Massachsuetts’ participation in the coastwise trade, a
number of cases arose questioning whether property rights established in the plantation
colonies were binding in New England. In 1670, for example, Robert Granby of St.
Christophers sued Nicholas Leech and William Hobby for carrying off eight tons of sugar
and five slaves – they asked for £600 in damages. The final determination of the case is
not recorded, nor is the exact form of action used to initiate suit clear, but, drawing on the
principles laid down in Butts, Granby clearly believed his slaves remained articles of
property, even in Massaschusetts.152 In 1670, a “little negro boy” named Seaser living in
the household of William Hollingworth was seized by Salem magistrates and returned as
the “proper goods” of Michael Powell of Barbados.153 When Massachusetts residents
held African servants claimed by planters, the law of property-in-man dictated rendition
or compensation for rightful owners.
Other cases were less straightforward, however. In 1672 John Keene sued
Thomas Blighe for depriving him of the service of his “Negroe boy” named James.
Keene presented evidence that James had been left to him as a “gift or Legacy” in the
will of William Oates. The jury found in Keene’s favor and ordered that either James be
returned or Blighe pay £30 plus court costs. James’ ultimate fate is unknown, and it is
entirely possible that the jury’s decision hinged on their belief that he was an article of
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property. It is also possible, however, that the case turned on questions of rights to
James’ labor – the fragmentary record does not record the form of action that intiated
Keene v. Blighe.154 A 1680 case further illustrates the confused nature of claims made to
black Bay colonists. In 1675, Elizabeth Gibbs had “put her negro man and servant
Zanckey” out to John Wing, a Boston shopkeeper, for four years in return for five pounds
ten shillings per annum. Wing was in arrears to the tune of £22 by 1680 and Gibbs, now
widowed and remarried to Jonathan Corwin, brought suit to recover the amount owed.
Zanckey was apparently a sickly fellow, however, and Wing argued that he had laid out
far more than the £22 he owed in medical costs over the years. The court found for
Corwin and awarded damages, but the logic of the decision is unclear. Some witnesses
had testified that Zanckey was a “slave” so perhaps the case is an early illustration of
slave hiring in the Bay Colony. Most, however, referred to Zanckey as a servant, and
Corwin clearly had no claim beyond the four years of labor he had contracted for. It is
plausible that all parties saw the sickly African as a servant subject to the same legal rules
as any bound English subject.155
This bias in favor of the legal humanity and basic rights of black Massachusetts
settlers also gave Africans themselves a number of rights in New England courtrooms. In
stark contrast to Restoration Virginia, Massachusetts courts consistently afforded black
colonists the same legal rights as English settlers. On 2 March 1669, the Court of
Assistants in Boston heard the case of Franck Negro. Franck was indicted for conspiracy
in helping John Pottell, a white sailor held on suspicion of murder, escape from prison in
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Boston. Governor Richard Billingham himself questioned Franck, and a number of
witnesses were summoned to give testimony in the case. In the end, the grand jury
acquitted Franck of all charges. Crucially, the trial procedures in Re: Franck Negro were
identical to those in other grand jury hearings.156 Since it is unclear from the surviving
evidence whether Franck was free or enslaved, two possible conclusions can be drawn
from this case, both of which support the claim that Massachusetts courts saw Africans,
whether servants or slaves, as persons with access to certain basic rights. If Franck was a
free man or a servant, the court’s treatment of his case is compelling evidence that racial
difference had not brought forth a two-tiered justice system, as it had in Virginia.
Franck’s potential freedom also raised the intriguing question of how he became free –
perhaps he had served out an indenture locally, was manumitted by an individual owner
for faithful service, or converted to Christianity and was absorbed into the Puritan
community, none of which would be possible for enslaved Africans in Virginia. If
Franck was held as a slave, the court’s treatment of his case is even more compelling,
illustrating that Massachusetts magistrates refused to complete Godwyn’s “two-fold Use”
by fully dehumanizing bound African laborers and depriving them of basic rights. In
either case, the contrast with developments in Virginia is striking.
Nor was this tendency limited to the Bay Colony – black New Englanders’ access
to courts of law was also evident in the cases of Robert Trayes and Hannah Bonny, heard
by Plymouth magistrates in 1684 and 1685 respectively.157 Robert Trayes of Scituate
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was brought before a grand jury to answer for the murder of Daniel Standlake, an English
settler also of Scituate. The grand jury, again using the same procedures as in any other
proceeding, indicted Trayes for “felonulously, wilfully, and presmtruously” killing
Standlake. The proceedings of Trayes’ trial are only briefly recorded in the record, but
again all trial procedures seem to be precisely those accorded any settler accused of a
crime. In the end, the jury acquitted Trayes of murder, finding him only to be “an
instrument of the death of Daniell Standlake by misadventure.” John Trayes, also
described as “negro” and likely a relative of Robert’s, was also cleared of any
wrongdoing in connection with Standlake’s death. The pair were ordered to pay £5 in
restitution to Standlake’s father, or to be publicly whipped if they could not pay, and
encouraged to “lay [their actions] much to heart” and repent before God.158 Again,
though the legal status of the Trayes family remains unclear, the Plymouth courts
certainly treated them as though they were subjects under English law.
Re: Hannah Bonny, heard by the Plymouth courts in 1685, is another telling
example of the degree of legal acceptance African New Englanders could expect in
Puritan society. Hannah Bonny, a white colonist, was convicted on two counts of
fornication in October 1685 – one with John Michell, another English colonist, and one
with Nimrod, with whom she had “a bastard boy.” Bonny was “well whipt” for her
indiscretions, as was Nimrod, who was also required by the court to pay 18 pence a week
for the child’s upkeep. In no way did the fact that Nimrod and Hannah Bonny’s dalliance
crossed racial lines impact the court’s deliberations. The case was unique in one way
however – unlike most other cases involving black settlers during this period, the court
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recorded that Nimrod was held in some sort of servile status. If he was unable to make
the ordered child support payments, his “master” was to make them on his behalf. In the
case that neither Nimrod nor his master could make payments, Nimrod was “to be putt
out to service...soe long time, or from time to time” to guarantee that his illegitimate child
would not become a burden on the community.159 Still, this does not necessarily prove
that Nimrod was a slave, at least not by Morgan Godwyn’s definition. Indeed his
presence in a Plymouth courtroom, the use of regular procedures of justice in his trial,
and the punishment meted out by the court are all perfectly in line with the normal course
of justice in Puritan New England. The fact that the court sentenced Nimrod to make
payments on his own account hints that he had some property of his own. Clearly, this
kind of equality before the law was anathema to widespread enslavement.160
The testimony of enslaved Bay Colonists also appears to have been accepted by
colonial courts. “Captain White’s ‘neger’” testified in Taylor v. White, a paternity suit
heard by the Essex County Quarterly Court in 1663.161 A decade later, Mary Rowland’s
“negro maid” gave a deposition in Smith v. James, a civil suit over a debt between two
white settlers.162 Black Massachusetts settlers also appear to have had access to another
traditional right of English settlers: judicial appeals. In 1676, Hannah Negro appealed
her conviction by a Suffolk County court in the Court of Assistants. Her appeal was
denied by the jury empaneled by the court to hear her case, and she was ordered to serve
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her original sentence and pay court costs.163 Still the fact that Hannah, who had almost
certainly entered the colony as a slave in the previous decade, had not only the right to a
trial in the Suffolk County court but the right of appeal to a higher court as well is truly
remarkable. Perhaps she had been baptized – her Christian name in the court record
suggests as much – and negotiated an indenture with her master. Perhaps she was already
free. She may even have still been considered a slave. In Massachusetts courts it made
little difference. In Hannah’s case, as in every instance where a black colonist came
before a Massachusetts court, she was treated as a person with rights, not a socially dead
article of property. Whatever their initial status on arrival to the colony, Africans in
Restoration Massachusetts were almost universally referred to as servants, not slaves – a
descriptor that much more aptly describes their treatment by colonial authorities.
As we have seen, however, Africans were most certainly defined as slaves when
they arrived in New England during the Restoration, and Massachusetts courts were
forced to deal with the property claims of slave owners when meting out justice to black
settlers. In 1676, for example, Robert Cox petitioned the General Court to release
“Sebastian, negro, his servant,” into his custody. Sebastian had been convicted of raping
Cox’s three-year-old daughter Martha, and was awaiting execution in a Boston prison,
not a situation likely to provoke the sympathy of godly Puritan magistrates. Despite the
gravity of his offense, Sebastian had his day in court – even a slave could not be found
guilty of such a heinous crime without a trial. Only after his slave was sentenced to die
did Cox attempt to intervene. The General Court, rarely overeager to impose the death
penalty, obliged. Sebastian was “severely whipt” and ordered to “weare a roape about his
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neck” as a visible reminder of his guilt, then released from prison and returned to his
master’s custody.164
The case is puzzling. Why would Massachusetts Puritans, who so closely
monitored the settler population and punished even minor sexual indiscretions, release a
convicted rapist from custody? Why would the father of the victim of such a terrible
crime petition for the release of his daughter’s assailant? One possible explanation is that
Cox claimed Sebastian as his slave and protested that the scheduled execution would
deprive him of a valuable property right. The Court of Assistants had explicitly
described “Basto” as a “slave” in his initial trial, making a property claim on Cox’s part
likely. Unfortunately Cox’s petition and the Court’s deliberations on it are lost to history,
so a definitive explanation of Sebastian’s case remains elusive. Even if the General
Court did accept a property argument, however, it still retained the ultimate power to
mete out punishments to African slave/servants who, even when they stood accused of
the most heinous of crimes, were not rightless before the courts. Though he had been
released into his master’s custody, and was subsequently sold out of the colony,
Sebastian was not under Cox’s absolute disciplinary power within Massachusetts itself –
there the powers of life and death were at the discretion of duly appointed courts, not
individual masters. Unlike in Virginia, that power had not fully devolved to
Massachusetts slave owners.165
This did not preclude the colonial state from exercising this power of life and
death, however, particularly in cases where open resistance by bound African laborers
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endangered the safety of the godly republic. In the summer of 1681, a spate of arsons by
African servants stoked fears of a widespread plot to destroy the Bay Colony. Three
African “servants” – Chefaleer, Marja, and “James Pemberton’s negro” – set fire to the
homes of Dr. Thomas Swann and Joshua Lambe in Roxbury on July 11th. Jack, “negro
servant” to Samuel Woolcot of Weathersfield, burned down Lieutenant William Clark’s
Northampton home three days later. All four arson cases came before the Court of
Assistants in the fall, and the colonial state used the most coercive means at its disposal
to punish the rebellious Africans and squelch any future plots. Chefaleer and
“Pemberton’s negro,” who had already been tried and convicted by a lower court, had
their sentences confirmed – both were confined to prison until their masters sold them out
of the colony, likely to labor-starved West Indian sugar plantations. The court appears to
have anticipated some resistance from Thomas Walker, Chefaleer’s master, perhaps a
claim about the wrongful taking of property, and stipulated that if the convicted Chefaleer
was not transported within one month, the county treasurer would handle the sale,
returning only the “overplus” from the sale to Walker.166
However terrible, sale and transportation paled in comparison to the brutal
punishments handed down to Marja and Jack. Marja admitted to being “Instigated by the
divil” and “at the barr pleaded & acknowledged hirselfe to be Guilty.” Jack pled not
guilty and asked to be tried “by God & the Country.” The trial was short – Jack’s
confession was read aloud to the jury and a series of witnesses testified to his guilt. No
one was surprised when the jury pronounced Jack guilty the next day. Both Marja and
Jack were sentenced to death. Marja was to be burned alive. Jack was to be hanged at

166

MA Assts Recs, I:197-198.

263

the scene of his crime, and his corpse returned to the court to be “burnt to Ashes in the
fier wth Maria.” Invoking the mercy of God on the souls of the rebellious Africans,
Governor Bradstreet sent Marja and Jack to their deaths.167 Such draconian punishments
were de rigeur in the annals of Anglo-American slavery and would only become more
common as the peculiar institution deepened its roots throughout the empire.
More immediate contexts also likely influenced Massachusetts’ response to an
increasingly restive African population. The Exclusion Crisis back in England was
reaching its peak in the summer of 1681, and pervasive fears of a “popish plot” to subvert
the Protestant succession may have heightened Bay Colonists’ anxieties about their own
godly mission. Perhaps the accused Africans were associated with a Catholic threat –
Marja (Maria) and Chefaleer (possibly an Anglicization of Chevalier) may have spent
time in the Spanish or French colonies before being imported to Massachusetts. Bay
Colonists certainly exhibited a good deal of paranoia about invasions from French
Canada, and reports of James Stuart’s close ties to the French court did little to assuage
these fears.168 Possible ties to a Catholic threat certainly informed Massachusetts’
response to another outbreak of slave resistance in 1690.169 With the future of their godly
experiment hanging in the balance and signs of declension all around, some Puritan
colonists may even have taken Marja’s admission that she was “Instigated by the divil”
literally – perhaps a burnt offering would placate a wrathful God who seemed bent on
destroying their city on a hill. These factors would certainly play a role in the witchcraft
trials that rocked the Bay Colony a decade later. Faced with very real threats to their way
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of life, Puritan colonists gladly utilized every ounce of coercive force their colonial state
could muster to protect their godly commonwealth.
This did not, however, include the reduction of human beings to socially dead,
rightless chattels. Even Marja, Chefaleer, and Jack, almost certainly among the handful
of African slaves trickling into Massachusetts during the Restoration, were tried in
colonial courts using the same procedures a free, English colonist would have expected.
All the 1681 conspirators were arraigned by grand jury, examined and tried before juries
of twelve colonists, and sentenced according to “the Lawes of the Jurisdiction.”170 In the
few cases where Massachusetts magistrates did seem to recognize some sort of property
right in bound Africans, this right was framed as ownership of labor not persons. One
might assume that the hated Dominion government imposed in 1685 would have rolled
back any recognition of enslaved peoples’ legal humanity – this would, after all, have
been perfectly in line with the kind of policies favored by James II’s darling Royal
African Company. Quite the opposite occurred, however. Instructions to Edmund
Andros required that the Dominion government “pass a low for the restraining of
inhuman severity” of slaveholders and make the “willfull killing of Indians and Negros”
a crime punishable by death.171 In other words, even in the midst of the human tragedy
of the Restoration, the Bay Colony refused to work Morgan Godwyn’s “two-fold Use” on
African slaves – they were never fully chattelized and reduced to “brutes,” and they
retained access to those “Temporal and Spiritual Rights, which their Manhood...[would]

170

MA Ct Assts Recs, I:198.
E. B. O’Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York... (Albany,
NY: Weed, Parsons, & Co., 1856), III: 547.

171

265

infer.”172 Indeed, by Godwyn’s definition, and Henry Parker’s before it, bound African
laborers in Massachusetts were hardly slaves at all.
***
James II and VII met much the same welcome on his ascension to the throne in
1685 as his older brother had twenty-five years earlier. Despite his open Catholicism and
close ties to the French court, James’ repeated assurances that he would rule according
the established laws of the realm sufficiently calmed most anxious subjects. Besides, the
purges and repression of the Tory Reaction had already condemned many Whig antiabsolutists to prison, exile, or the relative silence of tactical retreat. Rebellions by the
Duke of Argyle and James’ nephew, the Duke of Monmouth, were quickly suppressed by
the king’s new standing army. Bonfires filled the streets in celebration of every
conceivable royal commemorative event, and loyal addresses poured in to the king from
around the empire. The Virginia Council, for example, decreed that James II’s ascension
be celebrated with “all the solemnity and Ceremony, our Condition is capable of
performing.”173 With their colony becoming ever more profitable thanks to the enslaved
laborers James had delivered, Virginians had good reason to pledge their loyalty to such a
king.
Secure in his throne and rich from the profits of colonial trade, James must have
counted his early engagement in the slave trade as a major element of his success. It had
made him personally wealthy beyond measure and helped to guarantee the fiscal
solvency of his realm. He had made many powerful political allies among the empire’s
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most important merchants and colonial planters through continued support for imperial
slavery and the slave trade. During James’ short reign alone, at least 150 English vessels
delivered over 30,000 enslaved Africans to the colonies. What these thousands of forced
migrants knew or thought of their new and distant monarch, we cannot know. Did they
hear James’ name discussed in connection to their enslavement? Did they see his face
circulating on the newly minted coins named for their distant home? Did they hear
prayers for his health and long reign from their masters, or complaints about abuses of
basic rights? None of this seemed to matter anyway – no one in England was much
concerned about the plight of African slaves. Slavery and Stuart absolutism, it seemed,
had emerged triumphant and unchallenged from the ashes of the Interregnum.
Morgan Godwyn, however, was unwilling to sit quietly by and let James’
ascension to the throne pass without reminding the new monarch of his (specifically
Protestant) Christian duty to the heathens living in his dominions. The sermon Godwyn
preached before King James II at Westminster Abbey in 1685 urged the monarch to
promote the Christianization of African slaves and Native Americans in the colonies –
hardly a controversial request it would seem. None of this would necessarily challenge
royal authority or, since the decision in Butts v. Penny had defined slaves as non-human
properties despite their conversion, threaten the growing system of slavery. Yet the
Anglican cleric also linked his scathing attack on the slave trade to a series of thinly
veiled Whiggish criticisms of the Stuart regime, reminding his fellow subjects that their
new king, who promised them justice and protection, had actively enslaved thousands of
innocent Africans and stripped them of all basic civil rights. Would Britons be next?
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Godwyn’s sermon was based on Jeremiah 34:2 – “Also in they Skirts is found the
Blood of the Souls of the poor Innocents; I have not found it by secret search, but upon
all these.”174 This blood, Godwyn argued, was on the hands of all present, especially his
new absolute sovereign. By refusing, or at least not promoting, baptism for African
slaves and Native Americans in the colonies, the Stuarts had made the English nation
“Murtherers of Souls.” The devotion of metropolitan merchants and colonial planters
“unto their MAMMON” had driven them to the “unheard-of Villany...of exercising those
their Hellish Cruelties, not only upon the Bodies, but extending them to the very Souls,
and that of poor Innocent Men.” Indeed, “the necessity and benefit arising to them from
their Trade and Commerce with Forreign Nations,” these Mammonists claimed, “would
not barely excuse, but even consecrate the Villany.” Though there were many symptoms
of this moral cancer in English society, many of them promoted by the Stuart court, the
prime example, in Godwyn’s mind, was “the compelling of Persons imported out of
Africa...residing in our Families, and Vassals to us, to remain in their native Gentilism;
without any regard to the honor of our Religion and Nation, any more than to the good of
their, or our own Souls.”175 The greatest impediment to the baptism of Africans was the
definition of slaves as property, not persons – slave owners and metropolitan planners
were “not ashamed to debase Men, made in the Image of God (no less than themselves,)
and whose Flesh is as their own” to base chattels. Rather than becoming “Instruments in
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God’s Hand to save Men’s Souls from Hell, and their Lives from the Destroyers,” the
English had instead “conspired with Satan...entered into a confederacy with Hell it
self...[and] exceeded the worst of Infidels, by our first enslaving, and then murthering of
Mens Souls.” James hands, Godwyn implied, were “not so much spotted or stained only,
as thorowly wrenched and dyed in [the] precious Blood of Souls.”
The great tragedy, to Godwyn, was that this unchristian turn to slavery was so
recent. As recently as “fify or sixty years since,” the kind of claims made by slave owners
and traders would have “render[ed] the Authors obnoxious, not only to the publick
Censure, but to the Peoples Fury.” Sadly, in England no one dared “to open his Mouth
against it, or so much as to look the Impiety in the Face,” while in the colonies the sin of
slavery was “legible in Capital Letters, made evident to the most incurious Observer, and
entered into their very Laws and Records.” Slavery existed in the colonies, a fact that
Morgan Godwyn decried, but this did not mean an African slave was inhuman or without
“a living and immortal Soul, capable of Eternal things, and destined to the highest
Happiness.” Though certainly no Puritan, Godwyn put forth the “great Industry of our
People in New-England” in “their converting of Nations” as a possible model for England
to emulate. The only Christian solution, Godwyn advised his audience, was to make “a
speedy composure and reconciliation: At once striving to make (at least) some kind of
reparation for what is past, and no less joining in all laudable Proposals and ways for
effecting these poor Peoples Christianity, without any further delays.” The king, after all
was bound to protect those living in his dominions, even the “Negro’s and Indians,
Slaves and Tributaries, all of them Subjects of this Kingdom.” Should the English nation
fail to act, dire consequences were sure to follow. Slave traders and colonial planters,
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men very much after the king’s own heart, would face God’s “most calamitous
and...most lasting” punishment for their sins, and should they continue in their present
ways, would drive “divine Vengeance [to] stir up these very Soul-oppressed People...and
make them the Rods of his Anger.”
James II could not have been pleased to hear such a sermon. Though the king
was never directly indicted for the national sin of slavery, all who heard or read
Godwyn’s sermon would have known precisely who had orchestrated, and profited from,
the Anglo-Atlantic slave trade, and wondered whether their own liberty was safe under a
French-leaning Catholic monarch who had proved so willing to enslave his darkerskinned subjects. Godwyn knew his sermon would draw potentially dangerous attention
from powerful forces aligned with the king – the dedicatory to the published version of
the his sermon worried that the author would “fall under no small danger of Censure, as
well for my first preaching, as now publishing this Discourse.” Morgan Godwyn’s
predictions proved more correct than he knew – the Anglican cleric and lone antislavery
voice in the wilderness of the English empire was found dead under suspicious
circumstances shortly after his sermon was printed.176
But his death was not Morgan Godwyn’s only accurate prediction. Disaffection
with an absolute Catholic monarch only grew as James II used his dispensing power to
favor fellow English adherents of the Church of Rome, accepted massive financial
subsidies from the French crown, and infringed many of the cherished rights of his
subjects. As Godwyn had predicted in 1681, royal absolutism and slavery went hand in
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hand – “all Subjects and subordinate Governors would be Men but in part; but yet by so
much the more, by how much they approached nearer to Absoluteness. And in all the
Grand Seignior’s spacious Domains, where there are none but Slaves, there would not be
so much as one Man besides himself; not excepting the very Christians. The evil
consequences of which Belief, the Authors thereof may sooner feel, than they are willing
to understand or see.”177 In 1688, Godwyn’s prediction came to fruition, with dramatic
results for the place of slavery in the English empire.
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Chapter IV – The Williamite Moment: Property Personhood, and the Transformation
of Colonial Slavery, 1689-1714
John Locke’s desk is a remarkable piece of furniture. A scrutoire with a folddown writing surface and dozens of drawers and “pigeon holes” to store folios, octavos,
and manuscript notes, it is remarkable not in its appearance but in the body of work its
owner produced on it. We can imagine the father of English Enlightenment thought
reworking drafts of his philosophical treatises at this desk in the 1680s or scribbling
memoranda as secretary to the Board of Trade in the 1690s. Perhaps it was here that
Locke put the finishing touches on his magnum opus, the Two Treatises of Government,
originally penned while in exile during the Restoration. It was here that he laid down the
central maxims of modern liberal thought: “all men are naturally in...a state of perfect
freedom”; “every man has a property in his own person”; “no body can...compel me by
force to that which is against the right of my freedom, i.e. make me a slave.” It was here
that classical liberal political economy emerged: through his labor, man made the
common inheritance of the Earth into private property, “a part of him, that another can no
longer have any right to”; inequalities in property distribution were natural and even
beneficial, since “he who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not lessen, but
increase the common stock of mankind” through surplus production, leading the civilized
world to consent “to a disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth”; the “great
and chief end” of civil society was “the preservation of...property” by “an established,
settled, known law, received and allowed by comment consent.” We know this John
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Locke well – progenitor of modern liberal individualism, defender of private property
and proponent of limited government.178
We also know, however, that Locke’s desk also saw a startling number of
documents tied to plantation slavery and the trans-Atlantic slave trade shuffle through its
drawers and pigeon holes. The great theorist of natural freedom likely drafted key
sections of the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina establishing African slavery at this
desk, and passages about the sanctity of vested property rights drafted and revised on its
polished oak writing surface were used by slave owners to legitimate property-in-man.
Locke even explicitly condoned the “lawful” slavery of captives taken in “just wars,” the
traditional basis of European slavery, albeit with a number of crucial qualifications.
Despite lofty pronouncements about human equality, Lockean liberalism left ample
conceptual space for racist exclusion from full humanity as well – since the “freedom of
man...is grounded on his having reason,” then “any one [who] comes not to such a
degree of reason, wherein he might be supposed capable of knowing the law, and so
living within the rules of it, he is never capable of being a free man.” To large numbers
of Anglo-American colonists, it was self-evident that African and Afro-British slaves
lacked the rationality necessary for civil society and the exercise of freedom. Even
Locke himself hinted that uncivilized others who refused to enter into civil society were
unfit for freedom and remained in the state of nature, where the uncertainty of natural

178

John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, C. B. Macpherson, ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett
Publishing, 1980 [1690]), §4, §26, §27, §37, §50, §124. Much of the modern scholarship on Locke is
critical of his formulation of private property, seeing it as the Ur-text of modern capitalism, and is deeply
influenced by C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1962). For a more historical approach to Locke’s thought, see Richard Ashcraft,
Revolutionary Politics and Locke’s Two Treatises of Government (Princeon, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1986).

273

rights exposed them to warfare, captivity, and enslavement, “the state of war continued,
between a lawful conqueror and a captive.”179
While Locke denied the legitimacy of slavery in European civil societies, where
the natural law of reason precluded dominion over another human being, he also admitted
that the “legislative power...established, by consent, in the common-wealth” could limit
individual freedom with the “restraint of law.” Furthermore, any person whose life was
forfeit, through war captivity or legal proscription, came under the despotical and
arbitrary power of another – became a slave – allowing a master to “make use of [the
slave] to his own service, and he does [the slave] no injury by it: for, whenever he finds
the hardship of his slavery outweigh the value of his life, it is in his power, by resisting
the will of his master, to draw on himself the death he desires.”180 Unlike servants,
whose labor power could be purchased and whose terms of service were regulated by
law, suicide-by-slave owner was the only escape that enslaved people could hope for.
Was this not the very system Anglo-American slave owners had legitimated through their
local laws throughout the empire? Irrational, uncivilized captives taken during wars
between peoples inhabiting a state of nature became the property of civilized Britons
who, through their local legislatures, stripped the enslaved of their freedoms and took
dominion over their very lives, turning the labor of slaves into future property claims for
masters. The strong strand of possessive individualism underpinning Lockean thought, it
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seems, could be just as hospitable to human slavery as the patriarchalist absolutism of the
Stuarts.
Indeed, there is much in the history of the Glorious Revolution and its aftermath
to support this line of thought. A long and illustrious line of commentators from Edmund
Burke to J. C. D. Clark have argued that the revolution of 1688 was no true revolution at
all, but rather a conservative vindication of traditional English rights and liberties, the
triumph of the ancient constitution over popish innovations. The Glorious Revolution
was a quintessentially English affair, meant to benefit only a small sliver of the propertyowning male population. The Stuarts may have been deposed, but English law and
politics remained substantially unchanged by the ascension of William and Mary. 181
Historians of slavery and empire have drawn attention to the Janus-faced nature of the
revolutionary settlement – English, and later British, subjects reaped the benefits of
nascent liberalism while African slaves, indigenous Americans, and other subaltern
peoples were excluded from the liberal order, subjected to coercive labor regimes and
defined out of the community of rights-bearing subjects. The liberal empire that Britons
constructed in the wake of their Glorious Revolution depended in no small measure on
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the exclusion and enslavement of African and Afro-British men and women in the
American colonies.182
But there was another side to John Locke and the revolution he wrote to defend,
one deeply informed by the corporate humanism of the English Civil Wars and the
dissenting Protestant tradition embodied in Massachusetts’ godly republicanism. In
contrast to possessive individualism’s focus on natural freedom, the foundational
principle of the corporatist liberal tradition was fundamental human equality. As Locke
put it, mankind began in “A state...of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is
reciprocal...; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species
and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the
same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or
subjection...” Where liberal self-ownership opened up avenues to property accumulation
and inequality, Lockean corporatism recognized God’s higher proprietary interest in all
persons – everyone shared an “omnipotent, infinitely wise maker” and therefore “they are
his property, whose workmanship they are.” It was surely true that, even in the state of
nature, it might happen that “one man comes by a power over another,” but this could
never be an “absolute or arbitrary power” to use another “according to the passionate
heats, or boundless extravagancy” of one’s own will – to do so would violate God’s
interest in His own creation. This fundamental belief in the essential equality of all
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humanity is just as central to the liberal tradition as its oft-cited possessive
individualism.183
The Glorious Revolution and the settlement it wrought enshrined many of these
corporatist ideals in the unwritten English constitution, which bracketed all legitimate
authority under the rule of law and ensured the basic rights of all subjects within English,
and later British, dominions in the Bill of Rights (1689) and Act of Settlement (1701).
Broad toleration for dissenting Protestants largely quieted earlier conflicts over religious
exclusion from the body politic and linked England to the growing Protestant
International squaring off against Catholic absolutism. Though mediated through
multiple levels of virtual representation, all subjects were also understood to give some
form of consent to the arrangements under which they lived, and an increasingly
deliberative political culture meant that more and more Britons would participate directly
or indirectly in the affairs of the realm. Perhaps most importantly, the revolutionary
settlement recognized the fundamental legal equality of all subjects, and worked to bring
the common law into line with this foundational principle. The Glorious Revolution,
then, marked a moment of truly revolutionary possibility for England and its empire,
bringing “the people” more fully into the political life of the nation and shaping a new,
“modern” state committed to the protection of its subjects. After a nearly a century of
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often violent political turmoil, Britons hoped would that the revolutionary settlement
would “free the nation from slavery forever.”184
We are often told, however, that English revolutionaries like Locke were
interested only in preventing the political enslavement of rightfully freeborn Englishmen.
‘Slavery’ was simply a potent rhetorical weapon in the arsenal of the opponents of
absolute monarchy – Britons, by and large, had little interest in the very real, lived
slavery of the hundreds of thousands of Africans transported to their New World
colonies.185 Yet, as we have seen, the ways in which English men and women thought
about and structured their own political lives could, in certain circumstances, have a
dramatic impact on colonial bondage. For his part, Locke was explicit about the
illegitimacy of human slavery of all stripes. Slavery, said Locke, was “the state of war
continued” – an arena where the sacrosanct law of civil society held no sway. To be
enslaved was to be beyond the protection of the laws. But Locke questioned the kind of
power that conquest could convey, simltaneously undermining this very basis for
enslavement. “Despotical power” could be imposed only on “captives, taken in a just and
lawful war, and such only.” In Locke’s hands, however, the definition of a just war was
exceedingly narrow – only “those who actually assisted, concurred, or consented to the
unjust power” that provoked the war were liable to enslavement. By this metric, even if
enslavement in Africa, beyond the pale of English civil society, was legitimate, could the
children of slaves continue in bondage? Outside of this narrowing definition of
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legitimate enslavement, the law of natural liberty or the rule of civil law made slavery
difficutlt to justify. “Where there is an authority,” Locke argued, “a power on earth, from
which relief can be had by appeal, there the continuance of the state of war is excluded,
and the controversy is decided by that power” – the ability to appeal to the laws was
incompatible with slavery.186
If slavery was illegitimate, as Locke so clearly argued it was, then what relation
might former slaves turned free subjects have to the state and to their former owners?
Here Locke is silent, though his disquisition on the nature of subjecthood hints that all
free people who gave their consent to be ruled also had a claim to basic rights and
protections. Locke argued that all persons born into a civil society are naturally “obliged
to obedience and the laws of that government” and must therefore be considered subjects,
as they were understood to have given their tacit consent to their government. Even this
tacit consent bound “person and possession...to the government and dominion of [the]
common-wealth, as long as it hath a being.” Once established, the commonwealth’s
interest in the persons of subjects was immutable. There were also lines of exclusion
built into this theory of subjecthood however. Merely living peaceably under the law
“makes not a man a member of that society,” and the access of non-members to the
protection of the law was “only a local protection...[for] all those who, not being in a state
of war,” come within a jurisdiction.187 If property-in-man was rooted in the state of war
continued, then slaves could not be subjects.188 But any persons who could make a
“positive engagement, and express promise and compact” with the state must be
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considered “subjects or members of that common-wealth.”189 With the basis of slavery
increasingly narrowed, and such a robust and relatively capacious understanding of
subjecthood, it is little wonder that very real challenges to property-in-man emerged in
Britain and its empire.
Despite its reification of the vested property rights of individual subjects, then, the
Glorious Revolution also held out the potential of a fundamental reworking of imperial
slavery – there was nothing inherent to the logic of English revolution principles that
would exclude formerly enslaved people living within English dominions from their
basic rights as rational humans. This tendency was made clear by a series of remarkable
decisions handed down by John Holt, Chief Justice of King’s Bench, between 1697 and
1706. Turning Restoration-era slave law on its head, Holt, drawing on antislavery
principles first worked out during the Civil Wars, declared that property-in-man, the very
basis of imperial slavery, was inconsistent with common law and the rights of the subject.
Reaffirming traditional ideals of free English air, Holt declared that “as soon as a negro
comes into England, he becomes free” – though masters might still have a claim to the
labor of what Holt called a “slavish servant,” ownership of a person was illegitimate. As
legal persons living in English jurisdictions, then, Afro-Britons must have access to basic
rights because, as Holt said, “the common law takes no notice of negroes being different
from other men.”190 Whether they intended to or not, Whig revolutionaries had created
legal space for a forceful statement of antislavery principles from the highest court in the
Anglophone world.
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Though these developments at the metropole were crucial, however, the real
revolutionary contest over slavery took place on the uncertain terrain of empire, where
the patchwork of local law erected over the 17th century largely shielded colonial slavery
from imperial innovations. Scholars have long noted Locke’s fascination with empire
and the indigenous people of the Americas, and the ambivalent relationship he had with
both. Locke surely recognized the importance of the empire to England’s future, but his
was a new economic vision, based not on the extension of English dominion and
acquisition of ever more territory, but rather on the more intensive development of the
extant empire. True wealth, Whigs like Locke argued, was to be found not in extent of
possessions but in “greatness of people,” in the the ability of free subjects to contribute to
the common wealth throught their labor. Secure in their persons and possessions, AngloAmerican colonists would turn to intensive development of the resources they already
controlled, with the benefit redounding to the public good of all subjects. Not everyone
shared this vision, however, and the loose legal structure of empire precluded the kind of
centralized, coordinated economic development Locke desired. Colonial charters and
local positive laws could not simply be ignored. Even Chief Justice Holt, in his
revolutionary antislavery legal decisions, recognized that local colonial law, once
established, could not be easily altered and limited the scope of his emancipatory reading
of common law to England itself.
This complicated position on slavery, we are often told, was limited to the realm
of political theory, a rhetorical stance meant primarily to safeguard the rights of freeborn
white Englishmen – Whig anti-absolutists were at best ambivalent about the very real
bondage that tens of thousands of enslaved men, women, and children endured in the
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colonies. But John Locke was not merely a philosopher, and as secretary to the Board of
Trade from 1697 to 1703 he had considerable influence over the direction of colonial
policy, helping to craft reform plans that would bring colonial law more closely in line
with the revolution principles of 1688. Here Locke’s desk held one final secret, a
document hidden away in one of its pigeonholes for centuries until its discovery by
scholars in the 1960s – the Virginia reform plan of 1699, which sought to break up the
Old Dominion’s huge landed estates and guarantee the access of all imperial subjects to
life, liberty, and property. While Virginia’s local positive law made it difficult to tamper
with the institution of slavery directly, when Locke had access to the levers of imperial
power he attempted to use them in ways that would have fundamentally remade the basis
of the colonial plantation economy, bringing it more closely in line with the political
economy of Massachusetts and the antislavery legal culture of the Holt Court.191
The Glorious Revolution and its philosophical justifications, then, had a complex
and ambivalent impact on Anglo-American slavery. One the one hand, the sanctity of
vested property rights at the heart of possessive individualist liberalism reinforced the
claims of colonial slaveholders to their human property, couching their violent
domination of Afro-Britons in the rhetoric of English liberty. This same line of reasoning
also bolstered the claims of independent merchants to unrestricted participation in the
trans-Atlantic slave trade, inaugurating a period of unprecedented growth in the empire’s
enslaved population. On the other hand, however, many of the more corporate humanist
elements of English revolution principles seemed inimical to property-in-man. The
bracketing of all legitimate authority by consent and the rule of law, and the assertive
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claims of enslaved persons to the rights of freeborn English subjects, opened up political
and legal space where the enslaved and their allies could press for recognition of the legal
personhood of Afro-Britons. The contest between these competing strands of
revolutionary thought played out in courtrooms and legislative assemblies, New England
seaport towns and Virginia plantation fields, marking a protracted Williamite moment
throughout the British Empire and fundamentally transforming the institution of slavery.
***
Much may have changed when William of Orange came ashore at Torbay with
his Dutch army on 5 November 1688, but the desire of metropolitan planners to take
greater control of their empire did not. Though William and his Whig supporters were
initially occupied with hashing out their revolutionary settlement, by the mid-1690s the
broad outlines of the new English polity were in place and direct resistance from James II
and his allies had been scotched. With domestic affairs well in hand, attention turned to
the empire. Unlike at the Restoration in 1660, there was no widespread voiding of
charters or fundamental imperial reorganization. Instead, William and Mary, along with
their Whig allies, built on the progress of earlier imperial planners and continued the
centralization of their empire.
In 1694, for example, the Whig justices of King’s Bench declared that in
Blankard v. Galdy that parliamentary supremacy, one of the key elements of the postrevolution settlement, extended to the colonies. Though in theory limited to Jamaica,
Blankard set a crucial precedent tying colonial legal regimes to the centralized will of
Parliament.192 Two years later, the drive for imperial centralization was furthered with
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the creation of the Board of Trade, an advisory body tasked with informing Parliament of
the present state of the empire and proposing measures to make it more profitable and
easier to govern. Stacked with prominent Whigs and allies of the mercantile
establishment, the Board had no direct enforcement mechanisms but played a crucial role
in shaping imperial policy and regularizing colonial law by reviewing local legislation
and making recommendations on approval or rejection to the Privy Council.193 Colonial
assemblies certainly continued to assert their juridical independence from the metropole
and craft law to meet particular local needs, but there is little question that Williamite
reforms resulted in an empire far more centralized and subject to greater metropolitan
oversight than even the Stuarts could have dreamed.
The empire also continued to bear that hallmark of Stuart imperial policy –
plantation slavery – and metropolitan planners were forced to deal with numerous
questions surrounding slavery and the slave trade. Most pressing was the Royal African
Company’s monopoly over the slave trade, which many liberal Whigs now described as a
violation of the liberty of the English subject. To the merchants known as the “separate
traders,” the RAC monopoly was not only economically backward, it also violated the
liberties of freeborn English subjects. In a 1689 court case centered on a challenge to the
monopoly, Sir Bartholomew Shower, perhaps ironically a Jacobite sypmathizer, argued
that English law guaranteed freedom of trade to “freemen, whose property none can
invade, charge, or take away, but by their own consent.”194 In 1698, after years of
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Parliamentary lobbying and legal wrangling, the separate traders won a great victory –
though the RAC monopoly was upheld, the Africa trade was opened up to all English
merchants so long as they paid a ten-percent tax to offset the cost of maintaining the
Company’s slaving forts along the African coast. Continued lobbying resulted in the
complete deregulation of English slaving in 1712. The right of freeborn Englishmen to
trade in African slaves was clearly among the liberties protected by the Glorious
Revolution.195
With the Royal African Company and the separate trading “ten-percent men”
vying for dominance in slaving, the total volume of the English slave trade increased
dramatically. Even before the separate traders entered the picture, there was already a
robust trade in African bodies – between two thousand and eight thousand persons per
year were carried to the New World in Company ships. With the separate traders diving
into the trade with gusto after 1698, annual slaving totals ballooned to between ten
thousand and twenty-two thousand souls. All told, over 150,000 Africans were sold by
English slavers – over 40,000 died in the Middle Passage between 1688 and 1705.196 The
continued growth and importance of imperial slavery guaranteed that questions about the
property rights of colonial slave owners and the status of enslaved people as subjects
would continue to come before English courts.
The Williamite Bench was staffed by some of the most notable Whigs of the day.
Sir William Gregory, previous speaker of the Commons and a key force behind the
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passage of the Habeas Corpus Act, was appointed to the court in 1689 and sat until his
death in 1696. Sir Giles Eyre, also appointed to King’s Bench in 1689, had played an
important role in shaping the 1689 Bill of Rights, as did Sir George Treby, made Chief
Justice of Common Pleas in 1692. Samuel Eyre, on the King’s Bench from 1694 to
1698, had been a key ally of the Earl of Shaftesbury’s during the Exclusion Crisis. Sir
Thomas Rokeby, son of one of Cromwell’s officers, was an early supporter of William’s
ascension to the throne and was rewarded with a seat on the Court of Common Pleas in
1689 – he was later elevated to the King’s Bench in 1695. Littleton Powys too had
thrown his lot in with the Prince of Orange in the crucial days of 1688, and found himself
made Baron of the Exchequer by 1695 and a justice of King’s Bench by 1701. But the
most important and perhaps most politically committed of these Whig justices was Sir
John Holt, who sat as Chief Justice of King’s Bench from 1689 to his death in 1710. Holt
had been a crucial figure in shaping the constitutional settlement through which William
came to the throne and, the admiration of contemporaries and historians for his judicial
independence, was a strong supporter of Whig policies.197
These Whig-leaning justices also benefitted from structural changes to the English
legal system wrought by the revolutionary settlement. During the Restoration, all English
judges had held their positions in bene placito, at the king’s pleasure, ensuring that the
justice they meted out would be in line with royal policy. Judges who challenged royal
policy from the bench, like Sir Edward Coke under James I or Matthew Hale under
Charles I, soon found themselves turned out of their positions. Under the terms of the
Act of Settlement in 1701, however, all judicial appointments were to be made for life,
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giving the king’s justices an unprecedented level of independence.198 Ideologically, most
of the Williamite judges were reliable Whigs – Chief Justice Holt might even plausibly
be classed with the radicals – who hoped to use the bench as another way to insinuate
revolution principles into the common law. Like many other Court Whigs in the 1690s,
however, the Williamite bench was also closely linked to mercantile interests calling for
an expanded English slave trade. When questions touching on slavery came before the
court, then, Chief Justice Holt and the king’s judges had to balance a number of
ideological, political, and economic concerns. Revolution principles reaffirmed that
English air was uniquely free, at least for Protestant Britons, but could those same
principles coexist with an empire increasingly based on racialized chattel slavery? Might
the free air of England extend to the thousands of William and Mary’s unfree African
subjects?
Initially it appeared that the Glorious Revolution had done little to alter the
legitimacy of property-in-man. In 1694, the Court of Common Pleas followed in the
footsteps of Restoration-era jurisprudence and ruled that African slaves could be claimed
as chattel property under common law in Gelly v. Cleve. The only extant report of the
case is brief and straightforward. Chief Justice John Powell and his fellow justices,
Thomas Rokeby and Edward Neville, echoed the precedent set by Butts v. Penny (1677)
and declared that “trover will lie for a Negro boy.” As in Butts, the court’s decision
hinged on the definition of Africans as social outsiders. Powell declared that “a man may
have a property” in slaves because “they are heathens,” again echoing Butts’ rationale
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that, as “subjects of an Infidel prince,” slaves could be defined as “Merchandize.”199
Though it upheld earlier definitions of slaves as chattel properties, the court’s decision in
Gelly v. Cleve did not definitively answer the question of whether slavery and
Christianity were compatible. In this sense, the case provides an intriguing glimpse of
the tensions between absolute individual property claims and revolutionary corporate
humanism. Gelly’s individual property claim to his slave was confirmed, but the court
left open the possibility of emancipation through conversion. Membership in a corporate
body, particularly one as central as the Protestant church, might still establish a slave’s
humanity and bracket a master’s property claims. As we shall see, the refusal of the
Common Pleas to address this central tension would have dramatic repercussions for
subsequent cases.
Three years later, with Parliamentary debates over the future of the Royal African
Company driving the question of slavery into public debate, the Court of King’s Bench
handed down a decision that privileged the free air of England over any economic
considerations, contradicting the Court of Common Pleas’ decision in Gelly v. Cleve that
enslaved Africans would be treated as property under English law. What could have led
John Powell and Thomas Rokeby, now sitting with Chief Justice John Holt at King’s
Bench, to repudiate their earlier decision? At stake in Chamberlain v. Harvey was the
fate of an unnamed Barbadian slave, born to enslaved parents on the plantation of
Edward Chamberlain. Though the details of this enslaved man’s life emerge only dimly
in the record, what little we can discern is startling proof that the fears of English
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antislavery thinkers were not overblown. Again and again the logic of property-in-man
intervened and changed his life in ways that must have felt arbitrary and unjust.200
In Barbados, as in many late-17th century plantation colonies, slaves were classed
as real property, tied to landed estates as they descended from generation to generation to
guarantee a steady labor supply. Though on first impression this definition might seem to
have imparted some stability to plantation life by limiting the salability of slave property,
being classed as real estate did little to protect enslaved families or communities.201 The
actual workings of English inheritance law practically guaranteed that a decedent’s
enslaved labor force would be sold to pay debts or moved to another estate. When
Edward Chamberlain died in 1673, for example, one third of his estate descended to his
widow, Mary, as part of her dower right, with a reversion upon her death to his grandson
and heir, Willoughby Chamberlain.202 Mary was later remarried to Sir John Witham, the
Lieutenant Governor of Barbados, who gained use rights to her dower property through
the law of coverture, including the young enslaved man who would later spark such legal
controversy, and resettled many of the slaves on his own plantation. Classification as real
property did not tie Mary’s dower slaves to Chamberlain’s plantation, nor did it preclude
their sale. Witham himself purchased deeds to a number of Barbadian slaves in the
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1680s, like the “negro girl” he purchased from Mary Gough in April 1684.203 While the
common law of real property may have made the sale of enslaved persons more
complicated, requiring registration by deed unlike than the simpler and more direct
transfer of chattel property, a brisk market in enslaved bodies developed nonetheless.
Political scandal soon made life even more complicated for the Cartwright dower
slaves. In the winter of 1684, John Witham, who had been serving as Barbados’ acting
governor, was arrested and imprisoned by the governor, his political rival Sir Richard
Dutton, for maladministration and corruption. Among the charges leveled at Witham was
the doubly objectionable act of taking “a negro girl for a bribe.”204 After a sham trial –
the besieged lieutenant governor was not allowed counsel, had no time to prepare a
defense, and presented his case to a jury packed with personal and political enemies –
Witham was sentenced to pay an astronomical £11,000 in fines. When Witham could not
pay, he was hauled before the court again, and a fieri fascias was issued to attach his
estate for sale to satisfy the sentence. Before the Witham estate, and potentially many of
the Chamberlain dowry slaves along with it, could be sold, however, the disgraced
lieutenant governor lodged a complaint with the Lords of Trade, who ordered his release,
the return of his estate and offices, and restitution of over £400 in April 1685.205 By
September, John and Mary Witham were in London, where the former lieutenant
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governor presented his defense to the Lords of Trade and pressed legal claims against his
political enemies.206
When the Withams returned to London, they took a number of their household
slaves with them, including the young man who would later be at the center of
Chamberlain v. Harvey. There was nothing unusual in this choice. Doubly protected
under Barbados’ law of real property and the English common law as expressed in Butts
v. Penny (1677), Witham, like most colonial planters, assumed that his property rights as
an English subject would adhere throughout the empire. Witham was remarkable in one
crucial respect, however – he baptized his slaves “according to the rites of the church of
England.”207 We can only speculate at the motivations behind this decision. Perhaps
Witham was inspired by contemporary calls, like those from Morgan Godwyn, to prove
the justice of the Protestant cause by converting his slaves. Perhaps he had a genuine
concern for the souls of the enslaved, whatever injustices he might have visited upon
their bodies. Or perhaps the enslaved man had sought baptism on his own. Maybe he
heard the persistent rumor that conversion to Christianity would free a slave. He could
not have missed the contentious debates about the nature of English freedom and
subjecthood surrounding the Glorious Revolution – perhaps he took this discourse to its
logical conclusion and hoped that baptism in the national church would give him access
to the rights of an English subject. Whatever the motivations on either side, the baptism
of the Chamberlain dower slave turned out to have tremendous repercussions, forcing the
question of baptism and emancipation directly into the highest court in England.
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The status of the dower slaves became even more complex when Mary Witham,
nee Chamberlain, died in 1687. Under the common law of real property, her lifetime use
rights to the one-third interest in the Chamberlain estate and slaves reverted to her
grandson, Willoughby Chamberlain. At least one of the slaves in question, however, was
in London at the time, exposing the dubious nature of the legal fiction that Barbados
slaves, as real estate, were “tied to the land” in any meaningful way. Rather than
returning the dower slave to Chamberlain as the law required, however, John Witham
“absolutely put the said negro slave out of his service.”208 Again, the motivations behind
Witham’s decision are unclear. Perhaps he no longer needed to employ as many hands in
his household and found the expense of supporting an unneeded laborer excessive.
Family conflict may have influenced his decision as well, for John Witham’s relationship
with step-grandson was not a happy one. When Chamberlain was considered for a
position on the Barbados Council in May 1688, Witham cautioned William Blathwayt,
Secretary of the Lords of Trade, against giving his stepson any position of authority.
Chamberlain, Witham warned, was “deeply in debt, and has boasted that he will defeat
his creditors by getting into the Council.” Worse yet, the young Willoughby was
“quarrelsome drunk almost every night” and had a vicious violent streak – he had been
known to “beat the ordinary people within danger of their lives.”209 Perhaps Witham
balked at returning his baptized dower slaves to the arbitrary power of an unrepentant
drunkard and sadist. Or maybe the dower slave, having tasted free English air and
converted to Christianity, refused to return to slavery in Barbados and absconded.
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Whatever the circumstance of the dower slave’s discharge, he apparently lived
independently “for several years,” serving “several other masters” in England before
entering the employ of Robert Harvey, Esq. in September 1695.210 What kind of work
the dower slave did for Harvey we do not know, but he apparently lived in the parish of
St. Mary of the Arches in Cheapside, London and was paid £6 a year in wages for his
services.211 At some point in late 1696, Willoughby Chamberlain somehow tracked
down his wayward property and entered a writ of trespass against Harvey for “[taking]
and [leading] away...the negro...so that [he] totally was without, and lost the use and
benefit of the said negro for the whole time.” Chamberlain valued his slave at £100 and
claimed an additional £50 in damages for lost service.212
The legal framing of Chamberlain’s suit was significant. Rather than initiating
suit with a writ of trover, claiming direct compensation for improperly taken chattel
property, Chamberlain’s lawyers filed a trespass writ with the King’s Bench. While
trespass included a broad array of legal remedies that could address wrongs ranging from
battery to theft to wrongful imprisonment, it appears that Chamberlain entered a trespass
de bonis asportatis for the wrongful taking of chattel property.213 Unlike trover,
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however, a trespass de bonis asportatis sought not compensation for the lost property
itself, but for the rightful owners loss of the use of that property. Chamberlain already
overstepped himself by claiming the original £100 purchase price of his alleged slave in
addition to £50 for lost service, and both claims would now have to be considered up by
the jury. The very terms on which Chamberlain v. Harvey would be argued, then, forced
fundamental questions before the court – what exactly was the property right conferred
by slavery? Did masters own the persons of slaves or only their labor?
When the case began during Michaelmas Term in 1696, Chamberlain certainly
believed that the full weight of the law was behind him. In their pleading before the jury,
counsel for Chamberlain relied almost entirely on the force of Barbadian property law to
make their case. A 1668 statute there had defined slaves as “estates real, and not chattels,
[which] shall descend unto the heir or widow of any person dying, according to the
manner and custom of lands...held in fee-simple.” Since the slaves and estate in question
were legally defined as realty in Barbados, they should descend according to the common
law of real property, which clearly vested the estate and its slaves in Willoughby
Chamberlain. The slave at issue had been baptized and turned out of John Witham’s
service “without the consent or knowledge” of his legal owner, and Chamberlain had
been illegally deprived of his rightful slave’s valuable service.
The simplicity and clarity of this argument, however, was not enough to convince
the jury. In a clear illustration of continued English ambivalence toward property-inman, the jurors claimed to be “wholly ignorant” of the proper verdict in the case. Instead,
they entered a special verdict, seeking the “advice of the court” and throwing the final
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determination of the case back to the King’s Bench justices.214 The jury did, however,
recommend a specific sentence if the justices found Robert Harvey guilty of trespass.
Though Chamberlain had sued for the original purchase value of his slave plus damages,
the jury assessed his damages at only £50 and disregarded his claim of the original
purchase price of £100 entirely.215 This recommendation suggests that, while the jurors
were sympathetic to Chamberlain’s claims of lost service, they were not willing to
countenance the kind of absolute property claim he advanced in seeking the value of the
slave’s person as damages. Where the king’s justices would come down on the question,
however, remained to be seen.
When the court convened again during Easter Term 1697 to enroll the special
verdict and hear further arguments from counsel, it did so in spectacular fashion – King
William III himself joined his three justices at King’s Bench, illustrating the importance
of the question at hand to his government.216 The court certainly took note of the unique
circumstances of the case, stating in the record that “a case like this never happened
before.”217 After entering the special verdict reached by the jury in the previous
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Michaelmas term, the court laid out the three essential questions to be argued by counsel:
first, was there “any legal property vested in the plaintiff”; second, if Chamberlain did
have a property interest in the slave, would “bringing this NEGRO into England be...a
manumission, and the property thereby divested”; and finally, would “an action of
trespass...lie for taking a man of the price of one hundred pounds?”
While admitting that “the word ‘slave’ has but a very harsh sound in a free and
christian country,” Chamberlain’s barrister, the High Tory Sir Bartholomew Shower, set
out to address the court’s first question by illustrating that “perfect bondage has been
allowed in such places.”218 First of all, slavery was a perfectly natural institution. To
Shower, the “power” of slaveholders “naturally arises” because masters provide slaves
with “food and raiment...as a recompence for their labor.” Even if slavery were
unnatural, however, Shower went on to argue that positive legislation guaranteed
masters’ property rights in slaves. Since the slave in question had been born in the West
Indies, Shower’s next resort was to local Barbadian slave law. Citing a 1668 Barbados
statute, he argued that children born to enslaved parents were “slaves as well as they.”
Here counsel’s argument relied on the definition of slaves as strangers, citing ancient
Roman practice as precedent – “where both parents were aliens, the children were so
too.” To Shower and Chamberlain, African slaves were not members of the English
nation and were therefore liable to enslavement. Since local Barbadian law defined
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slaves as “part of the real estate,” the slave in question must revert to Willoughby
Chamberlain under the accepted common law of real property.
True enough for Barbados, but would colonial slave property law continue to
adhere in England? Shower argued that it must because colonial law, “being subject to
the crown of England, has the same force there as an act of parliament has here.” To
deny the extraterritoriality of Barbadian slave property would impugn both the power of
the royal prerogative as articulated through the colonial assemblies and the rights of
English subjects guaranteed by Parliament, a deft political argument sure to garner points
from both King William and the Whig justices of the King’s Bench. Besides, Shower
argued, there was an indigenous English legal precedent for Chamberlain’s claim –
villeinage. Tied to the land as real estate, Barbadian slaves were the equivalent of
English villeins regardent “in which, by the law of this land [England], the lord had so
absolute a property, that if [the villein] were taken away, the party detaining him gained
no property in him” – precisely the situation alleged by Chamberlain’s trespass suit.
Should appeals to colonial real estate law and villeinage fail, Shower also cited the
court’s 1677 decision in Butts v. Penny to prove that “it cannot be denied but that trover
will lie for a negro.” Whatever the initial terms of Chamberlain’s writ, Shower had
covered all his bases and put forth a broad array of justifications – the natural origins of
slavery, Barbadian real property law, English villeinage, and the imperial chattel
principle as elaborated by Butts v. Penny – to bolster his client’s property claim.
Moving on to the question of whether English air had freed the slave, Shower
flatly stated that, “nothing here found [in the case] amounts to a manumission or
enfranchisement.” Turning to the venerable Sir Edward Coke for authority, Shower
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again took English villeinage as his point of departure, arguing that villeins could never
be manumitted “but where the lord is an actor.” Whether through deed of manumission
or legal judgment, only a direct act of the lord, who held an absolute property in the
villein, would result in freedom. Clearly, Shower argued, there was “nothing of the
lord’s consent found” in this case. Indeed, as the equivalent to a villein regardent to a
lord’s manor, the slave should never have been removed from the Chamberlain estate in
the first place, and any purported alterations to the slave’s status were voided by John
Witham’s initial trespass in bringing him to England. Invoking the treasured right of
subjects not to be deprived of their property without consent, Chamberlain and his
lawyers couched the principle of property-in-man in the revolutionary discourse of
English liberty, the ancient constitution, and consensual governance.
The trickiest question for Chamberlain and Shower to address dealt with the
disputed slave’s conversion to Christianity. Unlike the other elements of the case,
emancipation through baptism was not a settled point of law. Most of the extant legal
precedent dealing with property-in-man had hinged on the heathenism of the alleged
slave – Butts v. Penny’s definition of the Africans in question as “Infidels” and the
cryptic declaration that “the court will take notice they are Heathens” in Gelly v. Cleve
for example. By grounding their narrow decisions in religious language, earlier justices
had left the door open to the enfranchisement of baptized slaves.219 This was a
particularly thorny issue because Willoughby Chamberlain was a vocal advocate of slave
baptism. In a sermon given shortly after Chamberlain’s death in late 1697, John King,
rector of an Anglican church in Chelsea, described a very different Willoughby
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Chamberlain than John Witham had known a decade earlier. Though he admitted that
Willoughby had fallen victim to the sins of a “licentious and vicious Age,” King praised
the deceased planter for “a most excellent act of Charity” – baptizing his slaves. Indeed,
in King’s telling at least, Chamberlain wanted “to have a Law made to oblige our
Plantations to baptize their Negro Slaves.” African slaves were, like English subjects,
“capable of being made Eternally Happy, and Instruments of praising God as well as we.”
Baptism was the least planters could do for “those poor Souls whose Bodies labour to
enrich them: and whose circumstances being so narrow in this, ought to have better
provision made for them in the next Life.”220
As King’s sermon made clear, Chamberlain, like many English slaveholders, did
not see baptism and slavery as incompatible. The Christian slaves’ circumstances would
remain narrow in this life – they could look forward to freedom only in the next. When
Bartholomew Shower took up the question of conversion before the King’s Bench, he
echoed his client and drove a wedge between Christianity and manumission. Here,
however, Shower seems to have known he was on contested ground. His argument
presented no relevant common law precedent. Indeed the only English case law on the
issue, the Butts and Gelly cases, could be read as allowing emancipation through baptism.
All he could muster was a tortured analogy to villeinage. For Shower and Chamberlain,
the crucial issue was not baptism but consent. Once again, Shower argued that, “what the
villein does without the consent of the lord, cannot acquire a manumission.” In a sense,
the relationship between baptism and emancipation was not even the issue – anything
done to or by the dower slave since his removal from the Chamberlain estate in Barbados
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was illegitimate, because Willoughby had not given his consent to any of it. He had no
qualms about baptizing his own slaves, but Christian baptism, it seemed, would not trump
English property rights.
Common law precedent, natural law, the ancient constitution, and the rhetoric of
English liberties had all been brought to bear to prove that Chamberlain’s wayward slave
was a legitimate article of property. The coup de grace, however, was that central pillar
of the English proslavery argument – economic interest. Hoping to settle the issue once
and for all, Shower put the point bluntly. “If baptism should be accounted a
manumission,” he said, “it would very much endanger the trade of the plantations, which
cannot be carried on without the help and labour of these slaves.” If the tedious minutiae
of English villeinage law had lulled King William into a daze, this would certainly have
snapped him out of it. Customs and excise duties on colonial trade were one of the main
sources of revenue for the king’s costly European wars in support of the international
Protestant cause. It was not that Chamberlain or Shower were opposed to baptizing
slaves. They believed that planters, as good Protestants, were “bound to baptize them as
soon as they can give a reasonable account of the christian faith.” The problem was, “if
that would make them free, then few would be slaves.” In Chamberlain’s mind, baptism
was an individual act of charity by consenting slave owners – Christ would be restored to
His rightful property in the souls of all nations, and Africans would be exposed to the
civilizing influence of (ideally High Tory Anglican) Christianity, all without disturbing
planters’ individual interests in the bodies and labor of slaves or the state’s colonial
revenue stream. If ever there was an argument designed to sway a cash-strapped and
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notoriously pragmatic monarch, this was it. But the issue was not yet settled, and other
arguments were still to be heard.
Robert Harvey’s attorney, a Mr. Dee, began his argument with a bold assertion –
“that it is against the law of nature for one man to be a slave to another.” Though a
discourse of natural law and natural rights had begun to emerge in English thought during
the run-up to the Glorious Revolution and continued to blossom in the 1690s, Dee’s
claim was radically universalist for its day. It was a crucial starting point for his
argument, however. Dee readily admitted that slavery certainly existed in certain places,
but flatly denied that England was one of them. “A man may lose his liberty by a
particular law of his country, or by being taken in war...or where a man voluntarily sells
himself,” he argued, but it was “by the constitution of nations, and not by the law of
nature, that the freedom of mankind has been turned into slavery.” To Dee, as to many
Whig thinkers, the common law was “called Libertates Anglia, because [it makes] men
free” – English law was natural law.221 So powerful was the English legal bias in favor
of freedom, that only a “particular law” could override natural law, as expressed through
the ancient constitution, and establish slavery.
Dee then set out to prove that no such positive law had ever existed in England.
Turning Shower’s argument on its head, he argued that, “even in the time of villeinage
here, the lord had not such an absolute property” as Chamberlain claimed in his slave. To
prove his point, Dee turned to the most basic marker of English subjecthood – access to
the courts. Even a villein “might have an action against his lord” in court to protect his or
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her family, property, and person, something slaves obviously could not do.222
Furthermore, Dee argued, if Chamberlain and Shower wanted to use villeinage as legal
cover for slave property in England, they needed to be much more specific about what
type of villeinage they meant. Was this slave a villein in gross or was he regardent to a
specific estate? Clearly he could not be the latter, “for then the plaintiff and his ancestors
must be seised of this negro and his ancestors time out of the memory of man.” Since
“Barbados was acquired to THE ENGLISH within time of memory,” villeinage regardent
was out. Nor could he be a villein in gross, because his parents, held as real property in
Barbados, were not villeins, nor did Chamberlain claim them to be.223
Drawing on the full arsenal of Whig thought, Dee also argued that servitude, like
all social relations, was reciprocal and, in a sense, contractual. Even if natural law and
free English air had not freed Chamberlain’s slave, Witham’s dismissal was a tacit act of
manumission. Living independently, Chamberlain’s wayward slave was “not allowed
sustenance” and was forced to make his own way. Since “food and cloathing are the only
recompence for servitude,” and Chamberlain provided neither to his alleged slave for
quite some time, he had broken his end of the bargain, and the slave was thereby
manumitted. In servitude, unlike in slavery, the relationship between master and bound
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laborer was a two-way street – servants may have owed their labor, but masters had
obligations too, and failure to live up to them could result in a servant’s freedom.
Harvey’s counsel did not set out to prove that masters had no claim to their slaves,
but they did want to be very clear about what masters owned. Did Chamberlain “have an
absolute or a qualified property” in his slave? Dee believed the answer was obvious –
“he could not have an absolute or general property, because by MAGNA CHARTA, and
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, no man can have such property over another.”
Chamberlain could only have “a qualified property” in his slave’s labor through writ of
trespass per quod servitium amisit [‘for the lost service’]. This remedy could compensate
masters for the lost labor of servants, but, crucially, did not recognize a proprietary
interest in a slave’s person. Whether he had read their work or not, Dee was indebted to
early antislavery thinkers like Henry Parker for this conceptual separation of person and
labor, source and output. Furthermore, even the limited remedy of a per quod servitium
amisit was off the table, Dee argued, because of the limited reach of colonial law.224
Chamberlain may have had a sufficient interest in the slave to support a more robust
claim in Barbados, where he clearly owned far more than the slave’s labor, but “that is
only lex loci, and adapted to that particular place...and extends only to that country, so
long as he is occupied in service on that plantation.”225 Once the slave left Barbados,
“that law has no effect, [and] that amounts to a manumission,” with or without

224

In his summation, Dee also noted that a trespass writ should not lie in this case on technical grounds of
usage. As he put it, “if this negro be part of the real estate, then Sir John Witham was a disseisor by
bringing him into England, and a disseisee cannot have an action of trespass before a re-entry, because
the freehold is in the disseisor.” Here again the legal fiction defining a person as real estate exposed a
weak point in the proslavery argument. A trespass would only lie once the disseisee, Chamberlain, had
‘re-entered’ his property. But how would one re-enter the property in a case like this?
225
Note again the centrality of labor to this antislavery argument – the property interest only adhered so
long as the slave was “occupied in service.”

303

Chamberlain’s knowledge or consent. Indeed, Dee argued, bringing a slave “into
England discharges him of all servitude or bondage” – English air made men completely
free.
Although Dee did not cite or refer to it, the very 1668 statute Shower had referred
to in support of Chamberlain’s property claim contains a clause that tacitly acknowledges
the jurisdictional fluidity of slave property and supports Dee’s claim that local colonial
slave law was not extraterritorial. While the act clearly defined slaves as real estate
within Barbados, “any merchant, factor or agent, bringing negro slaves” would be
exempted and would “possess and enjoy such slaves or negroes in such condition as they
might have done” before coming ashore. Only once the “sale of such slave or slaves hath
been made in the island” would their new status as real estate take effect.226 Butts v.
Penny had illustrated that the definition of slaves as chattels under the “custom of
merchants” could be a potent weapon for proslavery advocates, but, as the Barbados
statute makes clear, this mercantile definition ended at the point of sale, where local law
determined the exact contours of slave property. Dee’s argument is potent evidence that
antislavery thinkers could use the empire’s legal diversity to advance an emancipatory
agenda by cordoning off England as a zone of natural freedom.
Since masters only owned the labor of slaves, their physical dominion would, like
the absolutist pretensions of the Stuart monarchs, have to be curbed and brought under
the control of the rule of law. Again reflecting the Whig discourse surrounding the rule
of law that emerged during the Glorious Revolution, Dee argued that the common law
was always “careful of the liberties of men under its protection,” and would protect
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slaves from masters’ attempts at dominion. A master, for example, could not send a slave
out of England without the slave’s consent. Dee argued that a “lord could not send a
villein in gross [typically saleable as chattels] out of the kingdom, because the king had a
right in him.” Masters could not remove apprentices from the realm, even though “they
voluntarily submit themselves to serve...unless it be the agreement.” Even the king
himself, despite his “right to the duty and service of his subjects” could not “send anyone out of England against his will to serve in any other place.” If slaves, as Dee argued,
were simply persons held to labor, not absolute articles of property, then they must fall
under the protection of the law in the same way as villeins, apprentices, or any other
subjects.
Echoing Henry Parker’s argument about the state’s “publike and sublime
propriety” in the persons of subjects, this line of thinking illuminates the tension between
increasingly absolute individual property claims and an older but still resonant corporate
humanist understanding of property, where individual ownership rights were inseparable
from the broader common weal. Where proslavery thinkers leaned heavily on the former,
antislavery lawyers like Dee argued that property-in-man was illegitimate because it
impinged on a broader societal interest in the persons of subjects. Ideas of selfownership implicit in Whig ideology certainly played a role in turning some Britons
against the chattel principle, but the dominant strand in antislavery thought, expressed so
clearly in Dee’s argument, was still the incompatibility of property-in-man and the duties
of subjecthood. Particularly in an era where “the people” claimed the ultimate mantle of
sovereignty, denying basic rights to any person threatened the entire community.
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If these secular arguments were not enough to sway the court and the monarch,
Dee had one more crucial point to put forward – “Being baptized according to the rite of
THE CHURCH, [the slave] is thereby made a christian, and christianity is inconsistent
with slavery.” Villeins who absconded and took religious orders, he noted, though
considered “dead in law,” could not be forcibly removed from their cloisters because
“then he could not live according to his religion.” Since open access to Anglican baptism
was “incorporated into the laws of the land,” none who desired it should be excluded.
And if “the duties which arise thereby cannot be performed” by a slave without altering
the master’s property claim, then religious obligation must be privileged over property
rights – “the baptism must be a manumission.” Access to Anglican baptism brought
slaves, who, like villeins, were “dead in law,” into the community of English subjects, all
of whom were “enjoined by several acts of parliament to come to church.” Such social
and religious obligations were entirely incompatible with the kind of absolute individual
property claims made by slave owners like Chamberlain. If “the Turks” and other
“Mahometans” granted freedom to slaves who converted, “then baptism in a christian
nation, as [England] is, should be an immediate enfranchisement to them, and they should
thereby acquire the privileges and immunities enjoyed by those of the same religion, and
be intitled to THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.” Once again the rights and obligations of
membership in a corporate body, particularly one so integral to the state as the Church of
England, trumped any individual property claims by lords or masters. Conversion was
potent evidence of the legal personhood of African slaves, and in the context of the
revolutionary settlement, legal personhood guaranteed the protection of the common law.
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The decision Lord Holt and the King’s Bench handed down the following Hillary
term was a clear and almost complete vindication of Dee’s antislavery argument. Holt
flatly declared that “trover will not lie for a Negro,” a direct refutation of the earlier
decisions in Butts v. Penny and Gelly v. Cleve.227 Nor would Chamberlain’s trespass writ
hold, declared the court, “because a Negro cannot be demanded as a Chattel, neither can
his Price be recovered in Damages in an Action of Trespass, as in Case of a Chattel.”
The King’s Bench could not have been clearer – in England, a person could not be
property. They did not, however, deny that masters had a legal claim to the labor of what
Holt called “slavish Servants.”228 Just as “any man may maintain a trespass for another,”
slave owners could claim lost time from these slavish servants, but only through a
trespass per quod servitium amisit, just as Dee had argued.229 Holt and the King’s Bench
clearly established the central premise of English antislavery thought in law – one might
have a claim to a person’s labor, but no one could own another as property. Chamberlain
and Shower’s attempt to legitimize slavery through English villeinage had failed, turned
on its head by Dee and Lord Holt.
What the record left unsaid was the explicit reasoning behind the court’s decision.
Indeed, Holt studiously avoided many of the central issues raised by counsel in
Chamberlain v. Harvey. Since the alleged slave in question was resident in England at
the time of the suit, the jurisdictional reach of the court’s decision was limited.
Bartholomew Shower’s arguments about the lex loci of Barbados and the economic
importance of colonial trade likely played a role here. Holt would certainly have been
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hesitant to broach delicate questions of imperial jurisdiction that might have destabilized
the empire and endangered the king’s revenue. The court was also, however, unwilling
to fully embrace some elements of the antislavery position. They did not, for example,
include the language of natural law that undergirded Dee’s argument, though it is likely
that the justices, like Dee, saw English common law as an expression of the law of
nature. Nor did they explicitly endorse Dee’s Whig contractualism, though again Holt’s
definition of slaves as the equivalent of servants implies tacit agreement. Perhaps the
most puzzling silence concerned the now legally freed slave’s Christianity. As one report
noted, the case had been “argued upon that Point...Whether the Baptism was a
Manumission,” but “as to that the Court gave no Opinion.”230
The Holt court took up the question of property-in-man once again a few years
later in Smith v. Brown and Cooper.231 This case differed from Chamberlain in a number
of significant ways. First, Smith initiated his suit with a writ of indebitatus assumpsit
“for a Negro sold by the Plaintiff to the Defendant” in St. Mary-le-Bow, Cheapside,
London for £20. Apparently Brown and Cooper did not make good on their payment,
leading Smith to sue before the King’s Bench. Smith, unlike Chamberlain, did not claim
the slave in question as his property – rather, he sought damages for Brown and Cooper’s
debt. The only extant report of the case is brief and does not include arguments of
counsel, but the court’s decision reveals many of the central issues at stake. It appears
that the slave in question was held in Virginia, though the sale had been registered in
London, forcing questions of imperial jurisdiction back into the court. As in
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Chamberlain, the record suggests that villeinage was once again offered as an argument
in favor of slavery in England. Once again, however, the Holt court tilted toward liberty
and reaffirmed the freedom of English air.
In his decision in Smith v. Brown and Cooper, Chief Justice Holt declared that “as
soon as a negro comes into England, he becomes free; one may be a villein in England,
but not a slave.”232 Justice Sir John Powell, who had handed down the proslavery
decision in Gelly v. Cleve as a Common Pleas judge just over a decade earlier, now
concurred with the Chief Justice. Lords might have had a property interest in their
villeins, and guardians had a form of property in their wards, but “the Law took no Notice
of a Negro.” Here Powell clearly meant that English law did not recognize distinctions
based on race – if slaves became free upon entering England, and the law took no special
notice of Africans as a separate category of persons, then the “Negro” at issue must be
considered as a legal person living within English jurisdictions with access to the basic
protections of English law. As such, Holt and Powell agreed, Africans were not saleable
commodities in England, therefore the sale in question and the debt it produced were both
void. Smith’s claim was dismissed.233
While the court’s decision in Smith v. Brown and Cooper was certainly a
straightforward assertion that slavery was illegitimate in England, Holt did make one
crucial qualification that deserves some attention. The case appears to have gotten
bogged down in the minutiae of Virginia slave law and its legitimacy in England – no
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other issue is addressed in such depth in the court’s decision. Holt advised counsel for
Smith that, had they argued that the title at issue had been established in Virginia, not
England, they might have had a case because “the Laws of England do not extend to
Virginia, being a conquered Country.” While many colonists would certainly have
disputed Holt’s claim, implying as it did total metropolitan control over colonial law, this
doctrine of conquest was commonly invoked by imperial planners and bolstered royal
authority throughout the empire by placing colonial law under the royal prerogative. 234
Whatever English law said, a slave could be property in Virginia because “their Law is
what the King pleases” and local assemblies, the colonial expression of the king’s
prerogative, had established that species of property.235 Clearly, Holt believed that while
a master might retain rights to a “slavish” servant’s labor even in England, rights to
property-in-man were jurisdictionally bounded and could exist only where sovereign
authority had established them through positive law.
Possibly to remove the troublesome case from the courts, the Attorney General
argued that as real property under Virginia law, slaves could only be transferred by deed
– in the end, “nothing was done.”236 On this technicality the court refused to record
judgment, leading one scholar to describe Smith v. Brown and Cooper’s antislavery
credentials as “dubious.”237 It is true that, unlike in Chamberlain v. Harvey, it does not
appear that the slave in question actually gained his or her freedom in any meaningful
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way. It is entirely likely that he or she had already been shipped off to Virginia, where
the lex loci would determine their status. Close attention to the language regarding a
slave’s status as property, however, illustrates that Holt maintained the conceptual
distinction between personhood and property that was so central to the English
antislavery argument. As he had done in Chamberlain v. Harvey, Holt addressed the
labor status of slaves in England and the property rights of masters as separate issues.238
A slave’s labor, like that of a villein, could be owned, but his person could not, at least
within the realm of England.
The Holt court was even clearer two years later in Smith v. Gould (1706). The
case began with a straightforward trover claim for several chattel properties taken from
Smith, including an enslaved man. Gould demurred to all charges but argued that he
could not be held liable for the slave, bringing a motion in arrest of judgment because
“the Owner had not an absolute Property in him.”239 The motion also touched on the
physical dominion of slave owners, arguing as proof of a limited property relation that
Smith “could not kill [his slave]” legally. Interestingly, William Salkeld, Smith’s
attorney, shied away from making absolute property claims on his client’s behalf.
Perhaps Salkeld, an active case reporter who had been present for the court’s
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deliberations in Smith v. Brown and Cooper, knew that Holt was unlikely to look kindly
on such arguments. Whatever the reason, he clearly separated the kind of claim Smith
was making from the power men might claim over “Beasts, fowl and fish, which were
made Property of Mankind by the Act of God, and have a natural Existence.” Slavery, as
a civil status, not a natural state, dealt with “Things incorporeal, which consist in jure
tantum [in law only].” Therefore, “being a property ex Instituto only, the [slave] Owner
has only a Power according to the Measure of this instituted Right” – slave owners could
not have absolute ownership of slaves. In this sense, Salkeld argued, property-in-man
was the legal analogue of wardship, villeinage, or other forms of servitude. Spurred on
by the increasingly persuasive antislavery argument, Salkeld coopted the central premise
of English antislavery thought to proslavery ends. As we shall see, however, this
cooptation did not imply an endorsement of the antislavery argument – Salkeld turned the
logic of the antislavery separation of labor and person into a thoroughly proslavery legal
position.
Having once again attempted to make slavery palatable to the court by couching
the institution in the limited language of villeinage and servitude, Salkeld now turned to
another, more ruthless line of argument. First, he reminded Holt that his predecessors
had seen no problem with defining slaves as property. Alongside the now standard
citation to Butts v. Penny, Salkeld also cited “The Case of Monkeys” as precedent. Heard
back in 1610, Grymes v. Shack established that exotic animals, in this case “one hundred
musk-cats, and sixty monkies,” were “merchandise, and valuable,” and therefore were
liable to trover.240 How could Salkeld, who had just admitted that masters could not have
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absolute dominion over slaves, now reduce enslaved persons to the level of wild animals?
The answer comes in his ingenious, if insidious, co-opting of antislavery logic. If slavery
were merely a civil status, established by law, then masters could safely concede their
claims to the “incorporeal” elements of their slaves, their Christian souls and civic
personhood for example, without disturbing their property rights to what they really
wanted anyway – the labor power of enslaved bodies. Furthermore, this civil definition
of enslavement also accomplished the other central goal of slave owners – barring slaves’
access to legal protection. As Salkeld argued, neither habeas corpus, despite its recent
codification as an essential and basic right of English subjects, nor the vaunted principles
of Magna Carta would apply to slaves because one “must be Liber homo [a free man]” to
enjoy these rights. Appropriating the antislavery tactic of separating natural personhood
from civil status allowed Salkeld to argue that villeins and slaves were the legal
equivalent of monkeys.
It should come as no surprise that Holt and the Queen’s Bench disagreed with
Salkeld’s reasoning. Throwing out the court’s earlier decision in Butts v. Penny, the
justices of Queen’s Bench unanimously stated that trover would “not lie for a negro, no
more than for any other man.”241 Indeed, Holt continued, English law was colorblind –
“the common law takes no notice of negroes being different from other men.” As
persons under the protection of the common law, Afro-Britons, like all subjects, could
never be slaves because “there is no such thing as a slave by the law of England.”
Although there were “special cases” where an English subject might “have a property in
another,” forms of bondage like villeinage or servitude remained limited by law. An
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action for trespass quare captivum suum cepit might provide compensation to masters for
lost labor, as Holt had previously suggested, but not lost property. In a swipe at
European war slavery doctrine, Holt also argued that “the taker cannot kill” his captive,
but only “sell them to ransom them.” Though the Lord Chief Justice was certainly aware
that the “captives” purchased on the African coast were not being ransomed, and his
decision did nothing for the hundreds of thousands of Africans carried into bondage in
the English slave trade, he had once again reaffirmed the uniquely free nature of English
air.
The arguments presented by counsel and the decisions reached by the Holt court
in Chamberlain v. Harvey, Smith v. Brown and Cooper, and Smith v. Gould clearly
illustrate the contours of English pro- and antislavery thought at the turn of the 18th
century. The antislavery argument, drawing on revolution principles that stretched back
to the 1630s, flatly denied that persons could be property. The constitutional settlement
of the 1690s shared many of the core tenets of antislavery thought – all legitimate
authority stemmed from “the people” and must be delimited by law; any limitations on
the rights or liberties of “the people” must have their consent; all persons must have
access to the common law. Drawing on the corporate humanist strand of revolutionary
thought, antislavery jurists argued that Afro-Britons, as legal persons and subjects of the
British state, could not be defined as property and must share in the rights protected by
the Glorious Revolution. Slavery might exist in Barbados or Virginia, where local law
defined slaves as property, but English law would not condone the kind of dominion
implied by property-in-man.
***
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Massachusetts had anticipated the Glorious Revolution. Even before news of
William’s arrival in Britain had reached Boston, settlers incensed by the high-handed
absolutist pretensions of Sir Edmund Andros and the hated Dominion of New England
government arrested the royal governor and clapped him in irons. They had to, Bay
colonists argued – the alternative was the surrender of their most cherished liberties and
the destruction of their peculiar local political and social arrangements.242 Even with
Andros shuffled off to Virginia and a new charter in place guaranteeing many of the
privileges they had enjoyed before Dominion rule, many Massachusetts settlers remained
uneasy. It appeared that their godly republic was faltering. In 1691, for example, Joshua
Scottow, an octigenarian Puritan who had emigrated to the Bay Colony in its infancy,
worried about the future of the city on a hill in his pamhplet Old Mens Tears for their
own Declensions. What, Scottow wondered, had happened to the “Primitive Zeal, Piety,
and Holy Heat” of the Puritan fathers? The “Power and Practice of Godliness” had been
“turned into the form and substance of it,” the colonists’ “Soul lively Thirstings and
Pantings after God and his Ways, Metamorphosed into Land and Trade breathings, ...
transformed into conformity with the present evil world, lusts of the flesh, pride of life.”
Rather than a moment to celebrate deliverance from popery and absolutism, the Glorious
Revolution provoked an outpouring of pious self-denunciation.243
Declension theorists past and present are surely right to insist that the old
Congregational way was threatened by civil innovations. Though the 1691
Massachusetts Bay charter included many elements that must have pleased the Puritan
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fathers – the extension of the colonial state’s authority into Plymouth, Martha’s Vineyard,
and the Canadian Maritimes, for example – but other elements were less welcome. For
one, the colonial governor would no longer be elected by the settlers, as had been the case
before Dominion rule, but would instead be appointed by the king. Though Bay colonists
rejoiced to see their distinctive local governments protected, they worried that the
extension of political rights to non-Puritans would corrupt their godly republic.
Metropolitan planners had looked askance at Massachusetts’ exclusionary suffrage laws
for decades, however, and the logic of the Glorious Revolution required that the political
rights of all property owners be respected. Forced expansion of political subjecthood or
the presence of a royally appointed governor under the new charter were not as
immediate a threat as Andros’ Dominion had been, but Bay Colony Puritans were not
simply being paranoid when they claimed their godly republic was under attack. With
newly appointed royal officials now on hand to enforce the Navigation Acts, the colony
was also further integrated into the imperial economy. While this certainly benefitted a
growing class of well connected merchants, the godly were not wrong to worry about the
influence this new wealth would have on their city on a hill.244
Despite these very real changes, Massachusetts remained a distinctive colony.
Puritan cultural norms mitigated social change through the continued dominance of
partible inheritance, keeping estates relatively small and ensuring broad access to
freeholds. Samuel Sewall, a prominent jurist and vocal opponent of slavery, noted that
local courts regularly intervened to dock entails and prevent land from being engrossed
by a few wealthy colonists. Governors may have been royally appointed, but the
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Assembly still held the purse strings and could exert substantial influence over
appointees. Massachusetts colonists may have seen declension all around them, but the
continued cultural importance of Congregational churches and Puritan social norms
effectively moderated the impact of broader structural political and economic
transformations. If a broadened political suffrage threatened to wreck the Bay Colony’s
godly republic, local patterns of settlement and the retention of substantial local legal
autonomy meant that the political and legal culture of Massachusetts retained a definite
Puritan inflection. Though the colony was more thoroughly integrated into the political
economy of the English and then British Empire, patterns of property ownership and
continued cultural pressure for a rough equality between church members filtered the
acquisitive individualism of the rising generation through more communitarian cultural
mores. Declension, in other words, did occur in Massachusetts, and can largely be
attributed to some of the revolution principles promulgated throughout the empire. But
countervailing local and imperial forces mitigated the decline of puritan godliness, and
many of the more corporate humanist elements of early Massachusetts settlement
remained alive and well in the commonwealth. When it came to the development of
slavery in the Bay Colony, this moderating influence had a tremendous impact. 245
The 1690s saw the final death knell of Native American slavery in Massachusetts.
Relations with local Indians had grown increasingly fraught since the bloodlettings of
King Philip’s War in the mid-1670s. Native peoples were increasingly seen as
semiautonomous sovereign nations living under English jurisdiction, with relations
between settlers and Indians regulated through treaties. English settlers and local natives
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may have been “subjects unto the same king,” but relations between them became
increasingly asymmetrical and coercive as demographic pressures and economic
concerns drove the frontier of English settlement ever deeper into Native lands.246 In
another sign of Massachusetts’ declension, the Puritan mission to the Indians that had
been so important to John Winthrop and John Eliot was largely abandoned. The 1698
demolition of Eliot’s now-abandoned Indian College at Harvard was a telling portent of
this shift in attitudes toward Natives. The building was dismantled and the bricks used to
construct Old Stoughton Hall, a dormitory for the increasingly elite student body, scions
of a rising generation less concerned with converting and assimilating Native Americans
than the college’s Puritan founders.247
Treaties and legal subordination had taken the place of Eliot’s Indian Bibles and
inclusive godly republicanism. In August 1693, for example, Governor William Phips
negotiated a treaty with a number of local sachems that brought four years of local
bloodletting associated with King William’s War to an end. The document laid out the
new contours of colonial sovereignty and clearly defined the status of Natives living
within Massachusetts’ borders. The twelve sachems present pledged their “hearty
subjection and obedience to the Crown of England,” and all Indians residing between the
Penobscot River and the Atlantic Coast were specifically defined as “within their said
Majesties Soveraignty.” Indians, in other words, were quasi-autonomous nations subject
to English royal sovereignty. The terms of the treaty required Native warriors to lay
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down their weapons, recognize the land claims of English settlers in the area, submit to
new trade regulations, and “abandon and forsake the French Interest.” As subjects of the
English crown, Natives also agreed to abandon “private Revenge” in disputes with white
settlers. Instead, they would make “proper application” to have their differences heard
“in a due course of Justice.”248 In return, all the Bay Colonists offered was a flimsy
promise “to cease and forbear all Acts of hostility,” so long as the terms of the treaty
were followed “without fraud or cover, and no breach made.”249 This was a harsh peace,
to be sure, but the treaty also emphasized that, as persons living under English
jurisdiction, Natives had legal rights and must give their consent to the terms. The text of
the treaty was “deliberately read over” and “interpreted unto the Indians” who “well
understood, and consented” to its provisions. In agreeing to be ruled by Massachusetts
law, local Native Americans also expected “to have the benefit of the same.”250 One
wonders what choice the conquered Natives really had in the matter, but to Phips and the
English negotiators, the consensual nature of the treaty and the legal inclusion of Natives
were crucial. Like white English subjects, Natives could not be bound by any terms
without their consent and would have the full “benefit” of local law.
This emphasis on the consensual basis of Indian relations and the access of Native
subjects to basic legal protections is also evident in the treatment of Native Americans in
Massachusetts courtrooms. Unlike in the 1660s, when special Indian Courts heard cases
concerning local Natives, after 1689 Native Americans were brought more fully into the
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regular course of justice in Massachusetts. In September 1709, for example, two Indian
men were tried for murder in Bristol and found guilty. When Samuel Sewall, the judge in
the case, related the conviction to the governor and council, there was some question of
whether the conviction was legitimate. Colonel Samuel Vetch, in Boston to raise a force
for a proposed invasion of New France, protested that there was “no malice prepense”
and the felony murder charge should have been dropped. Sewell assured Vetch that
evidence had been taken and witnesses examined, as in any other case, revealing that the
accused had “kick[ed] his wife into the fire.”251 Even the fear of Native attacks during
another round of warfare did not disturb the ordinary course of Massachusetts justice.
At the Plymouth quarter court session in March 1712, a Native servant girl named
Mehetabel or Hittee was brought before the court charged with setting her master
Thomas Little’s house on fire. Hittee was convicted of arson and the attempted murder
of her master, but when the court sentenced her to death, Little begged the court to show
mercy. The girl was, after all, “under sixteen years old,” and may not have set the fire
intentionally. Unwilling to let the sentence pass without a thorough investigation, the
court closely examined Hittee’s indenture appointed Hittee’s former master Colonel
Otis252 and Major Nathan Bassett to “take Affidavits concerning her Birth.”253 Though
the final determination of Hittee’s case is not recorded, she certainly had the full benefit
of due process from local courts. Even a Native girl, an accused arsonist, had access to
the protection of local law.
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Massachusetts law was even more solicitous to the few Praying Indians who
remained in the colony. Despite the dismantling of most of the “Praying Indian” towns
following King Philip’s War, substantial Christianized Native communities remained in
Natick, Gay Head, Nantucket, and Mashpee. With frontier hostilities escalating,
however, the strategy of using Praying Indian towns as a buffer between English
settlements and the French allied Natives of the interior was abandoned in favor of more
closely monitored internal reservations. Still, limited efforts at conversion and
assimilation continued. Samuel Sewall rejoiced when a manuscript copy of an Indian
Bible was rescued from a fire in his home in July 1709, and the council gladly received
“Wellcom Orders” to print the manuscript the following October.254 In 1711, a number
of reservations were established for local natives on Martha’s Vineyard, and the colonial
government went to great lengths to protect and promote the orderly settlement of the
reservations.
To further this objective, Judge Samuel Sewall and Major Samuel Thaxter made
an extensive tour of the new reservations in the April 1714, hoping to settle a number of
property disputes and reinforce the centrality of English law in Native life. In many
ways, the Natives had made tremendous progress in adapting to English legal culture –
they conceived of their “body politick as a town,” elected local magistrates and Justices
of the Peace, and appointed boards of trustees to oversee each town.255 In other
particulars, however, particularly the subtleties of English property law, the Praying
Indians were less enthusiastic. The Christian Natives of Gay Head, for example, had
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some difficulty proving title to their land. Jonas Aosoe and Elezer Sonomag, two praying
Indians, claimed ownership of lots allegedly purchased in the mid-1680s. Both assumed
that because they had been assigned specific lots and continually occupied the land, their
ownership was secure, but Sewall didn’t believe they had “any Evidence” of their
purchase. He construed their occupation as a lease. Indeed, all land in Gay Head was
technically leased, and Sewall reminded the Natives that it was “very necessary that the
Town speedily join together as one Man...[to] pay what is owing.”256 Though he
certainly expected Natives to adapt to English property law, Sewall was equally
concerned that English settlers not use their legal experience to cheat neighboring
Indians. In a discussion with Ebenezer Allen, one of the landlords to the Gay Head
Natives, Sewall insisted that land should only be leased out “if it may stand with the
Main design of benefitting the aboriginal Natives.”257
Despite these legal difficulties, Sewall must have been pleased by the progress of
Christianity among the Gay Head Indians. The judge attended a prayer meeting on 7
April 1714 led by Joash Pannos, the Native minister of the Gay Head church, and Isaac
Ompane, a local Native magistrate and minister, who concluded the meeting with a
prayer. Sewall estimated that at least one hundred Natives attended the meeting, many of
them women and children, and took the opportunity to distribute psalm books and New
Testaments to the crowd. The judge even gave his own personal psalm book to a literate
Native who read aloud for the congregation.258 Just before his departure from Martha’s
Vineyard, Sewall noted with approval that Elisha Sonamog had “administer’d the Lord’s
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Supper” to a large Native congregation.259 The conversion and assimilation of Native
Americans certainly had not progressed as John Eliot or Samuel Sewall might have
hoped, and local institutional support for conversion continued to wane, but the example
of the Gay Head Praying Indians illustrates that Natives were not simply defined out of
Massachusetts society.
In this legal and diplomatic climate, the outright enslavement of Indians was
practically impossible. As they had in earlier New England wars, English and Native
armies took captives during both King William’s and Queen Anne’s Wars, and the return
of these prisoners was a critical element of treaty negotiations. Illustrating the
asymmetry of Anglo-Indian peace terms, the 1693 treaty stipulated that all English
captives “be set at liberty and returned home without any Ransom or Payment” – not only
was no provision made for the return of Native captives taken during hostilities,
additional captives were taken from among the kin of the Indian signatories, “to abide
and remain in the custody of the English...as Hostages or Pledges for [their] fidelity.”260
As diplomatic hostages, given “with a great deale of ffreedom,” however, these captives
were not considered or defined as slaves. Such a definition would have been highly
impolitic, especially when “the ffrench...used their utmost Endeavours” to induce local
Natives to break the treaty and attack Massachusetts settlements.261 Captive Indians were
valuable diplomatic capital, not enslaved chattels, and poor treatment could easily scuttle
an uncertain peace.
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When a new round of hostilities sparked by the War of the Spanish Succession
erupted in New England in 1703, the status of Indian captives still held by the English
became a potentially dangerous liability. With the French actively courting local Natives,
a number of sachems complained to Governor Joseph Dudley that one of their captive
kinsmen had been “carried into England” by former governor William Phips back in
1694. Dudley petitioned the Board of Trade on the sachems’ behalf and directed Sir
Henry Ashurst, the Bay Colony’s agent in London, to make arrangements for the
captive’s return, hoping it would “be a great benefit...in our Treaties.”262 Even among the
captives taken during hostilities, then, there is no record of Natives being sold out of the
colony as slaves in the wake of King William’s War, or during Queen Anne’s War a
decade later. Native Americans could be, and were, transported out of the colony, but
only after trial and conviction in a colonial court.
Diplomatic relations with local Natives and the continued access of Indians to the
courts combined to make the enslavement of Native Americans impossible in the Bay
Colony by the early 18th century. By 1712, Massachusetts colonists had not only
repudiated local Native slavery, they also refused to import Indian slaves from abroad.
“An Act Prohibiting the Importation or Brining into this Province Any Indian Servants or
Slaves”, passed in August 1712, banned all imports of Native Americans, limited the
sojourn of Indian servants to one month, and required registration and a L50 bond for any
Indians brought into the colony. Violation of the act’s terms would result in state seizure
and sale of the Indian slaves out of the colony. The assembly explained this extreme act
as a prophylactic against the “divers conspiracies, outrages, barbarities, murders,
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burglaries, thefts, and other notorious crimes” committed by the colony’s “over-great
number” of Native slaves. In addition to security concerns, Native slavery was also “a
discouragement to the importation of white Christian servants,” Massachusetts’ preferred
labor source. Native slaves might be desirable commodities in other colonies, but
Massachusetts was “differently circumstanced from the plantations in the islands,” and
did not want or need the same numbers of bound laborers. 263
Bay Colony magistrates were serious about enforcement of the statute as well.
When Samuel Penhallow, master of the Neptune, brought a Native woman and three
children into the colony from Carolina in April 1713, the four Indian servants were seized
under the terms of the 1712 act. Pleading ignorance of the law, Penhallow applied to the
governor and council for relief. Governor Dudley “urged the Council vehemently” to
grant an exemption from the law, but Samuel Sewall and the other councilors voted
against granting Penhallow amnesty. As Sewall noted, “if [Penhallow] could not do it
lawfully, the council could not make it Law.”264 Massachusetts had definitively turned
against the Native slave trade and recognized the basic rights of Indians living within its
borders. New imports of Indian slaves were outlawed and the status of internal Natives
more clearly defined under law. There were certainly Native American servants
remaining in Massachusetts, but they were not classified as slaves.
The legal status of Africans in the Bay Colony is somewhat more difficult to
define. Unlike in earlier decades, when only a few Africans entered the colony, usually
from Barbados, Massachusetts ships took on a more active role in the slave trade, making
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at least seven slaving voyages to Africa between the Glorious Revolution and the
Hanoverian Succession, bringing the issue of slavery into the Bay Colony as never
before. All but one of these slaving voyages disembarked in Barbados, delivering over
600 enslaved persons to the island’s booming sugar plantations. Unlike all other
Massachusetts slaving voyages in this period, however, the brigantine Friendship
delivered African slaves directly to the Bay Colony in the early months of 1700.265
Thomas Windsor, the captain and owner of the Friendship took advantage of
Parliamentary liberalization of the slave trade in 1698, making slaving voyages from
Boston each year between the passage of the so-called Ten Percent Act and 1701. Like
most slave traders, Windsor preferred to sell his cargo in the West Indies – his 1698,
1699, and 1701 voyages landed a total of 245 enslaved Africans in Barbados, having lost
40 souls to the middle passage.266 For some reason, however, Windsor appears to have
had difficulty acquiring any slaves on his 1700 voyage – only 31 enslaved Africans made
the return trip across the Atlantic in the Friendship’s hold. With such a small cargo,
Windsor likely decided to cut his losses and return directly to Massachusetts, delivering
the 25 surviving enslaved Africans directly to the Bay Colony. Slaves that ended up in
Massachusetts, then, tended to be those who were least desirable in prime slave markets
in the West Indies, or had proved unfit for plantation labor. Governor Dudley explained
to the Board of Trade in 1708 that these so-called “refuse” slaves “brought in from the
West Indies, are usually the worst servants,” and sold at very low prices – £15 to £25 a
head.267

265

TASTD2, http://www.slavevoyages.org/, (accessed 29 September 2014).
TASTD2, http://www.slavevoyages.org/, (accessed 29 September 2014).
267
CSPC, XXIV: 110.
266

326

But sell they did, and a recent spate of legislation ensured that when slaves like
those imported on the Friendship were sold on the Boston market, they were defined as
personal property. To pay for fortifications during King William’s war against France in
1695, the Massachusetts assembly classified all “Negro mulatto and Indian servants”
alongside livestock as personal estate for purposes of taxation. All male slaves over age
14 were assessed at £20, females at £14.268 This statute marks a crucial shift in
Massachusetts slave property law – all earlier taxes, starting in the 1640s, had classed
African servants as polls, not personal property. Indeed, only one year earlier the
assembly had recognized the humanity of “all negro’s molatto’s and Indian servants” by
taxing them as polls alongside other dependent members of Massachusetts households.269
It appears that this transition confused many tax assessors, who had to be reminded in
subsequent instructions that “all Indian, molatto and negro servants [were] to be
estimated as other personal estate.”270
The assessors’ confusion is understandable – the language of the statutes
continued to describe bound Africans as “servants,” not slaves, and generations of local
practice had recognized the humanity of African slaves. A 1707 statute cleared up any
uncertainty by taxing slaves and servants separately. “Indian, molatto and negro slaves”
would be rated “proportionably as other personal estate,” but “servants” of the same races
would be “numbered and rated as other polls, not as personal estate.”271 This definition
of slaves as ratable chattel properties for tax assessments remained the norm throughout
the colonial period, its language virtually unchanged until after the American Revolution.
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When the tax rates came up for revision in 1716, however, Samuel Sewall protested its
reenactment “to prevent Indians and Negroes being rated with horses and hogs” – the
dehumanization inherent under such a definition was too much for some Bay Colonists to
stomach.272
Whatever the pious Reverend Sewall may have thought of the practice, the
colonial state continued to recognize claims to property-in-man. Massachusetts wills and
probate records routinely listed enslaved persons alongside other chattel properties and
livestock, governed by the common law of inheritance and descent. Slave sales were
conducted and protected by law under the same terms as any other simple commodity
transaction.273 Liberal revolution principles demanded respect for individual property
rights, even, or perhaps especially, when state interference with property was involved.
During King William’s War, a number of New England slaves were pressed into service
in the Royal Navy, raising tricky questions at the heart of English revolution principles.
Could the state seize property in this way, even without the consent of owners? Should
an individual property right bend in order to secure the common wealth of the empire?274
These issues were raised in Massachusetts when Sambo, an enslaved man belonging to
Philip Knile of Charlestown who had been “impressed into his majestie’s service on
board a ship of warr” in the Port Royal expedition of 1690, died of a “mortal distemper.”
Sambo’s death is a testament to the harsh nature of a life at sea in the late-17th century –
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Knile alleged that his slave was “young, strong & able & in very good health” before he
was impressed “by force, against [Knile’s] consent.” To Knile, who was in ill health, this
was an economic loss he could not bear, for Sambo was about to be leased out as a
foremastman on a small merchant ship bound for Barbados, earning wages of 30 shillings
a month for his owner. Despite Knile’s repeated protestations, Sambo was sent out on a
second tour of duty in Governor Phips’ abortive expedition against Quebec. The
combined exactions of two rounds of naval combat duty had sapped young Sambo’s
strength, and he died shortly after returning to Massachusetts.275
Philip Knile, on death’s door an hoping to provide for his wife, petitioned the
Assembly for compensation in 1693, claiming that he could not “rationally Estimate his
damage...at Less than One hundred pounds,” an exorbitant request considering that
current market values for Massachusetts slaves topped out at £25. The petition took two
tacks in justifying this claim. First, Knile reminded the Assembly, Sambo was his
“proper Estate,” and property could not simply be taken from subjects without their
consent or compensation. If this liberal claim to property rights proved insufficient,
Knile could turn to local Puritan legal practice to gain redress. Age and infirmity
prevented him from working for himself, and “many Cross & afflicting providences
[reduced] him Low in Estate” – without compensation for the loss of Sambo, both as
property and as a productive laborer, Knile and his wife would be thrown onto the parish
relief rolls. When Knile died in 1695, his widow, Ruth, continued to press the Assembly
for action, and in November 1697, she finally received £20 in compensation for her lost
property from the colonial state.276 In the wake of the Glorious Revolution, magistrates
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had to be cautious when meddling with the property rights of individual subjects without
their consent, even in the service of the greater imperial common wealth.
Despite their hesitance to tamper with individual property rights, there was one
facet of property-in-man that Bay Colony magistrates were eager to regulate –
manumission. The 1703 Act Relating to Molato and Negro Slaves sought to address the
“great charge and inconveniences” entailed on town governments when masters freed
their slaves, particularly those who “by sickness, lameness or otherwise, [were] rendered
uncapable to support him- or herself” – no small problem in one of the least attractive
slave markets in the Atlantic basin. The statute required that masters post a bond of at
least £50 for each slave freed “to secure and indempnify the town or place from all
charge,” and any unsecured manumission would be considered void. Masters would
remain financially liable for any improperly freed slaves and, if they could not provide
sufficient support, the town selectmen were empowered to bind out any former slaves
who could not support themselves.277
On the surface, this local limitation on manumissions appears to be in line with
broader imperial practice – indeed, as we shall see, Virginia also imposed new
restrictions on manumission in this period as part of a new round of statutes legitimating
racialized chattel slavery. In the local context of the Bay Colony, however, where
children and the indigent were regularly bound out by the colonial state, the 1703 statute
appears less as a disincentive to manumission than another of many attempts by
Massachusetts magistrates to police their town labor forces. Though £50 was certainly a
substantial bond, and suggests that Bay Colonists were particularly worried about
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whether freed slaves would put down roots and become stable, productive members of
the community, other strangers without ties to a particular town underwent similar levels
of scrutiny before they were allowed to settle, lest they become a drain on the town’s
resources.278 Whatever disincentives the 1703 regulations posed, they did not do much to
slow the Bay Colony’s high rates of manumission.
For some of these Massachusetts critics, distaste for slavery was likely rooted in
an increasing awareness of the dangers an enslaved population could pose to their frontier
settlement. In 1690, for example, just as Philip Knile’s slave Sambo was being
impressed into service for the raid on Port Royal, Massachusetts was thrown into a panic
when rumors of a conspiracy by local Natives, African slaves, and French spies swept the
colony. The panic started when Isaac Morrill, recently arrived in Newbury from New
Jersey, and George Major, another New Jersey resident, attempted to persuade James, an
African slave belonging to a Mr. Dole, and Joseph, an Indian slave, to steal a small boat
and make for French Canada. Morrill and the slaves planned to join a joint force of three
hundred French Canadians and over five hundred Native allies for an attack on the
Massachusetts frontier. Morrill later testified that he believed such a force “might easily
destroy such small towns as Haverhill and Amesbury,” and admitted that none would be
spared “but the negroes and Indians.”279
Though no organized rebellion by Natives and African slaves occurred in 1690,
Bay Colonists were right to worry about the safety of their frontier settlements. Sporadic
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Indian raids and occasional bouts of outright warfare with the neighboring French did
occur, and outlying towns bore the brunt of this frontier violence.280 Fears of servile
insurrection surfaced again in 1703, as colonists braced for a new round of conflict with
French Acadia during Queen Anne’s War, the North American theater of the War of the
Spanish Succession.281 In order to prevent the “disorders, insolences, and burglaries”
they feared might ensue during the chaos of war, the General Court passed a 9 p.m.
curfew for all “Indian, negro or mulatto servant[s] or slave[s].” White colonists were
empowered to seize and detain any suspicious servants or slaves, but were then to deliver
them to a justice of the peace, who would examine them before sending them along to the
house of correction for punishment. In towns without a workhouse, offending slaves or
servants were to be “openly whipped...not exceeding ten stripes.” If they were charged
with any other crimes aside from breaking curfew, the accused slave or servant would be
remanded to the proper authority for trial.282
Fearing servile insurrection and frontier war, Bay Colonists began to turn the
police power of the colonial state against their few Native and African slaves and
servants. Statutes passed in 1690, 1693, and 1698 imposed harsh penalties on slaves
accused of stealing. Enslaved people who attempted to sell stolen goods would be given
up to twenty lashes and could also be prosecuted under colonial theft laws if the goods
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were not recovered.283 A 1705 statute declared that any black colonists, enslaved or free,
who struck a white settler would be “severely whipped” – the precise punishment was left
to the discretion of individual magistrates.284 Routes to freedom were also closed off for
enslaved Bay colonists by new restrictions on manumission. In 1703, the General
Assembly passed a statute requiring masters to pay a £50 bond to indemnify towns from
the “inconveniences” of supporting indigent former slaves – any enslaved people
manumitted without this bond would not be considered free, and could be bound out by
town selectmen to defray the cost of their support.285 This restrictive manumission policy
may have been a real hindrance to emancipations in a political economy where
Massachusetts towns regularly warned out outsiders who could be a drain on community
resources. With economic opportunities closely guarded by town selectmen, formerly
enslaved people would surely have found it difficult to build independent lives and often
ended up forced back into servitude.286
Even the heightened tensions in the colony, however, did not lead to the total
dehumanization of slaves under local law. As we shall see, Virginians chose to deal with
the same threats in a very different way, by delegating broad disciplinary powers directly
to individual slave owners – to Massachusetts colonists, a high act of physical dominion
like whipping had to be enacted by the state, and only after magistrates had examined the
specific circumstances of the case. Despite increasingly racialized lines of exclusion,
Massachusetts slaves were not fully chattelized. With African slaves entering
Massachusetts directly in ever-greater numbers in the early 18th century, Bay Colonists
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were faced with a startling new variant of slavery and attempted to reconcile property-inman with existing local practice. As we shall see, however, with their world changing
rapidly around them, some Massachusetts colonists saw in this new definition of slavery
another harbinger of declension from their initial godly mission.
This tension between liberal property rights and corporate humanist tendencies is
evident in a 1705 statute entitled “An Act for the Better Preventing of a Spurious and
Mixed Issue,” the Bay Colony’s first miscegenation statute. The act laid down draconian
punishments for interracial sexual relations – offenders would be “severely whipped at
the discretion of the justices of assize,” and the “negro or mulatto” party would be sold
out of the colony. European women who bore children by African men would be liable
for the support of the child to prevent mixed-race children from becoming burdens on the
community. White men who impregnated African women were financially responsible
for the upkeep of their children, and were liable to a £5 fine. Other elements of the
statute further illustrate the increasing racialization of Massachusetts police law. Any
black or mulatto who struck a white colonist would be “severely whipped,” and
interracial marriages were banned.287 Together with the 1703 curfews, the miscegenation
statute marks a dramatic shift in Massachusetts police law. All African colonists –
regardless of whether they were slaves, servants, or freemen – were singled out in penal
legislation for the first time.
This racial exclusion, however, sat uneasily with the still-potent belief that
Africans, even the enslaved, were persons under law. Not all Bay Colonists were pleased
about this restrictive legislation however. Samuel Sewall disliked the “extraordinary
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penalties” the miscegenation statute imposed, fearing it would “be an Opression
provoking to God.”288 Despite the draconian measures directed at black Bay Colonists,
other elements of the 1705 miscegenation act explicitly recognized the basic legal rights
of all African settlers, slave and free. As with the 1703 curfew law, punishment was
meted out by the state, not individual masters, and then only when wrongdoing could be
proved. Duly appointed magistrates could only punish black colonists when “the
conviction shall be [made].” Though the statute outlawed interracial marriage, it also
mandated that no master could “unreasonably deny marriage to his negro with one of the
same nation; any law, usage or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.”289 Furthermore,
this statute, while criminalizing interracial marriage, did not annul any interracial
marriages that did occur.290
Puritanical Bay Colonists may have recoiled at the prospect of interracial sex, but
the legal humanity of Africans, even the enslaved, led them to recognize black settlers’
access to one of the most basic of all civic institutions – marriage. On 23 November
1710, for example, Caesar and Fidella, two slaves belonging to Benjamin Lynde of Salem
were married. The process by which their relationship was recognized by the Bay
Colony followed the same procedures as any other wedding – their marriage banns were
published locally to ensure there were no objections to the union, and they were legally
wed in a civil ceremony.291 The realities of slavery made these marriages tenuous,
however. Marriage could not prevent the breakup of enslaved families through sale, and
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residence in the homes of separate masters made cohabitation difficult. In September
1700, for example, Samuel Sewall had to broker a deal between John Wait and Debora
Thair before their slaves, Sebastian and Jane, could marry. Thair wanted a guarantee that
Sebastian would “have one day in six allow’d him for the suport of Jane...and her
children,” but Wait “wholly declin’d” to give up Sebastian’s valuable labor. Instead, at
Sewall’s urging, Wait agreed to pay Thair £5 a year towards Jane’s upkeep – Wait left
Sewall’s home and went directly to the town clerk to have Sebastian and Jane’s marriage
banns “published according to law.”292 Though certainly colored by the dictates of the
chattel principle, such an admission of enslaved persons’ legal humanity would have
been almost inconceivable in Virginia’s slave society.
As access to marriage illustrates, enslaved Bay colonists also had access to the
central cultural institution of colonial Massachusetts – the Congregational Church. They
may not have been seen as fully equal members, and their roles may have been limited,
but people of African descent were never excluded from communion in Puritan
congregations. Samuel Sewall’s diary, for example, records numerous black baptisms,
and Cotton Mather, the colony’s leading divine, published a pamphlet trumpeting the
virtues of christianizing enslaved people. Mather, who had unsuccessfully lobbied for a
law guaranteeing that baptism would not free a slave back in 1694, argued in his The
Negro Christianized (1706) that converting enslaved people was “the noblest Work, that
ever was undertaken among the Children of men.” Like many Britons back home and
settlers in the plantation colonies, however, Mather saw Christianity and slavery as
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perfectly congruent. There was “no such thing” as emancipation through baptism, the
great divine argued, because the law of God “allows of Slavery.” Nor would the “English
Constitution” free a slave – “Villains, or, Slaves” could be “granted for Life, like a Lease”
and “passed...like other Goods or Chattels.”293
Mather recognized that slaveholders legitimately had a property interest in and “A
Despotick Power” over their enslaved people, but he also argued that this must be
mitigated by the shared humanity of master and slave. “They are Men, and not Beasts
that you have bought,” Mather reminded his readers, “and they must be used
accordingly.” Indeed, those slaves who attained a true “measure of Christianity” were
owed “comfortable circumstances” as “Children of Adam, [and] our Brethren, on the
same level with us in the expectations of a blessed Immortality.” Slaves might remain in
bondage, but good Puritan slaveholders would recognize their common humanity and
treat “not as Bruits but as Men, those Rational Creatures whom God has made your
Servants.” If Bay colonists seriously hoped to live up to the divine injunction to “Love
thy Neighbor as thy self,” they must recognize that “Thy Negro is thy Neighbor.”294
Though legally it may have been slavery, what Mather was describing hewed far closer to
English norms of servitude than Virginian practice of slavery. The reciprocity implied by
Christian brotherhood made the total denial of enslaved personhood
For at least some Massachusetts colonists, uneasy with slavery’s increasing role in
local life, the only viable solution was to prevent the continued growth of the colony’s
enslaved population. A 1701 resolution by the Boston selectmen called on the
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government to redouble its efforts at recruiting white servants and “put a period to negros
being Slaves.”295 To be sure, this falls well short of a ringing abolitionist program, and
there was certainly more than a little racial exclusivity at play in the selectmen’s
resolution. Indeed, much public condemnation of the slave trade focused not on
humanitarian concerns but on the undesirable presence of so many Africans in the
colony. A June 1706 article in the Boston News-Letter, for example, described Africans
as thieves and liars, and called for new bounties for the importation of white servants.296
Whatever their motivations, however, Massachusetts legislators were among the first
Anglo-American colonists to restrict the importation of African slaves. The
miscegenation statute of 1705 included a clause requiring all ships to register imported
slaves with the government and pay a £4 duty on each slave. If slave traders failed to
register their slaves, they were liable to a fine of £8 per slave illegally imported.297 Given
that slaves in the colony were commonly assessed at around £20 each at the time, the
1705 slave importation duty appears to have been intended as a sort of protective tariff, a
prophylactic measure making the cost of slave importation prohibitive.
The 25 Africans who disembarked the Friendship in late 1700, then, arrived at a
complex moment of transition in the structure of slavery in Massachusetts. As their
arrival itself illustrates, African slaves were entering the colony in larger numbers,
forcing Bay Colonists to confront the legality of property-in-man in new ways. For
increasing numbers of colonists, slavery was a morally unproblematic institution that
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bolstered their individual wealth and status. Following the lead of the plantation
colonies, Massachusetts legislators defined slaves as articles of personal property and
enacted racialized police laws to control their growing, and increasingly restive, enslaved
population. This same body of law, however, also recognized the essential humanity of
the enslaved – extreme physical force could only be meted out by state authority, the
right of enslaved persons to marry was recognized, and slaves were welcomed into
Puritan churches. By the 1710s, then, Massachusetts colonists had reconciled the
imperial practice of property-in-man with their own peculiar local modes of slavery.
Slaves were classed as personal property, but they were not socially dead or legally nonhuman. Local law saw enslaved Africans as both articles of property and persons with
rights. How did Bay Colonists perform this seemingly impossible feat of mental
gymnastics? A contentious debate involving some of colony’s leading lawyers, judges,
merchants, and ministers over the legitimacy and desirability of slavery and the slave
trade sheds substantial light on the how Massachusetts colonists reconciled legal
personhood with property-in-man.
The argument centered on Adam, one of John Saffin’s enslaved Africans, who the
prominent merchant, councilor, and judge had hired out to Thomas Shepherd, a tenant on
his Boundfield estate in Bristol, in the spring of 1694. As an incentive to faithful service,
Saffin promised Adam his freedom, “to be fully at his own Dispose and Liberty as other
free men are,” after a term of seven years.298 Shepard also allowed Adam a small plot of
Abner C. Goodell, “John Saffin and his Slave Adam,” in Publications of the Colonial Society of
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land to grow tobacco for his own use – the slave made over £3 annually for himself
selling the crop – and brought him into his household, setting him “at his Table to eat
with himself, his Wife & Children.”299 The promise of freedom and Shepherd’s
economic inducements did not have the desired effect on Adam’s behavior, however.
Though Adam worked “indifferently well” for a few years, on the whole Shepherd
described him as “a very disobedient Turbulent outragious and unruly Servant.” 300
Witnesses later testified that Adam once threatened “to Cut off [Shepherd’s] head” with
an axe, struck Shepherd’s daughter Sarah, and shirked his labor by injuring himself.301
Unable to “keep him nor bear with his evil manners any Longer,” Shepherd and Saffin
transferred Adam to the service of John Wilkins of Bristol. Adam got on better with
Wilkins, who later testified to the slave’s “sobriety and fidelity,” and the erstwhile slave
continued in his employ for some time.302 By late 1699, however, Adam had left
Wilkins’ service and bounced from one master to another until he wound up back in
Saffin’s Boston home in the early months of 1700, “where he had nothing to do but work
in the garden, make Fires and the like, was kindly used, [and] did eat of the same as the
English Servants did.”303 Adam was still in Saffin’s household on 25 March 1700, the
day his promised freedom was to be granted.
Saffin, however, argued that Adam’s refractory behavior under Shepherd’s
employ had voided the initial offer of manumission, and ordered the slave to serve yet
another master in Swansea. Unwilling to continue in slavery, Adam “absolutely refused”
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to go and took the first opportunity to abscond from his master’s service. Saffin,
following what, in a typical slave society, would have been standard procedure for
recapturing a runaway slave, simply attempted to seize Adam and force him to depart for
Bristol County. Saffin also had the weight of local precedent on his side – Bay Colony
magistrates regularly reallocated the bodies of children and servants to households where
their labor would be most productive. Judge Saffin had erred in one crucial regard,
however. Regulation of labor and policing of the town political economy were the shared
responsibilities of all freemen, not subject to the whim of individual masters.304 As Judge
Saffin was learning, Massachusetts was not a typical slave colony, and Adam was not one
to sit by and watch his long-awaited freedom slip away. Indeed, likely aware of the
contours of local practice, he steadfastly asserted his legal personhood and sought the
protection of local magistrates as a subject of the British Empire.
With Saffin away from Boston on business in late March of 1700, Adam
absconded and “wend about the Town at his pleasure.” Perhaps he took on wage work
along the docks to support himself, or took shelter in the homes of one of the town’s
growing number of free black families. When Saffin arrived back in Boston and
demanded that his restive property return to his household, Adam defiantly told his
master that he would not return – he had submitted his indenture to Judge Samuel Sewall,
who argued that Adam had fulfilled the terms of the contract and was thereby effectively
manumitted. To Sewall, “Liberty was a thing of great value, even next to life,” and the
prominent jurist argued that the law ought to tilt in favor of freedom. A furious Saffin
confronted Sewall and magistrate Isaac Addington to protest this “Negromantick
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Summons,” arguing that Adam’s poor behavior had voided the manumission offer.
Besides, if even this one slave were freed, then “all the men in the Country are as much
obliged to set their Negroes free.” Though Addington agreed that Adam had behaved
poorly, he argued that allowances had to be made for the behavior of African slaves
because they were “so ignorant, rude and brutish.” Sewall stressed the sanctity of the
indenture contract that Saffin and Adam had agreed to, and “very gravely admonished”
his fellow judge that, since he had “given such a thing under [his] Hand and Seal, [he]
ought to stand to it, and perform it.”305
Judge Saffin, however, had no intention of letting Adam go, and used his ample
authority as a justice of the Superior Court and member of the Council to secure his
erstwhile slave. The next day, he returned to Sewall with Colonel Penn Townsend, a
prominent military commander, member of the Governor’s Council, former Speaker of
the House, and future Chief Justice of the Superior Court, who he had convinced to assist
in Adam’s rendition. Following local practice, Saffin believed that two justices of the
peace could determine the matter directly without a full hearing in a court of law, thus
overriding Sewall’s objections. Sewall and Townsend disagreed, however, and in the end
Adam was bound over for trial at the upcoming Superior Court session. As he awaited
determination of his case, Adam lived independently of Saffin’s household. Perhaps he
was staying with Dick, “another Negro said to be free,” who posted bond for his
appearance in court. Adam almost certainly found other employment on the laborhungry Boston waterfront – his occupation is listed as “Laborer” on most subsequent
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court records. When the case came before the Suffolk County Superior Court,
jurisdictional issues came to the fore. Sworn witnesses from Bristol did not appear in
court to testify, leaving the jury with only written affidavits to consider, and the court
decided a change of venue was in order. The case was remanded to the next Superior
Court session in Bristol, the site of Adam’s alleged crimes, where witnesses could give
oral testimony.306
When the Bristol sessions convened in September 1701, Saffin summarized the
central issue in the case succinctly – the question was “whether the Negro should be free
or not, and that he might have all the benefits of Law as an English man.” In terms of his
access to trial by jury, Adam certainly appeared to have the benefit of English law. He
pleaded not guilty to the indictment and “for Tryal put himself on God and his Country.”
A regular jury was empaneled and, “the Prisoner making no Challenges,” the trial
proceeded following typical legal forms – like all defendants in the Bay Colony, Adam
could challenge the jurors assigned to hear his case. In addition to hearing the 1693
manumission agreement and Saffin’s testimony read in open court, the jury heard from
Thomas Shepherd, his family, and numerous neighbors who testified to Adam’s violent
temperament, “to the great satisfaction of the Jury.” Though Adam’s defense was also
“fully heard” and considered by the jury, they sided with Saffin and handed down a guilty
verdict.307 This outcome should not be surprising – with the case framed as an assault,
the immediate question of Adam’s freedom was not at issue, and the jurors were
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restricted to the matter at hand. In addition, Saffin was an extremely powerful man, and
he used the full weight of his influence to guarantee a favorable verdict. Samuel Sewall
believed Saffin had “tampered with Mr. [Joseph] Kent, the [jury’s] Foreman” and
“Conived at his Tenant Smith’s being on the Jury.”308 Saffin may even have sat as a
judge in his own case – he was a justice of the Superior Court, where he sat until early
1702. Adam may have had nominal access to the Bay Colony’s courts but, when facing
off against a weighty and unscrupulous settler like Saffin, a courtroom was far from a
level playing field.
The justices of the Superior Court, however, appear to have disagreed with the
jury’s verdict and balked when Saffin demanded that they enter judgment – though they
ordered Adam to return to his master’s service, they also sought to limit Saffin’s
authority over his slave. The justices dragged their feet on registering final judgment in
the case, and when they finally did so on 9 September 1701 they set aside the jury’s
decision and ordered the case to be retried at the next Superior Court session. In the
mean time, “the Negro was rendered to be [Saffin’s] Servant still,” but the justices
required Saffin to “promise before the Court, not to send [Adam] out of the country.”
Furious, Saffin sent his slave back to Boston to work at the fortifications on Castle Island.
Again, Adam proved an ornery servant. In early October, he got into a physical
altercation with one of the fort’s officers, Captain Timothy Clark. When Clark attempted
to discipline the reluctant slave, giving him “a stroke or two with his stick,” Adam “took
hold of the Stick and brake it, and took up his Shovel and struck at Captain Clark, and
had like to have spoilt him” if the other laborers had not broken up the fight. Saffin
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seized the opportunity to do what he had likely wanted all along – sell Adam out of the
colony, offset the financial losses occasioned by his restive slave, and quiet the growing
chorus of criticism leveled at him by his enemies. Transportation out of the colony, or
worse, was standard punishment for slaves who assaulted white settlers in most slave
colonies after all.309
Again, however, Massachusetts jurists stepped in and prevented Adam’s sale.
Isaac Addington, now Chief Justice of the Superior Court, protested that transportation
out of the colony was a penalty that only the courts could impose, and Adam was
imprisoned pending trial at the next Quarter Court. Though the disposition of this case is
not recorded, Adam was clearly not sentenced to transportation since the scheduled retrial
in his original case, now styled “Dom. Rex. v. Adam,” resumed in the Bristol Superior
Court in September 1702. Much had changed since the last Bristol hearing, however, and
Saffin must have been far less confident of his chances of success. Newly arrived
Governor Joseph Dudley had removed Saffin from the bench, perhaps as a punishment
for the irregular proceedings in Adam’s first trial, and the court was now stacked with
political rivals. Since Adam was sick with smallpox when the court adjourned, the trial
was once again rescheduled for the November session, when the Superior Court would
once again sit in Boston.310 Besides, the justices argued, the form of the suit did not fit
the circumstances of the case. As Judge Sewall noted, “Adam’s Freedom could not be
Tryed by Mr. Saffins complaint” when the queen, not the disgraced Bay Colony jurist,
was registered as the complainant – as one later commentator noted, “Saffin was the real
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party in interest – the virtual plaintiff.”311 Saffin’s case floundered once again at the
Boston trial in November and, likely emboldened by the favorable treatment he had
received from the Superior Court, Adam “preferred a petition for his Enfranchisement.”
Though the Superior Court demurred and did not answer the petition directly, they
recommended that Adam bring a suit against Saffin in the Court of Common Pleas and
appointed prominent local attorneys Thomas Newton and Joseph Hearne to represent him
“in order to his Regular proceeding in the affair.”312
After years of living restively under Saffin’s power, the shoe was now on the
other foot – Adam brought a suit against his master in the Suffolk County Court of
Common Pleas on 14 December 1702. The form of the writ Adam’s attorneys filed
followed all English common law procedural norms, and is remarkable only for the
confidence with which the alleged slave asserted his English rights. “[B]eing a freeman
and ready to prove his liberty,” Adam claimed that Saffin’s “claimeing him as his slave,
doth unjustly vex him” and asked for a substantial £100 in damages.313 The writ was
duly served on Saffin by the sheriff of Bristol four days later but it appears that Saffin did
not answer it and, with Adam’s suit abated on a technicality, the justices of the Common
Pleas refused his appeal to continue the charges.314 Emboldened by the court’s dismissal
of the suit, Saffin once again attempted to seize Adam and sell him out of the colony.
Again, however, Newton and Hearne intervened and petitioned the Superior Court in
May 1703, explaining that, contrary to the court’s order, Adam was “dayly threatned
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by...Mr. Saffin, to be sent out of this province in to forreigne parts to remaine a slave
during his life.” All Adam asked for was his day in court, “the Tryall of his liberty.”
Likely remembering Saffin’s earlier dirty tricks, the justices of the Superior Court now
interposed their authority between their former colleague and his slave, registering their
displeasure that “notwithstanding the former Order of this Court [Adam] is pursued by
Mr. Saffin as his Slave and has Endeavoured to Transport him beyond Sea” and ordering
“That Adam negro be in peace untill by due process of Law he be found to be a Slave.”315
Here was Massachusetts’ bias in favorem liberatis spelled out clearly – in the absence of
proof to the contrary, the courts would presume freedom.
Spurned by the courts, which were packed with personal and political enemies,
Saffin now turned to the legislature, where he hoped he would wield more influence, for
redress. The General Court, Saffin argued, as “an embleme or similitude” of the
sovereignty of the imperial state, had the authority to remedy all “grievances oppressions
Male Administrations and Tort actions of the greatest Persons or Courts of Judicature
subordinate to this Grand Assembly.” Complaining that he had exhausted his options in
lower courts and could find “no other Remedy” in a matter “wherein he is greatly Injured
& oppressed...in such a manner...[as] there hath not been the like done in New England,”
Saffin mobilized the Whig rhetoric of English liberties to bolster his case. At its heart,
Saffin argued, this was a simple question of property rights – his slave had been
“withheld or taken from him...under countenance of authority (not collour of law),”
depriving him of a valuable property right and making him “a meer Vassal to his slave.”
Saffin requested a new hearing before the Assembly or a special committee, and hoped
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that the General Court would “[restore] his said Negro to [him] that as an English subject
he may Dispose of his said Negro, as he shall see cause for his own safty, and all other of
her Majestys good subjects that may be exposed to any Detriment by the sd Negros
villainous practices.” The General Court could do justice only by recognizing the
unrestricted property rights of an Englishman and protecting the community of subjects
from violent, dangerous outsiders. Besides, the eyes of the colony were firmly fixed on
the case, so the Court’s decision could have dramatic repercussions. Setting Adam free
would be an “evill example of all Negros both in Town and countrey whose eyes are
upon this wretched Negro to see the Issue of these his exorbitant practices .”316 To
Saffin, the future of slavery and order in the Bay Colony hung in the balance.
The Assembly, perhaps swayed by Saffin’s flatteries and Whig rhetoric,
consented to the petition and scheduled a hearing before the General Court in June 1703,
but the Council refused their assent, and ordered the case back to Court of General
Sessions of the Peace. Samuel Sewall noted the new trial order in his diary, along with a
few lines of doggerel verse aimed at Saffin:
Superanuated Squier, wigg’d and powder’d with pretence,
Much beguiles the just Assembly by his lying Impudence.
None being by his bold Attorneys push it on with might and main
By which means poor simple Adam sinks to slavery again317
Sewall was right to worry about the outcome of a new trial. By countering Adam’s
freedom suit with a property claim, Saffin had retaken the initiative and reframed the
essential issue. Adam’s freedom was no longer presumed, and the question of whether he
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had fulfilled the terms of the old manumission agreement became the central question in
the case. After yet another trial on 3 August 1703, once again rehashing all the old
arguments presented in the earlier cases, a jury found that “Adam negro hath not
performed the condition for which he was to be Enfranchized & therefore is to continue a
servant.” Yet again it seemed as though the logic of English property rights and the
political power of a prominent white settler had trumped the natural right to freedom of
an Afro-British settler.318
Adam’s attorneys appealed the verdict once again, however, and Adam posted
“sufficient suretyes for his appearance...and for his good behavour in the mean time” and
was released on his own recognizance. The official appeal presented by Newton and
Hearne in October 1703 claimed that the verdict handed down in August was “wrong &
erronious and ought to be reversed” since Adam had served Saffin “faithfully &
honestly” during the seven-year term specified in the 1693 manumission agreement.
Besides, even if Adam had been refractory, there was “no provisoe or Condicon” in the
agreement stipulating that he would “forfeit the freedom or liberty thereby intended” if he
behaved poorly. “The Enffranchisemt,” Newton argued, “is positive & not conditionall.”
Besides, “liberty being a priviledge the greatest that can be given to any man save his life,
it ought not to be forfeited upon trivial and fivolous matters” like those proffered by
Saffin. Adam’s legal team put forward an extremely narrow reading of Saffin’s
manumission offer, treating it as a binding legal contract, and hoped that the Superior
Court would “Reverse the former sentence and give [Adam] his freedom.”319
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When the court met in Boston in November, Saffin should have known that his
case was lost. Samuel Sewall, the vocal antislavery jurist who had first sheltered Adam
when he absconded back in 1700, now sat as Chief Justice of the Superior Court. Saffin
had certainly hurt his case further by engaging in a rancorous pamphlet war with Sewall
over the previous two years. Written largely in response to the controversy over Adam’s
freedom, Sewall’s The Selling of Joseph, published locally in late 1700, is well known as
one of the first public calls for emancipation in Anglo-American history and presented a
thoughtful argument delegitimizing the peculiar institution, particularly in the local
context of the Bay Colony, and pointed to Adam’s case as a specific example of the
problem of slavery.320 In response to Sewall’s accusations, Saffin penned A Brief and
Candid Answer..., a baldly racist tract that refuted The Selling of Joseph point by point.
The crux of Saffin’s argument was that, while white Christians were bound to “love,
honour and respect all men according to the gift of God that is in them,” applying this
rule to blacks was a mistake since they were “not our own natural Kinsmen.” Indeed, in
a short poem attached to the pamphlet, Saffin described Africans as the repository of all
evil and vice:
Cowardly and cruel are those Blacks Innate,
Prone to Revenge, Imp of inveterate hate.
He that exasperates them, soon espies
Mischief and Murder in their very eyes.
Libidinous, Deceitful, False and Rude,
The spume Issue of Ingratitude.
The Premises consider’d, all may tell,
How near good Joseph they are parallel.
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To “tender Pagan Negroes with all love, kindness, and equal respect as to the best of
men” would be the equivalent of treating “a Prince like a Peasant.”321 This was not a
public stance that Judge Sewall, on record as a vocal opponent of slavery, was likely to
look upon kindly.
Happily for Adam, the jury that convened to hear his appeal in August 1703
seems to have shared Sewall’s antipathy toward slavery. After the succession of previous
court decisions were entered into the record and the grounds of the appeal read aloud, “all
things touching the [case were] fully heard,” and the jury returned quickly with a
decision. Their verdict overturned Adam’s earlier convictions, awarded him court costs
for his many lawsuits as damages, and declared that “Adam & his heirs be at peace &
quiet & free with all their Chattles from...John Saffin Esq. and his heirs for Ever.”
Finally, after over three years of litigation, Adam gained his freedom. Though Saffin
tried desperately to hold on to his slave property, even petitioning Governor Dudley, his
political enemy, directly in November 1703 and receiving assent from the Assembly for
another trial, the governor and Council quashed the matter and refused to allow another
round of appeals. The message from the Council was clear – Saffin was “referred to the
law” for redress. Facing personal and political enemies on the Council and the bench,
Saffin finally gave up and recognized Adam’s freedom.322
We can only speculate at what life as a freedman was like for Adam. To be sure,
many Bay Colonists would have agreed with Saffin’s description of the character of
Africans in A Brief Reply, and Adam’s reputation for violent resistance must have limited
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his employment options. Especially given the assertive, of not willful, streak he
exhibited in court, Adam must also have chafed under increasingly punitive legislation
regulating the lives of free black Bay Colonists. A [YEAR] statute, for example, required
that free blacks perform public labor in lieu of militia service – “Adam Saffin” was
required to do three days’ labor repairing Boston’s highways in June 1711.323 Still,
despite the many difficulties he must have faced, Adam was free, and it appears he
became a settled resident of Boston and an active participant in the town’s growing free
black community. In 1714, for example, he and four other free blacks offered to post
bond to indemnify the town in case “Madam Leblond,” a recently arrived free black
settler, should become a drain on the poor rolls.324 As a result of his own assertive
demands for freedom and the Bay Colony courts’ bias in favor of liberty, Adam emerged
from slavery and became a stable, productive, free member of Massachusetts society. He
had certainly been purchased and held as a slave, an article of property, as more and more
Africans were in turn of the century Massachusetts, but the Bay Colony’s emphasis on
the rule of law, its distinctive political economy, and its local ideals privileging the
freedom of residents created legal space where Adam and other black settlers could
assert, establish, and defend their legal personhood. Justice Holt at King’s Bench and
Judge Sewall in Massachusetts were of like mind.
***
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Unlike their cousins to the north, Virginians did not immediately experience the
transformative potential of the Glorious Revolution. The great planters of the Old
Dominion, with the memory of Bacon’s Rebellion still fresh in their minds, watched in
horror as their neighbors rose in open rebellion against Stuart imperial governance.
Indeed, by 1690, as the revolutionary settlement was being hashed out back in England,
Virginia was the only English royal colony left on the North American mainland.325
With its 1624 royal charter still intact, its civil institutions still operating, and its local
elites unwilling to fall in behind yet another embattled Stuart king, the revolution at home
barely registered to Virginia colonists – the disgraced James II was replaced by the heroic
William III and business went on as usual. Great planters continued importing ever more
enslaved Africans and planting ever more tobacco. Lesser planters and poorer whites
continued to enjoy the enhanced political and social roles they had wrested from the great
planters in the aftermath of Bacon’s Rebellion. Enslaved Africans were bought and sold,
rented out and bequeathed in wills – they toiled in tobacco fields and served in the
imposing manor homes of the great planters. The 5th of November 1688 was just another
Friday in Virginia.
Before long, however, the impact of the Glorious Revolution would be keenly felt
in the Old Dominion. Beginning in 1696, the Board of Trade, under the direction of John
Locke and a cadre of like-minded reformers, would attempt to fundamentally remake the
Virginia society, promoting the breakup of large estates, economic diversification, and
imperial regulation of the local practice of slavery. Though many elite Virginians
initially resisted this centralizing reform plan, the recurrent structural cycles of boom and
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bust inherent to tobacco monoculture lead to calls for local regulation of the slave trade,
and brought many leading planters in line with the imperial reformers on the Board of
Trade. The reform impulse generated by the Glorious Revolution dovetailed nicely with
these local concerns over Virginia’s political economy, resulting in a pronounced
moment of debate over the place of slavery in the colony. This moment was brief,
however – by 1705 King William was dead, Locke was off the Board of Trade, and many
of the local advocates of reform had either been ousted by political opponents or
abandoned the political field. They were replaced by a new imperial administration,
dominated by Queen Anne’s chief minister – Robert Harley, who sought almost singlemindedly to gain English dominance in the slave trade – and other colonial officials
zealous to protect their human property. It should come as no surprise, then, that John
Locke’s Virginia reform plan gave way to a new, comprehensive slave code in 1705,
once again placing the institution of slavery on firm legal ground in the Old Dominion.
As Britons at home and in New England set to remaking their political institutions
between 1689 and 1696, the Virginia gentry continued the processes of social and
economic consolidation begun during the Restoration and, at least initially, metropolitan
planners paid little attention to the colony. With Whitehall distracted by continental wars
and domestic uncertainty, the Virginia elite moved to further cement their grip on the
colony’s best lands, using the entail to guarantee the integrity of their estates. Though
earlier generations had used the entail as well, turn-of-the-century Virginians did so far
more often than their fathers or grandfathers – close to twenty-five percent of all probated
estates between 1680 and 1700 contained entails, cementing the gentry’s grip on nearly
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one quarter of Virginia’s arable land.326 This strategy was so successful that, by the turn
of the 18th century, the great planter class had amassed truly staggering amounts of land.
William Byrd I, a leading beneficiary of the boom years of the Restoration, controlled
nearly 19,500 acres in Henrico County alone by 1704. The comprehensive 1704 quitrent
rolls compiled by the colonial administration illustrate the tremendous levels of
inequality created by generations of primogeniture, entail, and insider land deals.
Virginia could boast 121 estates of over two thousand acres, the economic and social
base of the gentry, but even these paled in comparison to the holdings of the great
planters – seventeen Virginians had estates of over 5000 acres, and four grandees,
including Byrd and Robert “King” Carter, held truly massive holdings of over ten
thousand acres.327
The Virginia elite’s massive estates were both cause and consequence of their
dominance in local politics. As we have seen, the gentry benefitted tremendously from
the local custom of allowing headright grants for the importation of African slaves.
While technically only allowable for the importation of servant labor, the great planters’
stranglehold on the Assembly and Council gave the corrupt practice of granting slave
headrights a tinge of legitimacy. With a generation of mostly unchallenged local practice
behind them, the Virginia elite applied for unprecedented numbers of headright grants –
over ninety-five thousand acres of real estate, primarily in the fresh and productive lands
of the Virginia piedmont, were claimed on at least 1900 slave imports in the early 1690s
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alone.328 In such a lopsided social and economic context, indentured servitude continued
its long decline in the Old Dominion. England’s maturing manufacturing sector required
ever more hands to produce the finished goods so crucial to imperial trade, and with few
economic incentives to draw English men and women to the Chesapeake, white laborers
grew increasingly scarce. With the cost of indentured servants rising nearly sixty percent
in the decade after the Glorious Revolution, and the price of slaves on the local market
dropping as more direct imports arrived, the polarization of Virginia society between an
elite landowning class and an enslaved laboring population increased dramatically.329
Feeding this demographic shift was a dramatic rise in slave imports to the Old
Dominion. Despite the increasingly robust market for slaves in the Chesapeake, the
Royal African Company paid little attention to the Virginia market – only six company
ships docked in Virginia in the first decade of the 18th century, delivering less than seven
hundred enslaved laborers, and even this relatively meager trade was larger than that of
the 1690s. The coastwise trade that had traditionally supplied slaves from the West
Indies also slowed, with Governor Edmund Jennings estimating in 1709 that only three
ships had arrived from Barbados, previously a key source of Virginia slaves, in the
previous decade, carrying only 236 slaves into the colony. Supply only caught up with
demand after the Royal African Company’s monopoly was relaxed in 1698, opening the
trade to the separate trading ten-percent men. In a 1709 report to the Board of Trade,
Jennings recorded 5,692 imports by the separate traders since the trade was opened,
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nearly ten times the RAC’s total. And the pace of imports was only quickening – over
800 new slaves were sold annually by 1707.330 In total, fifty-six slaving voyages carried
well over 10,000 enslaved Africans into Virginia between the Glorious Revolution and
the Hanoverian Succession.331
The impact of this robust slave trade on Virginia’s demographics was dramatic
and visible. There were already approximately five thousand slaves in Virginia by 1698,
amounting to nearly one-tenth of the total colonial population, but representing over half
of the total bound labor force. The growing enslaved population was most obvious in the
fertile tidewater region, where slaves made up over forty percent of the population by the
turn of the eighteenth century. With the slave trade opened to all Britons in 1712, the
trend only intensified – by 1710 there were over fifteen thousand slaves in Virginia,
comprising roughly twenty percent of the total settler population and the vast majority of
the bound labor pool.332
Even before this influx of new imports swelled Virginia’s enslaved population,
however, local masters and magistrates already struggled to control their restive slaves.
Fugitives were a persistent threat to the stability of the plantation regime. A group of
runaways led by Mingoe, possibly a fugitive from Ralph Wormeley’s Rosegill plantation,
marauded through Middlesex and Rappahannock Counties for nearly two years, pillaging
local plantations and terrifying local magistrates when they got their hands on “two guns,
[and] a Carbyne” in November 1691.333 While the immediate discipline of recalcitrant
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slaves remained with individual masters, outlying slaves like Mingoe posed so great a
threat that, as they had during the Restoration, Virginia elites used the full police power
of the colonial state to track down fugitives and mete out exemplary punishments
designed to quell future disturbances. Lieutenant Governor Francis Nicholson made this
clear in a 1691 proclamation, admitting that most fugitives “canot be taken by the
Masters or any Single person.” To remedy this problem, Nicholson empowered county
sheriffs to deputize local residents as a posse commitatus “without any further order or
warrant,” delegating extraordinary power and discretion to county magistrates.334 The
Assembly passed a statute in April 1691 reinforcing Nicholson’s proclamation. In
addition to empowering local magistrates to raise posses, the statute allowed any white
settler “by lawfull authority employed to apprehend” runaways to “kill and distroy” any
fugitives who resisted recapture – the owners of slaves killed in this way would be
compensated for their lost property with four thousand pounds of tobacco from the public
treasury.335
This same statute also moved to further consolidate the racial basis of Virginia
slavery by outlawing interracial unions and criminalizing interracial sex. The act
attempted to prevent “that abominable and spurious issue,” mixed race children, that
resulted from marriages between Native or African settlers and whites. Rather than
simply targeting settlers of color, however, this statute also sought to punish white
settlers who engaged in interracial sex – white settlers who married persons of color were
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banished from the Old Dominion.336 By more clearly defining the racialized boundaries
of subjecthood and severely punishing those, black or white, who transgressed these
boundaries, Virginians sought to break the possibility of cross-racial solidarity and
prevent challenges to property-in-man. Restrictions on private manumissions passed in
1691 served a similar purpose. Slaveholders who wanted to free slaves had to obtain
legislative approval first, and were required to post a substantial bond to indemnify parish
poor rolls from the expense of supporting an indigent former slave. Manumitted slaves
were also required to leave the colony within six months – the masters of former slaves
who remained in the colony would be fined £10 to defray the cost of forced
transportation.337 Like the 1691 miscegenation statute and the many Restoration-era
statutes, these onerous manumission regulations sought to limit the size of Virginia’s free
black population and thus eliminate nagging questions about free black subjecthood.
It seems, then, that the Williamite moment and the ensuing legal contest over
slavery it provoked had little immediate impact on the Old Dominion – Virginia planters,
if anything, were even more secure in their dominion over the bodies of enslaved persons
than they had been just a decade earlier. Closer examination, however, reveals a growing
tension over the institution, pitting a reform-oriented Board of Trade and the royal
colonial officers charged with the implementation of metropolitan policy against the
entrenched political and economic interests of Virginia’s great planters. This tension was
already evident in the early 1690s. As the drive for greater imperial centralization
intensified, culminating in the creation of the Board of Trade in 1696, it became ever
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more evident that the interests of Virginia’s planter elite were not always in line with the
goals of metropolitan planners at Whitehall.
This conflict of interests moved to the very center of Virginia politics for nearly a
decade between 1696 and 1705, when the Board of Trade’s far-reaching reform plan,
profoundly shaped by the ideals of its secretary, John Locke, ran up against the
entrenched economic interests and political power of the Old Dominion’s slave-owning
elite. The basic problem was that Virginia was dominated by men cut from much the
same cloth as the deposed James II, petty plantation monarchs who saw themselves as
absolute masters over their dominions. In February 1697, the Board of Trade summed up
the complaints that had been trickling in about the state of affairs in the Old Dominion.
In a letter to governor Edmund Andros, the Board protested both the political power of
Virginia grandees and the social basis upon which this power was built. Like the
absolutist Stuarts, Virginia elites claimed that their status precluded them from
prosecution in “any action for any cause whatever.” Worse yet, many of these planters
sat on the General Court, though they had not “taken the oath of a judge.” The
overweening power of these planters made a mockery of justice and ensured that “a
plaintiff in any cause against a Councillor can have no remedy at law.” Locke and the
Board of Trade, not surprisingly given their Whig credentials, described this corrupt
judiciary as “unreasonable and hardly to be credited,” and pressed Andros for an
explanation of local legal practice. The Board, it seems, recognized that this political
dominance was closely linked to and rooted in “the engrossing of too large tracts of land”
by the planter elite. Such huge landholdings “hinder[ed] others from settling thereon”
and retarded the economic development of the colony. If the crown were to realize the
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maximum potential revenue from its colonial possessions, the engrossment of such
political and economic power in a few hands would have to be overcome and, despite
their hesitance to “meddle” with the “property of many private persons” in the colony,
the Board of Trade began framing measures that might, if fully implemented, lead to
“more regular planting and improvement in [the] future.”338
At the heart of these economic problems was the Old Dominion’s slave-based
tobacco plantation system. The Board of Trade began to question the wisdom of tobacco
monoculture, as cyclical booms and busts repeatedly destabilized the colonial economy
and strained the royal treasury, and imperial officials also began to promote economic
diversification on the ground. Edmund Andros came under fire from tobacco planters
and merchants in March 1697 for the “encouragement [he had] given to cotton-planting
in Virginia,” and a number of royal officials worked to promote the development of
mines in the west, but few of the colony’s planter elite supported such schemes.339
Francis Nicholson, then serving as governor of Maryland, observed that “the cursed thing
called self-interest too much governs” in neighboring Virginia. Large landowners were
protective of their property rights, particularly their landed estates, and feared being
“compelled to part with some of it,” a particularly objectionable possibility during a
boom period in the tobacco market. Nicholson worried that without “some measure to
restrain them,” the elite of the Old Dominion would continue to monopolize economic
and political power – if immediate action were not taken to engage more subjects in the
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colony’s economic development, Virginia’s future governor could “not see how it is to be
planted, in this age or the next.”340 Before long, Nicholson would be charged with
implementing just such a measure.
The chief author of this initiative was John Locke, who set to work framing a plan
that would fundamentally reorder Virginia society. 341 Implementation of this plan began
in 1699, when instructions from the Board of Trade to governor Francis Nicholson called
for a wholesale remaking of the Old Dominion – “all the laws” of the colony were to be
reviewed, revised, and submitted to the Board for approval. The first order of business
was restructuring the very basis of Virginia society – land ownership. Nicholson was to
end the Virginia “land grab” by pressing for payment of quitrents in arrears and ending
the practice of allowing “Negro rights,” or headright grants for slave imports. In the
future, headrights could not be claimed on any migrants except “Xian Subjects comeing
to reside” in the colony.342 Any estates with more than seven years of unpaid quitrents
were to be seized, and all future grants were to be “founded on settlement rather than the
importation of servants.” If the target of these measures were not already clear, the
Board also instructed Nicholson to compile a list of all settlers holding more than 20,000
acres. The Navigation Acts were also to be more strictly enforced, and official depot
“towns” were to be built to rate, price, and tax all tobacco exports.343 If adopted, these
policies would hopefully lead to economic diversification, with support industries
springing up around the “towns.” Former servants turned freeholders would implement
long-desired Board alternatives to tobacco monoculture, altering their crop mix to supply
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the royally-sponsored export towns with foodstuffs and engaging in small-scale
manufactures to support these commercial hubs, finally breaking free of the cyclical
tobacco market.
Less explicit but also crucial to the Lockean reform plan was a renewed focus on
the rights of settler-subjects in the Old Dominion. One of the most damning indictments
of the Virginia elite was their usurpation of nearly absolute political power in the colony,
dominating the Council and the General Court, exempting themselves from prosecution,
and even sitting as judges in their own cases. The 1699 reform plan sought to curb the
political power of elites by making the appointment of councilors “amenable to civil
process,” and to bolster the legal security of subjects by “ascertaining the qualifications
of jurors.”344 In other words, Locke and the Board hoped to do for Virginia what the
Glorious Revolution had done for England – firmly and definitively establish that all
legitimate authority was bracketed by law and consent, and protect the basic rights of all
subjects. If enacted, Locke’s land plan in and of itself would have done much to achieve
this goal by ensuring that all settlers would have access to productive lands, and thus to
full subjecthood and access to formal politics.
When he arrived in Virginia in early 1699, Governor Nicholson’s initial
popularity and the support of the lesser planters in the House of Burgesses made reform
look like a real possibility. After spending two years in various legislative committees,
the Board’s reform recommendations began to pass into law in August 1701, laying out a
blueprint for economic development in the Old Dominion. While it was difficult to
tamper with the vested property rights of the tidewater elite, expansion into the piedmont
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provided an opportunity to experiment with new property regimes. To better protect and
develop Virginia’s western frontier, one statute granted “societyes of men” between ten
and thirty thousand acres to be held “as tenants in comon and undivided.” Individuals
could claim two hundred acres each for planting, along with a half-acre “to seat upon and
live in” within a “cohabitation” or town. Frontier settlers would receive a number of
economic benefits, such as tax and quitrent forgiveness, along with exemption from
military service outside the settlement, as long as “one christian man” was
“continually...kept upon the land” for every five hundred acres claimed. If these
conditions were not kept, the land would revert to the crown.345 To be sure, the expected
benefit of such settlements was primarily military – an early warning system for Native
incursions on the frontier – but the way in which the Lockean reform agenda envisioned
Virginia society was fundamentally at odds with the established tidewater plantation
system.
What, then, might this reforming impulse have meant for enslaved AfroVirginians? In the immediate context, very little changed – the natural rights of
individual slave owners to their vested property, protected by local law, could not easily
be tampered with, even by reform-minded planners on the Board of Trade. But the
economic and political implications of the Lockean reform plan, if carried to their logical
end point, might have destabilized Virginia’s slave-powered plantation economy. By
keeping estate sizes small and promoting economic diversification, the Board’s plan
would likely have decreased the demand for bound labor in the colony, and this meager
demand would be met, ideally, by the importation of European servants who would
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eventually become freeholders themselves. Regulation of the slave trade might also have
hampered the further development of the plantation regime. Starting in 1699, Virginians
repeatedly enacted small duties on the slave trade. The twenty shilling impost levied
between 1699 and 1706 was intended to fund the construction of new royal College of
William and Mary in Williamsburg, not to stop slave imports, but it also set a clear
precedent that the local government could, if it chose, regulate the slave trade. The
legislature was serious about enforcement of the impost as well – the fine for evasion was
£100.346
There is even evidence that the most draconian elements of Virginia’s slave police
law might be altered. In 1699, for example, the colonial legislature amended the 1691
statute detailing legal process for trying slaves accused of felony crimes discussed above.
The 1691 statute had made a number of minor crimes, including “hog stealing,” felonies
punishable by death when committed by slaves. The 1699 law now rolled back this
provision, mandating a whipping for the first offense, and pillorying and ear-cropping for
the second, though it maintained a separate standard of proof in slave cases – an enslaved
hog thief could be convicted “by one evidence or by his owne confession.”347 While it is
hard to see this minor alteration as meaningful for enslaved persons themselves, and
though it was motivated just as much by concern for the property rights of slave owners
as any concern for the natural rights of slaves, the 1699 statute does represent another
attempt by the colonial state to regulate the kind of justice slaves would have access to.
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Even planters as bloodthirsty as Robert “King” Carter recognized that, in this specific
instance, Virginia police law had gone too far.
The immediate impact of Board of Trade’s reform policies, then, was certainly
limited, but they held out the possibility of a fundamentally different Virginia, one much
more in line with the political economy of New England and the legal culture of postGlorious Revolution Britain. Given time, the Virginia reform package might have broken
up large landed estates and diversified the colonial economy, easing demand for bound
labor, while the legal definition of enslaved Afro-Virginians as subjects with some basic
rights might have chipped away at the dominion of slave owners. By privileging the
corporate humanist strand of English revolution principles over its liberal individualist
counterpart, reformers on the Board of Trade and their allies on the ground in Virginia
could have made the Old Dominion as inhospitable to plantation slavery as the Bay
Colony.
This, of course, was not to be. By 1703, the great planters mobilized the
revolutionary language of vested property and individual rights and moved to beat back
the metropolitan reform plan. Governor Nicholson was forced out of office in 1703 by a
cabal of elite slave owners, including William Byrd II and Robert “King” Carter, and his
replacements, despite continued calls for reform from the Board of Trade, were largely
unable to break the Virginia plantocracy’s stranglehold on local law and politics.348
Besides, priorities were changing back in England – King William was dead, John Locke
had retired from the Board of Trade, and a new imperial administration, orchestrated by
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Queen Anne’s chief minister, Robert Harley, was less interested in the internal economic
development of the colonies than in extracting revenue from commodities production and
taxation. Anne was, after all, a Stuart, and her notorious conservative streak endeared her
to leading Tories and shaped her imperial policies. As they had during the Restoration,
Virginia planters took advantage of a friendly metropolitan administration and doubled
down on plantation slavery as the basis of their society.
It was in this context – the rejection of reform and a shift in imperial
administration – that Virginia enacted its notorious 1705 slave code, often described as
the first comprehensive body of slave law in the Anglo-American world. The timing of
this comprehensive code, however, has always been somewhat of a mystery to historians
– why would Virginians need such a body of law if earlier statutes had already
established the legal basis of slavery in the colony? A general trend toward imperial
oversight of colonial law and desire for more cohesive bodies of statute law certainly
played a role, but it is also possible, indeed likely, that the 1705 Virginia slave code was
also an attempt to entrench slavery more firmly in local law, beyond the reach of
metropolitan jurists and reformers like Chief Justice Holt and John Locke.
The basis of this slave code was, of course, the definition of “Negro, Mulatto, and
Indian slaves” as a species of property. As they had during the Restoration, Virginia
legislators defined enslaved persons as “real estate (and not chattels),” giving slave
owners access to the full panoply of English legal protections for landed estates. In some
cases, however, treating slaves as realty could prove a disadvantage to planters, and so
the 1705 slave code allowed for slaves to be treated as chattels in certain circumstances.
Slaves could be seized for debt “as other chattels or personal estate,” and slave sales
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within the colony did not need to be recorded as land sales did, facilitating the transfer of
slave property. Slaves were not liable to escheat, as other real property, but would be
treated as chattels if an owner died without heirs. To guarantee the integrity of the great
planters’ enslaved labor forces, the 1705 code also regulated the descent of slave
property. Since many planters had turned to the entail to protect their landed estates, it
was crucial that slave property not be distributed among heirs as other chattels would –
instead, the heir to the estate must also inherit its bound labor force. In order to provide
for younger children, executors would assess the value of the slaves, which would be
divided equally among younger siblings and paid out by the heir. To promote further
slave importations, and in keeping with imperial practice, Virginia law recognized the
separate property claims of merchants importing new slaves through the transatlantic
trade and mandated that local Virginia property law would only adhere once slaves were
sold in the colony. By refining their definition of property-in-man, Virginia legislators
cemented the central premise of Anglo-American slavery in local, black letter law –
slaves were the legal property of their masters.349
Having restated what slavery was – a property relation – the Virginia legislature
next turned to enumerating who could and could not be enslaved. Again drawing on
earlier statutes, the 1705 code stated that all non-Christians, except “Turks and Moors in
amity” with England, were subject to enslavement, “notwithstanding a conversion to
christianity afterwards.” Race and enslavability, then, were not yet fully equivalent, and
the law specifically exempted anyone who could “make due proof of their being free in
England, or any other christian country” from enslavement. Coming close on the heels of
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Lord Holt’s antislavery decisions at King’s Bench, these clauses may be a tacit
acknowledgement of the metropolitan freedom principle – any Christian Afro-Britons
wrongly enslaved could claim their freedom in Virginia courts on the basis of religious
affiliation and prior residence in England.350 Other elements of the 1705 code, however,
seem to have been intended as direct refutations of the Holt Court’s decisions. In direct
contrast to Holt’s ruling in Chamberlain v. Harvey, the Virginia legislature declared that
“a slave’s being in England, shall not be sufficient to discharge him of his slavery,
without proof of his being manumitted there.” As proslavery lawyers had argued before
the King’s Bench, even English air could not free a slave without the active consent of
his or her owner. The local law of the slave colonies, built upon a solid foundation of
royal prerogative, was here construed as extraterritorial in force, just as applicable in
Westminster as in Williamsburg. To squash any remaining doubts about the liberating
power of Christianity, Virginia also reenacted its Restoration-era statute declaring that
“baptism of slaves doth not exempt them from bondage.”351
With non-Christian emigrants, practically all of whom were Africans, defined
legally as slaves, all that remained for the Virginia legislature was to define the rights that
slaves and slave owners could claim under law. Here the 1705 slave code reiterated and
refined earlier 17th century law barring enslaved Virginians from the rights of
subjecthood. The mobility and independent economic activity of enslaved persons was
severely limited by pass laws and restrictions on trading with slaves. Enslaved settlers
were explicitly barred from ownership of their own separate property – all “horses, cattle,
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and hogs” owned by enslaved people were confiscated and sold by the state, and
ownership of weapons was also proscribed.352 The legal rights most subjects could
expect in court were also revoked from enslaved settlers. Defined as property, not as
subjects or legal persons, slaves could not initiate suits and had no standing as persons
before Virginia courts. Slaves who committed crimes were tried before a magistrate, not
a jury, and could be convicted on the testimony of two white witnesses, or only one in
“pregnant circumstances.” Masters could mount a defense for their slave, but were
restricted only to matters of fact – they could not challenge the irregular trial procedures
employed in slave cases.353 Testimony by enslaved or free black settlers was also
outlawed – “not being christians,” they were “deemed and taken to be persons incapable
in law, to be witnesses in any cases whatsoever.”354 Though countervailing impulses
from metropolitan planners continued to press for recognition of slaves as subjects in
Virginia courtrooms even after the Board of Trade’s initial reform plan was defeated, the
1705 slave code reinforced the piecemeal legislation of the 17th century by barring AfroVirginians from the possession and benefit of the properties of English subjecthood.
Perhaps the most shocking element of Virginia’s 1705 slave code is the
unprecedented police power it delegated to local magistrates, individual slave owners,
and the white settler community more broadly. Again reiterating earlier statute law, the
new code gave tremendous discretionary power to individual owners, re-enacting laws
exempting owners and overseers from prosecution for the death of a slave during
“correction,” mandating harsh penalties for any person of color who dared “lift his or her
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hand, in opposition against any christian,” and allowing any white settler to “kill and
destroy” any fugitive slave. All of these provisions had appeared in earlier legislation,
but the new 1705 slave code outstripped even these earlier laws in its brutality. To deter
runaways, slave owners could appeal to county courts to have habitual absconders
publically punished “by dismembering, or any other way...as they in their discretion shall
think fit, for...terrifying others from the like practices.”355 Robert “King” Carter, the
largest land and slave owner in the colony, was particularly brutal in his application of
this exemplary punishment – he had Dinah and Bambara Harry dismembered in 1710,
and later bragged that he had “cured many a negro of running away by this means.”356
Perhaps the most compelling illustration of the failure of reform in Virginia was
the case of Rose, an enslaved woman killed by her mistress, Frances Wilson, in the
autumn of 1713 in Isle of Wight county. A coroner’s inquest found that Rose, a “hail
[sic] Negro,” had died as a result of “hard usage...finding no mortall wounds but only
stripes.” Deaths like these were all too common in a legal context where a master’s
individual right to destroy his own property outweighed the right of an enslaved person to
her own life in the scales of Virginia law – Frances Wilson was well within her legal
rights under the 1705 slave code when she whipped Rose to death. But, as we have seen,
the reform attempts initiated by John Locke and sustained by newly arrived royal
officials like Alexander Spotswood had challenged many of the underpinnings of
Virginia’s slave law. Perhaps suspicions were piqued when Rose’s body was “suddenly
and secretly Buried,” suggesting that something more than “Moderate Correction” had
contributed to her death. A coroner’s inquest, called by justice of the peace Andrew
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Woodley, looked into Rose’s death in November 1713 and, perhaps surprisingly to most
slave owners, the jury returned “a Verdict of Murder.”357 Even after the defeat of reform
through the 1705 slave code, there were still some Virginians who asserted the basic
subjecthood of enslaved persons, challenging the absolute individual dominion of masters
over their slaves.
If the brief glimpse we get of him in Rose’s case is any indicator, Andrew
Woodley appears to have been one of them. A recently arrived settler, Woodley patented
six hundred acres in 1693 and settled his household, including five slaves – Cowberry,
Isabella, Maria, Ruben, and Jenny – along Pagan Creek outside Smithfield in Isle of
Wight county. Woodley quickly made a name for himself in the community, and was
appointed as surveyor in 1694 and justice of the peace by 1707, but he never attained the
kind of wealth that would mark him as one of the great planters. Perhaps resentment of
the advantage his neighbors gained from their large slave labor forces made Woodley
hostile to their unchecked power, or perhaps he had internalized the antislavery
potentialities of English revolution principles and could not countenance the wanton
killing of a fellow subject – the fact that he specified the manumission of two slaves in
his will certainly suggests some unease with slavery.358 Whatever the reason, Woodley
brought the case to the attention of John Clayton, the newly appointed Attorney General,
in the spring of 1714.
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Clayton, who had studied at the Inns of Court in Westminster and argued cases at
the bar during Lord Holt’s tenure as Chief Justice, built a lucrative local practice after his
arrival in Virginia in 1705 as private attorney to such notables as William Byrd II.
Perhaps he had imbibed some of Lord Holt’s legal antislavery principles, because he now
sought to limit the physical dominion of his slave-owning clients – Clayton approached
Lieutenant Governor Spotswood about prosecuting Frances Wilson for felony murder,
arguing that “no Subject has power over the Life of his Slave.” Despite local statutes
proclaiming that the death of a slave during the usual course of correction was no felony,
Spotswood agreed with the attorney general and empaneled a grand jury to hear Rose’s
case.359 When the grand jury convened in March 1714, Spotswood gave them very clear
instructions that could just have easily have come from Lord Holt or Judge Sewell.
Spotswood avowed it “indispensably my Duty” to ensure that “a legal Tryal” was held,
and told the grand jurors in no uncertain terms that:
“...in this Dominion no Master has such a Sovereign Power of his Slave as not to
be liable to be called to an Account whenever he kills him; that at the same time,
the Slave is the Master’s Property, he is likewise the King’s Subject, and that the
King may lawfully bring to Tryal all Persons here, without exception, who shall
be suspected to have destroyed the life of his subject.”
Spotswood clearly wanted Frances Wilson, and those like her “who delight in inhumane
Severitys,” brought to justice.360 Here was the Revolutionary case for slave subjecthood
clearly stated. All persons living within the king’s dominions were subjects entitled to at
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least the barest of rights, and no master could legitimately wield the power of life and
death over another subject.
If it seemed for a moment that justice might be done in Rose’s case, the reality of
slaveholder power quickly became obvious. Indeed, there had been stiff opposition to
Frances Wilson’s prosecution from the start. Had Spotswood and Clayton not pressed the
issue, the case likely would not have come before the court at all – no local warrant was
served on Frances Wilson after the coroner’s inquest, and it was only pressure from the
Attorney-General and Lieutenant Governor that had forced the issue. Great planter John
Custis IV, empaneled as a grand juror, certainly tried to dissuade some of his less
weighty peers from handing down an indictment. After hearing testimony from Mary
Lupo, a white neighbor who described the “mortal strokes” Frances Wilson gave Rose
and “plainly accused” her of murder, however, the grand jury moved to indict Wilson,
over Custis’ objections. When the case came before the General Court in October 1714,
the court was presided over by yet another great planter – William Byrd II, who
questioned the validity of the indictment and argued that Wilson “ought not to be tried”
for her crimes since local law precluded charges of murder in the death of a slave.361
As in the slavery cases heard by the Holt court and Adam’s case in Boston, the
central question in Rose’s case was the balance between the property rights of some
subjects – slave owners – and the rights to subjecthood of others – enslaved Africans.
Arguing for the former were the great planters of the Old Dominion, the wealthy slave
owners who had leveraged their political and economic power to dominate Virginia
society over the past two generations. The latter position had less powerful supporters –
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a handful of royal appointees, a politically marginalized class of smallholders, and, of
course, enslaved people themselves. Despite a decade of attempts at reform that sought
to check the power of the great planters and empower royal officials and common
subjects, then, the outcome of Rose’s case was never really in question. Frances Wilson
was acquitted and released. There would be no justice for Rose, for her friends or family.
Indeed, John Clayton reported to the Board of Trade two years later that “the plain and
whole truth of [the] matter” was that no other slave owner had been “prosecuted for the
death of a Slave by Correction” since at least 1710.362 Despite repeated instructions from
the Board of Trade to prosecute settlers who killed the king’s enslaved subjects, and the
attempts of magistrates like Andrew Woodley, John Clayton, and Alexander Spotswood
to make these instructions a reality, the property claims of freeborn Anglo-American
slave trumped the rights of enslaved Afro-Virginians. In the Old Dominion, unlike in
England and Massachusetts, revolution principles proved to be just as conducive to
slavery as Stuart absolutism.
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Chapter V – “Britons Never Will be Slaves”: The Passions and the Interests of Late
Colonial Slavery, 1715-1754
On the evening of 1 August 1740, a coterie of finely dressed Britons assembled at
Cliveden, the opulent Buckinghamshire estate of Frederick of Hanover, Prince of Wales
and heir to the British throne. On this warm evening the gathered notables, many of
whom, like the prince himself, were in open opposition to George II and the Walpole
ministry, were treated to the debut of Alfred, a new masque about the 9th century king of
Wessex who repelled Viking invasions and united the English people. David Mallet and
James Thomson’s libretto made obvious comparisons between the great English hero and
the current Prince of Wales that must have pleased Frederick and his opposition court.
Alfred’s patriotic message was that the English-cum-British were a particularly free
people, and under a heroic, manly ruler like Alfred the Great, or the presumptive heir
Frederick, the virtues of British civilization would be both safeguarded at home and
promoted abroad.1
As the final act drew to a close, the players reiterated this point in a musical
setting by Thomas Arne:
When Britain first, at Heaven’s command
Arose from out the azure main;
This was the charter of the land,
And guardian angels sang this strain:
”Rule, Britannia! Rule the waves:
Britons never will be slaves.”
We can imagine Frederick and his court joining the cast in greater numbers with each
succeeding refrain, repetition cementing lyrics and message more firmly in their minds.
By the end of the fifth verse – “To thee belongs the rural reign/Thy cities shall with
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commerce shine/All thine shall be the subject main/And every shore it circles thine” – the
spacious halls of Cliveden must have swelled with patriotic British voices. With the
Protestant succession and the liberties of subjects secure at home, and the bounty of a
growing empire flowing into the metropole from abroad, Britons could finally and
permanently be freed from the slaveries of popery, arbitrary government, and economic
privation.2
This message would have held special salience for Frederick and the opposition
figures gathered around him in 1740. To these Opposition or Patriot Whigs, the timid,
effeminate foreign policies of George II and Sir Robert Walpole threatened both the
liberties of Britons at home and the nation’s manly reputation abroad. “Rule, Britannia!”
was more hope than reality in 1740, but the lyrics held the solution. Other nations, “not
so blest” as Britain, were falling to tyranny all around, but whenever slavery reared its
head in fair Albion, it would “arouse [the] generous flame” of Britons’ “manly hearts” to
“guard the fair.” This assertive, manly nation would protect the essential liberties
encapsulated in the near-hegemonic Revolution principles of 1688, ensuring that Britain
would “flourish great and free” and never be “tame” or “bend...down” to tyrants. But to
guarantee this domestic outcome, Britain must enter fully and manfully into international
imperial competition. Empire would make the cities shine with commerce, unman the
tyrants of the continent by stripping them of their possessions, and make Britain “the
envy of them all.” In the zero-sum game of 18th-century European imperialism, British
dominion over the “subject main” and the “shore it circles” was the key to ensuring that
Britons never would be slaves.3
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The irony of “Rule, Britannia!” is obvious to modern commentators. Even as
Frederick and his court took up the refrain for the first time in 1740, British subjects and
British capital were busy overseeing and financing the massive expansion of the Atlantic
slave trade and the colonial plantation complex. The power and prosperity the new
imperial anthem celebrated rested on the commodification and labor power of ever more
socially dead, chattelized African bodies. But how could an empire based on the brutal
extraction of labor from tens of thousands of enslaved Africans claim that its subjects
never would be slaves? Again, the answer is in the lyrics. The idealized Briton of
Thomson’s verse fit a very specific mold – manly but sensible; commercial and
industrious but not grasping; rational, polite, and Protestant. To growing numbers of
colonial planters and imperial planners, it was self-evident that African slaves could
never be Britons under this definition. Emasculated, lazy, and irrational Africans were
fitted only for slavery, not British freedom, and their enslavement served the ultimate
cause of furthering the common wealth. A stream of legal opinions, imperial and
colonial statutes, and public pronouncements made this image of African slavery as a
positive good for both the “benighted African” and the British nation nearly hegemonic.
But not quite hegemonic – there were other conceptions of empire and
subjecthood circulating in the mid-18th century Anglophone Atlantic as well. Some
Britons believed that international competition necessitated a more open definition of the
British nation and greater access to traditional English liberties. Debates over the
naturalization of foreigners, the rights of colonists throughout the empire, and the legal
status of British Jews all necessitated a rethinking of the boundaries of British-ness, and
often spilled over into discussions of the nature of personhood and subjecthood more
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generally.4 The continuing efforts of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel to
Christianize and “civilize” the imperial slave population, despite the SPG’s deep
complicity in enslavement, also challenged dominant ideals of Africans as socially dead
outsiders.5 Others worried about the effect grasping, individualistic consumerism had on
the British nation. A true Briton used his property not for individual gain, as West Indian
planters did, but to benefit the common wealth of all subjects, an argument with startling
antislavery potential.6 Dovetailing with an emergent critique of the Walpolean political
economy of empire emanating from Patriot Whig circles, this denunciation of the
economic dangers of slavery proved particularly potent in the 1730s and ‘40s. And, of
course, the actions of enslaved people consistently defied simple classification, forcing
Britons to confront the contradictions underlying their imperial project. Continuing
instances of large and small scale rebellion, the self-evident rationality of the enslaved,
and the conversion of some Afro-Britons to Protestant Christianity put the lie to facile
racist stereotypes and challenged British justifications for property-in-man.
***
Mid-eighteenth century Britons were acutely aware of the importance of the
colonies to their daily lives and, increasingly, the role of slavery in shaping the economic,
political, and moral contours of empire. Virginia tobacco; Jamaican sugar and coffee;
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Indian tea and cotton; African mahogany, ivory, and people; shipped in vessels made
from New England timber – all flowed into the metropole in ever greater quantities.
English aristocrats and wealthy merchants had long enjoyed the benefits of empire, but
these were now available to a growing cross-section of the British populace, bringing
colonial commodities into the homes of artisans, small farmers, and even common
laborers for the first time. Nor was this simply a metropolitan phenomenon – provincial
and colonial Britons also saw rising standards of living and levels of material
consumption in the mid-eighteenth century boom years. The material good of the British
nation, it seemed, hinged more than ever on the economic health of the empire.7
All of this economic success, of course, came with a price. Those Britons who
cared to look past the veneer of unprecedented material wealth to the substance of their
imperial economy must have been struck by the central role played by slavery and the
slave trade. When the Royal African Company’s monopoly privileges expired in 1712,
Britain’s independent traders, and the “ten-percent men” who had already begun to edge
in on the African trade in the 1690s, dove into the slave trade with vigor. Before the
expiration of the RAC monopoly, mainland American planters often carped about how
Company ships bypassed them in favor of more lucrative markets in the West Indies, but
by mid-century they could have no such complaints. Virginia alone imported some
54,000 enslaved Africans in the middle half of the 18th century – by comparison, only
about 10,000 slaves were imported in the years between the Glorious Revolution and the
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death of Queen Anne in 1714. Indeed, the half-century between the Hanoverian
Succession and the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War saw a stunning revitalization of the
English slave trade. In this period, British vessels made 3,269 slaving voyages, carrying
over 830,000 enslaved persons into colonial bondage. The human cost of this increased
slave trade activity was truly staggering – nearly 150,000, or roughly 17 percent, of the
enslaved men, women, and children laded on British slavers in Africa died in the hellish
middle passage.8 Here was a human tragedy to make even a Stuart blush.
Yet the British imperial state remained committed to the slave trade throughout
the mid-18th century. It was good business to do so. African slaves were purchased with
British manufactured goods, bolstering the domestic manufacturing sector of the imperial
economy. The purchase price of African slaves in the colonies alone amounted to an
infusion of nearly £15 million into the British colonies, and the labor power of enslaved
persons produced ever more marketable commodities for sale on the home market and reexport to the continent.9 The imperial state also benefited directly from the slave trade
and the plantation complex it fed – customs duties on Jamaica sugar alone provided from
£200,000 to £300,000 to the Treasury per annum.10 Whatever moral or political qualms
Britons may have had about the slave trade, there was far too much money at stake to
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turn away from slaving, and imperial policy was, in no small measure, designed
specifically to protect the transatlantic trade in human flesh.11
Slave trade policy, however, was only one element of a larger imperial vision that
garnered support from a series of metropolitan planners including Robert Harley, Queen
Anne’s chief minister, and Sir Robert Walpole, Prime Minister and architect of
Establishment Whig policy. Unlike the proponents of the turn-of-the-century Lockean
imperial reform agenda, Harley the High Tory and Walpole the Establishment Whig
agreed that the advantages of empire came not from “greatness of people,” as Locke had
argued, but from increased territories and control of commodities production. By
conquering territory in the West Indies and ensuring that these were well stocked with
African slaves, Walpolean political economy sought to dominate the European market for
the 18th century’s prime commodity – sugar – thus reaping increased state revenues
through re-export taxation and rewarding Whig-leaning British merchants with a bigger
slice of the imperial fiscal pie. Meanwhile, colonial economic development had to be
curtailed to ensure an outlet for the growing metropolitan manufacturing sector,
preventing the plantation colonies from diversifying and relegating New Englanders to
the carrying trades. Dominating foreign and imperial policy from the Hanoverian
succession into the 1740s, and retaining substantial influence even longer, it was this
Establishment Whig political economy, in many ways dependent on plantation slavery
and the transatlantic slave trade, which undergirded the high age of British mercantilism.
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The economic boon of the slave trade, however, was not an unalloyed benefit to
the British nation. Some metropolitan planners believed the imperial common wealth
would be better served not through the acquisition of new territories and the expansion of
the plantation complex, but rather through intensive economic development in the
colonies, diversification of commodities production, and free trade to all New World
colonies, where British and colonial commodities and manufactures would find a ready
market, pumping hard money into the Anglo-American economy and supporting
domestic manufacturing. While this political economic critique of empire, tentatively
developed by the Country Whigs of the 1720s and fully embraced by the Patriots of the
‘30s and ‘40s, was not directly critical of slavery or the slave trade, it did espouse
prescriptions for imperial development that often ran directly counter to the interests of
slave owners and traders. It is no coincidence that many leading Patriot Whigs – men
like William Pulteney, John Barnard, William Kieth, and George Lyttleton – also
supported antislavery programs like Georgia’s free labor experiment and the Society for
the Propagation of the Gospel’s mission to colonial slaves. Hidden beneath the veneer of
political stability and Establishment Whig hegemony of the mid-18th century, then, lay a
roiling debate over the future of slavery in the British Empire, a debate that came
repeatedly to the surface of imperial politics.12
Indeed, the slave trade was at the heart of one of the worst financial crises in
British history – the South Sea Bubble of 1720.13 In the peace negotiations at Utrecht
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that brought the War of the Spanish Succession to a close in 1713, the fate of the asiento,
an exclusive contract to deliver enslaved Africans to Spanish America, was “a major part
of the negotiations,” and Queen Anne’s chief minister and architect of the peace plan,
Robert Harley, insisted that the contract go to the British. Under the terms of the asiento,
British merchants would deliver 4,800 slaves a year to the Spanish colonies, and the
rights to fulfill this lucrative contract were granted exclusively to the newly-formed South
Sea Company, founded in 1710 and headed by none other than Robert Harley, now Earl
of Oxford and Lord High Treasurer.14
Despite the questionable business ethics of the South Sea Company, Britain’s
acquisition of the asiento contract was widely hailed as a major economic victory, even if
it was the only tangible benefit of the notorious “Tory peace.” This victory was made all
the sweeter by the fact that France, the previous asientists, would lose out in the zero sum
game of imperial competition. Even the Whig press, typically critical of Queen Anne’s
Tory ministers and their foreign policy, hailed the asiento as one of the great
achievements of her reign.15 Tory supporters were even more effusive. Joseph Trapp,
for example, in his Peace: A Poem, heaped praise on Queen Anne and Harley for the
Peace of Utrecht and, implicitly, their acquisition of the asiento:
Pleas’d with the Prospect pious ANNA smiles,
Restoring Plenty to her happy Isles:
Annexes new Dominions to her Crown,
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Press, 2004); Peter Temin and Hans-Joachim Voth, “Riding the South Sea Bubble,” American Economic
Review, vol. 94, no. 5 (December, 2004): 1654-1668; Richard S. Dale, Johnnie E. V. Johnson, and Leilei
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Increas’d in Empire, deathless in Renown.
To Her each World it’s Wealth and Strength resigns,
Europe it’s Forts, and India yields it’s Mines.
The terms of the peace would serve the national good by increasing material
wealth and imperial power. Alexander Pope, in his peace poem Windsor-Forest,
was just as laudatory, hoping that Britain’s new international power would
“stretch thy Reign, fair Peace! from shore to shore,/Till Conquest cease, and
Slav’ry be no more.” The “Slav’ry” Pope hoped to see extinguished, of course,
was the political slavery of French absolutism, not the very real human slavery
into which British ships now delivered ever more enslaved Africans.16 The
asiento, and by extension the slave trade more generally, were rhetorically
positioned as positive benefits to the British nation.
When the South Sea Bubble finally burst in 1721, it shook the entire imperial
economy and shook the confidence of Britons throughout the empire. In the wake of this
spectacular economic collapse, popular opinion began to turn, not only on the South Sea
Company itself, but also on the growing cross-section of Britons whose ill-gotten wealth
derived from the slave trade. To be sure, some still supported the South Sea Company,
with one pamphleteer heaping praise on the “South Sea Saviours of the Realm” in verse.
“[T]ho’ some unprovided Accidents/Have brought the soaring Project lower,” the poet
argued, critics were being unfair:
Where Praise is due, that Satire’s the Reward;
That Men, who act the Patriots like These,
Make it their Pains to give a Nation Ease,
Should, just like Slaves, by Britons treated be,
Because their Study was to set them free.17
16
17
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The South Sea Company’s directors deserved praise, not scorn, since they only sought to
free Britain from the slavery of economic backwardness.
Others, however, were not so sanguine in their evaluation of the South Sea
Company’s directors. John Trenchard, for example, described South Sea directors as
“Harpies and Publick Robbers...Pickpockets and Stock-jobbers: A sort of Vermin” who
had duped “ignorant and unwary, but industrious Subject[s]” by their “merciless Villainy
and consuming Avarice.” Trenchard’s solution was simple, if brutal – “let us have the
only Satisfaction they can make us, their Lives, and their Estates.”18 William Hogarth
turned his biting visual satire against the Company as well in a 1720 print entitled The
South Sea Scheme, where Throngs of Britons flocked to “ye Devils Shop,” rendered as a
market in human flesh, while “Honour” is flogged by “Vilany” and “Honesty” is broken
on a wheel by “Self Interest.”19 The Country Whig critique of the South Sea Company
was closely linked to a larger unease with the perceived corruption, profligacy, and selfinterest associated with the Court.20 Britons would surely have known that critics like
Trenchard and Gordon were being hyperbolic when they claimed that Court corruption
would reduce the nation to slavery, but they would also have understood that Court
policies enabled the very real enslavement of countless thousands of Africans.

Briton most is Britain’s Friend,” and depicting those who were ruined by the South Sea Bubble as
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In the wake of the South Sea crisis, a number of colonial assemblies attempted to
regulate slave importations. In 1723, for example, South Carolina and Virginia passed
slave trade duties, both of which were resolutely opposed by metropolitan merchants and
imperial planners on the Board of Trade. Four years later, with slave trade restrictions
spreading to the more profitable sugar colonies, merchants aligned with the South Sea
Company protested Jamaica’s slave trade impost.21 Directly opposed to the imperial
economic policies being promulgated by the metropole, all of these local slave trade
duties were denounced by the Board of Trade and eventually struck down by the Privy
Council.22 Few if any of these imposts were intended as a real challenge to slavery per se
– indeed, in many cases they were designed primarily to consolidate the economic power
of select planters and merchants who could better control the inflow of new slaves – but
they all clearly illustrated the very real conflict of interest between colonial legislatures
and imperial planners when it came to the slave trade.
Though the immediate political crisis over colonial slave importation duties
appeared to have been resolved, it had raised troubling questions about the future of
slavery if left under local colonial control. Thus far, despite attempts at imperial
centralization made during the Interregnum, again at the Restoration, and even in the
wake of the Glorious Revolution, slavery had remained a creature of local law and, as the
colonial drive to regulate the slave trade illustrated, many colonists hoped to retain local
control over the institution. This legal diversity, however, was now seen as a barrier to
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Court Whig mercantile policy, and the Crown, the Walpole ministry, and the West India
merchants all hoped that a more uniform slave law would promote commodities
production and increase customs revenue. In 1729, a group of merchants closely tied to
the Walpole ministry approached Sir Philip Yorke, the Attorney General, and Charles
Talbot, Solicitor General, to obtain a legal opinion supporting this position. They had
come to the right place. Both lawyers had risen to prominence through close connections
with leading figures in the Walpole ministry and could be relied on to toe the
administration line.23
Indeed, Yorke had already proved his willingness to give independent legal
opinions outside of the courtroom that supported the Walpole ministry’s imperial policy.
In 1724, for example, just after taking up the office of Attorney General, he opined that
Jamaica could be taxed directly by the crown without local consent, and later, in 1728,
argued that Massachusetts’ Congregational establishment violated the repugnancy clause
of its charter. Talbot, as Solicitor General, collaborated with Yorke in crafting the 1728
opinion, and was equally committed to the administration policy of imperial
centralization.24 When presented with the West India merchants’ petition for an opinion
on the imperial legality of slavery in 1729, then, there was little question how the crown’s
attorneys would respond. The crown, ministry, and merchants got all they could have
hoped for:
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We are of opinion, [wrote Yorke and Talbot,] that a slave, by coming from
the West Indies, either with or without his master, to Great Britain or
Ireland, doth not become free; and that his master’s property right in him
is not thereby determined or varied; and baptism doth not bestow freedom
on him, nor make any alteration in his temporal condition in these
kingdoms. We are also of opinion, that the master may legally compel
him to return to the plantations.25
The Yorke-Talbot opinion was straightforward and devastating. With a stroke of the pen,
it turned assumptions about slave property that had informed the Holt Court’s decisions
on their head, undermining the legal foundation of English antislavery.
Though little direct contemporary commentary on the Yorke-Talbot decision
survives, examination of its clauses illustrates the extent to which proslavery arguments
born in the plantation colonies had penetrated metropolitan legal opinion. First, it
established slave property as an extraterritorial right. Unlike earlier decisions, the YorkeTalbot opinion implied that, once established, property claims to slaves would adhere
throughout the empire and would not be “determined or varied” by passage through local
jurisdictions. Furthermore, since it was irrelevant whether the slave entered England
“with or without his master,” and since masters could “legally compel [slaves] to return
to the plantations,” the Yorke-Talbot opinion essentially created an imperial fugitive
slave law.26 Defined only as rightless articles of property, and protected as such
throughout the empire, slaves could no longer hope to gain their freedom in English
courts as some had done a generation earlier. The potential for emancipation through
Christianization was closely linked to this question of the extraterritorial reach of slave
property, and the Yorke-Talbot opinion sought to close off any possibility of
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emancipation through baptism. Though already closed in the plantation colonies, this
window had been left open a crack by the King’s Bench decision in Butts v. Penny and
opened more fully by the Holt court.27
Unlike many modern historians, mid-18th century Britons well understood the
significance of the Holt court’s rulings that Christianized Africans would be protected by
common law in England. An anonymous pamphleteer from the Leeward Islands
admitted as much in his 1730 treatise, A Letter to the Right Reverend Lord Bishop of
London. Displaying a canny awareness of recent legal developments in England, A
Letter provided a detailed description of how colonial slaves might gain their freedom
through baptism. A planter who brought a slave to England ran the risk that “some of
[the slave’s] own Colour...or the Servants of the Family” would teach the slave
Christianity and bring them “to some Minister, attended with some Persons (of his own
Colour belike) to stand as Witnesses,” for baptism. The baptized slave, still advised by
his “Country-folks,” might then steal away to “some remote County” or remain in the
master’s service until the time came to return to the colonies, when the Christian slave
would “give [his or her owner] the Slip.” This left the owner with two dangerous and
expensive options: he might “get [the slave] decoy’d on board some Ship...[and] shut him
up under the Hatches till the Ship is fallen...in her Way to the West-Indies”; or “carry [the
slave] before a Magistrate to shew Cause why he refuses to return” to bondage. These,
however, were not desirable options – everyone knew “the Danger of carrying a Man
from England against his Will.” Faced with these unpalatable choices, many owners
simply walked away from their valuable slave property, thus increasing England’s
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putatively free black population and providing more experienced allies upon whom future
slaves brought to the metropole could rely.28
If this were not bad enough, the anonymous West Indian author argued, planters
faced an even more terrifying possibility. Under the terms of the Holt court’s decisions, a
slave might come before a judge and, as “a Christian, and a Subject of England,” invoke
“the Liberty and Protection of a Subject” and have his master “carried before a
Magistrate to shew Cause why I pretend to transport him...against his Will.” The
unnamed judge, clearly modeled on Chief Justice Holt, might then chastise the slave
owner, reminding him “that England is a Land of Liberty; that either surely [he] must
never have known its happy Constitution, or else by being long accustom’d to tyrannize
over [slaves] in the West-Indies, have forgot it.” Drawing directly on Holt’s language,
the hypothetical judge might remind the erstwhile slave owner “that a foreign Slave
brought into England, is, upon landing, ipso facto free from Slavery” because “this now
happy Nation is so sensible of the Sweets of Liberty, that it would spare neither for Blood
nor Treasure to procure the same, if possible, for the rest of Mankind every where.” As
in the Holt court, baptism was key to this emancipatory agenda, “Not that Christianity
frees them from slavery, but the Law and Usage of the Land, made and continu’d by
Christians, does.”29 If baptism never freed a single slave in the British empire, as many
scholars have claimed, the anonymous Letter was much ado about nothing. In the years
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since the Holt court’s rulings, however, the hypothetical scenario described in A Letter to
the Lord Bishop of London was all too real to imperial planters.
It was precisely this problem that the Yorke-Talbot opinion sought to address by
extending colonial laws decoupling Christianity and freedom to the metropole by ruling
that baptism would not “make any alteration in [a slave’s] temporal condition” in Great
Britain.30 Were Holt’s rulings to stand, “the Sugar-Planters would either refuse to buy
them at the same Rates as before, or buy no more of them at all, and then what would
become of the Nation’s Trade to Guinea and the Sugar-Colonies?” With the YorkeTalbot opinion now in place, however, planters could simply “take it for granted that the
Nation or Community does approve...of the Sale and Purchase of...Men and WomenSlaves...by Laws made here [in the colonies], and ratified in England.”31 London had
become as conducive to slavery as Kingston or Jamestown.
Yet despite the apparent strength of the Yorke-Talbot Opinion and its congruence
with the crown’s colonial policy, its precedential value was dubious. The opinion was
simply a response to a petition by private merchants, with Yorke and Talbot scribbling
their response in Lincoln’s Inn Hall over supper, not an official decision by a court of
record.32 The Opinion left an important question unanswered as well. Though it argued
that entry into Great Britain would not alter masters’ property claims to their slaves, the
Yorke-Talbot Opinion did not mandate a specific, uniform definition of slave property.
This was no small matter, as each colony continued to reclassify slaves as real property,
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chattels, and special forms of mixed property throughout the colonial period. These
patchwork legal definitions of property-in-man, however, created headaches for
metropolitan merchants and creditors, who continued agitating for further policy
refinements.
Parliament attempted to address exactly this problem three years later through the
Debt Recovery Act of 1732.33 As we have seen, individual colonies had defined and
refined the particular forms slave property would take within their jurisdictions. By the
mid-18th century, most plantation colonies defined slaves as a special mixed form of
property. Slaves were classified as real estate for most purposes, guaranteeing that
plantations would retain a sufficient labor force when sold or bequeathed, but in cases of
intestate descent slaves were treated as chattels and estate administrators could keep, sell,
or distribute them as they saw fit.34 This system certainly benefited colonial planters by
providing both stability and flexibility, but defining slaves as realty was a serious
problem for metropolitan creditors. Under English common law, real estate was
generally not subject to seizure for the collection of unsecured debts, and colonial
assemblies had passed further legislation shielding realty, both in land and slaves, from
debt collectors. Making the situation even more complicated, the Walpole ministry,
hoping to woo the landed interest to establishment Whiggery by reducing the land tax,
was embarking on a new and controversial taxation plan. With the national debt
decreasing and the imperial economy rebounding from the South Sea bubble, Walpole
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hoped to cement his political base by shifting the tax burden from the landed gentry to
rising commercial interests, particularly the free traders associated with the Patriot
opposition. As the subsequent excise crisis illustrates, questions of national and imperial
finance were hot-button political issues, and the Debt Collection Act of 1732 was no
exception.35
Perhaps in an attempt to placate mercantile interests in preparation for the excise,
“An Act for the more easy Recovery of Debts in his Majesty’s Plantations and Colonies
in America” eased the process of debt collection by allowing metropolitan creditors to
prove colonial debts through a simple declaration before any British magistrate. In
addition, valuable “Houses, Lands, Negroes, and other Hereditaments and real Estates”
would no longer be exempt from seizure for debt. Colonial real estate was now “liable
and chargeable with all just Debts, Duties and Demands” and could be seized “as Assets
for the Satisfaction thereof” by “any Court of Law or Equity” in the plantations. In other
words, real estate would now be considered “in like Manner as Personal Estate in...the
said Plantations” when it came to debt collection.36 Though some contemporaries
worried about the “summary Way” in which debts could be collected under the statute,
especially its denial of jury trial to debtors, the Debt Recovery Act must have pleased
metropolitan creditors.37 Land and slaves, the principal forms of colonial wealth, were
now subject to seizure to satisfy unsecured debt. Indeed, as Claire Priest has pointed out,
the Debt Recovery Act “came close to abolishing the age-old distinctions between real
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and chattel property” altogether, contributing to an increasingly commercialized AngloAtlantic economy by facilitating the alienability and transferability of colonial real
estate.38 Additionally, the Debt Recovery Act, like the drive to overturn colonial slave
trade duties a decade earlier, reinforced the tendency toward greater metropolitan
regulation of colonial law in the interest of the imperial common wealth.
Imperial centralization and the further metropolitan regulation of slave property
regimes within the colonies remained important issues as the English economy emerged
from the long recession sparked by the South Sea Bubble, and the English courts did their
part in promoting economic recovery by rejecting the antislavery ideals promulgated by
the Holt court a generation earlier. In October 1749, Philip Yorke, recently made Lord
Chancellor Hardwicke, had an opportunity to reinforce the proslavery principles he had
laid out over dinner with Charles Talbot two decades earlier. Sitting as the king’s justice
in the Court of Chancery, Hardwicke handed down a decision in Pearne v. Lisle that
entered the Yorke-Talbot opinion into the judicial record.39 Robert Pearne, a wealthy
absentee West India planter with a number of holdings in Antigua and St. Kitts, in
addition to an opulent home in Isleworth outside London and an estate in Evenly,
Northamptonshire, brought a writ of ne exat regno to prevent [William?] Lisle, a near
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relative on his mother’s side, from leaving England and returning to Antigua.40 The
family squabble was over fourteen enslaved laborers Lisle had rented from Pearne’s
agent back in Antigua for £100 a year. Lisle, who had nowhere near the wealth of his
cousin, either could not or would not pay up, and since he was threatening to return to
Antigua with the matter still unsettled, Pearne brought the writ. The wealthy absentee
planter sued in Lord Hardwicke’s equity jurisdiction rather than the common law courts
because he claimed to have “no remedy at law, his witnesses being abroad.” Lisle’s
attorneys, however, moved to have the writ discharged, and Lord Hardwicke obliged –
Pearne could have had Lisle arrested and held on bail under common law, so the ne exeat
was unnecessary and improper for a “mere legal demand for money.” Besides, even if
Lisle left England and returned to Antigua, Pearne could have “justice done him in the
Courts there” just as well as in London.41
It was not sympathy with the fourteen enslaved persons, however, that led
Hardwicke to discharge Pearne’s writ, and in a lengthy explanation he elaborated on the
principles underpinning the Yorke-Talbot opinion and the Debt Collection Act. First, and
most importantly, the Lord Chancellor declared that “trover will lie for a Negro slave”
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becuase “it is as much property as any other thing.” Here was the chattel principle baldly
stated. Not only were slaves a form of property, they were rhetorically signified as
unhuman, rendered as ‘it,’ a ‘thing,’ rather than a person. As chattels, it was not even
necessary that the specifc slaves in question be returned to Pearne. Unlike “a cherrystone, very finely engraved” or “an extraordinarily wrought piece of plate,” enslaved
bodies were standardized commodities, interchangeable parts in the vast plantation
machine. Asking for the “specific delivery of the Negroes” was unneccessary because
“as [with] diamonds, one may be as good as another.” Demanding return of the actual
slaves would disrupt production in the plantation complex because, “like stock on a
farm,” small planters “could not do without [slaves]” and “would be obliged...to quit the
plantation” if courts required restitution of specific slaves. Seeking to regain specific
slaves was also bad business for wealthy planters like Pearne. Though they may have
been as valuable as diamonds, enslaved bodies were not forever – “they wear out with
labour, as cattle or other things.”42 Better, then, to turn to the law courts for
compensation through writs of trover and trust that English law would continue to
recognize claims to property-in-man.
But what of Lord Holt’s ringing antislavery decisions following the Glorious
Revolution? Were they not the law of the land? Hardwicke turned aside all objections
by arguing that Holt’s ruling in Chamberlain v. Harvey had “no weight” to it. Based on a
very narrow reading of Holt’s decision, the Lord Chancellor asserted that the case turned
on a technical issue of wording and was “determined on the want of proper description” –
the claim in Chamberlain had been for a “Negro, without saying slave; and the being
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Negro did not necessarily imply slave.” Words mattered, and in this case the simple
omission of the word ‘slave,’ despite all parties’ clear understanding of the institution,
had allowed Holt to issue his ringing dicta about free English soil. But if Holt was
correct, then slaves would be “equally [free] when they set foot in Jamaica, or any other
English plantation” because “All our colonies are subject to the laws of England,
although to some purposes they have laws of their own.” Holt had used the legal
diversity of the English empire to limit property-in-man to the colonies, cordoning off the
British Isles as a pocket of free soil, but now the drive for imperial centralization and the
harmonization of colonial and metropolitan law forced Hardwicke to explicitly justify
property-in-man under English law.43
The Lord Chancellor made sure to cover all his bases. First, Hardwicke argued
that the common law of servitude allowed for slavery, noting that the claim in Pearne
was “for the use of Negroes” and English law clearly allowed subjects to “hire the
servant of another, whether he be a slave or not.” But servitude was not slavery, and the
Lord Chancellor knew it. Likely aware that arguments from the law of master and
servant had repeatedly failed in the Holt court, Hardwicke turned to villeinage, the old
standby of English apologists for slavery. After briefly rehearsing the distinctions
between villeins regardent in villeins in gross, he argued that “although [feudal] tenures
are taken away, there are no laws that have destroyed servitude absolutely.” Since
“Trover might have been brought for a villain,” and there was “no law to abolish it,”
slavery could exist in English law under the cover of villeinage.44 This was precisely the
argument that Holt had demolished, and the logic antislavery lawyers had turned into a
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tool of emancipation a generation earlier, but the political and economic context had
changed. Lord Hardwicke was arguing in an echo chamber. Neither Perne, nor Lisle,
nor any other immediate party to the case was likely to dispute his basic assumptions
about the legitimacy of property-in-man. Furthermore, these assumptions were now
clearly supported by Parliamentary legislation and imperial policy. There was not even
an antislavery argument presented to the court. Even still, Hardwicke could not pass up
an opportunity to finish off the old antislavery argument from baptism once and for all.
He admitted that “there was once a doubt, whether, if [slaves] were christened, they
would not become free by that act,” but now there could be no such doubts.
“Precautions” had been taken in the colonies “to prevent their being baptised,” and the
Yorke-Talbot opinion dictated that Christianity “did not alter their state,” even in
England itself.45
Whatever the crown’s lawyers, Parliament, or the courts said about the legality of
imperial slavery, however, not everyone was convinced of its desirability. Though
Britons’ moral and political arguments against slavery were as old as their involvement
with the institution, the outsize role slavery played in the mid-18th century imperial
economy provoked new economic arguments as well, the first stirrings of a cohesive free
labor critique of chattel slavery. A remarkable pamphlet by an anonymous Jamaican
settler of clear Patriot Whig sensibilities, published in London in the late 1740s,
illustrates the ways in which earlier moral arguments intersected with new economic
considerations, increasingly racialized ideologies, and the demographic realities of
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settlement to shape 18th century English arguments against the slave trade and, even if
only haltingly, slavery itself.
The author of An Essay Concerning Slavery claimed that the English plantation
complex in Jamaica was in grave danger “owing to the too great Number of Negroes.”
Though he admitted to being “affected with the moral [argument]” against slavery, and
wished “with all my Heart, that Slavery was abolish’d entirely, and hope in Time it may
be so,” he admitted that “to do it at once, would be itself a great Evil.”46 Instead, he
proposed “hindering the further Importation of Slaves,” and initiating a gradual shift to
free labor in some sectors of the plantation economy. The slave trade to the Spanish
colonies might still continue and West Indian plantations should still produce marketable
crops, but by banning further slave importations Jamaica would be spared economic
decline and the devastation of servile rebellion – as the author wryly noted, “let us be
Wicked still, but let us not be Fools.”47
An Essay’s antislavery argument was rooted in a thoughtful reading of
contemporary political philosophy and expressed in the language of Whig revolution
principles, citing authorities including Locke, Puffendorf, and Wollatson. The
anonymous author began with a simple (and increasingly ubiquitous) statement – “in a
State of Nature, Men are equal in respect of Dominion [and] free by Nature.” This
“Birth-right” of liberty could certainly be lost or limited, however. It could be “sold...for
a certain and more plentiful Maintenance” as in English servitude,
“forfeited...by...Crimes” under law, or “taken away...by Force.” The first two routes to
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bondage were “agreeable to Nature” and scripture, and were regulated by legislation.
The third, however, which the author termed “the Right of War,” was “contrary to the
Law of Nature, and...the Law of God.” Though this war slavery doctrine had been
“introduc’d with great Solemnity into the Law of Nations, and supported by grave
Authorities,” An Essay argued that this reasoning was “built upon a false Foundation.”48
The problem, the anonymous author argued, was a conflation of the law of war
and the rights of conquest. Though he admitted that the law of war conferred the power
of life and death upon enemy combatants, the traditional basis for war slavery doctrine,
when combat ends “the State of War ceases, and consequently its Rights cease with it.”
After a war ends, then, “a Conqueror...cannot, by the Right of Conquest, take away his
Adversary’s Life, and consequently cannot take away his Liberty, his Right to the latter
being founded on his Right to the other.” There was a practical reason to abandon war
slavery doctrine as well. If slavery was merely a state of war continued, then “it must be
owned the Conqueror has a Right to kill the other, but the other has likewise the same
Right, though not the same Power to kill him.” War slavery doctrine might justify chattel
slavery, but it also justified violent servile rebellion.49
Basing slavery on the power of life and death conferred by the law of war also
undercut the principles of consent and limited authority upon which human society, and
particularly post-Glorious Revolution British constitutionalism, rested. As An Essay
argued, “all social Rights must be founded upon Compact...between Persons that are free,
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and in their own Power.” The threat of death might extort a promise of service “out of
Fear” and the natural instinct for self-preservation, but “no Right to a Man’s perpetual
Service can be founded upon it” because such a compact would be “in its Nature void, as
obtained by Duresse.” Slavery, like servitude, could not exist without the free consent of
the enslaved.50
Claiming a right to perpetual servitude through war slavery doctrine also
perverted the course of justice by granting the power of life and death as a “divine right”
to individual masters. All persons had the power of life and death in a state of nature,
where the right of self-preservation and the pre-civil war of all against all required
violence to safeguard life, liberty, and property, but this dominion could only belong to
those powerful enough to subdue the weak, and “Power gives no Right.” The physical
authority masters lorded over their slaves, then, was not a right but the mere consequence
of brute force. This unchecked physical violence made English slave owners responsible
for a continuing state of war on imperial plantations, “for all the Murders the Negroes
commit on White Men,...[and] all the Executions we make of them, whether in the Field,
or on the Gibbet.” Masters might exercise this kind of physical dominion in a state of
nature, “but the Magistrate is alone invested with it in a civil Society.” With war slavery
doctrine thoroughly discredited, the philosophical basis of slavery disappeared – restored
to their natural freedom, enslaved persons must give consent to their servitude and be
subject only to the bracketed authority of duly appointed magistrates, just as other British
subjects were.51

50
51

Ibid., 5-12, passim.
Ibid., 5-16, passim.

402

Despite its lengthy discussion and dismissal of the philosophical basis of slavery,
the main concern of An Essay was far more prosaic. The anonymous author spent the
majority of his pamphlet addressing the “Proportion of Freemen (of one Colour or
another, white black or yellow...) to Slaves,” and the impact this demographic ratio had
on the economic productivity and physical security of Jamaican plantations.52 Jamaican
planters, in their “Rage...for buying Negroes” and “total Unconcern for every Thing that
doth not regard their immediate Interest,” had sowed the seeds of slave rebellion and
stifled economic opportunity for free settlers of more modest means.53 Since these selfinterested planter grandees were unlikely to remedy the situation on their own, the author
called for a ban on the “further Importation of Negroes...by a British Act of Parliament.”
With new importations ended, planters would be forced to “make the most of the Negroes
they have” by sending their “lazy House-Slaves” and skilled laborers “into the Field, their
proper Place.” With all slaves relegated to field labor, and further regulations passed
excluding slaves from skilled trades, “Business within Door” would be done by “White
and Free-People.”54 By the author’s reckoning, Jamaica’s skilled labor market was
dominated by “two or three white Men...and about a Score of free Negroes and
Mulattoes, with their slaves.” The use of slave labor allowed this handful of artisans to
“monopolize all the Work” and “[keep] up the Price of Labour.” Competition in a free
labor market would bring down the price of skilled labor and attract new white settlers,
who otherwise would not come since they “doth not care to be put upon the same Foot
with Negroes, and serve with them under another.”55 Ending the slave trade would be the
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first step in securing a free, white labor force in Jamaica and implementing Patriot Whig
political economy.
There was also space for free black labor in this new Jamaica, however, and
selective emancipation was a crucial element of the anonymous author’s free labor
argument. An Essay Concerning Slavery proposed that, since substantial white migration
was unlikely in the short term, planters should free “a limited Number of Slaves in each
Plantation” to be brought up as artisans and slave drivers under indentures of “fourteen
Years, or some large Term.” The “Negroe Towns” could also supply “many Children fit
for some Trade” who would be apprenticed, “taken by Degrees out of that savage Way,
and made useful to the Community.” These children would “be in a manner Hostages for
the Fidelity of the Parents,” once again extracting a double benefit to the planter class.
Once these indentures or apprenticeships were complete, emancipated slaves would be
given small plots of land “at an easy Rent, or some Service” and become stakeholders in
Jamaican society. As a “Freeholder and Tenant, under certain Conditions to the State,” a
former slave would “be still useful” to the colony. This system would “effectually secure
[the] Fidelity” of the freed people, “oblige [them] to live upon their own Work” and
prevent them from becoming a “Nusance to the Community,” and provide an incentive to
“keep the rest [of those still enslaved] in Obedience.”56
Barring further slave imports and initiating selective, gradual emancipation would
also bring another benefit – increased physical security from slave rebellion and foreign
invasion. An Essay Concerning Slavery argued that a controlled and limited
emancipation plan would guarantee “a proper Number of Freemen, White, Black, or
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Yellow” on each plantation. Having one free resident for every ten or twelve slaves
would guarantee that the enslaved “would be better kept to their Work and do twice as
much” and prevent them from “running into the Woods” or rebelling.57 Furthermore,
controlled gradual emancipation would provide every plantation with “a tolerable
Company of free Negroes fit for Arms, which would be of vast Service” in putting down
rebellions and repelling invasions. “A free Negroe that has fifteen or twenty Acres of his
own,” the author avowed, “will defend it with his Life against the French or Spaniards.”
Rather than facing the “Danger of every Slave’s turning against” them to seek freedom
during an invasion, planters could “be sure of the free Negroes” standing with them in
defense of Jamaica. Planters would even benefit financially from a free black militia –
rather than purchasing costly insurance on their estates in times of expected invasion,
often at “10 per Cent. and that for six Months,” planters could save money by “Mak[ing]
one of your best Negroes out of every ten free...that is the best 10 per Cent. Insurance.”58
Though it falls well short of a call for the total abolition of slavery, the plan
proposed by An Essay Concerning Slavery – a slave importation ban coupled with smallscale conditional emancipation and the promotion of Patriot Whig free labor political
economy – illustrates how older English antislavery arguments stressing the moral and
political costs of slavery were integrated into a new economic vision of the imperial
common wealth. As will be illustrated below, the author of An Essay also had deep
moral qualms with slavery that bear a striking resemblance to those expressed by Henry
Parker, Morgan Godwyn, Samuel Sewall, and the antislavery lawyers so conspicuous in
the Holt Court. And despite the racial exclusivity of his rhetoric, the anonymous
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pamphleteer could still conceive of free black Britons as active members of Jamaica’s
settler community – as artisans, as landowners, as militia members, as fellow subjects.
He and a growing number of like-minded Britons welded the economic necessities of
empire to already-potent arguments about the illegitimacy of property-in-man and the
inclusion of Afro-Britons in the community of subjects.
Indeed, it was next to impossible to consider the place of slavery in the mideighteenth century British Empire without addressing questions of subjecthood, for such
questions were already in the air. A number of factors informed the increased attention to
the boundaries of the British nation in Hanoverian England. The ascension of the house
of Hanover in 1714 brought yet another foreign-born monarch to the throne of Great
Britain – the second in a generation – raising the specter of foreign influence in the royal
court and further destabilizing the accident of birth within British dominions as a basis
for subjecthood. Furthermore, the official state policy of Protestant toleration made
membership in the Church of England an increasingly problematic foundation for
subjecthood, opening up the possibility of full British subjecthood to dissenting
Protestants and even, for a short time, British Jews. The budding field of political
economy also played a crucial role in shaping debates over subjecthood. As competition
with continental and imperial rivals intensified, many Britons came to believe that an
open naturalization policy would bolster the common wealth by attracting skilled labor,
foreign capital, and military prowess to Britain and its colonies. In a political context
where the Protestant succession remained threatened by Stuart Pretenders and their
Jacobite allies, and in a global economy where French Catholic absolutism appeared
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poised to seize the initiative in Atlantic commerce, expanding the boundaries of the
nation made good sense.
In this new context, the basis of subjecthood shifted decisively away from
religious conformity or birth on British soil to an increased focus on allegiance and
economic productivity. To promote this imperial vision of loyal, industrious Protestants
working for the common wealth of the whole British nation, Parliament passed a series of
naturalization acts that refined and expanded on earlier legislation passed after the
Glorious Revolution. Even before this flurry of legislation, Britons worried that their
relatively small population – only 7 million people inhabited the British Isles, as
compared to well over 22 million in France – put them at a serious disadvantage in
European economic competition.59 In his 1718 A Survey of Trade, for example, William
Wood, despite his later adherence to mainline Walpolean Whiggery, argued that liberal
naturalization policies, along with free trade for all Britons and general religious
toleration, would put “all the Subjects of Great Britain on an equal foot” and be “of
happy Consequence to this Nation.” Since “PEOPLE are the real Strength and Riches of
all Nations,” attracting foreigners would only benefit Britain – “by a quick Vent and
Consumption of the Product of the Country, the Value of all home Commodities would
be raised, Land and Houses yield greater Rents, and Money by its Increase and quick
Circulation be plentiful.”60
Here was a policy to please all sectors of British society – merchants and
craftsmen would benefit from an overall increase in trade, the landed classes from
increased rents, and financiers from a freer circulation of money and credit. If this
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economic boon was not enough to convince skeptical Britons, there were political
benefits to consider as well. Writing only three years after the abortive 1715 Jacobite
rising, Wood stressed that these new subjects would have to demonstrate their allegiance
and live “under as strict an Obligation of Loyalty and Duty as any of the Native
Subjects,” but, once they experienced “the Excellency of our Constitution and Laws,”
naturalized Britons would become patriotic subjects and rally to defend their adopted
homeland from foreign enemies and Stuart pretenders.61
The British Nationality Act of 1730, the Plantations Act of 1740, the British
Subjects Act of 1751, and the short-lived Jewish Naturalization Act of 1753 all put this
impulse into action, opening British subjecthood to broader masses of strangers, and the
debates surrounding these pieces of legislation illustrate the continuing contest over the
boundaries of national and imperial identity in Hanoverian Britain. The Nationality Act
of 1730, for example, dealt with the issues raised by an increasingly mobile imperial
population by declaring that any children of British fathers born outside the king’s
dominions were natural-born subjects. Reflecting continued fears of Jacobite influence
and the increasing salience of political loyalty as a basis for subjecthood, the Nationality
Act specifically exempted the children of any fathers who had been attainted for treason
or employed by a foreign prince – neither the Old Pretender or Bonnie Prince Charlie
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could be a Briton under this definition.62 The British Nationality Act of 1751 went even
further and removed proscriptions on the ownership of landed property from the children
of aliens who inherited British real estate.63 Blood ties remained important in
determining British subjecthood – lineal descent through a male line was still necessary
to inherit landed estates and the political power that came with them – but loyalty and
economic utility had clearly supplanted geography and religious conformity as the basis
for subjecthood by the mid-18th century.
This tendency was even more explicit overseas in Britain’s demographically
diverse empire. As we have seen, colonial governments had always had a great deal of
leeway in granting naturalization to settlers, but the increasing centralization of the
imperial bureaucracy led Parliament to codify naturalization procedures in the Plantation
Act of 1740. The act echoed the pro-naturalization position of political economists like
William Wood and Josiah Child, stating that “the Increase of People is a Means of
advancing the Wealth and Strength of any Nation or Country” and arguing that the
“Lenity of our Government, the Purity of our Religion, the Benefit of our Laws, the
Advantages of our Trade, and the Security of our Property” would cement the loyalty of
“Foreigners and Strangers” to their naturalized homeland. To guarantee these benefits to
both the empire and its foreign settlers, the Plantation Act decreed that any strangers who
resided in a British colony for seven years without an absence of longer than two months,
took an oath of allegiance affirming the Protestant succession, and paid a nominal fee of
two shillings, would be accounted “his Majesty’s natural born Subjects.” To ease the
naturalization of colonial Quakers, the requirement for oath-taking was relaxed – Friends
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were required only to affirm the substance of the oath through a Declaration of Fidelity –
and colonial Jews were allowed to omit the words “upon the true Faith of a Christian”
from the oath. To be sure, there were still glaring omissions in this colonial
naturalization procedure. Catholics were expressly excluded, and naturalized colonial
subjects were barred from holding office or owning real estate in Britain itself.64
Taken as a whole, however, the Plantation Act illustrates how the dictates of
imperial economic competition altered earlier ideals of colonial subjecthood. Even
marginalized and oft-oppressed groups like Quakers and Jews could now enjoy the full
benefits of British subjecthood, as long as they proved their loyalty and allegiance. The
Plantation Act was so successful that at least a few Britons hoped to open naturalization
even further and introduce similar legislation in the British Isles as well. In 1747, for
example, George Coade, a successful wool merchant from Dorset, urged a “universal
Naturalization of the whole Race of Mankind, of whatever Kingdom or Nation under
Heaven, without Exception,” and the access of “People, from all Corners of the World,
the Jew, the Pagan, the Mahometan, the Persian, [and] the Chinese” to “the Protection of
our Laws” as the surest way to guarantee continued economic success and “Balance the
Greatness of any other Country in Europe.”65
These extremely open colonial naturalization policies, however, were not so
easily transposed to the metropole, where traditional links between popular Protestantism,
cultural ‘English-ness,’ and subjecthood were far stronger. This tension between popular
xenophobia and liberal naturalization was most evident in the debates over the so-called
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‘Jew Bill’ of 1753. There had long been some support for Jewish naturalization among
British political economists. Josiah Child, for example, in his New Discourse of Trade,
argued that since “All men [are] by Nature alike,” it was mere prejudice that prevented
Britons from accepting Jews as fellow subjects. “Fear is the cause of Hatred,” Child
asserted, and British xenophobia led proscribed outsiders “to Sedition and Rebellion”
rather than patriotic love of country. If Britons would only practice that “Perfect Love
that casts out Fear” and shed their anti-Semitic bias, British Jews, who like “all men are
in love with Liberty and Security,” would prove themselves loyal, industrious, and
productive subjects.66 To Child and other advocates of Jewish naturalization, the
absorption of new subjects into the community of the realm would have to be
accompanied by a turn away from British cultural exclusivity.
The Jewish Naturalization Act of 1753 put this ideal into practice, decreeing that
“Jews, upon Application to Parliament, may be naturalized without taking the
Sacrament.” This was a costly procedure, to be sure, and without a weighty patron in
Westminster it could be difficult to get a naturalization bill before Parliament, but the
Jewish Naturalization Act broke with centuries of legal tradition in opening up
subjecthood to Jewish immigrants. Any Jewish foreigner resident in Britain or Ireland
for at least three years could apply for Parliamentary naturalizaion. The rationale behind
the act was simple – the sacremental test prevented “many Persons of considerable
Substance professing the Jewish Religion” from adding their economic clout to the
British nation. Besides, the statute noted, such procedures were already in place in the
colonies under the terms of the 1740 Plantations Act, and the presence of Jewish settlers
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there had done nothing to hurt the imperial economy or undermine Christian religion.67
The Jewish Naturalization Act passed easily through the House of Lords and, despite
stirrings of popular dissatisfaction and Tory fears for the Anglican establishment, was
pushed through the Commons by a solid Whig majority.68 Outisde the halls of
Westminster, the popular press also showed some enthusiasm for Jewish naturalization,
with one author arguing that it would “bring an Addition of Men, Money and Trade into
the Kingdom...[and] tend to a general Advantage.”69
Not all Britons agreed that open naturalization, particularly for cultural outsiders
like Jews, would benefit the nation, however. In the wake of the passage of the Jewish
Naturalization Act, a hefty dose of anti-Semitism was added to this potent mixture of
xenophobia and fear of economic competition. Under the pen name ‘Britannia,’ one
author laid out a litany of grievances against British Jews, calling them a “brutish, stupid,
ungrateful, Covenant-breaking Nation; a Seed of Evil Doers, a Generation of Vipers”
who delighted in crucifying Christian children and sought to “over-ballance the Interest
of the Natives by their prodigious Purchases.”70 Again illustrating the potential these
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debates had to spill over into broader fears of general naturalization, other Britons
worried that George Coade’s earlier plans would come to fruition and Jewish
naturalization would serve as an opening wedge in offering the benefits of British
subjecthood to “the Mahometans,...Turks, Tartars, Persians, or Indians” as well.71
Another pamphleteer, supportive of Jewish naturalization, claimed to have overheard
opponents worrying that “in time we shall have the first Offices in our State and Capital,
occupied by Jews, that they will purchase and over-run our Land, and, that we shall
become their Slaves.”72 Arguments about fundamental human equality or the national
economic good could not withstand such withering prejudice.
In the end, these anti-Semitic arguments, combined with the political pressure of
an impending Parliamentary election, led to the repeal of the Jewish Naturalization Act in
1754 – British Jews would not again be considered full subjects until 1858. Still, if the
economic dictates of imperial competition could force a reconsideration of the status of
Jewish subjects, other excluded groups might have hope as well. Though the Jewish
Naturalization Act only impacted foreign Jews, many Britons responded as though all
Jews, even those born in Britain itself, were permanent outsiders who could never be true
British subjects. Against this argument, some supporters of open access to subjecthood
revived the old argument about birthright subjecthood elucidated in Calvin’s Case back
in the early 17th century. In his Appeal to the Friends of Great-Britain, one pamphleteer,
writing under the pen name “Friend to the Nation,” stated this position boldly and
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forthrightly. “What Law in Nature can there be,” he asked, “against any Person’s
enjoying the common Privileges of a Society, or Nation into which they are born; and to
which they were join’d by their...loyal Obedience to the Rules of that Polity[?]”73 The
mid-18th century debates over naturalization had spilled over into a more general
consideration of the nature and basis of subjecthood. Natural law, some argued, dictated
that all persons born into British society must be subjects as long as they were loyal and
obedient, and Britons like George Coade hoped to see the benefits of subjecthood
extended to “all People upon the Earth.”74 Under this rubric, could colonial Afro-Britons,
or even slaves, be considered subjects as well?
This question, of course, could not easily be answered. Under the terms of the
Yorke-Talbot opinion and Hardwicke’s logic in Pearne v. Lisle, slaves were classed as
articles of property without access to even the most basic rights, clearly beyond the pale
of British subjecthood. As we shall see, most Virginians, like other colonial planters,
certainly continued to view their enslaved population in this light. But in other colonies,
relatively large free black populations continued to actively assert their subjecthood,
while in Massachusetts the peculiar local history of slavery dovetailed with this new
emphasis on open access to subjecthood to reinforce the access of even enslaved Africans
to basic legal rights. In the context of this imperial debate over naturalization, the
antislavery significance of the anonymous Jamaican Essay concerning Slavery becomes
far more obvious as well – political economic arguments about population growth and
national productivity; metropolitan debates over naturalization and access to subjecthood;
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public criticism of the profligate luxury and vice associated with slave trading and the
South Sea Bubble; and older moral and legal arguments against property-in-man were
woven together to produce a coherent critique of the plantation complex, and this in its
very heart. The principles that had informed the Holt court’s antislavery decisions in the
wake of the Glorious Revolution had not disappeared entirely. The Yorke-Talbot
opinion, the Debt Collection Act of 1732, and Hardwicke’s decision in Pearne v. Lisle,
however, did much to put these antislavery principles on the defensive. Indeed, these
legal maneuvers amount to nothing less than a near-total shutdown of English imperial
antislavery.
There was one group of Britons, however, that did begin to channel antislavery
sentiment into an institutional structure capable of enforcing an emancipatory agenda –
the Society of Friends. Historians have long noted the central role Quakers played in the
development of Anglo-American antislavery thought, and there is much to recommend
this position. Committed to a radically egalitarian reading of scripture, a total disavowal
of the “carnal sword,” and a belief that the golden rule should govern all human relations,
Quaker theology, born amidst the upheaval of the English Civil Wars, was, in many
ways, inimical to human slavery. George Fox, founder of the Society of Friends, first
testified against slavery after a trip to Barbados in the 1660s, and the 1688 antislavery
petition from the Quakers of Germantown, Pennsylvania, is one of the earliest recorded
institutional stands against human slavery. In the mid-18th century, growing numbers of
Quakers, including Ralph Sandiford, Benjamin Lay, and John Woolman, publically
denounced slavery in a series of pamphlets circulated throughout the empire. These few,
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however, were lone voices crying out in the wilderness, unable to gain a serious hearing
beyond their own local meetinghouses, nevermind in the empire as a whole.75
Or so we are typically told. The Friends’ principled religious stand against
slavery needed the upheaval of the American Revolution and its infusion of natural rights
rhetoric into political discourse before it could take root and blossom into true American
antislavery. When read in light of earlier English antislavery arguments and in the
context of the mid-18th century, rather than backward from the American Revolution and
early republican gradual emancipation, however, these Quaker testimonies appear far less
exceptional. It is certainly true that mid-18th century Friends took a relatively novel tack
in linking arguments about slavery’s illegitimacy with the New Testament’s emphasis on
the so-called golden rule – “Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do
unto you, do ye even so to them” – and pointing out that “Tyranizing over and making
Slaves of our Fellow Creatures, the Negroes, every one knows...is not the way they
would be done unto.”76 Other critics also stressed the violence inherent to human slavery
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as fundamentally incompatible with Quaker nonviolence. To Friends, the Golden Rule
required that they “do violence to no Man, without excepting either Indian or
Ethiopian”77
Mid-18th century Quakers were also in the vanguard in taking action against
slavery within their own “nation,” crafting arguments for the gradual emancipation of
slaves held by Friends.78 Ralph Sandiford laid out a clear plan for individual Quaker
meetings to begin gradually divesting themselves of their slaves. Rather than simply
selling off enslaved people to “worse Masters, thereby to add Sin to Sin,” but rather to
manumit slaves “in their Youth” and provide them with “a Trade and Necessaries.”
Sandiford, likely speaking for many Quakers, clearly preferred “with their Consent [to]
send [freed people] back into their own Country.” Even without colonization, however,
Quakers were obliged by the “Spirit of the Gospels” to “proclaim the Jubilee...unto them,
that they may go forth freely.” If formerly enslaved pelpe who remained in Quaker
households as servants, it could only be by “their own Consent” and could not be a
“Covenant for their Children.” These children were to be raised with “a humane and a
Christian Education, that they may be capacitated at a proper Age, of doing for
themselves, both for this World and the World to come.”79 Renounce absolute
proprietary interests in the persons of slaves and ensure the legal freedom and education
of the children of gradual emancipation – Sandiford’s recommendation presaged later
legislation that finally abolished slavery throughout much of revolutionary and early
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national America. This was a crucial step in the history of antislavery thought. A clear
agenda for abolition was emerging from the Society of Friends.80
In other ways, however, Quakers were perfectly in line with the earlier English
antislavery tradition developed during the Civil Wars and refined by the Holt Court.
First, as we have seen, early English antislavery thought had a robust moral element that
prefigured and paralleled the Quakers’ principled stand against human bondage. It would
be difficult to accuse Henry Parker, Morgan Godwyn, or Samuel Sewall with moral
turpitude when it came to outright chattel slavery, and they all drew special attention to
the physical plight of slaves on the ground in the colonies, just as the Quakers now did.
The Friends’ fellow mid-18th century critics of slavery, from all denominations, had a
strong moral component to their antislavery as well, and Quaker authors regularly
appealed to broader audiences in their tracts.
John Hepburn, for example, praised Cotton Mather’s stance on slavery, lauded the
few “excellent souls” scattered throughout the colonies who “openly...declare against”
slavery, and cited a number of non-Quaker printed sources. Indeed, Hepburn argued,
“neither Church-men or Presbyterians have generally agreed in making Slaves of
Negros; For some of both have preached and some have printed against it here in NorthAmerica.”81 Ralph Sandiford, in his 1730 Mystery of Iniquity, pointed out that there were
“man-stealers” in “sundry places of worship” throughout the empire, but also noted that
“the Righteous in all Churches are undefiled with [slavery]” and called on “the bishops
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and ministers of all churches” to take action against slaveholding. He also drew on
earlier English antislavery arguments, specifically citing Morgan Godwyn as precedent,
and admitted that his antislavery ideals grew from his “Education...in the Church of
England” before his conversion to Quakerism. In closing his pamphlet, Sandiford
appealed not only to his fellow Friends, but to “the king...and his council” and the “true
British Spirit” of “the whole realm.”82 Antislavery Quakers knew they had potential
allies scattered throughout the empire, and their arguments were tailored to convince not
only their fellow Friends, but to all members of “the true catholick church of Christ” and
“such as are concerned in the government.”83
Nor were the moral arguments put forth by Quakers foreign to their broader
Anglophone audience. The anonymous Jamaican author of the Essay Concerning
Slavery for example, almost certainly not a member of the Society of Friends, admitted to
being “tinged with that Passion” against slavery, much as Quakers were, and argued that
human bondage was “contrary to the Law of God and Nature.” He illustrated from
biblical text that, since Christ “broke down the Bounds that separated the Jew from the
Gentile, all Nations that believe the Gospel are obliged...to observe the same Rules of
Behaviour towards those of other Nations, as the Jews were obliged to observe one
towards the other” – a golden rule for international relations.84 He also provided readers
with grim descriptions of the tortures visited on enslaved bodies. Some slaves “pine
away and are starved.” Others, to sate their hunger, “go a stealing, and are shot as they
are caught,” while still others “are whipt, or even hang’d for going into the Woods, into
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which Hunger and necessity itself drives them to...keep Life and Soul together.” “Are the
Lives of human Creatures,” the anonymous Jamaican asked, “to be play’d with...as a
giddy thoughtless Planter thinks fit?”85 One need not stretch too far to imagine how
Ralph Sandiford or Benjamin Lay would respond. Clearly, Quakers did not have a
monopoly on moral and theological arguments against slavery.
Nor were Quaker arguments rooted exclusively in their unique theological
perspective – Friends also drew on and refined earlier political arguments against slavery
as well. Ralph Sandiford, for example, echoed earlier arguments by Henry Parker and
Morgan Godwyn in stressing “the Injury” slavery did to “the Common-Wealth” by
“setting up the Rich in Arbitrary Power.” Avaricious slave owners, having sacrificed
their “Publick Spirit” on the altar of “Power and Riches,” would think it a sign of their
“Honour” to “subvert Justice” and reduce their fellow subjects “into the same Captivity”
as their African slaves. Such men “must needs be corrupt in the Government, and more
especially in Offices of Trust,” and Sandiford recommended that subjects “reject such out
of the Legislative Power” to chasten haughty slaveholders and protect traditional English
liberties.86 New Jersey Quaker John Hepburn also indicted slavery on political grounds,
arguing that slave ownership led masters to lose all “regard to the lawfulness of what they
do.”87 In this sense, Quakers shared a great deal with other imperial critics of slavery.
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Our anonymous Jamaican pamphleteer, for example, argued not “from a moral View
only...but from a political one too.”88 Here, admittedly, his analysis did depart from the
typical Quaker argument. As we have seen, An Essay concerning Slavery presented a
sophisticated political argument rooted in natural rights ideology, the disavowal of
captivity in war as a legitimate basis for slavery, and the bracketing of legitimate
authority by law. This detailed dissection of the philosophical origins of slavery,
however, was not a repudiation of Quaker claims, but an elaboration of earlier
antislavery ideals upon which Friends also drew.
Quakers also shared the growing imperial concern over the economic dangers of
slavery. As we have seen, the anonymous Jamaican author of An Essay concerning
Slavery based his critique, in no small part, on the unfair competition between slave and
free labor, and colonial Friends also decried the damaging influence of slavery on their
ideal free labor economies.89 John Hepburn argued that slavery inculcated a love of
luxury in masters, who raised “their Sons and Daughters in Idleness and Wantonness, and
in all manner of Pride and Prodigality, in decking and adorning their Carkasses with
pufft and powdered Hair, with Ruffles and Top-knots, Ribbands and Lace, and gay
Cloathing.” Meanwhile, in a “Country [that] abounds which [sic] Negros,” common
subjects would “want Imploy, and must either beg or steal for their Living.”90 A
generation later, Ralph Sandiford urged that the colonies should be “an open country
(were slaves kept out) for our own poor to come...and to enjoy to themselves the fulness
of the earth.” The growth of slavery meant that the “meanest of...subjects” were

88

[Anon.], Essay concerning Slavery, introduction [np],
Ibid., [pages for political economic critique].
90
Hepburn, American Defence, 4, 35.
89

421

necessarily “reduced where slaves abound, [and] have starved for want of business, for
the rich need not [their labor], and the poor could not employ them.” Allowing slavery to
continue would prevent colonists from enjoying “the Riches of the Earth, wherewith we
might be of general Service in the Body, by employing of our own Poor, many of
whom...want Bread; Labour being reduced that they cannot live by it.” Because the slave
labor economy “levels [all] Labour at the Price of Bondslaves,” Sandiford was left to
wonder, if slavery continued to grow, “where shall we and our Children then be?”91
Imperial settlers like the Jamaican author of An Essay concerning Slavery and the
colonial legislators who attempted to regulate local involvement in the slave trade clearly
shared these economic concerns.
Even the Quakers’ gradual emancipation plans appear less unique in the context
of a longer Anglophone antislavery tradition. Ralph Sandiford drew directly on Morgan
Godwyn’s antislavery principles for precedent in framing his proposal for the
emancipation of the children of enslaved people.92 Nor were Quakers the only mid-18th
century Britons to espouse a form of gradual emancipation. The anonymous author of An
Essay concerning Slavery, while certainly not calling for a universal gradual
emancipation as some Quakers now did, argued that “if no more Slaves be imported, and
those we have put under good Regulations” by the imperial state, then “Time will do the
rest, which is the best Mender, when Things are put in a good train...doing its Business
by imperceptible Touches and Degrees.” Much as Quakers did, he advocated gradually
freeing small numbers of slaves, training them in a trade, and integrating them into a free
labor economy. Though his ten-percent plan would only have freed a handful of slaves,
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the anonymous Jamaican outdid even the Quakers in one regard – unlike Ralph
Sandiford, who called for the repatriation of freed slaves to Africa, he could envision an
imperial economy of free laborers “of one Colour or another, white black or yellow”
working side by side as fellow subjects for the good of the empire.93
Though refined and elaborated over time, this antislavery argument, shared by
Britons of many faiths, was essentially the same as that proposed by Henry Parker in Jus
Populi a century earlier – interpose the power of the state between master and slave, limit
the power of the former and recognize the legal humanity of the latter, and slavery would
cease to exist. Admittedly, it is difficult to confirm whether individual antislavery
thinkers drew directly on Parker or Godwyn, or the extent to which mainstream English
antislavery drew on arguments elaborated within the Society of Friends, but the
congruence of Anglophone antislavery arguments across geographic, temporal, and
denominational space is striking nonetheless. Perhaps what makes the Quakers most
significant, then, is not the particular moral stance they took against slavery, but the
presence of an institutional structure that could disseminate antislavery ideals and,
eventually, force compliance with emancipation within the Society of Friends. While
antislavery thinkers in other institutional contexts continued to run up against entrenched
proslavery ideals that precluded such action, the Quakers could use their consensus-based
theology to pressure individual Friends to emancipate their slaves. This was no small
feat, to be sure, but the impetus behind Quaker antislavery was far more widespread than
their reputation as a lone voice crying out in the wilderness suggests.
***
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In the autumn of 1730, the largest slave rebellion in Virginia’s colonial history
broke out. It was mid-September, one of the most demanding moments in the annual
tobacco cycle, a time when enslaved people often ran off to escape the most grueling
labor, so perhaps the first few escapes went relatively unnoticed. A small-scale rebellion
was put down relatively quickly in the first week of the month, and all seemed as usual in
the Old Dominion. But with a rumor circulating along the slave grapevine that recently
returned Alexander Spotswood carried orders from the crown to emancipate
Christianized slaves, the tension in the colony was palpable. On a Sunday in September
1730, while their masters attended church, hundreds of enslaved men and women in
Norfolk and Queen Anne counties massed together, selected officers, and ran off “in
order to obtain their freedom.” Perhaps they planned to make for the Blue Ridge, where
a maroon community had been broken up only a year earlier, or for the Great Dismal
Swamp on the border with North Carolina, long home to small fugitive communities.94
Whatever their ultimate plan, these well-organized bands of rebels “committed many
outrages against the Christians” and “did a great deal of Mischief” as they progressed
through the Virginia countryside.95
Then the Old Dominion’s system of slave police law sprung into action, swift and
brutal. Details are scarce, but by the end of the month hundreds of enslaved people had
been rounded up by militia and slave patrols and given “severe chastisement,” while the
purported leaders of the conspiracy were rounded up and publically tortured and
executed. Other enslaved people, like the twenty-four men and women James Brickell
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saw hanged in a forest along the North Carolina border, met their death at the hands of
vigilantes empowered by Virginia law to kill any resisting slave with impunity. 96 With a
coordinated insurgency breaking out nearly simultaneously throughout the colony,
planter elites had good reason to be anxious, but in the end the apparatus of slavery
worked precisely as it was designed to – it detected and quelled the rebellion and meted
out exemplary, often extralegal violence to the enslaved men and women involved (along
with many who were not). Virginia planters may have been anxious about a great many
things, but, outside of their nightmares, a large-scale slave rebellion does not seem to
have been one of them. They were supremely confident in the coercive power of the
slave system they had constructed.97
Some Virginians, however, were somewhat less confident about the long-term
future of the economy slavery had built. Tobacco monoculture left them subject to the
whim of distant and increasingly impersonal economic forces, and the cyclical boom-bust
market for Virginia leaf left many planters teetering on the brink of bankruptcy. As
William Byrd II noted, “some of the poor Planters are already So in debt for necessarys
for their familys that the Slavery of their whole life will never pay for it” – another
nightmarish prospect.98 The tobacco economy could be profitable, but only with
substantial protection and support from metropolitan planners, and these were not
guaranteed. The solution, at least according to most of Virginia’s great planters and the
Walpole ministry, was to double down on slavery and the slave trade, producing as much
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tobacco as possible for re-export to European markets. The Walpolean commitment to
commodities production reinforced Virginia’s gentry-dominated and slave-reliant
tobacco culture, where the great planters hid their anxieties behind a facade of honor and
self-possession, their passions veiled (or inflamed) by the cold logic of economic
interest.99
As we have seen, however, not everyone agreed that plantation slavery and
commodities production were in the best interest of the imperial common wealth. The
Patriot Whigs, along with a small but growing number of Virginians, hoped to see the
Virginia economy develop and diversify. Lesser planters and free laborers would
certainly have benefited from these recommendations, and even a few of the great
planters, William Byrd II notable among them, came to see the logic of Patriot political
economy.100 While this economic critique did little to threaten slave owners’ control over
their enslaved property, its long-term implications for the institution of slavery must have
made many planters anxious. Moral and political objections to slavery had not
disappeared either. The Anglican Church continued to call for increased proselytization
to the enslaved population, keeping the debate over the connection between Christianity
and freedom alive in spite of the Yorke-Talbot Opinion.101 And, as the 1730 rebellion
illustrated, enslaved people themselves responded to these broader imperial debates,
rising in rebellion when the freedom they believed they had been granted was withheld.
The system of slavery, it seems, was the wellspring of most Virginians’ anxieties.
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In mid-18th century Virginia, the center of this system was the trans-Atlantic
trade. Though the enslaved population began to grow by natural increase in the first
decades of the 18th century, the productivity of the plantation system still relied on access
to new slave imports. With the slave trade now open to all British subjects, however,
access to slaves was not the problem it had once been. Indeed, the total enslaved
population of Virginia grew rapidly between 1715 and 1754, from approximately 30,000
to well over 150,000.102 A large proportion of this enslaved population was African born,
as at least 54,000 slaves were imported into Virginia on 284 slaving voyages in this
period.103 By 1760, the nearly 200,000 enslaved people in the Old Dominion made up
nearly forty percent of the total colonial population, and the vast majority of the bound
labor pool. The white indentured population, meanwhile, continued to dwindle in
significance. Likely deterred by the lack of opportunity in Virginia’s gentry-dominated
society, free in-migration also slowed. The mid-century influx of African labor, then,
primarily benefitted the great planters.104
The same economic structure that undergirded the fabulous wealth of Virginia’s
planter elite, however, also created recurrent cycles of boom and bust that left even the
greatest planters, enmeshed in local and imperial webs of debt, exposed to metropolitan
creditors. When times were flush, as they were in the 1690s and into the early years of
the 18th century, planters imported greater quantities of slaves to clear and cultivate more
land, hoping to cash in while the tobacco market was strong. During the boom years
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from 1703 to 1708, Virginians dramatically increased slave imports from less than two
hundred to well over one thousand enslaved people per year, leading to a spectacular
increase in tobacco cultivation. This orgy of production, however, glutted the market and
sent tobacco prices into a tailspin. By 1708, the recession had only deepened, and with
metropolitan creditors calling in Virginia debts, the House of Burgesses began to debate
raising their meager forty-shilling duty on slave imports, hoping to restrict the amount of
tobacco produced and bring prices back up. In 1710, the burgesses raised the colony’s
slave trade impost to a more prohibitive £5, a measure that clearly favored Virginia elites
who could afford to pay it (or could borrow enough from their English merchant
contacts) and maintain production to take advantage of rising prices. But lesser planters,
hoping restrictions on slave imports might help them compete with the great planters,
also supported slave trade taxation. With such broad support the £5 duty was easily
reenacted in 1712 and 1714 and quickly had the desired effect – fewer than three hundred
slaves were imported to Virginia between 1710 and 1713, and tobacco prices began to
rebound.105
Metropolitan planners and crown officials were always skeptical of these imposts,
however, worried they might slow output in a lucrative primary commodities production
zone, lessening royal revenues from re-export duties. Lieutenant Governor Spotswood
was initially wary as well, worried that the £5 duty might be “Interpreted as a
prohibition” and draw the ire of his metropolitan superiors.106 Spotswood eventually
came around to support the imposts – perhaps not coincidentally at the same time he
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became a weighty planter himself – but he did so primarily for economic reasons. As he
explained to the Board of Trade, without the slave trade duty to assist in raising tobacco
prices, Virginians would be unable to repay their debts, forcing them to diversify their
local economy to satisfy their metropolitan creditors. While this might have benefited a
great number of Virginians, and might in the long term have lessened the Old
Dominion’s reliance on African slavery, it would be a disaster as far as imperial planners
were concerned. Virginia was meant to be a commodities production zone, not a
diversified economy of self-sufficient farms and manufactories.107 The position adopted
by Spotswood and the Board of Trade, then, anticipated the Establishment Whig political
economy touted by the Walpolean regime – plantation commodity production and
taxation for re-export – but used a critical element of what would later become Patriot
Whig political economy – restrictions on the slave trade – to achieve its ends.108
By 1715, the tobacco market had entered another boom phase, and the demand for
slaves increased apace. Over 1500 enslaved people were carried into the Old Dominion
each year between 1718 and 1721, with peak imports reaching 2,301 souls in 1721.109
By the early 1720s, in the wake of the South Sea Bubble, tobacco’s wheel of fortune
made yet another turn, sending prices on European markets plunging. As they had fifteen
years earlier, the planters once again attempted to staunch the influx of slaves and bring
tobacco production under control. The imperial context had changed, however, and with
the Walpole/Townshend ministry ascendant and Britain at peace, colonial restrictions on
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the slave trade were a direct challenge to the emergent mercantilist system. Unlike they
had done in the 1710s, in 1723 the House of Burgesses sought only a modest fortyshilling impost, a return to the levels of taxation associated with the revenue duties of the
1690s. Even this modest duty came under attack from metropolitan merchants and
imperial planners. Noting that earlier imposts had proved “a great hindrance to the
Negroe Trade, as well as a Burthen upon the Poore Planters,” the Board of Trade worried
that the 1723 impost would have “ill Consequences” and “Discourage the Planting and
Cultivating [of] Naval Stores.”110 Facing such staunch opposition from the metropole,
Robert Carter, then a member of the Virginia Council, sagely predicted “there’s no doubt
but the African Company will break the neck of this law”111 – the forty-shilling duty was
disallowed by the Privy Council on the grounds that it would cut into the profits of their
merchant allies and repealed by royal proclamation on October 27, 1724.
When Virginians erected a new slave trade duty in 1732, they avoided this
criticism by taxing slave purchasers rather than importers. Unlike the imposts of the
1710s and ‘20s, which were payable by imperial slave merchants, the new duties imposed
a five-percent tax on colonial slave purchasers. When pressed by the Board of Trade to
explain the new slave impost, Governor Gooch framed it as a simple revenue measure
with no discernable impact on imperial trade. Indeed, Gooch bragged, the duty raised
nearly £1000 in annual revenue, defraying the crown’s costs in supporting the colonial
government, and benefitted metropolitan merchants who “receive the same, if not a better
price, for their slaves, as if there were no such duty.”112 The Board of Trade was
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apparently persuaded by this argument, because they let the duty stand, and the House of
Burgesses renewed it with little opposition in 1734 and 1738. The duty was even
increased to ten-percent of the purchase price in 1740, with the additional revenue used to
bolster colonial defenses and provide incentives for enlistment in the war against Spain,
and was renewed again in 1742 and 1745, with Virginians arguing that the tax was “very
necessary...in order to discharge the public debt.” Though the duty lapsed in the summer
of 1751, it was revived again in February 1752 and was not set to expire until 1756.113
Unlike the prohibitive duties of the 1710s and ‘20s, these revived slave trade duties fit
perfectly within the Walpolean vision of empire, offsetting the expense of colonial
administration without overly restricting the inflow of slave labor necessary for
plantation agriculture.
When restriction of slave imports proved untenable, Virginians turned to local
regulation of tobacco production and marketing to stabilize their economy. As had been
the case with the slave trade duties, debates over tobacco regulation hinged on
fundamental differences over political economy. Most of the great planters, men like
Robert Carter and John Custis, supported a thoroughly Walpolean vision of imperial
economy, promoting measures that would bring the tobacco market under control and
protect their dominance in Virginia’s consignment system, where they acted as gobetweens for smaller planters and metropolitan merchants.114 The “stinting” laws passed
in 1723 and 1728 are examples of this position. These were intended to improve the
quality and price of Virginia tobacco by limiting production to six thousand plants per
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laborer. This policy clearly privileged the Virginia gentry at the expense of smaller
planters in the newly settled Piedmont and independent yeoman producers. Large-scale
plantation owners like Carter and Custis had such massive enslaved labor forces that the
six thousand plant cap would have only a minor impact on their economies of scale.
Despite their attempts to regulate the local slave trade, the institution of slavery itself
remained the very heart of Walpolean great planter political economy.115
As in England, however, this position did not go unopposed, and a local hybrid
political economy began to develop that melded elements of the Patriot Whig imperial
vision with Virginia’s distinctive tobacco culture. Adopted primarily by middling
planters, royal officials, and a few dissident Virginia gentlemen like William Byrd II, this
alternative model called for even greater regulation of tobacco production and the
promotion of urbanization and economic diversification in the Old Dominion. This
unlikely coalition came together in 1730, under the leadership of Byrd and Governor
William Gooch, to pass the Tobacco Inspection Act, the most thoroughgoing attempt to
regulate tobacco production in Virginia’s colonial history. Limits on production were
lifted, but all tobacco would now have to be inspected, graded, and stamped at one of
sixty-two public depots to prevent the export of “bad and trash tobacco.” Any tobacco
rendered as payment for debt also had to be registered and inspected at one of these
warehouses.116
William Byrd II, Virginia’s most vocal proponent of Patriot political economy,
hoped that these regulations would improve quality and raise tobacco prices on the
international market, yielding sufficient profits for Virginia planters to begin diversifying
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their local economy. Tobacco depots would ideally develop into thriving market towns
for the produce of the hinterland and entrepots for European imports. A stabilized
tobacco economy would also allow planters to reallocate labor and capital to new crops
like hemp, flax, and wheat, and even to local manufacturing in support of British
shipping. In contrast to the Walpolean political economy espoused by his fellow great
planters, Byrd saw a profitable tobacco economy not as an end in itself, but as a crucial
first step in the further development of the local and imperial economy. While clearly not
an antislavery position – Byrd was himself one of the colony’s largest slave owners and
employed slave labor in myriad roles on his diversifying plantations – in the long run this
distinctive Virginia Patriot political economy pointed toward an alternate future, one less
reliant on tobacco monoculture and plantation slavery.117
On questions of Virginia political economy, however, Byrd and the Board of
Trade were clearly in the minority. Most imperial planners and the vast majority of
Virginians still saw tobacco production and plantation slavery as the surest route to
imperial wealth and colonial social status, and their revisions to the Tobacco Inspection
Act over the years illustrate how they turned it into a prop for the existing plantation
society. As might be expected, the great gentry of Virginia’s tobacco culture believed
their personal seal and reputation as “planters” carried more weight in the market than an
inspector’s stamp, and resented accusations of poor quality. By guaranteeing all planters
some access to public trade depots, the 1730 Inspection Act also cut into the great
planters’ control over the consignment system by giving independent Glaswegian
merchants greater direct access to small and middling planters.118 By opening up the
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tobacco trade to middling planters, however, the Tobacco Inspection Act ended up
reinforcing their commitment to slavery by keeping the Virginia economy hitched to
tobacco monoculture which, in the Old Dominion, meant increased demand for slaves.
Debates over Virginia’s political economy, then, ended up doing precious little to
push the colony in an antislavery direction. Other forces, however, continued to keep the
question of slavery near the center of Virginia politics. The presence of SPG
missionaries, for example, kept alive the old debates over the connections between
Christianity and personal freedom, debates that were supposed to be scotched by the
Yorke-Talbot Opinion and local Virginia statutes. Crucially, enslaved people also
continued to force the issue, using conversion to Christianity as a basis for individual and
collective claims to legal personhood. As we have seen, the great 1730 Chesapeake
rebellion was inspired in part by enslaved peoples’ belief that imperial planners had
declared emancipation for Christian slaves – a particularly ironic belief given that Yorke
and Talbot had issued their famous opinion that baptism would not free a slave only a
year earlier. Christianity may not have directly freed any slaves in mid-18th century
Virginia, but this did not prevent enslaved Christians from pushing for their liberty.119
Nor was the 1730 rebellion the only instance of mass resistance by the enslaved.
A large conspiracy involving over two hundred slaves was uncovered in Rappahannock
County in 1722.120 That same year, three enslaved men – two named Sam and one
Cooper Will – planned a conspiracy that intended to “kill murder & destroy very many”
Virginians before making for the Blue Ridge. A conspiracy of enslaved people in
Gloucester and Middlesex counties in 1723 aimed to burn towns and plantations before
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making a break for freedom. Seven of the conspirators were sold out of the colony as
punishment. Slave runaways were a persistent thorn in Virginia planters’ collective side,
and a small maroon community even began to form along the western frontier in the Blue
Ridge Mountains before it was destroyed by militia in 1729.121 However draconian their
police law, then, Virginians lived in near-constant fear of an ever-present internal enemy.
Virginians may have disagreed about the political economic future of their
colony, but in their response to slave resistance the white settlers of the Old Dominion
spoke with one voice. Two sets of laws passed in 1723 and 1727 restated and refined the
core elements of the colony’s comprehensive 1705 slave code. Issues of slave property
ownership were most directly addressed in 1727 when the House of Burgesses laid out a
comprehensive code regulating the purchase, tenure, transfer, and descent of slaves. As
they had in earlier codes, the Burgesses once again defined slaves as a special form of
real estate. This definition protected slave property from forfeiture for debt or sale by
executors of estates, and the 1727 statute explicitly allowed for slaves to be entailed to an
estate, shielding Virginia slave owners from their creditors and guaranteeing a steady
labor supply on large plantations. Once again, as earlier statutes had done, the 1727 act
also gave slave owners maximum flexibility by allowing masters to “transfer the absolute
property of such slave or slaves” to purchasers without the cumbersome legal devices
typical of real property sales. As a special mixed form of property – real estate in some
cases, chattels in others – slave property was doubly protected under “the rules of the
common law.”122
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Slaves were still defined as a species of property in the Old Dominion, and the
burgesses continued to bolster the physical power of masters over their enslaved
property. A series of acts passed in 1723 restated key elements of the comprehensive
1705 code, barring slaves from congregating in groups larger than five without white
supervision, setting down special procedural rules in cases where slaves were accused of
crimes, and preventing slaves from testifying in cases involving white settlers. Owners
could present a defense for any slaves accused of crimes, but were limited to matters of
fact – challenges to the irregular legal proceedings in slave trials were beyond objection.
Earlier police powers allowing any white settler to kill runaway or resistant slaves with
impunity were restated, and masters would be compensated for any slaves killed during
recapture or “correction.” The right of masters to mutilate or dismember particularly
recalcitrant slaves was also upheld.
To clarify the earlier code, however, the Assembly also now included a clause
allowing for prosecution when slaves were killed “willfully, maliciously, or designedly”
by a non-slave owner. In such cases, however, the white murderer would typically be
tried not for a felony, but rather in a civil suit where the owner could sue for “recovery of
damages for such slave or slaves so killed.” In the rare instance where a white settler
might be tried for the death of a slave, convictions for felony homicide by a jury of
colonial planters were unheard of, and convictions on lesser charges of manslaughter
carried no “forfeiture or punishment for such offence.”123 Virginia justice held the
property rights of slave owners in higher esteem than the lives of enslaved AfroVirginians. Unlike the close attention imperial planners gave to issues of taxation and
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trade, Virginia’s increasingly draconian slave police law drew little opposition from the
Board of Trade – colonial slave owners could do largely as they wished with their own
property.
Colonial legislators also targeted Virginia’s small free black community, and
sought to further limit their access to the traditional rights of British imperial subjects.
To prevent the growth of the free black population, the Burgesses once again limited
access to private manumissions, allowing owners to free their slaves only in cases of
particularly “meritorious services” to the colony, and even then only with the approval of
the governor and council. Any slaves improperly freed under the earlier 1690
manumission regulations were to be seized by parish churchwardens and reenslaved, the
proceeds from their sale going to the parish vestry, and any slaves manumitted in the
future would have to leave the colony within one month or face the same fate. Black
freedom was difficult to attain in mid-18th century Virginia, and even harder to keep.
The few free Afro-Virginians already resident in the colony were barred from
testifying or bringing suit against white settlers. Under particularly “pregnant
circumstances,” black testimony could be considered, but only in cases involving other
non-white colonists, and even here Afro-Virginians were on dangerous ground – any
black settler found to have given false evidence would be subjected to gruesome physical
torture, their ears nailed to the pillory and cropped, followed by a severe public whipping.
The few free black settlers with sufficient property to qualify for suffrage were also
disfranchised on explicitly racial grounds. While the 1723 Virginia black code did roll
back some earlier restrictive legislation – allowing free black householders, particularly
those in frontier regions, to own guns; and requiring free Afro-Virginians to serve the
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militia as “drummers or trumpeters...and to do the duty of pioneers, or...other servile
labor” in cases of rebellion or invasion – on the whole it continued the trend, evident
since at least the Stuart Restoration, toward the exclusion of free black settlers from
imperial subjecthood.124
Unlike statutes targeting enslaved Virginians, however, some of these restrictions
on the free black population met with objections from imperial planners. Richard West,
serving as a legal advisor to the Board of Trade, called the legitimacy of the 1723
disfranchisement of black freeholders into question as soon as the Virginia laws arrived
at Whitehall for review in January 1724. Though he admitted that “slaves are to be
treated in such a manner as the proprietors of them (having a regard to their number) may
think necessary for their security,” he found it difficult to understand “why one freeman
should be used worse than another meerly upon account of his complexion.” To West,
the “severall negroes” who had legally obtained their freedom and acquired sufficient
property to vote in the colony could not be deprived of the “incidentall rights of liberty”
that were “actually vested in [them].” As imperial subjects, free Afro-Britons must be
subject to a colorblind rule of law. West advised the Board of Trade that “it cannot be
just by a Generall Law...to strip all free persons of a black complexion (some of whom
may perhaps be of considerable substance) from those rights which are so justly valuable
to every freeman.”125 The Board of Trade finally acted on West’s recommendation a
decade later. In 1735 they asked Lieutenant Governor Gooch to explain how Virginians
justified a law that “carries [such] an appearance of hardship towards certain freemen,
meerly upon account of their complection, who would otherways enjoy every priviledge
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belonging to freemen.”126 Stripping rights from enslaved persons defined as property
was one thing, but depriving subjects and freeholders of their rights did not sit well with
the broad vision of imperial subjecthood being elucidated at the metropole.
The response Gooch sent to the Board of Trade in May of 1736 affords a
remarkably clear view of the ways in which slavery, race, and subjecthood became
entwined in the Anglo-American plantation colonies. Limiting the rights of free AfroVirginians, Gooch claimed, was essential to the physical security and economic
productivity of the Old Dominion. Passed in the aftermath of a number of attempts by
“the negros to cutt of the English,” the 1723 restrictions on free blacks were rooted in
fear. “The free negros and mulattos were much suspected to have been concerned [in the
rebellions] (which will for ever be the case),” and, despite the fact that “there could be no
legal proof so as to convict them,” the “insolence of the free negros” stirred up resistance
among the enslaved and threatened the security of the colony. Virginia slavery was
threatened by black solidarity and cooperation. Free black Afro-Virginians, Gooch
claimed, “always did, and ever will adhere to and favour the slaves.”127
Slavery itself, however, was not at issue here – West and the Board of Trade had
no real criticism of Virginia’s brutally racialized slave police law. The problem was the
Old Dominion’s treatment of free Afro-Britons, of imperial subjects deprived of the
cherished rights of English freemen. Gooch replied to this charge by linking the security
of Virginia’s plantation economy directly to white supremacy. As they always had in
Virginia, black freedom and the fluid nature of “race” provided a basis, however narrow,
for Afro-Virginians to press claims to subjecthood. It was precisely this assertive pursuit
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of legal personhood that worried Virginians most. “[T]he pride of a manumitted slave,”
Gooch argued, led free Afro-Virginians to think themselves “as good a man as the best of
his neighbours,” asserting claims to civic and personal rights, “especially if he is
descended of a white father or mother, lett them be of whatever mean condition soever.”
Indeed, Gooch claimed, “most” free Afro-Virginians were “the basterds of some of the
worst of our imported servants, and convicts,” the dregs of Virginia society who the great
planters were, at this very moment, also working to disfranchise. Making the racial basis
of exclusion clear, Gooch argued that “time and education” might eventually alter “the
indication of their spurious extraction” – Afro-Virginians would quite literally be
‘whitened’ – and work “some alteration in their morals” that would force the House of
Burgesses to “consider to what degree of descent this incapacity shall extend.” For the
time being however, the Lieutenant Governor argued, “there is a necessity of continuing
of it on the foot it is.” Local statutes excluding free Afro-Virginians from the rights and
privileges of imperial subjecthood, barring their testimony and stripping them of the
franchise, regulating their households and limiting their economic opportunity, were
crucial to protecting slavery and maintaining the imperial economic interest.128
To perpetuate plantation slavery and promote economic growth, Virginia
legislated near-total white supremacy. Free Afro-Virginians had to be made “sensible
that a distinction ought to be made between their offspring and the descendants of an
Englishman, with whom they were never to be accounted equal.” Writing away the long
debate over black subjecthood in the Old Dominion, Gooch flatly stated that Virginia law
“fix[ed] a perpetual brand upon free negros and mulattos by excluding them from that
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great priviledge of a Freeman[.]” Local statutes barred Afro-Virginians from civic
participation and courts of law on the grounds that their race “excluded [them] from
being good and lawful men,” leaving free blacks subject to the coercive power of masters
and the state “as villains were of old by the Laws of England.” Besides, there were so
few Afro-Virginian property owners in the colony that it was “scarce worth while to take
any notice of them in this particular.” Though Gooch recognized that Virginia’s
racialized law might “seem to carry an air of severity to such as are unacquainted with the
nature of negros,” he argued to the Board that it was “in no ways impolitick...to preserve
a decent distinction between them and their betters, to leave this mark on them” as a
distinct subordinate class excluded from imperial subjecthood. In the end, the Board of
Trade was persuaded by Gooch’s argument and “the present disposition of the Country”
to continue racially proscriptive legislation – on the 15th of October 1736, Secretary
Alured Popple recorded the Board’s decision to let the 1723 black codes “lay by.”129
A subsequent round of statutory revisions in 1748 made no substantive alterations
in the status of enslaved and free black Virginians. Despite the growing sense that
something was fundamentally wrong with their plantation economy, with its overreliance
on a single, distant, and fickle market, the Old Dominion’s planter elite was structurally
bound to their social order. The dictates of the broader imperial context prevented
diversification and stymied plans for the development of a free labor economy. Nor were
the Virginia gentry really willing to make the kinds of changes necessary to create such a
system. Numerous and repeated violent clashes with rebellious slaves and generations of
state-sanctioned racial violence left many Virginians unable to think their way out of
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continued reliance on slavery. Despite the increasingly clear economic critique of
slavery emerging from the metropole, and its acceptance if not promotion by a number of
important local figures, Virginia’s economy was too reliant on slavery in the short term to
move against the institution, however beneficial it might have been to do so over the
longer term.
***
If the Glorious Revolution brought Massachusetts within the bounds of a
politically centralized empire, the mid-18th century saw the acceleration of the Bay
Colony’s transformation into a critical hub in the empire of goods. Fears of declension
that emerged in the 1690s seemed to be confirmed by the 1750s. Bay colonists were far
less culturally distinct and far more closely linked to the British mercantilist system than
at any point in the 17th century.130 This certainly did not improve the colony’s image
with imperial officials, however. One noted in 1739 that it was “impossible to get twelve
honest men” to execute “the King’s Justice” and, despite the 1691 charter revision,
complaints about exclusion from political rights on religious grounds remained. The
lingering influence of Massaschusetts’ Puritan heritage gave a peculiar inflection to local
cultural norms and provided fertile ground for criticism of the new imperial economy and
its adjunct – the expansion of human slavery.
As Bay Colonists became more culturally English, they, like their cousins back in
Britain, increased their direct participation in the Atlantic plantation system to finance
their consumption of the mother country’s manufactures. On forty-one recorded slaving
voyages, Massachusetts ships carried over 5,000 people away from kith and kin on the
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African coast, delivering just over 4,000 survivors of the middle passage into colonial
slavery.131 The only way slave traders could profit despite such staggering mortality rates
was to sell their enslaved cargo where it was in highest demand – the West Indian sugar
plantations. Though the point of slave sale on these voyages is often absent from the
record, at least half of all recorded Massachusetts slavers sold their human cargo in the
sugar colonies, with Antigua and Barbados prominently represented, while others found
ready markets for slaves on Virginia tobacco plantations. One Captain Ellery made at
least two voyages to the African coast, aboard the Anne in 1750 and the Britannia in
1753, delivering 257 enslaved persons to St. John, Antigua.132 In 1730, Captain Samuel
Moore laded 166 slaves purchased on the Senegambia coast into the hold of the Friend’s
Adventure, selling the 142 persons who survived the middle passage in Barbados – he
delivered an additional 56 persons to Virginia aboard the sloop Bumper three years
later.133 By contrast, Massachusetts ships had made only seven slaving voyages between
the Glorious Revolution and the Hanoverian succession, all but one of which
disembarked in Barbados.134 Bay Colonists were not simply deepening their involvement
in the slave trade – the geographic reach of their slaving, now freed from burdensome
metropolitan restrictions, also increased.
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The economic impact of Massachusetts slaving went far beyond the direct sale of
slaves – the secondary and tertiary sectors of the New England economy were imbricated
in the slave trade as well. With its abundant timber, Massachusetts was quickly
becoming an important center of the ship building industry, and many of these New
England vessels were employed in the slave trade. Both the Friend’s Adventure and the
Bumper, captained by Samuel Moore, were constructed in Massachusetts, as were at least
49 other vessels active in the slave trade between 1714 and 1754. Collectively, these
Massachusetts-built ships made at least 88 slaving voyages in this period, delivering well
over 18,000 people to the plantations.135 Each of these vessels needed to be outfitted,
employing hundreds more Bay Colonists in the ropewalks, cooperages, and sailmaking
shops of the colony’s seaport towns.136 Massachusetts distilleries also played a crucial
role in the triangular trade, transforming West Indian molasses into rum that could be
exchanged for slaves in West Africa.137 Given the structure of its mercantile economy, it
is hard to imagine how Bay Colonists could have avoided complicity in the slave trade,
even if they had wanted to do so.
Though the vast majority of Massachusetts slavers delivered their human cargo to
the West Indian sugar islands, the growing volume of the New England slave trade
guaranteed that an increasing number of Africans would arrive the Bay Colony as well.
In stark contrast with the years following the Glorious Revolution, when only one
recorded vessel landed African slaves in the colony, Massachusetts saw a marked
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increase in direct slave importations in the mid-18th century. Many of these importations
are difficult to trace since so few slaves arrived direct from Africa. Responding to
requests for slave import statistics from the Board of Trade, Lieutenant Governor John
Wentworth noted in April 1727 that Massachusetts “kept no record of the importation of
negroes, not haveing any commerce with Affrica.” The slaves who were brought into the
colony were “supply’d from Barbadoes, Antigua and the Leeward Islands,” and there
were very few of them, “seldom...more than four or five in the space of a year.”138 A
minor market in the trans-Atlantic slave trade, the few slaves who were carried into the
Bay Colony came through the coastwise inter-colonial trade rather than direct from
Africa. The few African-born slaves who were purchased in Massachusetts tended to be
“refuse slaves” who, for one reason or another, were not purchased in the West Indies.139
This rather anemic slave trade meant that, by Wentworth’s reckoning, there were “not
more than one hundred and fiffty negroes...in this province.” Wentworth’s estimate was
surely low – Governor Dudley had estimated that there were at least 550 Bay Colonists of
African descent in 1708140 – but whatever the actual numbers, it was clear that
Massachusetts’ black population was growing. The Lieutenant Governor also noted that
“Boston, New York, and Rhoad Island, have of late years sent vessells to the coast of
Africa, and bro't their slaves directly to their own ports,” a harbinger of things to come.141
At least fourteen voyages imported African slaves directly to Massachusetts
during the period under consideration. The vast majority of these voyages were
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concentrated in the 1740s, when, as we shall see, enforcement of local regulations on the
slave trade was effectively banned by the Board of Trade, making direct importations
economically feasible for the first time since prohibitive import duties were enacted in
1705. The most prolific of these Massachusetts slave importers was Robert Ball of
Boston, who made at least five voyages to Senegambia and the Gold Coast, delivering
nearly 600 Africans to the Bay Colony. All told, the fourteen recorded voyages that
delivered slaves to Massachusetts carried over 1,200 enslaved persons into bondage in
the Bay Colony, an unprecedented level of slave imports.142 This explosive growth in the
Bay Colony’s slave trading operations left a visible imprint on the colonial population.
By 1755, at least two percent of Massachusetts’ population was of African descent, in
Boston nearly eight percent.143 While these numbers paled in comparison with the
massive enslaved populations of the plantation colonies, there had been a visible increase
in Massachusetts’ black population since Governor Wentworth’s day.
Facing the specter of a growing enslaved population, Massachusetts legislators
hoped to staunch the influx of African slaves by continuing their prohibitive £4 duty on
slave imports. Rather than serving as a mere revenue tariff to fund the governor’s salary,
the Massachusetts slave import duty was put in place explicitly to prevent further slave
imports, to “put a period to negroes being slaves” as the Boston selectmen put it.144 But
the Bay Colony was, as ever, under close scrutiny from the Board of Trade.
Massachusetts was notorious for its “antimonarchical traders” and their regular voyages
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to “the French and Dutch Settlements in the West Indies where it may be suspected a
great deall of illegall trade is carryed on.”145 Nor did repeated bouts of warfare against
Spain and France slow Massachusetts’ smugglers – though New England vessels
“appear[ed] wholly English,” some were “commanded and navigated by ffrench
Refugees naturaliz’d” and “carried the English Provisions to their owen Enemies...in the
Ports of Spain” during the War of Jenkins’ Ear. Worse yet, Bay Colonists were
importing finished cloth from Holland and France, a practice that would “destroy the
Vital parts of the British Commerce” if left unchecked.146 New England’s evolving role
as a commercial hub made these evasions of the Navigation Acts more conspicuous, and
local trade restrictions like the Massachusetts slave trade duty were anathema to the
Board of Trade’s mercantile policy.
When the Assembly attempted to renew the colony’s slave importation duty in
1718, then, they did so under the watchful eye of the Board of Trade. As we have seen,
the 1705 slave importation duty had been challenged by the Board of Trade, but was
never expressly disallowed, and Massachusetts legislators now hoped to ramp up
enforcement of the impost. A special committee tasked with promoting trade included
among its recommendations “That the Importation of White Servants be encouraged &
that the Importation of Black servants be discouraged.”147 Promoting the migration of
white servants would bolster the Massachusetts economy by increasing the number of
potential consumers and contribute to local defense through service in the militia. The
committee drafted a bill to achieve this goal, and presented An Act for Encouraging the
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Importation of White Male Servants, and the preventing the Clandestine bringing in of
Negroes and Molattos on June 16, 1718. The bill received a second reading the
following day, but failed to garner the votes needed for a third reading.148 Perhaps
increased oversight by the Board of Trade caused the legislature to back down – the Bay
Colony’s import duties for 1718 were all overturned by the Board anyway149 – or maybe
pressure from local merchants forestalled further action against the slave trade. Whatever
the circumstance, local enforcement of the 1705 slave trade duty continued despite
opposition from imperial planners in London. Worse yet, from the Board of Trade’s
perspective, the tax was having the desired effect. Lieutenant Governor John Wentworth,
writing to the Board from New Hampshire, noted in early 1728 that there were “more
negroes imported [to New Hampshire] this last year then in ten years before.” The
explanation for this sudden increase in New Hampshire slave imports was simple – “in
the Massachusets they pay an impost of four pounds p. head, and in this Province they are
imported free.”150
The question of slave import taxation arose again in 1728 when the Assembly
passed An Act More Effectually to Secure the Duty on the Importation of Negroes.
Despite the Board of Trade’s disapproval of the import duty, the Massachusetts
legislature continued to act as though the impost had never been disallowed, citing the
original 1705 legislation in the preamble. The 1728 slave import duty continued the £4
impost, and required all merchants to register their imported slaves with the customs
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collector. To prevent slaves’ being “landed in the neighbouring provinces or colonies,
and brought thence into [Massachusetts] in order to save the duty,” anyone bringing a
slave into the Bay Colony overland was required to register their slave with the town
clerk within two weeks. In all cases, failure to register a slave or pay the £4 duty would
garner a fine of £8. As a concession to merchants, the duty could be drawn back on any
imported slaves who died within a year.151
Once again, Massachusetts’ attempt to prevent the importation of slaves drew the
ire of the Board of Trade. In December 1731, the Board of Trade advised King George II
that, despite being repeatedly disallowed, a number of colonies, including Massachusetts
Bay, continued to place import duties on slaves.152 To remedy the situation, explicit
instructions were once again sent to all colonial governors requiring them to withhold
their consent for any such measures. The instructions sent to Massachusetts governor
Jonathan Belcher, for example, complained that local slave trade duties exacerbated the
“Discouragement of the Merchants trading thither from the Coast of Africa” and
instructed the governor to refuse his assent to any further slave trade imposts.153 The
instructions did not, however, explicitly repeal the 1728 duty, and, once again, local
customs officers continued to collect the impost. And despite the king’s explicit
instructions, Belcher gave his assent to another slave trade duty in 1739. In addition to
restating the terms of the 1705 and 1728 imposts, the new slave trade duty imposed a fine
of £100 on any importers who falsified the required import lists and shortened the
drawback term in case of the death of an imported slave to six months.154
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Despite attempts by imperial planners to prevent local regulation of the slave
trade, then, Massachusetts continued to defy metropolitan mandates and repeatedly
passed prohibitive duties on slave importation. To be sure, there was a good deal of
racially exclusionary motivation for this policy. As Governor Belcher noted in a 1739
letter to Lord Egmont, one of the trustees of the fledgling Georgia colony, “there is such a
natural & general aversion in whites to blacks, that they will never mix or sodder.”
Belcher and other Bay Colonists certainly had a marked preference for white servants,
since “From every white we may hope for a good man to add to the common wealth.”
White migrants, the governor believed, would contribute to the economic health and
military security of the colony in a way black colonists could not. There was also a clear
strand of antislavery thought informing this position, however. Belcher noted the
Georgia trustees’ “generous & noble” decision to ban slavery “with a great deal of
pleasure.” The governor explained that he had long been “in that way of thinking, that no
part of mankind was made to be slaves to their fellow creatures,” and lamented that “even
Christians [do not] treat them much better than they do their horses & other cattle.”
Writing only two months after he assented to another slave import duty in the Bay
Colony, Belcher was not tilting at windmills when he noted that “We have but few
[slaves] in these parts, and I wish there were less” – he and the Massachusetts Assembly
were taking concerted action to translate antislavery principles into policy.155
The Bay Colony’s slave importation duties, then, were politically contentious, and
drew unwanted attention from the Board of Trade back in London. Despite regular
statements of disapproval from the metropole, however, local customs agents continued
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to collect the import duty, even after repeated royal attempts to end the practice.
Lieutenant Governor Wentworth’s observation that the £4 Massachusetts duty
contributed to increased slave imports in New Hampshire, for example, came six months
before passage of the 1728 slave importation tax, at a time when the original 1705
legislation had lapsed and a decade after the 1718 An Act for Encouraging the
Importation of White Male Servants, and the preventing the Clandestine bringing in of
Negroes and Molattos failed to pass into law.
Applications by individual slave owners to draw back the impost due to financial
hardship or the lameness or death of an imported slave illustrate that, whatever the Board
of Trade thought of the practice, Massachusetts’ slave trade duty was consistently
enforced throughout the mid-18th century. In July 1715, for example, Archibald Stobo, a
Presbyterian minister and refugee from the Yamasee War on the South Carolina frontier,
petitioned the Assembly for abatement of the import duty he had paid on “Eleven Negro
Women and Children by him Imported.” Two days later, Mary Haddrell and Magdalene
Beauchamp, also refugees driven from South Carolina, asked that the import duty on the
“Eight Negro Slaves” they brought with them to Massachusetts be refunded. In August
1723, John Welland of Boston petitioned the legislature for remission of the importation
duty on grounds of financial hardship. Welland had been taken captive by notorious
pirate Edward Low some years earlier and now, with Low’s accomplices on trial for
piracy in Rhode Island, he asked the Assembly to draw back the duty on “a Negro lately
imported here from Jamaica” to offset the “considerable Expence in Travelling to Rhode
Island, to be at the Tryal of those Pirates.” The Assembly assented to all of these
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petitions, even though no official slave importation duty was on the books at the time
they were made.156
Not all petitioners were so fortunate, however, even when their requests fell
within the letter of the law. Hugh Hall, for example, petitioned the assembly in
November 1718 for abatement of the import duty when “a Negro Boy he lately
Imported...Died in Ten Weeks after his Arrival.” Technically, such a request fit the
criteria for remission to the letter – unforeseen death or injury were the only cases in
which exemptions could be made – but the Assembly denied Hall’s petition anyway.157
In January 1727, again a time when no official impost was on the books, another slave
imported by Hugh Hall died shortly after his arrival. Samuel Smith, a Cambridge
innkeeper, sought to draw back the duty on a slave he had purchased from Hall who
“died within ten Weeks from his being Landed in this Province.” Perhaps Hall’s
unsuccessful petition nine years earlier convinced the Assembly that he was habitually
cheating his customers by selling sickly slaves. Whatever their reasons, the legislators
rejected this petition as well.158 The Assembly rejected another such petition in July
1731, when Samuel Royall, a Dorchester merchant and brother of Antiguan planter Isaac
Royall, was denied a refund on the impost paid for six slaves, again at a time when no
official duty was in force.159
Despite continuing debate over the desirability of slave importation, the legal
status of African slaves living in Massachusetts was clear. Under local law, enslaved
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persons were clearly defined as personal property, as they had been since at least 1696.
Following the practice adopted in the 1690s, all “Indian, negro and molatto servants”
were classed alongside livestock and rated “proportionably as other personal estate” for
the purposes of local tax assessment.160 Beginning in 1729, the language of annual tax
assessments changed slightly, defining “Indian, negro and molatto servants or slaves” as
personal property, and Massachusetts’ taxation apportionments continued to follow this
formula into the 1750s, illustrating increasingly racialized distinctions between white and
black laborers and flattening the distinction between African servants and slaves.161
Despite their servile status, all white servants were consistently defined as polls in
Massachusetts. Operating in an imperial context where blackness and enslavement were
increasingly linked, Bay Colony legislators began to associate even putatively free black
colonists with the concept of property-in-man.
This taxation system, however, elided the critical distinction between slaves as
articles of property and servants as laborers that earlier jurists like Samuel Sewall had
been careful to parse. While annual tax assessments continued to define all non-white
servants as personal property, periodic inquiries by the Assembly into the total taxable
property in each town were far more precise in their attention to personal status. The
Assembly’s 1718 inquiry, for example, tackled this ambiguity head on. All slaves in the
Bay Colony, termed “servants for life,” would be assessed as personalty – male slaves
over 14 years of age were rated at £15, females at £10, commensurate with contemporary
market values – but all “Indian, negro and molatto male servants for a term of years”
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would be “rated as other polls, and not as personal estate.”162 This fine legal distinction
between slavery and servitude, however, seems to have been abandoned by the 1730s,
bringing inquiries into ratable estates into line with local tax assessments. In 1735, for
example, the Massachusetts Assembly included “all Indian, negro and molatto servants,
as well for term of years as for life” alongside other ratable properties, including lands
and farm implements.163 Fine distinctions in status that had been so important to earlier
Bay Colonists were now subsumed under an increasingly racialized system of slavery.
The growing number of bound Africans in the colony, whether enslaved or
putatively free, contributed to unrest and resistance by black Bay Colonists, likely
exacerbated by this changing definition of black servants. When a number of suspicious
fires broke out in Boston in 1723, the local black community was made the scapegoat,
leading to the passage of a number of legal restrictions on enslaved and free black Bay
colonists.164 In 1755 two slaves, Phillis and Mark, were executed for poisoning John
Codman of Charlestown – Mark was drawn and quartered while Phillis was burned to
death.165 These troubling instances of servile resistance led some Bay Colonists to push
for closer regulation of the daily lives of enslaved and free black settlers. At their annual
town meeting in March 1722, for example, the freeholders of Boston created a committee
to draft a code of laws “for the Better Regulating Indians, Negroes & Melattoes.”166 The
committee’s recommendations amounted to a near-total disavowal of black settlers’
subjecthood, an attempt to deprive enslaved and free African colonists of many basic
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rights they had enjoyed throughout the 17th century. Though local curfew statutes were
already in effect, the selectmen called for closer invigilation of bound settlers’ mobility,
forbidding slaves and servants of color from leaving their masters’ property between
sunset and sunrise, loitering on the training field after dark on militia training days, or
“Idling or Lurking together” in groups larger than two persons. The punishment for
infractions would be a “Sever Whipping at the Hou[se] of Correction.” Other proposed
regulations sought to prevent violent resistance by the enslaved. Servants or slaves of
color found in possession of “any manner of armes or weapons Clubb Stave Cane or
knives” would receive a “Severe punishment.” Any African or Indian servant or slave
who should happen to “assalt Strike Beat wound or mame any of his Majesties Subjects”
would be “Severely Punished at the Discression of the Court before whom Convict” and
transported out of the colony.167
These proposed regulations were, in many ways, illustrative of changing views of
African slaves and the tensions created by the evolution of slavery in the Bay Colony. In
one sense, the Boston selectmen’s recommendations bore a striking resemblance to local
police laws passed generations earlier in the plantation colonies. “Indian, Negro, or
Molatto Servant[s] or Slave[s]” were rhetorically counterpoised against “his Majesties
Subjects,” reinforcing cultural assumptions about people of color as perpetual outsiders,
and leaving punishment to the “Discression of the Court” mirrored the arbitrary police
powers delegated to individual slave owners in Virginia and the West Indies. In other
ways, however, these statutes continue to bear the imprint of earlier ideals of bracketed
authority and the rule of law. Though the punishments handed down under these
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municipal regulations were unquestionably draconian, and diverged from the usual
course of Massachusetts justice by granting broad discretionary power to the courts, they
still preserved many of the basic legal forms associated with the rule of law. In the case
of assaults by slaves or servants upon free white settlers, for example, punishment could
only be meted out once the alleged assailant was “Convict” following an official inquiry
into the incident in question, and the punishment itself would be enacted by a duly
constituted court of law, not an individual master.168 While it is likely that many
individual slave owners in Massachusetts took the discipline of their slaves or servants
into their own hands in practice, the letter of the law continued to impinge on the
absolute authority of masters by routing punishment through the courts, whose authority
must always be bracketed by the rule of law.
It should not be surprising to see such punitive regulations placed on enslaved
Bay Colonists, particularly in an era when local Massachusetts practice was coming
increasingly into line with imperial norms of enslavement. Many of the Boston
selectmen’s proposed regulations, however, focused on Massachusetts’ growing free
black population, a largely unprecedented limitation of the rights of free subjects in the
Bay Colony. Likely fearing alliances between slaves and free black settlers, much of the
proposed legislation aimed at breaking ties of community and kinship that connected
enslaved and free blacks. Free black colonists were forbidden to entertain or shelter any
slaves or servants of color on their properties, making cohabitation difficult if a slave
married a free black colonist. Perhaps the most shocking proposal, particularly given the
Bay Colony’s cultural emphasis on stable household units, required that “every free
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Indian Negro or Molatto...bind out, all their Chlidren...to Some English master” from
ages four to twenty-one. If free black parents refused to comply, the Overseers of the
Poor were empowered to find suitable placements for children of color.169 Though
Massachusetts magistrates were similarly empowered to bind out the children of indigent
white households, targeting all free settlers of color in this way, regardless of their ability
to support their families, was an unprecedented intrusion into the family lives of free Bay
Colonists.170
Another set of proposed statutes, targeting the underground economy of the black
community, imposed draconian penalties on free blacks for fencing goods or provisions
stolen by slaves – “upon Conviction” in a court of law, any free settler of color found in
possession of stolen goods would be banished from the colony, and if they returned “Sent
to the House of Correction...there to Remain and abide during life & keept to hard
Labour.” The economic possibilities for free settlers of color were further curtailed by a
statute forbidding any “free Indian Negro or Molatto” to sell any “Strong drink Cakes or
any other Provision” on public days. Each of these proposed regulations would also give
unprecedented police powers to white settlers – “any two freeholders” were empowered
to enter the homes of free black settlers to search for stolen goods, and to seize any
provisions sold by black colonists in contravention of the law to be sold for the benefit of
the poor. Free black households were also forbidden to “keep any manner of weapons
fire armes, Powder or Ball,” a particularly punitive regulation at a time when the Bay
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Colony, particularly its western frontier settlements, was under continual military threat
from hostile natives and imperial rivals.171
Perhaps the clearest illustration of the increasing racialization of Massachusetts
law is the way in which the Boston selectmen’s proposed regulations elided distinctions
between enslaved and free settlers of color. A proposed statute aimed at preventing
thefts, for example, required that “any Indian, Negro or Molatto bond or free [who was]
Convict[ed]” of theft be “Transported beyond Sea” in addition to making the usual
restitution “as the Law Provides.” A similar elision is evident in a proscription that
would prevent both enslaved and free settlers of color from working as porters in Boston
without gaining the approval of the selectmen and posting a hefty bond of £50. Fear of
rebellion by settlers of color clearly motivated one proposed regulation. In response to
“Sundry fires...wickedly contrived and Designed by Some Evel Instruments” that had
recently destroyed a number of homes and businesses in Boston, the selectmen
recommended that all settlers of color, whether free or enslaved, be confined to their
homes if a fire broke out “unless his or his masters House or Estate be on fire or in great
hazzard thereof.” Any settlers of color found outside during a fire would be “Secured
and Sent to the Comon Gaol” where they would be whipped for three days, apparently
without trial.172 In their desire to protect their own properties and livelihoods, the Boston
selectmen sought to limit the rights of even free black colonists, subjecting them to
racialized local police laws that would, in many ways, reduce free settlers of color to the
level of slaves. If the Boston selectmen had their way, free Bay Colonists of color would
have been stripped of many of the properties of mid-18th century British subjecthood –
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their persons, property, and families would be subject to the increasingly arbitrary police
power of Massachusetts’ freemen and courts; their capacity to contribute to the imperial
common wealth through productive labor would be limited; and their ability to defend
themselves and their colony would be eliminated.
Despite the Boston selectmen’s recommendations, however, the Massachusetts
Assembly ultimately refused to enact such punitive legislation. In June 1723, the
Assembly appointed a committee of prominent politicians, jurists, and merchants –
including Elisha Cooke, Jr., a leading figure in the “popular” faction of colonial politics
and perennial thorn in the side of colonial governors, Jonathan Remington and John
Menzies, justices of the Superior and Vice-Admiralty Courts, William Dudley, son of
former governor Thomas Dudley, and John Quincy of Braintree – to draft a bill “for the
better Regulating Indians, Negroes and Molattoes” based on the selectmen’s
recommendations.173 The bill the committee proposed, An Act for the better Regulating
Indians, Negroes, and Molattoes, and preventing many mishcievous Practices which
[they] have of late in a most Audacious manner to the great Disturbance and grievous
Damage of His Majesty’s Good Subjects, more especially in the Town of Boston addicted
themselves unto, passed the Assembly on 21 June 1723 and was sent to the governor and
Council for concurrence.174 For some reason, however, the Council returned the bill to
the Assembly in August with a number of amendments, and when the revised bill came
up for a vote on 27 August, the Assembly voted it down.175
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Undeterred by this legislative failure, Elisha Cooke, Jr. proposed limiting the
scope of these regulatory statutes to Boston only, and presented An Act for reducing
Indians, Negroes & Molattoes, residing in, and belonging to the Town of Boston, to good
Order to the Assembly on 4 December 1723. After two readings, the bill was returned to
committee, and “sundry Amendments” were added to the proposed statute. Debate on
the bill continued for nearly two weeks before the Assembly finally voted down the
proposed measures on 17 December.176 Had either of Cooke’s bills succeeded, they
would have amounted to nothing less than a comprehensive black code for colonial
Massachusetts, or at least the town of Boston, mirroring many of the measures enacted in
the plantation colonies generations earlier. Bay Colony legislators, however, despite their
uneasiness with the “mischeivous practices” that slaves and free blacks seemed to be
“addicted...unto,” refused to enact such punitive statutes.
Refusal to enact a comprehensive black code, however, did not mean that the
Massachusetts Assembly had given up legislating the daily lives of enslaved and free
colonists of color – indeed, the Bay Colony enacted a number of statutes to regulate the
public behavior of enslaved and free black settlers. A 1745 law, for example, made it
illegal to sell “strong drink” to slaves.177 The 1746 Act...to Prevent Profane Cursing and
Swearing attempted to stamp out the “horrible, impious and execrable [vice] of profane
cursing...so highly displeasing to Almighty God” by sentencing any slave convicted of
profane speech to pay a four to eight shilling fine or suffer a public whipping of between
ten and twenty lashes.178 A flurry of statutes passed in 1752 made it illegal for “negro
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servants” to extinguish or “wilfully break, remove or damnify” streetlamps, on pain of
ten to twenty lashes; to congregate in groups larger than three or participate in any
“public shew” in the streets of Boston, on pain of ten lashes; or to light bonfires in public
spaces, again on pain of ten lashes.179 With the bonds of kinship already strained and
opportunities for communal celebration limited by regulations on their use of public
space, life for Bay Colonists of color must have been particularly lonely and isolated. It
would have been far more onerous, however, had Elisha Cooke’s 1723 recommendations
become law.
Though the Assembly refused to enact far-reaching punitive regulations on black
life, individual municipalities did begin policing their free and enslaved black populations
more closely in the mid-18th century. Even the most punitive of these municipal laws,
however, paled in comparison to the draconian slave police laws of the plantation
colonies. A 1723 resolution by the Boston selectmen, attempting to prevent “great
numbers of Indians Negros & Molattoes” from gathering for funerals, forbid the burial of
any settler of color in the municipal burial grounds after sunset or on the Sabbath except
in “Extraordinary cases.”180 Enforcement of earlier curfew laws was ramped up in 1736,
when the Boston selectmen required two watchmen to patrol the streets after ten in the
evening at least three times a week to “take up all Negro and Molatto Servants” who were
“unseasonably Absent” from their masters’ homes, and appointed additional watchmen to
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prevent “Profanation of the LORD’S Day, by loose vain Persons, Negro’s, &c.”181 The
mobility of black settlers was further limited by local magistrates’ vigilance in “warning
out” strangers who lacked immediate ties to the community. In October 1716, for
example, Peter Negro, a servant in the household of John Grafton of Salem, was ordered
to leave Boston and return to Salem once his treatment by a local surgeon was complete.
Again in November 1718, “Katherine & Mary two Negro women” who had arrived in
Boston from Haverhill some months earlier were warned out of town.182 Ever mindful of
the strangers in their midst, the Boston selectmen were quick to expel unwanted settlers
from their community.
This exclusionary tendency, however, was not limited to settlers of color – Bay
Colony magistrates closely regulated the admission of all new settlers to their towns.183
In the same month that black settlers Katherine and Mary were warned out of Boston in
1719, for example, two full shiploads of British immigrants were ordered to leave town
as well.184 Indeed, many of the local regulations enacted by Boston magistrates to police
the local black population were compatible with the broader corpus of police law in the
Bay Colony. Though settlers of color must have chafed under local curfew laws, it
appears that they were not always enforced, particularly when it came to free black
householders. On 10 June 1740, for instance, John Woodby, a “free Negro Man” of
Boston, was “taken up...Bound and Imprisoned” by John Rice, one of the town’s night
watchmen, as he was returning home after a long day’s labor. Just over a week later,

181

Boston Recs, XII: 139; Ibid., XV: 2.
Boston Recs, XIII: 11, 64. For other instances of black settlers being warned out of Boston, see Ibid.,
XIII: 5, 37, 68, 72, 86, 101. Warnings out of black settlers appear to have waned substantially after
1721, perhaps a function of the increasingly stringent colonial regulations on black mobility, or the
growing demand for labor on the waterfront.
183
Levy, Town Born, 35-45 and passim,
184
Boston Recs, XIII: 63-64.
182

462

Woodby, who had regained his liberty after paying thirteen shillings in fines, appeared
before the selectmen to lodge an official complaint against his jailor. The problem,
according to Woodby, was that Rice had imprisoned him “without any legal process.”
Woodby rightly pointed out that, unless he was convicted in a court of record, his
imprisonment was “against Law and Justice.” The selectmen agreed – when Rice
appeared to answer Woodby’s accusation, he was officially reprimanded and warned “to
Act prudently in all such matters” in the future.185 Though local magistrates certainly
attempted to invigilate their daily lives and limit their mobility, the access of black
settlers like John Woodby to the usual course of justice in the Bay Colony made absolute
control difficult to attain.
Boston’s freemen also sought to circumscribe the economic activity of local
slaves and free blacks but, yet again, they were only partly successful. Citing the
“Inhanced...Price of provisions,” a proposed 1728 bylaw would have banned black
servants or slaves from buying or selling produce in the market, though it would still have
allowed black settlers to participate in the local economy by directing “any Country
People to his or Her master...or other white Servant,” who could legally conduct the
transaction as a proxy.186 Like so many other attempts to limit black life in the Bay
Colony, this proposed regulation never passed into law, though the 1746 Boston town
meeting did proscribe the ownership of hogs by settlers of color, arguing that separate
property ownership by the enslaved led to “very great Wast” and “Loss of time” to slave
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owners.187 These proposed limitations on the economic activities of black Bostonians,
however, ran up against the increasingly important role of black labor in the local
economy and, for Bay Colonists as for Britons back home, economic productivity was a
crucial element of social inclusion.
Admittedly, the occupations typically plied by black settlers were among the least
desirable in the community. Mingo Walker and Great John, free black Bostonians,
worked as chimneysweeps alongside enslaved laborers Toby and Jack in 1720.188
Starting in 1716, the Boston selectmen put free black settlers to work maintaining and
repairing roads, usually for between three and six days a year, as “an Equivalent” to the
watch duty or militia training required of white settlers. Though their contributions were
certainly segregated, free black Bostonians, like all settlers, were expected to labor “for
ye comon benefit of this Town.”189 One of the clearest illustrations of the value of black
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labor to the common good came when waves of smallpox intermittently plagued Boston
between 1739 and 1741. As Onesimus, Cotton Mather’s black servant, had been a
generation earlier, free black settlers were on the front lines fighting the disease. Betty
Woodby, the wife of laborer John Woodby discussed above, was employed by the Boston
selectmen as a nurse in a makeshift hospital on the west end of town for wages of fifteen
shillings a week. As the epidemic stretched on into the early months of 1741, the
selectmen also hired John Woodby to stand watch outside the hospital and prevent
infected patients from leaving and spreading the disease further – he was paid thirty
shillings a week, and Betty’s wages were also raised to thirty shillings weekly. Though
the work was dangerous, it provided an economic windfall for the Woodby family –
Betty’s stint as a nurse in the winter of 1739-1740 alone earned her £4.10, a tidy sum for
six weeks of work.190 To be sure, the vast majority of black Bay Colonists, free and
enslaved, toiled in some of the least desirable jobs in the colony – in the ropewalks and
on the docks of Boston; as servants in the homes of well-to-do merchants; as sailors on
the Bay Colony’s ships – but, in a cultural climate that put a high value on productive
labor for the good of the community, the contributions of settlers of color to the common
wealth were a marker of their inclusion in Massachusetts society.191
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Free and enslaved black settlers were also welcomed into the Bay Colony’s
churches – indeed, colonial law required that all masters provide religious instruction for
their servants and slaves, and all heads of household were enjoined to bring dependent
household members to church. As members of Massachusetts churches, free and
enslaved black settlers had access to the sacrament of marriage, and their marriages were
protected by local law and custom.192 Between 1715 and 1751, Boston ministers and
magistrates performed at least 109 weddings involving black settlers – an additional 51
black couples had their marriage banns published, but records of their weddings have not
survived. Many of these marriages involved prominent white Bay Colonists, either as
officiants or as masters to the bride or groom. Cotton Mather, for example, conducted at
least six black weddings between 1715 and his death in 1728. Samuel Sewall, chief
justice of the Massachusetts Superior Court and avowed critic of slavery, married at least
five black couples by the power vested in him as a Justice of the Peace – black Bay
Colonists had access to civil marriages as well as church ceremonies – and his son, Rev.
Joseph Sewall, was one of the most prolific officiants at black weddings, conducting at
least twenty-two ceremonies between 1716 and 1751. Among the Bostonians listed as
masters of the “Negro servants” being married were such notables as Peter Faneuil,
Josiah Quincy, Thomas Hutchinson, and Thomas Cushing.193 Unlike their cousins in the
plantation colonies, Bay Colony elites saw legal unions between black settlers as crucial
to the social stability of their commonwealth and actively promoted slave marriage.
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What is more, the legal recognition of black marriages seems to have had the
intended effect – black settlers who married put down roots in Boston and become
fixtures in the local community. Anthony Negro, a free black Bostonian, married
Priscilla Negro on 23 May 1717, and remained on the list of free blacks required to
maintain the town highways well into the 1720s. Robert Cumings married Margaret
Negro the following year – in 1725 he was still on the list of free black Bostonians
laboring for the town. And Ned Hubbard, who had been on the Boston free black lists
since 1716, finally married Martha, a free black woman from Lynn, on 21 September
1727. When Andrew Mingoson and Naomi Sutton, both free people of color, married on
9 January 1746, they marked the rise of a second generation of free black Bay Colonists,
coming of age as free settlers in a colony that, by and large, recognized them as fellow
subjects.194 These free black settlers were clearly not the wandering strangers
Massachusetts magistrates feared – they were the basis of a god-fearing, stable,
economically productive black community.
Even for many enslaved Bostonians, a recognized marriage must have provided a
degree of solace and comfort in their bondage, particularly when circumstances allowed
them to live together. When “Negros Tom & Jenny” married in June 1734, for example,
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their masters, Rev. Peter Thatcher and Rev. Joshua Gee, appear to have facilitated the
couple’s cohabitation – both Tom and Jenny are listed as Gee’s servants in the marriage
records. Sam and Kate, as “Negro Servants” to the same master, Captain Nicholas Davis,
likely cohabitated as well.195 While the sanctity of these enslaved marriages could never
be entirely sure – Bay Colony slaves, defined as articles of personal property, were liable
to sale, and even the legal recognition of slave marriages could not prevent the separation
of enslaved families – in situations like those of Tom, Jenny, Sam, Kate, and the dozens
of other Boston slaves who built families in bondage, a recognized marriage provided a
modicum of stability and companionship in an uncertain and often hostile world.
Of course most married black Bay Colonists faced serious challenges to their
unions. Nearly seventy percent of all black couples in the Boston marriage records, for
instance, probably lived most of their married lives in separate households. Of the
eighty-five married couples whose personal status was specified in the marriage lists
between 1715 and 1751, forty-nine served different masters at the time of their weddings.
When Dick and Clarinda married in 1745, then, they had little opportunity to see one
another – Dick was a servant to Peter Cade of Charlestown, while Clarinda served in Col.
Benjamin Pollard’s household in Boston. Ownership by different owners could also be a
substantial obstacle to marriage. When Toney and Ginney published their banns in
January 1717, for example, the fact that they served in separate households intervened
and prevented their union – Mary Thomas, Ginney’s mistress, forbid the marriage, likely
because she feared losing Ginney’s valuable service in her own household. Another
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fifteen marriages involved one partner who was free and another who was a servant,
meaning that the couple was likely separated much of the time.196 There is much, of
course, that we simply cannot know about these marriages – how many were arranged by
owners, for example, or the fate of children born to couples serving in separate
households – and black families in the Bay Colony certainly faced many challenges their
white counterparts never experienced. What is striking however, particularly in light of
restrictions on the black family imposed in the plantation colonies, is how often black
Bay Colonists, enslaved and free, took advantage of open access to marriage to formalize
their unions.197
Local churches and magistrates closely monitored these free and enslaved black
couples, as they did all married Bay Colonists, to ensure their compliance with the rigid
strictures of Puritan morality. [fornication/adultery cases from Bailey?] If these minor
sexual indiscretions shocked white Bay Colonists, they must surely have been appalled
when Joseph, a free black Bostonian, murdered his wife Nanny in the autumn of 1720.198
Shocked by the “barbarous manner” of the crime, and fearing the expense of keeping
Joseph in jail until the next scheduled court session the following May, the governor and
Council recommended a “speedy Tryal” and asked the Assembly to empanel grand and
petit juries to try the case immediately. However horrified the Assembly may have been
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at the heinous nature of Joseph’s crime, they would not alter the regular course of justice
– the Council’s request for an immediate trial was denied, and Joseph’s trial proceeded
according to usual legal procedures.199
As the disposition of Joseph’s trial indicates, when black Bay Colonists entered
courts of law, they received substantially the same treatment as any other settler. Local
law certainly impinged on free and enslaved black life in unprecedented ways in the mid18th century, but when charged with or the victims of a crime, black settlers were tried
according to the normal course of colonial justice. Though the Boston selectmen
recommended limiting the applicability of testimony by colonists of color in their
proposed 1723 black codes, this legal disability failed to pass into law. The wording of
the proposed statute is telling, however. The selectmen recommended that “Indian Negro
and Molatto Evidence only with Concurring Circumstances Shal be proof Soficient to
Convict Indian Negro or Molattos.”200 Here the selectmen seem to imply that, though
testimony from settlers of color might be sufficient to convict other Indian, black, or
mixed-race colonists, it would not be applicable in trials of whites. This assertion,
however, flies in the face of the usual practice in most Massachusetts courts. As we have
seen, black Bay Colonists consistently had a great deal of access to Puritan justice. Even
the punitive restrictions proposed by the Boston selectmen in 1723 required that
offenders be tried and convicted “as by Law...provided.”201 Of course, for any crimes
that did not have separate specified punishments for colonists of color – the vast majority
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of major and petty crimes under Massachusetts law – black settlers would be tried,
convicted, and punished under the same body of law as any white colonist, just as Joseph
was when he killed Nanny in 1720.
Black Bay Colonists, at least those who were free, also maintained the right to
appeal convictions to higher courts. Joseph Woodel, a free black farmer from Tiverton,
Bristol County, initiated an appeal in a civil suit filed by Samuel Snell, likely a trespass
dispute over land boundaries.202 Woodel petitioned the Massachusetts Assembly for a
new trial in the Superior Court in December 1740, revived his appeal again in August
1741, and finally, in June 1742, received an answer from the Assembly and Council – his
appeal was denied.203 We can only speculate at the reasoning behind this denial. Perhaps
the magistrates were convinced by Snell’s response to Woodel’s petition. The Assembly
was in the midst of debating new laws to regulate appeals in civil cases and prevent the
“unnecessary Cost” of judicial reviews, so the politics of the moment may have played a
role. Or maybe the decision was racially motivated, privileging the property claims of a
free white settler over a colonist of color. Regardless of the final disposition of Woodel’s
petitions, however, the fact that he was able to so aggressively pursue a judicial appeal is
yet another potent illustration of the legal rights afforded to black settlers in the Bay
Colony.
Massachusetts law also protected black settlers who were the victims of crimes.
If a black colonist died under suspicious circumstances, local governments regularly
Though Woodel’s petition is not included in the printed records, the Assembly’s response notes that the
appeal was directed at “a Report of Referrees” upon which the Bristol court had based its decision.
These reports were typically filed in trespass cases to determine the exact boundaries of landed estates.
Later colonial law did away with the kind of appeal Woodel made here by making the reports of referees
final and beyond the scope of judicial appeals. See entry for ‘referee’ in Henry Campbell Black, Black’s
Law Dictionary, 10th Edition, Bryan A. Garner, ed. (St. Paul, MN: Thomson West, 2014).
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performed inquests into the circumstances of their deaths.204 Even the lives of slaves
were protected under Bay Colony law. In the summer of 1719, for example, Samuel
Smith of Sandwich was arrested and “imprisoned for the Murther of his Negro Servant.”
When Smith petitioned the Assembly for a special Court of Oyer and Terminer to hear
his case because the county court would not meet again for nearly a year, the
Assemblymen refused his request – Smith had to languish in jail until the following
spring before his case was heard. Though the final disposition of Smith’s case is
unknown, the fact that he was held to account for the death of his own slave is potent
evidence of the protections afforded to black settlers by Massachusetts law – such a
situation was all but unimaginable in Virginia and the other plantation colonies.205
As it had in the 17th century, Massachusetts law also followed settlers onto the
high seas, and its protection of black lives with it. Samuel Rhodes, captain of the slave
ship Africa, for example, ran afoul of the law after a disastrous voyage in 1734-36. En
route to the Senegambia from the Cape Verde islands, the Africa’s cargo of rum sprung a
leak, a loss of over 3500 gallons and £4500 to Boston merchant and ship-owner Samuel
Waldo, and things only got worse from there. Rhodes traded the remainder of his cargo
for some beeswax, ivory, and about two hundred slaves along the Gambia and the Gold
Coast, but soon the flux broke out among the Africa’s human cargo, killing many of the
slaves and weakening the rest. When the slaver finally arrived at the Dutch island of St.
Eustatius in late 1735, Rhodes was forced to sell the remaining “ageing and meagre”
slaves for a pittance. Incensed by the captain’s losses, Waldo eventually sued Rhodes to
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recoup his lost investment in a case that dragged on in the Vice-Admiralty courts for
years.206
Waldo’s lawsuit was the least of Capt. Rhodes’ problems in the summer of 1737,
however. On June 7th, the Special Court of Admiralty filed “certain Articles of Felony
and Murder” against the slaving captain. The slaving captain stood charged with “killing
and murdering a Negro Man called Frederick’s Slave, on the 2d. of January 1735, upon
the high Seas, and within the Jurisdiction of the Admiralty of Great Britain.” Perhaps
Rhodes had lashed out in frustration at his economic losses, or perhaps, as so often
happened on slaving vessels, Frederick’s slave resisted the captain’s authority and,
weakened by the diseases that ravaged the ship, died during punishment. Whatever the
circumstance, Rhodes was now called to account by a Massachusetts court for a criminal
act committed halfway around the world. In his defense, Rhodes simply argued that the
destruction of an article of property on the banks of the Gambia was “not in the
Jurisdiction of the Court.” The justices of the Admiralty attested to the “great and
uncommon Difficulties” of the case, and asked the Assembly for advice.207 Though the
Assembly’s response is not recorded, the case of Frederick’s Slave illustrates that, unlike
in the plantation colonies, the lives of enslaved Bay Colonists, even those far from New
England, were protected under local law.
Perhaps the most potent evidence of Massachusetts’ continued bias in favor of the
legal humanity of black settlers was the prevalence of individual and state manumissions.
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Though a 1692 statute had laid down strict requirements for manumission, the practice
continued unabated well into the 18th century, and Bay Colony magistrates often relaxed
manumission requirements to ease enslaved settlers’ transition to freedom. The
substantial bond required to indemnify towns in case a manumitted slave ended up on
poor relief, for example, was often dispensed with when the enslaved person in question
could provide for themselves. In November 1716, for instance, William Brown, son of a
free black man and an enslaved woman, who had been “sold as a Slave” to Andrew
Boardman, petitioned the Assembly to allow his manumission without bond since he was
“a young and able bodied Man, & it cannot be suppos’d that he is manumitted by his
Master to avoid Charge in supporting him.” The Assembly gave their assent to the
petition, decreeing that Brown would be “deem’d free when sett at Liberty by his Master,
altho no Security be given to Indemnify the Town.”208 Again in December 1719, Scipio,
servant of the late Rev. William Brattle of Cambridge, petitioned the legislature, “Praying
the favour of this Court as to his Manumission” – the Assembly obliged, indemnifying
Brattle’s estate from any charges that might arise from the manumission and declaring
Scipio free.209 When enslaved Bay Colonists demonstrated that they could support
themselves without the assistance of local poor relief, colonial magistrates were more
than happy to facilitate their transition to freedom, another stark difference from the
practice of slavery in the plantation colonies.
Not all manumissions sailed so easily through the Massachusetts courts, however,
and protests by white heirs could tie up manumission cases for years. In December 1735,
James, a “Negro Man...formerly a Servant for life” to Samuel Burnell of Boston,
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petitioned the Assembly, requesting that they ensure his freedom in accordance with
Burnell’s will. Though he had served his master “faithfully near forty years,” and it was
Burnell’s “constant intention” to free James at his death, the unfortunate slave was
“unhappily considered as part of the Intestate’s Estate, and the property of [his master’s]
Widow and Children.” When James asked that “upon his producing lawful Security he
may enjoy that freedom which he is now so unfortunately deprived of,” the petition
sparked a two-year legal battle pitting the Bay Colony’s bias in favorem liberatatis
against the property rights of Burnell’s heirs.210
At first glance, James’ petition appears to have had a shaky foundation. Though
he claimed to have been promised his freedom upon his master’s death, none of Burnell’s
four wills were ever proved, and no physical copy could be produced – Samuel Burnell,
Jr., who stood to inherit James as part of his father’s estate, “by some ill Acts, conveyed
away and probably destroyed” the documents in order to maintain ownership of his slave
property. Even without a physical will, however, the Assembly sided with James and
declared that freedom, once promised, could not be revoked. Though the Assembly
ordered James to return to the Burnell household and “serve the Widow...faithfully,
during her life,” they also required Samuel Burnell Jr. to “give bond not to molest or
disquiet the petitioner during that term.” Should Burnell refuse to post bond, the full
power of the colonial state would protect James through a “Writ of Protection to secure
and defend him from all Warrants, Claims, Writs, Actions, or Demands whatsoever...as
any part of the [Burnell] Estate.” Upon the widow Burnell’s death, James would be
afforded “reasonable time to make application for his freedom, which he insists on as his
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right.” When the widow Burnell passed away in the autumn of 1737, the Assembly
declared that James was “fully and absolutely Manumitted and set free from his
Servitude, and...discharged from all Claims and Demands whatsoever...as a Servant, or as
Part of...Burnell’s Estate.”211 By fighting so tenaciously to secure and protect his
manumission, in spite of Samuel Burnell Jr.’s property claims, James made himself a free
man.
The individual agency and desire for freedom exhibited by enslaved Bay
Colonists like James was not, however, enough to challenge the imperial system of
slavery on its own. What made the actions of colonists of color like James, Joseph
Woodel, and John and Betty Woodby so significant was the context in which they
occurred. Whereas Virginia and the other plantation colonies, not to mention the
metropolitan courts, consistently denied Afro-Britons access to the basic rights of
subjecthood, in Massachusetts these rights were regularly upheld and reaffirmed. It is
hard to imagine a Virginian or Jamaican slaveholder recognizing the legality of enslaved
marriages, being charged with the murder of a slave as Samuel Rhodes was, or allowing a
state manumission when no physical evidence could be produced. To be sure,
Massachusetts slavery was changing rapidly, bringing the Bay Colony more closely in
line with imperial practice over the course of the mid-18th century. Enslaved and free
black Bay Colonists must surely have chafed at the increasing restrictions on their lives,
but their resistance to bondage, their stable families and productive economic lives, and
most importantly their access to the basic rights of English imperial subjects, made
slavery intensely problematic in late colonial Massachusetts. It would not be long before
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similar issues arose throughout the British Empire, shaking the foundation of imperial
slavery and setting the stage for the first wave of mass emancipations in Anglo-American
history.
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Chapter VI – “This Golden Act of Liberty”: Slavery, Personhood, and the Crisis of
Empire, 1754-1783
Our story ends, as it began, with an assault. In the evening gloom of 26
November 1771, James Somerset was accosted by slave catchers in the darkening
alleyways of St. Giles parish in London. The street toughs employed by Charles Stuart,
Somerset’s quondam owner, beat and bound the erstwhile slave and dragged him aboard
the Anne and Mary, a merchant ship sitting quayside in the Thames and scheduled to sail
for Jamaica, where Stuart hoped to sell his troublesome property. Somerset, however,
had friends and allies in London who refused to see him treated with such inhumanity.
Granville Sharp, a stalwart ally to Britain’s growing black community, procured a writ of
habeas corpus for James Somerset’s release, setting the stage for the most important
court case in the history of Anglo-American slavery.1 Just as Cartwright’s Case had way
back in 1569, James Somerset’s legal battle for freedom pitted the physical dominion and
vested property rights of a slaveholder against the legal personhood and basic rights of an
enslaved person. And as it had over two centuries earlier, the free air of England once
again trumped the claims of a slaveholder to property-in-man. In a watershed moment in
the history of Anglophone antislavery thought, Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice of the Court
of King’s Bench, declared that claiming a person as property was “odious” to English law
and, therefore, “the black must go free.” With that simple statement, a centuries-long
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debate over the legitimacy of slavery came to a close – at least in England itself, Britons
never again would be slaves.2
The imperial crisis that destroyed the first British Empire and birthed the new
United States was a deeply transformative moment that opened up political and legal
space from which to challenge human slavery. Drawing on English republican ideals that
had historically been hostile to property-in-man, American Patriots founded a new nation
devoted to the basic precept of fundamental human equality and the rule of law. To
many British policymakers, shaken by the rebellion of their North American colonists,
the imperial crisis required a thoroughgoing rethinking of the basis of empire and the
rights of all subjects both at home and overseas. Both sides in this conflict drew heavily
on the rhetoric of freeborn English rights and liberties and, increasingly, the inalienable
natural rights of all humanity. Without question, this dramatically transformed political
and intellectual climate played a crucial role in shaping Anglo-American ideals of slavery
and freedom, preparing the ground upon which James Somerset and thousands of other
enslaved Afro-Britons could stake their claims to legal personhood and the protection of
the law. Revolutionary transformations bred revolutionary antislavery. Mansfield’s
decision in Somerset and the context from which it sprung inaugurated a new phase in the
struggle to destroy human bondage.3
As the long line from Cartwright to Somerset illustrates, however, the imperial
crisis also represents the culmination of a much longer debate over the legitimacy of
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property-in-man. Reinvigorated in a new political, legal, and cultural climate, long-held
English antislavery tendencies burst into active life in an Anglo-American world
transformed by revolution. The principle of fundamental human equality that had always
been at the heart of Anglophone antislavery was now enshrined in the founding document
of a new nation committed to the “self-evident” truth that “all men are created equal, and
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, and that among these are
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”4 Acting on this foundational belief, Britons
and newly independent Americans started to turn on the institution of human slavery.
Combining the moral, political, and economic critiques of property-in-man produced by
their forebears over the previous two centuries, Anglo-American abolitionists crafted a
coherent and powerful argument against human slavery and, slowly but surely,
transformed argument into action. By the time the War for Independence came to a close
in 1783, thousands – perhaps tens of thousands – of enslaved people throughout the
British Empire had been freed through a combination of their own assertive claims to
liberty, the receptivity of common law courts to their claims, and the exigencies of war.
In several of the new United States, and in England itself, the cornerstone of the
institution of slavery – property-in-man – was destroyed completely. The first phase in
the long Anglophone debate over slavery, then, reached its culmination in the
transformative context of Anglo-American revolution.5
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All revolutions are in a sense, however, unfinished – the lofty ideals of
revolutionaries are rarely implemented to perfection. The American Revolution and the
broader British imperial transformation it wrought are no exceptions to this rule.6 Indeed,
to many American Patriots, securing the private property of individual citizens was the
very foundation of their revolution. How could such a revolution legitimately destroy a
species of property that accounted for more American wealth than any other besides the
land itself? When Virginian Patrick Henry called for American liberty, even at the cost
of his own life, he did not have enslaved persons in mind. Thomas Jefferson drafted the
charter of American liberty by the light of candles lit by a slave, with a quill sharpened by
a slave, in ink prepared by a slave, on paper procured by a slave, and though he proposed
gradual abolition a number of times he did not emancipate his own slaves, even his own
enslaved children.7 The wealth George Washington and Edmund Randolph fought to
protect had been amassed by the exploitation of thousands of enslaved people. Whatever
philosophical discomfort American slaveholders may have had with human bondage –
Henry described slavery as “totally repugnant to the first impressions of right and wrong”
while Jefferson worried that “the rights of human nature [are] deeply wounded by this
infamous practice” – most could not envision a way to end it. Devoted to the natural
right to property, the American Revolution also laid the foundation of the largest and
wealthiest slave society in human history.8
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However fundamentally the imperial crisis transformed Anglo-American slavery,
then, the problem of property-in-man remained. The long conflict between slavery and
legal personhood was not yet over. The American Revolution had, however, altered the
institutional structures and ideological frameworks in which this conflict would play out
in the future – it reframed the terms of debate. Despite the loss of the thirteen mainland
colonies, the British Empire remained a powerful force and, with its administration
effectively centralized in ways Cromwell or Charles II could only have dreamed of, it
now stood poised to use its moral capital to swell the bounds of its dominions in the name
of universal liberty. For Americans, as we shall see, their new independent nation, an
intentional experiment in decentralized power, channeled the English antislavery impulse
in strikingly different directions – some new states moved to regulate or abolish slavery
while others dove headlong into its expansion. All of these outcomes were a function of
the ways Britons and Americans re-forged older moral, political, and economic
arguments for and against property-in-man.
***
The imperial crisis was, in its origins, a dispute between two conflicting systems
of political economy that were deeply linked to questions of property rights, civil liberty,
and human slavery.9 Conservative Whig and Tory policymakers Grenville and North
favored a strict mercantilist political economy that limited colonial economies to specific
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roles designated by metropolitan planners and relied on large-scale production of
plantation commodities, and thus required continued access to the trans-Atlantic slave
trade and support for colonial slavery. Strict mercantilist policy had the added benefit of
tying the plantation colonies more firmly to the empire even as the mainland broke out in
open rebellion.10 One absentee planter noted that Jamaica was “weak and feeble...from
its very small number of white inhabitants and its peculiar situation” – with its
“incumbrance of more than 200,000 slaves, it cannot be supposed that we now intend, or
ever could have intended resistance to Great Britain.”11 Reliance on access to the slave
trade and military protection against slave rebellion tied the plantation colonies tightly to
the metropole. Tory political and economic policy suited most West Indian planters
perfectly.
To some colonists and a significant number of Britons at home, however, strictly
enforced mercantilism both impoverished the empire and violated the basic rights of
subjects. The antislavery implications of this political and economic framework come
through clearly in the work of Adam Smith. Drawing on long-held Whig assumptions
about the fundamental equality of rational mankind and the limited nature of authority,
Smith constructed a political economy which was, like that of his Patriot forebears,
fundamentally hostile to the concept of property-in-man, and often explicitly so. To
Smith, slavery was an anachronism that retarded economic development. In Wealth of
Nations, for example, following a meditation on how large landed estates limit economic
On the politics of British policy during the imperial crisis, see Andrew Jackson O’Shaughnessy, The Men
Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire (New
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growth, Smith leveled a direct indictment against the plantation complex, arguing that “if
great improvements are seldom to be expected from great proprietors, they are least of all
to be expected when they employ slaves for their workmen” because “work done by
slaves, though it appears to cost only their maintenance, is in the end the dearest of any.”
With no incentive to labor beyond what could be “squeezed out of him by violence,” a
slave “who can acquire no property” would “eat as much, and...labour as little as
possible.” “Freemen,” on the other hand, “have a plain interest that the whole produce be
as great as possible, in order that their own proportion may be so.” Though the
spectacular short-term profitability of sugar or tobacco might “afford the expence of
slave-cultivation” in the colonies, the British Empire as a whole – polite, commercial, and
free – required the labor of industrious freemen for its further development.12
To illustrate both the historical development of free labor and its economic
superiority over slavery, Smith drew on one of the central elements of the long
Anglophone debate over property-in-man – the conceptual separation of slavery and
villeinage. At first glance, it appears that Smith conflated the two institutions, describing
European serfdom as a “species of slavery.”13 Their enslavement, however, was “of a
milder kind than that known among the ancient Greeks and Romans, or even in our West
Indian colonies.” The crucial difference was that while feudal villeins or Eastern
European serfs, like slaves, could not own their own separate property, they were not
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defined as property themselves as colonial slaves were. Villeins, legally tied to their
master’s estate, could “be sold with it, but not separately” – every English colony, in
contrast, allowed for the transfer of slaves as private property. Furthermore, villeins,
despite their degraded status, retained the basic rights of subjecthood. They could marry,
albeit only with their masters’ consent, and masters could not “dissolve the marriage by
selling the man and wife to different persons.” Masters who “maimed or murdered” their
villeins were “liable to some penalty” in courts of law. In Smith’s reading of English
economic history, feudal villeinage never implied the kind of property right inherent to
New World slavery, and even the most debased serf retained access to the basic
protections of English common law.14
With no economic impetus to labor, however, Smith argued that serfdom was
doomed. Emerging in tandem with the decline of villeinage, however, was another social
basis for production – tenantry. Since tenants, “being freemen,” were capable of property
ownership in the form of a lease, they would have an economic incentive to produce a
greater surplus, benefitting both the landlord and tenant. Smith argued that this basic
difference separated free labor from feudal serfdom (and imperial slavery) and paved the
way for the gradual disappearance of human bondage. Tellingly, the rights of English
subjects and the interest of the sovereign in the common wealth – central pillars of the
long English antislavery argument – were crucial in this development. Desire for
increased productivity and limitations on the power of the nobility led to “encroachments
of the sovereign” on feudal lords’ dominions. Indeed, Smith argued, English kings
“encouraged their villains” to make claims “upon their [the sovereign’s] authority” rather
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than that of their lords. Together, the productivity of free labor, the assertive claims of
English men and women to the rights of subjecthood, and the receptivity of the sovereign
to these claims “rendered this species of servitude altogether inconvenient.”15 Villeins,
transformed into free cultivators and tenants, were freed to contribute their labor and
consumption to dynamic English economic growth.
The lesson Smith took from this narrative was that slavery was economically
backward because “it diminishes the number of free men even to a degree beyond
imagination, for every slave takes up the room of a free man,” limiting the potential for
both production and consumption in the British Empire, just the argument Patriot Whigs
had made earlier in the century. While landed elites like colonial planters might appear
to spur consumption by spending “what would maintain a thousand men,” in reality “he
eats or wears no more than the rest.” Hoarding wealth limited the potential of more
subjects to become active consumers. The owners of such vast wealth might be “really
useful,” however, if through their consumption they employed free people in “refining”
this private wealth “by an infinity of ways so as to make it worth the whole.” As Smith
pointed out, this redeployment of wealth would “[give] room for all kinds of
manufactures” and stimulate economic growth. Slave economies, however, inhibited this
kind of growth by edging out free labor. “Where slaves are employed,” Smith argued,
“one must be a tailor, another a weaver, a third a smith, and thus each takes up a free
man’s place.” Unlike free artisans, slaves would never become active consumers,
retarding economic growth and development. In this Smithian developmental schema,
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the long-term benefits of free labor in distributing wealth more equitably far outweighed
the short-term gains that accrued to a tiny number of slaveholders.16
Despite his abiding faith in the emancipatory potential of a free labor economy,
however, Smith had a deep pessimism about the immediate prospects for abolition.
Indeed, “[a] small part of the West of Europe is the only portion of the globe that is free
from it, and is nothing in comparison with the vast continents where it still prevails.” The
problem with abolition, Smith argued, was that it would require tinkering with vested
property rights. Indeed, in societies where slaves made up “the most considerable part of
the nation’s property,” abolition would be seen as an infringement on the rights of
subjects and “occasion a general insurrection.” In an absolute monarchy, where “one
single person is lawgiver, and the law will not extend to him, nor diminish his power,”
slavery might be “gradually softened” by the sovereign’s regulation of slave treatment,
but respect for the property rights of slave owners made it difficult for the institution to
be “entirely abolished.” The problem was even worse in “free governments” – where
“every law is made by [slave] masters,” citizens would never “make a law so hurtful to
their interest, as they might think the abolishing of slavery would be.” Indeed, Smith hit
on the central contradiction between English liberty and colonial slavery. “Freedom and
opulence,” Smith argued, “contribute to the misery of the slaves. The perfection of
freedom is their greatest bondage; and, as they are the most numerous part of mankind,
no human person will wish for liberty in a country where this institution is established.”
The freedom of some relied on the slavery of others.17
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Great Britain, however, had bucked the global trend and taken steps to insulate
itself from the dangers of slavery. Demonstrating his close if selective attention to the
history of English slave law, Smith drew on the emancipatory logic of the Holt court and
stated flatly that “a negro in this country is a man,” not an article of property. If a “negro
servant” was stolen or absconded from service, an owner could “have no action for the
price, but only for damages sustained by the loss of [a] servant.” A master could own the
labor of another subject, but not his or her person. And since “a negro servant is entitled
to the privileges of a freeman while here [in England],” Afro-Britons must be under the
protection of the common law of subjecthood. “If a negro is killed,” then, “the person
who does it is guilty of murder.” Technically, Smith was flat wrong – though his position
was nearly identical to that taken by Chief Justice Holt in his post-Glorious Revolution
antislavery decisions at King’s Bench, the subsequent Yorke-Talbot Opinion and a
handful of lower court decisions had declared property-in-man to be operative throughout
the empire. Smith largely ignored these proslavery rulings. In a nod to the imperial
chattel principle, he did admit that a master might have the power to “oblige [a slave] to
return to America and keep him as formerly,” but carefully delimited this property right
to the colonies alone because “from the laws of this country...[a slave] enjoys freedom,
because there is no such thing as slavery among us.”18 Considering his linkage of free
labor and economic development, one need not stretch too far to imagine Adam Smith’s
desire to see the free air of England extended to the entire empire.
As Smith’s work illustrates, imperial free trade was conceptually linked to a
number of older moral and political arguments against slavery. To many free traders and
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political radicals throughout the empire, the fundamental equality of all humanity
required that the basic rights of all persons be protected through access to civic
subjecthood. To at least some Britons informed by this position, these rights must be
extended to all subjects, even the enslaved. The clearest illustration of the emancipatory
potential of this broad vision of subjecthood is found in the work of Granville Sharp, the
radical Whig and social reformer who transformed English antislavery opinion into an
abolitionist movement. This was to be a limited abolitionism, to be sure – a broad-based
social movement against slavery was still decades in the future – but, led by a cadre of
committed antislavery lawyers, Sharp hoped his antislavery strategy would reframe the
law of England in ways that had far-reaching emancipatory potential. Sharp did not,
however, have to invent English antislavery from whole cloth, and he drew on ideas
developed by a long line of antislavery thinkers, from Morgan Godwyn and Lord Holt to
contemporary critics like Anthony Benezet and William Blackstone, in framing his
argument for the illegitimacy of property-in-man.
As his antislavery forebears had, Sharp identified the twin concepts of propertyin-man and civil death as the central problem of slavery – under colonial slave law, “the
Negro [was] divested of his humanity, and rendered incapable of the King’s protection.”
The first order, then, was to delegitimize “the modern unnatural claims of private
property in the persons of men.” The ancient Roman laws of slavery, the basis for
Continental civil law, “[did] not at all concern a Christian government,” nor did the
institution’s continuing existence among “heathen nations.” The English common law
favored liberty. Sharp also argued that English villeinage, so often invoked by proslavery
Britons as an indigenous legal basis for slavery, must be “a matter of serious

489

consideration.” The old feudal serfdom could not be a valid precedent, however, because
“modern bondage did not even commence, until the former had been many years extinct
[and] customs cannot exist to things newly created.” “West Indian Slavery” was “sprung
from a very different source.” Besides, villeinage was against “religion and morality,
reason and the law of nature” in and of itself, and proslavery reliance on feudal law was
tacit proof of the weakness of “modern” claims to property-in-man – why else would
slaveholders be “obliged to go so far back for precedents’?19
Earlier antislavery thinkers had made all of these points before, but Sharp also
stressed a relatively novel element of the English argument against slavery – he called
into question the legitimacy of war captivity as a basis for bondage. Generations of
jurists had found the conceptual and legal origins of human slavery in the power of life
and death a victor gained over captives taken in a just war. According to Sharp, however,
this “imaginary right of conquerors...to enslave their captives” could no longer legitimate
bondage because, under evolving norms of European warfare, captors had no claim to the
lives of prisoners. Instead, they were expected to hold captives “in safe custody, until
there can be a convenient opportunity of ransoming, exchanging or of sending them away
with safety to the public [at] the conclusion of the peace.” The radical implications of
Sharp’s reasoning were clear – if there was no legitimate legal means to acquire a right to
property-in-man, then “the derived power or right of the last master who detains the
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Slave, is certainly as unjust...as the unmerciful usurpation of the first possessor.” With its
traditional bases stripped away, slave property everywhere was illegitimate.20
Without a recognized property right to their slaves, Sharp argued, the kind of
dominion claimed by slaveholders was illegitimate because enslaved persons, as legal
persons and thus subjects, came under the protection of the law within England. Indeed,
no topic receives more consideration in A Representation than the nature of British
subjecthood. Sharp interpreted the ambit of English subjecthood in light of his
fundamental assumptions about the congruence of common law and natural rights – the
law saw “no distinction of bond or free; neither of colours or complexions, whether of
black, brown, or white...[all] are bounden by and unto the laws,” and “every person, who
in any respect is in subjection to the laws, must undoubtedly be a subject.” In this sense,
every person within British dominions was “the King’s property in [a] relative sense,”
and even the property claims of slaveholders could not a subject’s “indispensible
obligation and allegiance to the King and the laws.” Subjecthood was a two-way street,
however, and in return for their allegiance, all subjects, “black as well as white, bond as
well as free...are entitled to personal protection” from the king’s courts. By excluding
enslaved people from subjecthood and the protection of the courts, Britons not only
committed a grave injustice against strangers but also undermined “the equitable force
and reason of those laws, by which we ourselves are protected.” Property-in-man was

20

Sharp quoted a lengthy passage from William Blackstone’s commentaries in support of his claims about
the illegitimacy of war captivity as a basis for enslavement. Blackstone read A Representation in
manuscript, and engaged in a productive critique with Sharp on a number of legal points, but he
apparently agreed with Sharp’s use of his reading of the law of nations. William Blackstone to Granville
Sharp (DATE?), MS, Granville Sharp Papers, New-York Historical Society. As we will see, this
antislavery reading of international law would have enormous consequences on wartime emancipation
policy during the American Revolutionary War.

491

fundamentally illegitimate because it deprived the commonwealth of its proprietary rights
in the persons of subjects, endangering the liberty of all.21
The claim that slavery conflicted with the proprietary claims of the sovereign (or
state) in the persons of subjects was as old as English antislavery – this was precisely the
position Henry Parker had taken in Jus Populi back in 1646 and had informed the Holt
Court’s decisions at the turn of the 18th century.22 Sharp, however, also explicitly
invoked a newer strand in antislavery thought: self-ownership. The “mere mercenary
plea of private property,” Sharp argued, “cannot equitably (in a case between man and
man) stand in competition with that superior property, which every man must necessarily
be allowed to have in his own proper person.” Self-ownership was different from other
kinds of property rights, however, and “the nature of every kind of property ought to be
considered, before it can be lawfully claimed.” As Sharp noted, there were “many cases
wherein property is absolutely altered” under English law, but nothing could erase “that
blessing to which all mankind have an undoubted right, their natural liberty.” This selfproprietary right was “of much more value and consideration” to each person “than any
other kind of property whatsoever can be to another,” and was certainly to be preferred to
“the Slavemonger’s mere mercenary claim.” A slave’s “property in his own person, is
certainly far superior,” Sharp argued, “and ought to be preferred to any claim whatsoever,
that another person can possibly have upon him, on account of his having been formerly a
Slave, private property, possession, or mere chattel.”23
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Far from repudiating the older corporate humanist antislavery tradition, however,
this new invocation of self-ownership remained relied on and augmented it. Not only did
the basic precept of self-ownership fit neatly into existing discourses of “freeborn”
Englishness and the universal natural rights of mankind expressed in English common
law, it allowed antislavery thinkers to counter proslavery arguments that slaves, as
perpetual strangers, could not be subjects and had no claim on traditional English rights.
As legal persons, even if not full subjects, “a Negro or Indian Slave in this general
capacity of alien, must be accounted a subject...[notwithstanding] his particular state or
condition of Slave, Negro, or Indian.” Even granting that enslaved persons might not be
full subjects – a point Sharp was not willing to concede except for the sake of argument –
as aliens they still came under the protection of the common law once in England. The
only option left to slaveholders, then, was to “prove...that [a slave] is not a MAN.” Sharp
argued that no servile status could erase a person’s fundamental humanity – even the
“custom of the Colonies” defining a slave as an article of property could “make no
alteration in his human nature.” Linking the liberal ideal of individual self-ownership to
the longer antislavery tradition of broadly construed subjecthood, Sharp could now argue
that whatever their status before arrival in England, “every Negro Slave, being
undoubtedly either man, woman, or child, ...immediately upon their arrival in England,
...cannot [then] be out of the King’s protection.”24
Sharp recognized, however, that the situation was not nearly as clear-cut in the
colonies. In cases where “the question of property relates to Slaves remaining in the
[colonies],” for example, the courts were bound to recognize the “plantation laws” in a
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form of imperial comity. To Sharp, however, this made a mockery of the law. The
courts must certainly recognize claims to the labor of servants who gave their free
consent through contracts or indentures, but the “many-headed monster of tyranny” that
was colonial slave law “subverts our most excellent constitution; because liberty and
slavery are so opposite to each other, that they cannot subsist in the same community.”
The solution was to broaden the geographic reach of free English air – “wherever the
bounds of the British empire are extended, there the Common Law of England must of
course take place.” If metropolitan courts declared their opposition to property-in-man,
and this common law interpretation were exported to the colonies, the English freedom
principle would be “so established in every province, as to include the respective byelaws of each province, instead of being by them excluded.” Cognizant of their own
liberties, Britons could not simply stand idly by as their “fellow-subjects” suffered in
chains – whatever blame was rightfully due to American colonials, a “great share of this
enormous guilt will [also] certainly rest on this side of the water!”25
The crux of Granville Sharp’s sophisticated antislavery ideology, then, was the
emancipatory potential of British subjecthood. United in their commitment to human
freedom, Britons around the globe would ensure the protections of the common law to all
persons. As Sharp eloquently put it:
“This law breathes the pure spirit of liberty, equity and social love; being
calculated to maintain that consideration and mutual regards, which one person
ought to have for another, howsoever unequal in rank or station. But when any
part of the community, under the pretence of private property, is deprived of this
common privilege, ‘tis a violation of civil liberty, which is entirely inconsistent
with the social principles of a free state. True liberty protects the labourer as well
as his lord; preserves the dignity of human nature, and seldom fails to render a
province right and populous: whereas on the other hand, a toleration of Slavery is
the highest breach of social virture, and not only tends to depopulation, bot too
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often renders the minds of both masters and Slaves utterly depraved and inhuman,
by the hateful extremes of exaptation and depression”
Only by repudiating human slavery could Britons make their empire a stable, productive,
“free state.”26
Slaveholders would have to be forced to remake the empire along these lines
however, and, as Sharp’s argument made clear, the first venue in this battle would have to
be the English courts. Sharp called specifically on “every lawyer who is a well-wisher to
the civil liberties of mankind” to take up the cause of “publickly protesting against all
doctrines which may tend to...the least right of property in...our fellow-subjects,” and
reached out to prominent lawyers, including William Blackstone, for commentary on his
legal antislavery theories. To force the issue of property-in-man into the courts,
antislavery jurists must “strenuously contend” for the “absolute and immutable” rights of
subjecthood, particularly trial by jury. Would not “the spirit and equity of this old
English doctrine be entirely lost,” Sharp asked, “if we partially confine that justice to
ourselves alone, when we have it in our power to extend it to others?” The lives of all
subjects, “Slaves as well as others...even in the remotest parts of the British empire,”
must be protected – “when any...are put to death, ‘WITHOUT THE SOLEMNITY OF A
JURY,’...there is much reason to attribute the GUILT OF MURDER, to every person
concerned.” Lawyers should also use the Habeas Corpus Act to challenge the physical
detention of enslaved Britons. “ALL SUBJECTS; both natural born and alien, of every
denomination, (without exception real or implied)” were guaranteed access to habeas
writs under the revolutionary settlement of the 1690s, and so “every attempt to detain,
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imprison, or TRANSPORT any person whatsoever as a Slave...must inevitably be
construed as an offence” against this central pillar of the English constitution.27
Well before the Somerset case, then, Granville Sharp had already formulated a
clear legal argument against property-in-man, and in 1771 he had the opportunity to put
this argument to the test in an English court in Lewis v. Stapylton, a crucial if underexamined case heard by the Court of King’s Bench in 1771. The arguments shaped by
Sharp and presented by counsel, as well as Mansfield’s decision, all bore the imprint of
much older English antislavery arguments. Thomas Lewis, a West Indian slave, escaped
from his master, Robert Stapylton, while sojourning in England in 1770. The erstwhile
slave likely found refuge in London’s growing Afro-British population and found work in
the port city’s mixed race waterfront economy. Eventually, Lewis fell ill and paid a visit
to Dr. Thomas Sharp. After hearing the story of Lewis’ escape, Sharp recommended that
Lewis contact his brother, abolitionist Granville Sharp, who had numerous antislavery
contacts who might shelter and employ the fugitive. This contact would prove to be
crucial, for not long after his introduction to Sharp, Lewis was forcibly kidnapped by
Stapylton’s agents on the streets of London, bound, gagged, and placed on a ship bound
for Jamaica where he was to be sold.28 All of this was perfectly in keeping with the
proslavery legal regime constructed by imperial planners since the Yorke-Talbot Opinion
– as an article of imperial property, Thomas Lewis had no claim to the rights of British
subjecthood, and the Stapylton’s power over him was just as extensive in the free air of
England as it had been in the colonies.

27
28

Ibid., 50-51, 71-72.
On Lewis’ escape and connection to Sharp, see Wise, Though the Heavens May Fall, 59-68.

496

Just as the Captain Seward was about to leave the Thames estuary, however,
another ship pulled alongside brandishing a habeas corpus procured by Sharp for Lewis’
release. The ship’s captain released Lewis into Sharp’s custody, but the abolitionist was
not willing to stop there. He immediately moved for the indictments of Stapylton and the
dockworkers that had seized Lewis for unlawful assembly, assault, and false
imprisonment. Stapylton responded that the indictment was ridiculous – how could one
assault and wrongly imprison his own property? Sharp responded by stressing the central
element of English antislavery thought – property-in-man was illegitimate in England,
therefore Lewis was a British subject, protected from Stapylton’s high-handed dominion
by the English common law. Sharp’s intent was not only to punish the “wicked and evil
disposed persons” who had roughly treated Lewis, but also to bring a test case before
Chief Justice Mansfield that would address the broader question of slavery’s legitimacy
in England.
The central tenet of the long English antislavery argument – the distinction
between servile status and slave property – came into clear relief as counsel presented
arguments before King’s Bench.29 Delivering his opening statement, former Solicitor
General John Dunning stated that, simply because Lewis had “the misfortune…to be in
point of color a black,” Stapylton believed that “he was not under the protection of the
laws of this Country, and [had] a right to treat him as a horse or a dog to carry him where
[he] pleased and do what [he] pleased with him.” But according to Dunning “they have
no such right,” because “the laws of this Country admit of no such property. I know
nothing where this idea exists, I apprehend it exists only in the minds of those who have
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lived in those countries where it is suffered.” The “idea” of slave property, he argued,
was dependent on jurisdiction, and was legitimate only where local law upheld it.
The only witness called by the crown was Thomas Lewis himself, and the
question immediately arose as to whether his testimony was admissible. Lewis was
alleged to be a slave; obviously a piece of property could not testify in court. Mansfield
set aside this issue, proclaiming that he would “presume him free unless [the defendants]
prove the contrary,” thus applying the English common law assumption in favorem
liberatis to an African and an alleged slave. The Chief Justice flatly stated that “his being
black will not prove the property.” Dunning proceeded to question Lewis about his life,
and the alleged slave’s testimony spun a fascinating tale for the court, one that illustrated
the depth of knowledge enslaved persons themselves had of the antislavery potential of
English law.
Born on the Gold Coast of Africa to free parents, Lewis had been a servant to the
local governor. A curious lad, he signed on with a ship sailing for the New World, where
his servitude passed from one captain to another, each of whom, Lewis claimed, paid him
wages. At some point in his travels, Lewis was baptized. Eventually, he was passed on to
Richard Smith, an English merchant residing in New Spain, who asked if he would like
to travel to Carolina with Stapylton. Lewis said that he “should like it very well,” and set
off with his new master for the British mainland colonies. Before reaching their
destination, however, Spanish pirates took the ship and Lewis eventually wound up in
Havana, working as a waiter for wages. Shortly thereafter, Stapylton passed through
Havana and, recognizing his lost servant, placed him on a ship bound for Philadelphia,
where Lewis again worked for wages. The footloose young man found work in New
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York, Santa Cruz in New Spain, Pensacola, and New England, all the while living
independently of his erstwhile master and earning his own wages. Eventually, Lewis was
once again seized by Stapylton, who took him to Carolina, Jamaica, and finally to
England in 1770.
Throughout this odyssey, Lewis believed himself a free man, serving a series of
employers through his own consent. He had been bound to ship captains and merchants,
and to Stapylton, as a servant, but was never their property. Payment of wages seemed to
suggest as much. He had agreed to accompany Stapylton to Carolina, but only as a
servant, not a slave. When counsel for Stapylton argued that Lewis was a “servant” of
Stapylton, the Chief Justice agreed, stating that “nothing he has said is inconsistent with
that one way or another.” But what kind of servant was he? Stapylton’s counsel claimed
he was a slave – an article of property – and provided as proof “from Captain Smith a
regular transfer to Stapylton and at all the places he has claimed him, at Havannah, at
New York and Pensacola, [Lewis] has never denied it.” Mansfield countered that there
was “a great chasm” between the initial transfer and Lewis’ recent escape. Besides,
“[w]hether [masters] have this kind of property or not in England never has been
solemnly determined.” Mansfield had no inclination to resolve this question at present,
however. The Chief Justice determined on a special verdict, and instructed the jury to
“find whether [Lewis] is [Stapylton’s] property as a slave, and then put it in some solemn
way to be tried.” In other words, the jury would first decide whether Lewis was a slave;
only if they believed he was a free man would they proceed to the question of Stapylton’s
guilt on the assault and imprisonment charges.
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To prove that Lewis was Stapylton’s property, counsel for the defense called a
series of witnesses, all of whom testified to Lewis’ servitude – none could conclusively
prove that he had been property, however. Vigorous cross-examination by Lewis’
counsel proved that Stapylton’s alleged title was suspect, and none of the witnesses could
swear that the document presented in court was legitimate. Numerous witnesses testified
that they had heard Lewis admit to being Stapylton’s property. During cross-examination
of Stapylton’s witnesses, however, the clever Dunning pressed this point to great
advantage: “Did you hear [Lewis] say he was Stapylton’s property?” The witness
replied, “I heard him say he was his master.” Dunning saw his opportunity. “But not the
word property…. Did you ever hear him say he was his property?” “That he was his
master,” was the witness’ only reply. No one denied that Lewis was Stapylton’s servant,
but they could not prove that he was an article of property.
Dunning’s closing argument hammered home this distinction between servile
status and property. He had hoped for “an opportunity of…insisting that no such
property can exist…in any place and in any court in this kingdom,” but Mansfield
interrupted to remind him that this was not the material issue in the case. Indeed, the
Chief Justice openly stated in court, “I hope it never will be finally discussed, for I would
have all masters think they were free and all negroes think they were not, because they
would both behave better.” Undaunted, Dunning presented a ringing summation, arguing
that, because Stapylton produced no clear title, “the boy is born as free as any man, and
can never be otherwise than free, but by some act of those, that have power over one
another, by captivity in war, or in other circumstance of that sort.” Furthermore, Dunning
argued, race was not a salient issue in the case, asking rhetorically, “is it to be
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distinguishable only by color that such right [to property] is to exist?” Jurors should not
“suffer any man in a free country like this to be sold and conveyed to the place where he
would be treated…with more inhumanity than would be applied to a dog.”
In his instructions to the jury, Mansfield openly advocated for Lewis. He pointed
out that, since there was “no evidence of a bill of sale,” and “no evidence that [Stapylton]
bought [Lewis],” they must find in favor of the plaintiff. The jurors complied, shouting
“no property, no property!” Granville Sharp believed that, given the opportunity, the jury
would have gone further and declared slave property illegitimate throughout England.30
Mansfield congratulated the jurors, saying, “I think you have done very right. I should
have found the same verdict…for he was not the property.” If ever there was a
Mansfieldian Moment, this was it.31 The Chief Justice also hinted to Dunning, and the
many other lawyers who had gathered to hear the case, that they might “find more in the
question than you see at present…. There are a great many opinions given on it.”
Thomas Lewis walked out of Westminster Hall a free man, while Granville Sharp and a
crack team of legal minds set to work honing their arguments in preparation for a final
climacteric battle over property-in-man.
On the very day the Lord Mansfield handed down his decision in Lewis, another
habeas corpus came across his desk. This habeas writ, also filed by Granville Sharp,
sought the release of another enslaved man, James Somerset. The details of the Somerset
case are now so well known to historians that they require little direct commentary here.
Lord Mansfield’s decision in the case, based on the “odious” nature of slavery and its
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incompatibility with English common law, has been deeply studied, and most scholars
now agree that Somerset formed the legal basis for future debates over slavery. What
many of these scholars have missed, however, is the extent to which the Somerset case
drew on the much longer debate over property-in-man that had been simmering since the
very beginnings of the English empire.32 Close attention to arguments made by counsel
for Somerset and Steuart, as well as Mansfield’s decision in the case, reveals the imprint
of this long legal debate.
The argument presented by Charles Steuart’s lawyers, John Dunning and James
Wallace, relied on centuries of proslavery legal thought. For Dunning and Wallace,
slavery was precisely what generations of slave owners and imperial planners claimed it
was – the reduction of persons to articles of property, and the absolute rightlessness of
enslaved persons. These two tenets were essentially the only arguments put forth by
Charles Steuart’s counsel in the Somerset case. The crux of John Dunning’s argument,
for example, boiled down to one sentence – “his condition was that of servitude in Africa;
the law of the land of that country disposed of him as property, with all the consequences
of transmission and alienation; the statutes of the British Legislature confirm this
condition, and thus he was a slave both in law and fact.”33 James Wallace, Dunning’s cocounsel, worried that a decision destabilizing slave property within England would lead
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restive African slaves to behave like English servants, making demands on their masters
and the state. For good measure, both Dunning and Wallace also offered a dose of
economic realpolitik, perhaps the most potent weapon in the proslavery arsenal – “many
thousands of pounds would be lost to the owners by setting [Somerset] free.”34 Drawing
on a deep well of proslavery English law – Dunning and Wallace cited the definition of
slaves as chattels in Butts v. Penny (1677), the Yorke-Talbot Opinion’s extension of the
chattel principle to English soil, and Lord Chancellor Hardwicke’s assertion that English
villeinage illustrated the potential for rightlessness in Britain – Stuart’s attorneys made a
strong case for the legality of James Somerset’s rendition.
Just as Dunning and Wallace drew on a long history of English proslavery legal
thought, James Somerset’s legal team – Francis Hargrave, John Alleyne, and James
Mansfield – had ample legal precedent and tradition to draw on. The central element of
this antislavery legal tradition, stretching back to the Holt Court and beyond, was the
separation of property-in-man and control over labor. Hargrave, for example, drew a
contrast between “service for life” and “the power of the master over the slave’s person.”
Property-in-man, Hargrave argued, was plainly “incompatible with the natural rights of
mankind, and the principles of good government,” but a “moderate servitude” was
perfectly legal – Charles Stuart could own James Somerset’s labor, but not his person.
Hargrave and Alleyne used this conceptual separation between ownership of labor and
ownership of persons to dismantle the proslavery argument from villeinage. Though
villeinage “had most of the incidents of slavery,” said Hargrave, it was not germane to
the case – Stuart never claimed that Somerset was his villein, nor would such a claim
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have implied the kind of property relation involved in chattel slavery.35 Serjeant William
Davy, another attorney for Somerset, added that although “there had been a time when
slavery was understood to exist” under the guise of villeinage, those days were long gone,
and even then the kind of claims made by Steuart would “not have been endured.”36
Somerset’s legal team drew on the emancipatory logic of the long English antislavery
argument to drive a wedge between servitude, even its basest form, and property-in-man.
If Steuart wanted only to claim Somerset’s labor, he was going about it wrong. A
trespass writ would suffice in that situation, as Chief Justice Holt had ruled nearly a
century earlier, but claiming Somerset as property was an altogether different issue.
Having established that property-in-man was illegitimate under English law,
Somerset’s legal team next worked to prove that, as a legal person living within English
jurisdiction, James Somerset must have access to the basic rights guaranteed to all
subjects. James Mansfield, a young barrister who would later go on to become Chief
Justice of Common Pleas, argued that England was “a country where the laws of liberty
are known and regarded” and the young barrister knew of no reason why Somerset
should “not...be protected by these laws, but…carried away again to be sold.”37 John
Alleyne argued that since Somerset, by “making choice of his habitation here [in
England],” had “subjected himself to the penalties, and is therefore entitled to the
protection of our laws.”38 Bound by the laws of England, James Somerset must be a
subject. In some ways the question was moot – if James Somerset did not have access to
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the rights of English subjects, his case would never have come before the court in the first
place. Somerset v. Steuart was initiated when Somerset’s godparents filed a writ of
habeas corpus with the King’s Bench protesting their godson’s wrongful detention. Had
Mansfield wished, he could have rejected the writ outright on the grounds that Somerset
was a slave. One did not file a habeas to retrieve lost property.39 Yet there James
Somerset stood, before the highest court in the empire, invoking the most basic
protections royal justice accorded a subject – protection of his person and recognition of
his legal personhood.
The greatest obstacle to James Somerset’s freedom was jurisdictional. All
English lawyers agreed that local law in the colonies, supported directly by the sovereign
prerogative, could diverge from common law so long is it was not “repugnant.” To deny
the local legitimacy of colonial law would be to deny the power of the monarch over his
dominions, seen as largely outside Parliament and the courts’ purview. As one of
Somerset’s lawyers put it, slavery was a “new species of tyranny…created entirely by
Colony government.” This colonial legal diversity cut both ways, however – if Somerset
was in Virginia, “there he might be the subject of property…but not here [in England].”40
John Alleyne, a freshly minted barrister added to Somerset’s legal team, eloquently
argued that slavery was “not a natural, [but] a municipal relation; an institution therefore
confined to certain places, and necessarily dropt by passage into a country where such
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municipal regulations do not subsist.”41 As Chief Justice Holt had said, “as soon as a
negro comes into England he becomes free.”42
But how could Somerset’s attorneys account for the many precedents that did
seem to allow for property-in-man in England? As we have seen, the argument from
villeinage fell apart once ownership of persons and labor were conceptually separated.
Francis Hargrave turned aside the proslavery argument that the Navigation Acts
established the chattel principle through parliamentary statute, arguing that they only
“impliedly authorize the slavery of negroes in America; and it would be a strange thing to
say, that permitting slavery there, includes a permission of slavery here.”43 The YorkeTalbot Opinion, as dicta, could easily be dealt with, and Hardwicke’s decision in Pearne
v. Lisle (1749) dealt with slaves held in Antigua, not England, and was therefore not
relevant precedent. Butts v. Penny, another crucial proslavery decision, was dealt with by
simply dismissing its conclusion that slaves were chattels – Lord Holt’s decisions
following the Glorious Revolution overrode the earlier decision in Butts.
In addition to these older antislavery arguments, counsel for Somerset also relied
heavily on natural rights arguments of more recent vintage. Hargrave, for example,
admitted that “moderate servitude” might be allowable under natural law, but “slavery in
its full extent” was “incompatible with the natural rights of mankind.” In a truly novel
move, Somerset’s attorneys also emphasized the importance of self-ownership as the
basis of all rights. Hargrave, for instance, claimed that English law would not allow a
person “to bind himself by contract to serve for life” and could certainly not “invest
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another man with despotism” – one’s own person was unalienable. John Dunning, as
counsel for Stuart, summarized his opposing counsel’s arguments succinctly – Hargrave,
Alleyne, and Mansfield relied on the assumption that “natural relations...attend the person
of the man.” Bringing natural rights and self-ownership together, Alleyne asked
rhetorically, “what power can there be in any man to dispose of all the rights vested in
him by nature and society in him and his descendants?” The answer was clear: “He
cannot...part with them, without ceasing to be a man; for they immediately flow from,
and are essential to his condition as such.”44
Both sides had marshalled old arguments and crafted novel ones, making the
Somerset case both a true summation of the long English antislavery argument and the
opening salvo in a new legal conflict over slavery. Lord Mansfield, despite any personal
misgivings he may have had, laid down a very clear ruling in the case:
The power of a master over his slave has been extremely different, in
different countries. The state of slavery is of such a nature that it is
incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or political; but only
positive law, which preserves its force long after the reasons, occasion,
and time itself from which it was created, is erased from memory: it is so
odious that nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive law.
Whatever inconveniences, therefore, may follow from a decision, I cannot
say this case is allowed or approved by the law of England; and therefore
the black must be discharged.45
With that simple statement, the legitimacy of slave property under English common law
was finally and definitively voided. Arguments against the chattel principle first
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developed in the earliest days of colonization had finally carried the day. When James
Somerset left Westminster Hall and stepped into the free air of England, he not only
gained his own freedom but that of all African slaves who reached English shores.
Englishmen could now rightly claim that “Britons never will be slaves.”46
Despite the clarity of Mansfield’s decision, there has been extensive scholarly
debate about what, exactly, the Somerset decision did. Critics have pointed out that
masters could still claim labor from their “slavish servants” through coerced indentures or
apprenticeship agreements. If we define “freedom” as full access to political and social
rights, then Mansfield’s ruling certainly falls well short of the mark. Besides, there were
relatively few slaves in England itself – the Somerset principle left colonial slavery,
established and protected by positive law, entirely intact.47 If we take Mansfield on his
own terms, however, and situate the Somerset decision in the context of a long English
antislavery argument, the outcome of the case appears both far more radical and far more
predictable.
What Mansfield did with the Somerset decision was precisely what generations of
English antislavery thinkers had advocated – he interposed the power of the state between
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master and slave, breaking the property relation between them and legally transforming
slavery into a form of servitude. As the use of habeas corpus writs in Lewis and
Somerset illustrate, this definition of slaves as legal persons opened up various ways to
limit the physical power of masters, and allowed African servants to make claims on the
English state through the courts. This was exactly what Henry Parker dreamed of in
1644, what Morgan Godwyn agitated for at the cost of his life in the 1680s, what Chief
Justice Holt enshrined in law at the turn of the 18th century, what thousands of
slaveholders throughout the empire dreaded and millions of enslaved persons longed for.
Mansfield’s decision in Somerset and the antislavery principles that undergirded it
quickly made their imprint on mainstream English legal thought. This transformation can
be seen most clearly in the evolving treatment of slavery in William Blackstone’s
Commentaries on the Laws of England. At its publication in 1765, Commentaries
already contained many the legal principles that informed the antislavery thought of
Granville Sharp, Francis Hargrave, and the other Somerset barristers. Blackstone, citing
Chief Justice Holt’s decision in Chamberlain v. Harvey, flatly stated that “the law of
England abhors, and will not endure the existence of slavery,” and therefore “a slave or
negro, the instant he lands in England, becomes a freeman; that is, the law will protect
him in the enjoyment of his person, his liberty, and his property.” As earlier English
antislavery thinkers had done, Blackstone also distinguished between property-in-man,
which was illegitimate and unsupported by common law, and servile status, which was
explicitly allowed by English law. While a slave could not be property in England, any
rights “to the perpetual service of John or Thomas” given to masters “by contract or the
like” would remain “exactly the same.” A master could own a servant’s labor, “for this

509

is no more than the same state of subjection...which every apprentice submits to,” but
could never own another subject’s person.48
Though Blackstone’s discussion of the law of slavery fit nicely into the long
tradition of English opposition to property-in-man, some contemporaries hoped for a
more forceful repudiation of the power of masters over enslaved subjects. In the process
of drafting A Representation..., for example, Granville Sharp corresponded with
Blackstone and contested the claim made in Commentaries about a master’s right to “the
perpetual service” of enslaved subjects brought to England. This criticism, in
conjunction with Mansfield’s decision in Somerset, led to an important alteration in the
Commentaries discussion of slave law. Where the first edition had argued that an
enslaved person still owed service even in England itself, by the time a revised edition
came out in 1775, Blackstone had inserted a crucial qualifier – the only legitimate claims
masters had were based in “general and not...local law.”49 While this qualification may
appear relatively minor, it brought Blackstone’s Commentaries into line with the
Somerset decision by rooting claims to the labor or service of Afro-Britons in English
common law, not colonial statute law. Whatever the case might be outside English
jurisdictions, Afro-Britons within England might be servants but they never could be
slaves.
Explicitly limited to England itself, the Somerset decision had little immediate
impact on slavery in the colonies. As the imperial crisis continued to deepen, however,
many of the principles undergirding Mansfield’s decision were exported throughout the
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empire in the form of military emancipation plans. Evolving international law norms
proscribing the enslavement of war captives made their way into the mainstream of
English common law in the late-18th century. In his Commentaries on the Laws of
England, for example, William Blackstone repudiated earlier jurists who, following the
civil law tradition, argued that slavery legally arose “‘jure gentium,’ from a state of
captivity in war.” This justification for enslavement, Blackstone argued, was “built upon
false foundations” because the captor’s power of life and death over a captive could only
be exercised in “particular cases...of absolute necessity, for self-defence.” Since this
necessity clearly did not exist – “the victor did not actually kill him, but made him
prisoner” – then the law of war gave captors “no other right over prisoners, but merely to
disable them from doing harm...by confining their persons: much less can it give a right
to kill, torture, abuse, plunder, or even to enslave, an enemy, when the war is over.” With
a captor’s “supposed right of slaughter” delegitimized, “the consequence drawn from it
[slavery] must fail likewise.”50 Slaves might be freed by a war, but free persons could no
longer be enslaved by one.
As colonial tax rebellion turned into open warfare in the summer of 1775, the
question of military emancipation took on new significance, forcing the issue into
Parliamentary debate in November. To supporters of the North ministry, military
emancipation would bring the rebellious Americans to heel and force the colonial Patriots
to accede to imperial policy. Lord North himself defended military emancipation as a
necessary evil, denying that his ministry ever had “any idea of raising or employing the
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negroes...until the Americans themselves had first applied to them.”51 Others were less
circumspect. William Lyttelton, the former governor of South Carolina and Jamaica now
seated in the Commons as MP for Bewdley, spoke from experience when he noted that
“the southern colonies...were weak, on account of the number of negroes in them.”
Imperial planners could easily exploit this weakness – “if a few regiments were sent
there, the negroes would rise, and embrue their hands in the blood of their masters.”52
Lyttelton was sure that rebellious Southern planters, faced with this bloody prospect,
would quickly capitulate. Not everyone agreed that arming colonial slaves against their
rebellious masters was good policy, however. Some worried that slaves would refuse to
desert their “kind” masters, and that “the state of slavery [which] cuts off all the great
magnanimous inventive powers of the human mind [and] strengthens fidelity and
attachment” would prevent enslaved people from becoming effective soldiers. Besides,
such a scheme was “too black and horrid to be adopted.”53
At this very moment, however, John Murray, Earl of Dunmore and royal governor
of Virginia, was implementing just such a scheme. Indeed, Dunmore had been hinting at
his plans to emancipate the slaves of rebellious Virginians for years by the time
Parliamentary debate over military emancipation began. As early as 1772, the royal
governor had noted to Colonial Secretary Lord Dartmouth that Virginians worried about
the fidelity of their slaves. Surrounded by “a body of men, attached by no tye to their
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Master nor to the Country,” colonial planters knew that their slaves would “join the first
that would encourage them to revenge themselves.” The message was clear – Dunmore
believed that freeing and arming enslaved Afro-Virginians would result in “a Conquest of
this Country...in a very short time.”54 Though he received no explicit support for his
emancipation policy from Dartmouth or other imperial planners, and a measure
supporting military emancipation in the rebellious colonies failed to pass in Parliament,
Dunmore remained convinced that freeing the slaves of Virginia rebels was both sound
strategy and good policy. If pushed, there was little question how Virginia’s royal
governor would proceed when faced with intractable resistance to imperial policies.
For Dunmore, the tipping point in this conflict with Virginia Patriots came in May
of 1775. Stoked by the governor’s hints about military emancipation, rumors of an
impending slave insurrection terrified white Virginians, and these fears were only
exacerbated when Dunmore removed public reserves of powder and shot from the arsenal
in Williamsburg. As Dunmore explained to Lord Dartmouth, he had hoped to “soothe
[the Virginians] verbally” by assuring them that he had only removed the powder and
ammunition “lest the Negroes might have seized upon it.” The real logic behind the
governor’s removal of the public magazine was clear, however – Dunmore knew that,
given “the ferment in which [the Virginians] then appeared,” it would be “highly
improper to put it into their hands.” The actions of Virginia Patriots proved Dunmore’s
fears were not exaggerated – in June an unruly mob drove the governor from
Williamsburg and looted his home. Facing open rebellion, Dunmore informed Lord
Dartmouth that his “fixed purpose” was to “annoy [the rebels] by every means possible,
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...reducing their houses to ashes and spreading devastation wherever I can reach.” As he
had earlier hinted, the most effective way to achieve this end was to “arm all my own
Negroes and receive all others that will come to me whom I shall declare free.”55 British
subjects in open rebellion abrogated their rights to property-in-man – enslaved persons
became free subjects through their fidelity and service to the crown.
When Lord Dunmore issued his famous emancipation proclamation from his
headquarters aboard the HMS William off Norfolk on November 7th, 1775, then, he was
not instituting a new policy, but rather ratifying a practice that had already been in use for
months. Dunmore called all able-bodied male subjects “to His MAJESTY’S
STANDARD,” and declared “all indentured Servants, Negroes, or others (appertaining to
Rebels,) free that are able and willing to bear Arms.” The logic behind these
emancipations was clearly spelled out in the proclamation. American rebels had become
“Traitors to His MAJESTY’S Crown and Government” and were thus “liable to the
Penalty the Law inflicts upon such Offences,” including confiscation of property. As
such, the slave property “appertaining to Rebels” was liable to seizure, while enslaved
persons held by “the well disposed Subjects” of Virginia were not.56 Indeed, enslaved
people brought within British lines by the many Loyalists who flocked to Dunmore in the
summer of 1775 remained the private property of their masters. The property rights of
loyal subjects could not be tampered with.57 In a striking reversal of fortune, however,
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Dunmore’s proclamation stripped rebellious Virginians of many of their cherished rights
while simultaneously bringing enslaved people within the ambit of British subjecthood.
The impact of Dunmore’s wartime emancipation policy was immediate and
profound. Even before the official proclamation was announced, Virginia Patriots
complained that Dunmore was raiding plantations and “[carrying] off the negroes,” and
dozens if not hundreds of enslaved people took advantage of the chaos of war to break for
British lines. Once military emancipation became official policy in November, the pace
of escapes quickened – hundreds of enslaved people made for British ships in the weeks
following Dunmore’s proclamation. By early December, at least three hundred enslaved
Virginians had been enrolled in the British forces. With the slogan “Liberty to Slaves”
emblazoned on their uniforms, Dunmore’s “Ethiopia Regiment” made up nearly half of
total British forces operating in Virginia in the winter of 1775-1776. Other freed people,
likely a majority of those who reached British lines, were employed as laborers in
military camps and aboard warships, while others served as guides and pilots on foraging
expeditions and guerilla operations. And though Dunmore’s proclamation was limited
only to able-bodied men, this did not prevent women, children, and the aged and infirm
from running to British lines as well.58
The freedom of all of these formerly enslaved people, however, rested on the
success of the British military in subduing the rebellion, and the tide of war in the
Chesapeake turned in favor of the American Patriots in the winter of 1775. Dunmore’s
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Ethiopian Regiment saw its first real action on December 9, 1775 at the Battle of Great
Bridge outside Norfolk. After a lopsided American victory in the short but furious
engagement, Dunmore and his troops were forced offshore, where smallpox spread
quickly through cramped quarters. By June of 1776, Dunmore reported that the pox had
“carried off an incredible number of our people, especially blacks,” reducing his fighting
force to “150 effective Negro men” – had disease not cut down so many of his troops,
Dunmore estimated he would have had at least two thousand Afro-Virginians in arms.59
By August, his supply lines cut and his forces ravaged by disease, Dunmore had no
choice but to retreat from the Chesapeake Bay – the remnants of the Ethiopian Regiment,
around three hundred strong, sailed with him, headed for further military service in other
theaters of war. Thus, Lord Dunmore’s experiment in military emancipation came to an
abrupt end. Doubtless many Afro-Virginians who had come within British lines were left
behind when the British fleet sailed – the able-bodied men of the Ethiopia Regiment must
have left families and friends behind them in the Old Dominion, and those not fit for
combat were abandoned to their former (and future) masters. Without the military
capacity to hold Virginia and enforce his emancipation policy, there was little Dunmore
could do to establish or maintain the freedom of most Afro-Virginians. Despite its
shortcomings, however, military emancipation in Virginia had resulted in the freedom of
thousands of enslaved people.60
Lord Dunmore’s emancipation proclamation has most commonly been interpreted
as a conservative and short-lived policy dictated by wartime necessity – aside from
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enslaved people themselves, few Britons as yet had any intention of abolishing the
institution of slavery, and the military emancipations in Virginia were meant to bring
rebellious colonists to heel, not eradicate human bondage.61 This interpretation, however,
relies on the separation of wartime emancipation from broader British debates over
slavery and often examines Dunmore’s proclamation its local Virginia context. From the
perspective of the metropole, however, with its rapidly changing legal norms regarding
slavery, wartime emancipation takes on a new light. Indeed, when linked to the broader
imperial debate over emancipation policy during the American Revolution, Dunmore’s
proclamation is indicative of the ways in which elements of the long English antislavery
argument entered into the mainstream of British political discourse. In the hands of a
number of committed antislavery Britons, the question of military emancipation even
opened up space for more direct criticism of slavery itself.
In the winter of 1775, for example, with debates over arming enslaved AfroBritons in defense of the empire still swirling, Parliament took up the question of the
legal rights of imperial slaves. On December 7th, David Hartley, MP for Kingston upon
Hull and friend of Benjamin Franklin, proposed a resolution to “establish the Right of
Trial by Jury in all Criminal Cases to all Slaves in North America.” This measure,
supported by many friends to the American cause, would have voided “all Laws of any
Provinces repugnant thereto,” echoing Lord Mansfield’s language about slavery’s legal
basis in colonial positive law. Though no such bill was ever framed – the resolution was
voted down – its proposal in the midst of ongoing debates over military emancipation
illustrates how some British policymakers linked questions of slavery and freedom to the
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broader imperial crisis.62 To supporters of the North ministry’s coercive policies,
military emancipation was simply another cudgel to be used in beating the American
colonists into submission, but to some friends of the Patriot cause – men like Grenville
Sharp, David Hartley, and Sir George Savile – it was an opening wedge to a broader
attack on imperial slavery.
How did supporters of the rights of British Americans come to adopt such a
coercive position? The answer lies in a reformulation of the very meaning of empire
itself. Speaking in support of his proposal, Hartley made this connection clear. While
admitting that it was “dangerous to disturb questions of the rights and extent of empire or
obedience,” he argued that a resolution of the imperial crisis on equitable grounds would
“be perhaps in the event the abolition, [or at least] the first step to correct a vice, which
has spread through the continent of North America, contrary to the laws of God and man,
and to the fundamental principles of the British constitution. That vice is slavery.”
Hartley, like Mansfield, saw slavery as repugnant to English law, but he also recognized
that it would be “infinitely absurd to send over...an act to abolish slavery at one word” –
the positive law of the colonies, created and upheld by the representative assemblies that
pro-American Whigs like Hartley so admired, protected the institution and required “the
greatest discretion to root it out.” The solution to this jurisdictional issue was colony-bycolony gradual emancipation. Once the British Parliament had “led the way by the act
for [trial by] jury,” each colony could work within their own “peculiar circumstances” by
finding some “practicable way...by which slavery be in a certain term of years
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abolished.” Extending trial by jury, the most basic right of British imperial subjecthood,
to enslaved Afro-Britons would be the first step in the process of gradual abolition.63
Furthermore, by uniting all imperial Britons behind the worthy cause of human
freedom, antislavery policies would quiet the conflict between metropole and colonies.
Extending jury trials to the enslaved would:
“lay the first stone of universal liberty to mankind, [something that] no
American could hesitate an instant to comply with...and thereby to reestablish peace and harmony with the parent state. Let us all be reunited
in this, as a foundation to extirpate slavery from the face of the earth. Let
those who seek justice and liberty for themselves, give justice and liberty
to their fellow-creatures. ... Let the only contention henceforward between
Great Britain and America be, which shall exceed the other in zeal for
establishing the fundamental rights of liberty to all mankind.”
Here, then, was the reformulated British imperial agenda flatly stated. Abolition
would redeem the British Empire and “re-unite its common interests and exertions
into one common cause” – universal freedom.64 The following year, as the
American colonies began to abolish the slave trade, Hartley again rose in the
Commons to propose a resolution describing English participation in the transAtlantic slave trade as “contrary to the laws of God, and the rights of men.”65
Though this motion was also voted down, Hartley’s open opposition to slavery
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and the slave trade illustrates how debates over military emancipation spilled over
into broader critiques of imperial bondage.66
This broadening debate, in conjunction with the actions of enslaved Afro-Britons
in the rebellious colonies, redounded back on imperial war policy and pushed the
boundaries of wartime emancipation. Indeed, by 1779 metropolitan planners were
actively expanding the scope of their emancipatory military strategy. On June 30th,
General Henry Clinton, commander of British forces in America, issued his Philipsburg
Proclamation, which extended emancipation to all slaves of rebellious masters who
would desert to British lines. Though any “Negroes taken in arms” would be “purchased
for the public service” and employed as military laborers, Clinton “strictly forbid” any
person to “sell, or claim right over” any Patriot slaves who “take refuge with any part of
this army.” Clinton’s proclamation also promised “full security” to Patriot slaves, who
would be allowed to “follow...any occupation which he may think proper.”67 Unlike
Dunmore’s 1775 proclamation, which had been limited to Virginia and applied only to
able-bodied male slaves willing to take up arms, Clinton’s proclamation applied equally
to men and women, young and old, able-bodied or infirm, and implied that freed people
would be maintained in their liberty.
This was certainly a move made in desperation – the tide of war had turned
against the British following Washington’s victory at Monmouth the previous summer,
and Clinton hoped that his emancipation proclamation would draw American forces away
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from the field of battle to guard against slave rebellion.68 While the law of war generally
recognized the legitimacy of arming slaves during a conflict, emancipating noncombatant slaves was an unprecedented step. Furthermore, the Philipsburg Proclamation
also hinted at a longer-term commitment to the freedom of emancipated slaves on the part
of the British Empire. Freed people were allowed to follow the occupation of their
choice, hinging that they were conceived of as subjects free to enter into employment
arrangements through their own consent. And if enslavement through captivity in war
was illegitimate, as so many Britons were coming to believe, then the Empire had a
responsibility to maintain these subjects in their freedom. The congruence between
Clinton’s wartime emancipation policy and broader British debates about the legitimacy
of property-in-man and the rights of subjects is striking. Drawing on the novel tool of
military emancipation, Clinton, whether he intended it or not, had achieved the old
English antislavery goal of bringing enslaved persons into the community of subjects.
Many Britons, however, still harbored doubts about military emancipation. As
they had four years earlier when debating Lord Dunmore’s arming of Virginia slaves,
some policymakers worried that Clinton’s Philipsburg Proclamation would incite a race
war, leaving slaveholders at the mercy of their slaves. Edmund Burke, a stalwart if
deeply conservative opponent of the American war, argued that freeing and arming
colonial slaves was “contrary to the common and statute law of this country, as well as
the general law of nations,” painting a lurid picture of what would ensue “from
constituting 100,000 fierce barbarian slaves, to be both judges and executioners of their
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masters.”69 The Duke of Richmond echoed Burke’s disapproval in the House of Lords,
flatly stating that “to arm negro slaves against their masters...is not...a fair war against
fellow subjects.”70 Temple Luttrell, another vocal opponent of the American war and
booster for the Africa trade, specifically targeted Lord Mansfield, who had nothing to do
with military emancipation policy, for “set[ting] the negro servants to butcher their
masters.”71 He, at least, saw a connection between Mansfield’s Lewis and Somerset
rulings and the emancipatory power of the war – unlike David Hartley, however, Luttrell
was concerned not with the liberty of Afro-Britons but with the security (and
profitability) of Anglo-American planters. Particularly for these opponents of the British
war effort, arming colonial slaves was yet another marker of the arbitrary and unjust
nature of the war against the American colonists.
Whatever their qualms, however, British policymakers stood behind their
commanders’ military emancipation programs. Burke, Luttrell, and other critics may
have blanched at the prospect of servile war, but the British were committed to the policy
of wartime emancipation, and as the Revolutionary War came to a close in 1782,
ministries dominated by Rockingham and Chathamite Whigs sought to guarantee the
continued freedom of enslaved people emancipated during the war. The summer of 1782
saw slow progress on a preliminary peace treaty, but questions of compensation for
property confiscated during the war were a major point of contention. The British
delegates, led by Richard Oswald, a prominent merchant and co-owner of the Bance
Island slaving factory with close ties to a number of prominent American planters,
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demanded the “restitution of all estates, rights, and properties” confiscated from Loyalists
during the war.72 The American negotiators – Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and John
Jay – responded that if British claims to confiscated property must be honored, then
“carrying off Goods from Boston, Philadelphia, and the Carolinas, Georgia, Virginia, &c.
and the burning of the Towns” in America should be considered as well. Questions of
allegiance and property ownership had stalled negotiations – as British negotiator
Alleyne Fitzherbert noted, this intractable issue threatened to put the peace process out
“to Sea again.”73
It was in this already charged atmosphere that the question of compensation for
slave property entered the negotiations. Henry Laurens, a prominent South Carolina
planter who had just joined the American delegation, added that “the Plunders in Carolina
of Negroes” should also be considered in tabulating the Americans’ compensation bill –
indeed, Laurens insisted that he “could never give his Voice for any Articles” without
it.74 When the commissioners assembled to sign the preliminary peace treaty on
November 30th, Laurens again insisted on a “Stipulation that the British Troops should
carry off no Negroes or other American Property” and Oswald, a friend and factor to the
Laurens family, agreed to add an amendment to the 7th article of the treaty.75 According
to the amended clause, British troops would be withdrawn “without causing any
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destruction, or carrying away any Negroes or other property of the American
inhabitants.” To Laurens and Oswald, this clause must have seemed perfectly clear –
while property taken during the war would be a subject of future negotiation, now that
hostilities were over no further confiscations could take place, so all persons claimed as
slaves must remain in America. Wartime emancipations did not empower the British to
remove property from the now-independent United States.
The clause that Laurens and Oswald had thought so transparent turned out to be
open to competing and mutually exclusive interpretations, however. In a well-known
series of encounters with George Washington, Guy Carleton, the British officer in charge
of the evacuation of New York, spelled out the logic behind the dominant British
interpretation of the treaty. Though Carleton claimed to have cooperated with observers
sent to ensure that the British did not carry off American property during their
evacuation, there was some “difference of opinion...in the case of the negroes who had
been declared free.” The British general denied any intention to set down a definitive
interpretation, but argued that the language of “Property” in the treaty only encompassed
“Property at the Time, the Negroes were sent off.” While other articles of property were
to be “restored” to American claimants, “Negroes...were only not to be destroyed or
carried away.” Carleton’s position was that there were no slaves to return within British
lines – there were only black British subjects, and these could not be held as property.
“Delivering up the Negroes to their former Masters,” Carleton told Washington, “would
be a dishonorable violation of the public Faith, pledged to the Negroes” by the British
government.76 To Carleton and a growing number of antislavery Britons, the
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foundational premises of the long English antislavery argument – persons could not be
made into property, and all subjects came under the protection of the law – followed the
British flag.
It is likely that Carleton’s interpretation of the Treaty of Paris was a fair
approximation of the British government’s broader stance on restitution for slave
property taken during the war. When American and British negotiators met to finalize
and sign the Treaty of Paris in the summer of 1783, for example, the British delegation
was led by none other than David Hartley, the MP who had so fervently argued for the
inalienable claims of black Britons to the rights of subjecthood back in 1775. Though the
American commissioners dutifully presented Hartley with Congress’ objections against
Britain’s carrying off “a considerable Number of Negroes belonging to the Citizens of the
United States,” they must have known that their claims would fall on deaf ears.77 Though
Hartley, like Carleton, left the door open to potential compensation in the future,
restitution of slave property was impossible – this would be tantamount to reenslavement of a free British subject and was clearly repugnant to English law after
Somerset. Compensation for slave property remained a sticking point in Anglo-American
relations for decades but, to their credit, the British never budged on their interpretation
of the Treaty of Paris. Not a single cent in compensation was ever paid to an American
slaveholder by the British government.78
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The imperial crisis and the American Revolution, then, fundamentally altered
British discourses surrounding slavery and freedom. With property-in-man delegitimized
at home and the British state committed to maintaining the freedom of thousands of
emancipated slaves in America, legal antislavery and military emancipation laid the
foundation for an emerging abolitionist movement. The Society of Friends, committed to
ending the slave trade and rapidly disentangling itself from slaveholding, drew on longheld English antislavery beliefs in framing abolitionist petitions to the House of
Commons in 1783.79 Linked through epistolary networks to cadres of like-minded
Britons and Americans of all denominations, these early abolitionists turned first to the
slave trade and the amelioration of the conditions of slavery.80 These were halting
measures to be sure, and did not directly attack property-in-man – indeed the British
would not tackle the issue of slavery head on for another fifty years. Still, the rising
dominance of antislavery principles had important effects. Moral and ecomomic
critiques of slavery honed over generations fueled the drive for slave trade abolition in
the 1790s. The ability of Afro-Britons to gain and protect their own freedom made
people of color central to this abolitionist drive – Equiano and Cugoano humanized the
experience of enslaved people for mass audiences as never before, adding urgency to the
abolitionist movement.
Even this lukewarm antislavery looks far more radical in the context of the longer
English antislavery argument. Enslaved people would certainly still be classed as
property, ameliorationists argued, but slaveholders would not have unlimited arbitrary
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power over their bodies – in a sense, enslaved people would cease to be rightless. When
emancipation finally came in 1833, then, there were centuries of antislavery arguments
for British activists to draw on. Well before the last West Indian slave was freed in 1838,
the basic English antislavery premise laid down in Cartwright’s Case nearly three
centuries earlier – that the air of England was too pure for slavery – had already been
vindicated. There was much work yet to be done to ensure that this basic proposition
applied to all subjects around the globe, but generations of antislavery Britons, black and
white, had provided English abolitionists with fit tools for the destruction of human
bondage.81
***
American national mythology accords Virginia a prominent place at the center of
the narrative of the American Revolution, and with good reason. Virginians, driven to
expand into the Ohio River valley by the monopolization of prime lands by the colony’s
planter elite, sparked the imperial crisis when a small contingent of British regulars and
Virginia militiamen, under the command of an obscure planter-officer, George
Washington, skirmished with French and Native American troops. When economic
depression and exacting metropolitan taxation programs drove American colonists into
revolution, it was a Virginian – Patrick Henry – who gave the rebellious provincials their
rallying cry: “give me Liberty or give me Death!” One Virginia delegate to the Second
Continental Congress, Richard Henry Lee, took the fateful step of proposing American
independence, while another, Thomas Jefferson, drafted the document declaring it as fact.
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A tall, taciturn Virginian led American forces to victory in a long and bloody war, and
rose to lead the new national government that emerged from it – the great George
Washington, father of the nation.
This American founding mythos, however, is also deeply connected to the
cornerstone of the Old Dominion – human slavery. Recent generations of scholars have
illustrated beyond any doubt that slavery and racism played central roles in shaping the
ideals and course of the American Revolution in Virginia. Far from being the liberatory
moment of popular historical memory, Virginia’s revolution saw planter elites pulled
reluctantly into rebellion by the concerted action of rebellious slaves, restive Native
Americans, and tumultuous poor whites, all aided to a greater or lesser degree by royal
officials. The few halting moves against slavery that did take place were a function not
of any meaningful commitment to universal natural rights but rather self-interested
attempts to gain independence and maintain the Old Dominion’s slave society.
Abandoning the slave trade was a minor concession – Virginia’s enslaved population was
already growing by natural increase well before the Revolution – and the few scattered
voices calling for gradual emancipation were fatally compromised by racist insistence on
the removal of emancipated blacks from the state.82 Sameul Johnson’s famous query
about how such loud yelps for liberty could come from American slaveholders is now
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easliy answered – Virgnia Patriots were bald-faced hypocrites, unwilling or unable to see
the incongruity of their claims to natural rights and their continuing enslavement of tens
of thousands of people.
Neither of these founding myths is quite right, though both have basis in historical
reality. When Virginia revolutionaries drew on the tradition of English republican
thought in framing their new state, they imported a set of political ideals that had been
historically hostile to property-in-man – when they sought to remake the social basis of
their new republic, they favored policies that many theorists hoped would cut into the
profitability of large-scale plantation agriculture. Tidewater planters and republican
farmers repeatedly debated gradual emancipation and the nature of a free multiracial
society. The exigencies of war and British emancipation policies had provoked
widespread resistance from the enslaved, however, and in the end Virginians, anxious to
maintain the stability of their society, closed ranks and doubled down on the civic
exclusion of people of color and the definition of slaves as a species of property. Despite
widespread moral, political, and economic criticism of slavery, then, when push came to
shove most Virginia slaveholders could not imagine their immediate future without their
human property.
This fact should not blind us to the very real debates over slavery that took place
in revolutionary Virginia. The tension between antislavery ideals and the reality of
plantation slavery in the Old Dominion shaped the legal development of the institution
during the American Revolution, resulting in attempts to “ameliorate” the condition of
enslaved people, and even a few gradual emancipation proposals. Whatever their qualms
about slavery, however, most Virginians simply could not think their way out of the
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institution. To some, like Thomas Jefferson, belief in black inferiority, reinforced by
generations of laws stripping enslaved Afro-Virginians of basic rights and limiting the
economic and political inclusion of free blacks, precluded immediate action against
slavery. Others, however deeply they may have opposed slavery’s deleterious effect on
their economy over the long term, could not imagine any short term economic solutions
that did not rely on the continuation of slavery. As Patrick Henry told a correspondent in
1773, “I am drawn along by the general inconvenience of living without [slaves]. I will
not – I cannot justify it, however culpable my conduct.”83
As had been the case in the mid-18th century, Virginains’ main critique of slavery
was that it stifled their economy. In a sermon celebrating British victory over France in
1763, for example, Jonathan Boucher, an English-born tutor to a number of prominent
planters’ children and Anglican minister, argued that Virginia and Maryland lagged
behind other colonies in their economic development “because they are cultivated by
slaves.” Indeed, Boucher claimed, if it were not for “the immediate interest which every
man has in the property of his own slaves, it would be for every man’s interest” that the
institution be abolished. The “free labour of a free man, who is regularly hired and paid
for what he does,” would be far more productive than the “extorted eye-service of a
slave.”84
Despite this economic criticism and his moral “abhorrence of slavery,” Boucher
did not challenge the existence of the institution. Instead he argued that its “lawfulness
has again and again been clearly proved” and that flatly denied charges that Virginia

83
84

Henry quoted in Wolf, Race and Liberty, 13.
Jonathan Boucher, “On the Peace of 1763” in A View of the Causes and Consequences of the American
Revolution in Thirteen Discourses Preached in North America between the Years 1763 and 1775...
(London, 1797), 38-42.

530

slaveholders were cruel to their human property – indeed, Boucher claimed that “in no
part of the world were slaves ever better treated.” His recommendation was simply that
slaves be better instructed in Christianity to “emancipate them from the bondage of sin.”
Actual emancipation was unthinkable. “To set all free,” Boucher argued, would be “no
gain to them.” The sticking point was an emerging scientistic conceptualization of race –
“even when made free” a person of African descent could never be “on terms of equality
with a free white man. Nature has placed insuperable barriers in his way.” Slavery was
not objectionable because of its “tendency to debase and injure slaves,” but because it
was “injurious to society at large.” Hamstrung by white supremacy, Boucher, like many
Virginians, could simultaneously believe that “an essential part of the improvement [of
Virginia] must be the abolition of slavery” and that slavery was a legal, benevolent,
Christian institution perfectly suited for Africans.85
George Mason also saw slavery as an impediment to Virginia’s future
development. In 1765, Mason bemoaned the fact that a “Policy of encouraging the
Importation of free People & discouraging that of Slaves” had “never been duly
considered” by Virginians. The effect of Virginia’s reliance on slavery was that “Half of
our best Lands…remain unsettled” while the rest was “cultivated with Slaves.” From this
basic problem flowed a variety of economic ills – the “fluctuating State of our Trade, the
Uncertainty of our Markets & the Scarcity of Money” among them. Illustrating the
congruence of his thought with elements of the long English antislavery tradition, Mason
also argued that slavery was not merely an economic problem. Reliance on the
institution had an “ill Effect” on the “Morals & Manners of our People.” These social
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and economic symptoms were the “first Signs of the Decay” of the Old Dominion and, if
not quickly remedied, would be the “primary Cause of the Destruction” of a free
government. Mason’s solution was simple and straightforward, and bore a striking
resemblance to John Locke’s reform plan from the 1690s. Virginia should encourage the
immigration of free settlers who could lease undeveloped lands from the great planters.
While in the short term this might seem to decrease the profits of the Virginia gentry, in
the long term such a scheme would be “more useful to the Public.” That tenant labor was
more productive than slavery was, Mason argued, “a Maxim that will hardly be denied in
any free Country. Despite his clear economic animus toward slavery, Mason knew he
was on dangerous ground – he would not push the slavery question too hard for fear that
it would “expose our Weakness by examining this Subject too freely.” Whatever the
economic virtues of free labor, it was politically difficult to openly challenge slavery in
revolutionary Virginia.86
Like Mason, many Virginians drew on elements of the long English antislavery
argument in their criticisms of imperial economic policy. Few, however, shared his faith
that freedom and education might gradually prepare former slaves for participation in
Virginia society. To most Virginians, race presented an insuperable barrier to
emancipation. This distinct admixture of economic, and often philosophical, opposition
to slavery with reliance on racially based systems of social control determined the outer
limit of revolutionary antislavery in the Old Dominion. Arthur Lee, youngest son of the
Lee dynasty and a British trained doctor and lawyer, provides a case in point. Lee took
up his pen in 1764 to refute Adam Smith’s claim in Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759)
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that American slaveholders, “whose levity, brutality, and baseness, so justly expose them
to...contempt,” were in many ways inferior to their African slaves, who Smith described
as “nations of heroes.”87 The honor of his family and his country wounded, Lee
responded that Smith’s assertions were “more worthy an African savage than an
European philosopher.” Virginia planters were refined, generous, and hospitable –
African slaves were “a race the most detestable and vile that the earth ever produced.”
Even Aristotle, Lee proclaimed, could not have imagined a more naturally slavish race
than Africans, who he described as “generally shallow, and their hearts cruel, vindictive,
stubborn, base, and wicked.”88 Far from a simple racist diatribe against outside criticism,
however, Lee’s Essay in Vindication of the Continental Colonies went on to consider the
role slavery played in the Old Dominion, and whether it ought to continue in the future.
Despite, or perhaps because of, his intense hatred of Africans, Lee argued that the
colonies should gradually disentangle themselves from human bondage. Unlike
Granville Sharp, however, he did not start from the premise that slavery was in and of
itself illegitimate. Indeed, Lee claimed, “the origin of slavery seems just and legal.”
Illustrating how slaveholders grappled with evolving ideals about the legitimacy of their
increasingly peculiar institution, Lee agreed with Hutcheson, Smith, and Blackstone that
war captivity was no longer “sufficient authority for enslaving” since “it is founded on a
right which is itself unjust..., the power of inflicting death on a prisoner.” Nor could a
person consent to be enslaved – under this circumstance, a slave “yields all his duty and
obedience to his master; [and] is no longer entitled to any privileges or protection from
society. A slave...would be constantly an outlaw.” Even Virginians recognized that the
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law must, in some circumstances, recognize the humanity of enslaved persons, at least as
far as their liability to punishment was concerned. What, then, could be the basis for
legitimate enslavement? To Lee, the only acceptable foundation for slavery was “the
legislative power in each society” – anticipating Lord Mansfield, Lee saw the root of
slavery in local positive legislation.89
If slavery was a legitimate institution based on local law, and Africans were so
degraded as to deserve their enslavement, what was Lee concerned about? The problem
with slavery, Lee argued, was that it retarded local economic development. Here the
Virginian placed the blame squarely on British merchants. They were the malign force
behind the slave trade, a commerce “shocking to justice and humanity, ... [a] barbarous
tyranny, and...abominable craft.” Worse yet, the merchants’ allies in Westminster and
Whitehall had pursued a “confined and puny” mercantilist policy “employed to depress
[the colonies], and prevent their growth.” Unable to control their own economic destiny,
Virginians found themselves with “their manufacturing hands tied up; their commerce
confined; and their staple commodity oppressed. They are treated, not as the fellowsubjects, but as the servants of Britain.” By channeling slaves into Virginia, British
merchants had rendered the colonial economy “unfavourable to trade and manufactures,”
which would be more likely to flourish in “free states.” To Lee, the solution was clear –
“if slavery be...an enemy to arts and sciences, good policy would surely direct us to
suppress it.”90
Though Lee stopped short of recommending any specific policies to this end, the
basic outlines of his antislavery agenda are clear enough. Virginians must be freed from
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the servitude of imperial mercantilism and allowed to direct their own internal economic
development. Though slavery, legitimated by “the legislative power” of the Virginia
Assembly, would continue for a time, the slave trade should be abandoned – “how long
shall we continue a practice,” Lee asked, “which policy rejects, justice condemns, and
piety dissuades?” Besides, closing the slave trade had the added benefit to racists like
Lee of keeping more “barbarous Africans” and “inhuman...savages” out of Virginia.
Once the benefits of a free labor economy began to be felt in the Old Dominion, slavery
itself might even be abandoned, since it “tends to suppress all improvements in arts and
sciences..., deprave[s] the minds of the freemen..., [and] endangers the community by the
destructive ends of civil commotion.”91 Here was the distinctive antislavery of
revolutionary Virginia on full display – it is hard to discern which Lee found more
distasteful: slavery or enslaved people.
It was in this context of growing unease with the economic role of slavery that
Virginia legislators took up the question of slave importation duties in the mid-1760s. As
we have seen, the House of Burgesses had resuscitated their slave trade tax in the decades
preceding the imperial crisis, placating imperial planners by levying the duty on slave
purchasers rather than importers, and this trend continued when the slave trade picked up
again with peace in 1763.92 In that year, the colony’s 1752 slave importation duty – five
percent of the purchase price – was renewed without metropolitan opposition. Three
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years later, the tax was renewed once again, and new amendments extended the duty to
slaves imported overland or through the coastwise trade as well. These slave importation
duties skirted the fine line between revenue measures and prohibitive tariffs, and many
Virginians held out hope that regulating slave importation would both foster economic
diversification and raise the market price of tobacco. Few, however, saw taxation of
slave imports as a step toward the ultimate abolition of slavery itself – controlling the
influx of new slaves was meant to make Virginia’s slave economy more dynamic and
diversified.
The tension between these lukewarm antislavery ideals and the continued
commitment to racial slavery in practice also informed revisions in the slave law of the
Old Dominion. When the Burgesses made the first major revisions to their slave codes in
nearly two decades in 1765, for example, new laws seemed to hint at a growing
ameliorationist ethos in the Virginia legislature informed by English antislavery legal
principles. Refining an older law that bound mixed-race children born of free white
mothers to servitude for thirty-one years, one new statute sought to prevent colonists
from “selling...mulattoes and others as slaves, who by the law of this colony are subject
to a service...after which they become free.” Violation of this statute would result in a
£50 fine, and for a second offense the master would “forfeit the residue of the time of
service” to the state – if unable to pay their fines, offending masters could even be bound
out “to serve...[for] the full time of service that would have been due.” Furthermore, the
Burgesses recognized that thirty-one years of bondage was “an unreasonable severity”
and shortened the term of bondage for freeborn mixed-race children to twenty-one years
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for boys and eighteen years for girls.93 Born free, these children could not be considered
as property in the way that enslaved people were. They were certainly forced into a
servile status, but treating a free person as a slave, even a mixed-race servant, could not
be condoned. All free people were subjects with basic rights.
If the colonial state intervened to regulate masters’ property rights and protect
mixed-race servants, however, it increasingly abrogated its responsibility for the capture
and rendition of fugitive slaves. Indeed, the state delegated fugitive renditions almost
entirely to private Virginians. Unlike earlier laws that required sheriffs or other
magistrates to retain runaways until their masters retrieved them, a 1765 revision now
required that “the taker up” or his agent “immediately carry such runaway to his or her
owner.” As a reward, slave catchers received five shillings plus four pence for each mile
of their journey – in 1769 the rate was raised to ten shillings plus six pence per mile,
further incentivizing slave-catching. The only case in which the old system of holding
fugitives would remain was if a captured runaway refused to identify his or her owner –
enslaved Afro-Virginians captured in escape attempts must have been particularly
reticent after this statute passed.94 This same tendency to delegate authority over slavery
is evident in another 1765 act regulating trials for enslaved people accused of capital
crimes. Unlike earlier laws which required that the governor issue separate commissions
of oyer and terminer for each trial, the new statute called for blanket commissions to be
issued to all county justices, who would “try, condemn, and execute, or otherwise punish

93

William Waller Hening, The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia... (New
York: Bartow, 1823), VIII: 133-135. [Hereinafter cited as Hening, SAL.] The statute also reduced terms
of service for any children born to a female mixed-race servant during her term of servitude to the same
ages discussed above.
94
Ibid., VIII: 135-6, 358-361. The 1769 revision allowed for Virginians who preferred not to deliver slaves
in person to deposit fugitives in the county jail. Sheriffs would then take custody and be responsible for
returning the fugitive to his or her owner and receive the reward.

537

or acquit” at their discretion “without the solemnity of a jury.”95 Even as the colonial
state intervened to protect the liberty of freeborn mixed-race children, then, it also
delegated ever-greater discretionary power over the bodies of enslaved people to private
citizens and local magistrates.
As Patriot rhetoric of liberty reached a fever pitch in the late 1760s, however,
there were signs that ameliorationist tendencies were making inroads in Virginia’s slave
police law as well. Earlier laws empowering county justices to order the mutilation or
castration of “outlying slaves” were deemed “disproportioned to the offence, and contrary
to the principles of humanity.” In 1769 castration was outlawed as a punishment except
in cases of “an attempt to ravish a white woman.”96 Three years later, a series of statutes
gave a semblance of judicial form to slave trials and further limited punishments inflicted
on enslaved people accused of crimes. Slaves accused of breaking and entering without
theft, for example, were allowed to invoke benefit of clergy, while private citizens were
no longer empowered to kill outlying slaves with impunity. Limits were also placed on
the capital punishment of slaves, requiring at least four county justices to “concur in their
opinion of...guilt” before sentence could be passed.97 These were clearly not policies
meant to touch property-in-man, but they circumscribed the near-absolute physical power
previous generations had given to slaveholders and hinted at the kind of ameliorationist
policies British abolitionists would later employ.
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As the imperial crisis deepened, Virginia Patriots began to directly link their
concerns about the long-term future of slavery in the colony to their resistance to
metropolitan authority. In his Summary View of the Rights of British America (1774),
Thomas Jefferson asserted that “The abolition of domestic slavery is the great object of
desire” in the colonies. Though the institution had been “unhappily introduced” to the
colonies “in their infant state,” slavery was now opposed to the “lasting interests of the
American states.” The “immediate advantages of a few African corsairs,” however,
weighed heavier than “the rights of human nature” in the scales of imperial policy, tying
the hands of colonists who hoped to see slavery end. Virginians, Jefferson claimed, had
made “repeated attempts” to “exclude all further importations from Africa...by imposing
duties which might amount to a prohibition,” but these attempts had been “defeated by
his majesty’s negative.” Here, Jefferson was at least partially correct – the prohibitive
import duties enacted by the House of Burgesses in the early-18th century had been
disallowed by the Privy Council, though his linkage of earlier slave trade taxes to a
broader program of emancipation strains credulity. Drawing on these earlier slave trade
duties, however, Jefferson now argued that regulation and eventual abolition of the slave
trade would prepare the ground for “the enfranchisement of the slaves we have.”98
The most potent challenge to slavery in Virginia came not from internal critics of
the institution, however, but from imperial officials working to crush colonial resistance
to metropolitan policy and enslaved people themselves who used the chaos of revolution
to claim their freedom. As we have seen, Lord Dunmore’s 1775 military emancipation
proclamation and the expansion of this policy to all slaves held by American Patriots
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during the Chesapeake campaigns of 1779-1781 had freed thousands of enslaved
Virginians who ran for British lines. In an attempt to prevent their valuable slave
property from running to British lines, Virginians expanded their already brutal police
law. Shortly after Dunmore issued his proclamation in November, for example, the
Assembly declared that any enslaved people “taken in arms against this colony, or in the
possession of the enemy, through their own choice” would be transported to the West
Indies and sold, the proceeds from their sale going to purchase weapons and ammunition
for Virginia Patriot units. If for some reason sale out of the colony was inconvenient,
slaves could also be returned to their owners or punished under existing law for punishing
enslaved people for capital crimes.99 Particularly given the close attention Virginians
gave to the traditional practice of prisoner exchanges and paroles when dealing with
British redcoats, this application of police law is striking. To British commanders and
imperial planners, once enslaved Virginians were freed and enrolled in military service,
they were understood to be subjects in arms, protected by the norms of European
international law. To Virginia planters, however, Lord Dunmore’s Ethiopia Regiment
was nothing more than a band of rebellious slaves, subject to the brutal police law of their
revolutionary state.100
Virginia slaveholders also sought to protect their slave property by moving
enslaved people away from the theater of war, making escape to British lines far more
difficult. The revolutionary state also sought to prevent enslaved people from running to
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British forces and to exploit their labor power in service of the Patriot cause by sending
runaways westward to toil in the lead mines of western Virginia. When Bristol, an
enslaved man owned by William Montague, was captured by Patriot forces while
attempting to reach Lord Dunmore’s forces at Gwin’s Island in the early summer of
1776, for example, he was sent west and “employed in the public service at the lead
mines” – Montague was paid nearly £100 in compensation for Bristol’s labor, and the
unfortunate slave was returned to his owner in June of 1779.101 Despite these efforts,
however, enslaved Afro-Virginians continued to exploit the chaos of revolution to claim
their freedom.102
When war returned to the Chesapeake in 1779, the steady stream of enslaved
people who had been running for British lines since Lord Dunmore’s proclamation now
became a torrent. During Cornwallis’ 1781 campaign alone, at least 4,500 enslaved
people ran for British lines. Many prominent Patriots, including Washington, Jefferson,
and Madison, lost slaves to the British during this campaign. Though tabulating the total
number of enslaved people who escaped during the Revolutionary War is a notoriously
difficult task, it is certain that at least 6,000 slaves deserted Virginia plantations for
British lines. With Cornwallis’ defeat at Yorktown, however, the future of these escaped
slaves was thrown into uncertainty – around 2,000 were evacuated with British forces and
carried to Canada, while the vast majority were left behind to fend for themselves. Most
were returned to slavery. Throughout the War of Independence, then, enslaved AfroVirginians consistently took advantage of British wartime emancipation policies and
protection from re-enslavement to seize their own liberty, but with Patriot victory the
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institution of slavery was shielded from further erosion. Indeed, the enslaved population
of Virginia had actually grown over the course of the war, to over quarter-million men,
women, and children.103
British policy may have shaken slavery, but Virginia slaveholders were not
willing to see their property claims extinguished without a fight. In addition to local
police laws meant to terrorize Afro-Virginians and prevent them from making it to
British lines, Patriots in the Old Dominion pursued legal and diplomatic strategies to
reclaim or at least gain compensation for lost slave property. For slaves still in Virginia,
or who had died during the war, the solution was relatively simple – earlier statutes
allowed slaveholders to petition the legislature for compensation, and existing law
already regulated the rendition of fugitives within Virginia. Private citizens regularly
petitioned the new House of Delegates for compensation for slaves lost during the war.
In May 1777, for example, the executors of John Bowdoin’s estate petitioned the General
Assembly for the return of Ned, an enslaved man captured in an escape attempt and sent
to the lead mines, along with compensation for the slave’s “hire” by the state.104 Masters
of slaves taken in arms and condemned by the state during the war also sought
compensation. Lewis, an enslaved man who had escaped to Dunmore’s lines and was
taken captive by Patriot troops at the battle of Great Bridge in December 1775, died in
jail while awaiting transportation out of the colony – Hansford Rowe, his former master,
sought “such satisfaction as shall be thought just” from the General Assembly for the loss
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of his property.105 The Virginia legislature approved the vast majority of these claims for
compensation.
The war had destabilized slavery in Virginia, however, and property claims were
not always clear. One statute sought to address the problem of slaves “wandering about”
by empowering local justices to imprison any suspected slaves for up to three months.
Justices were required to advertise these captured slaves in the Virginia Gazette so that
slaveholders could claim them, and if no owner materialized they were to hire out
unclaimed slaves to recoup their costs. Private Virginians were also required to assist in
the rendition of slaves who had escaped during the war. The General Assembly took up
the question enslaved people who had escaped from one master and wound up in the
hands of “wicked and evil disposed persons” who refused to return them to their rightful
owners in 1782. They attempted to solve this problem by ordering the return of all such
slaves to their owners by October 1st – Virginians who refused to comply would be
subject to a £50 fine, laggards who stalled in returning slaves would be fined £5 per
month, and all would be “liable to the action of the party grieved at the common law.”
The legislature also recognized the limited geographic reach of this law, however. Any
slaves “taken by the enemy” and removed from the state, along with any “retaken in
action” in “any of the United States,” were beyond the reach of Virginia slaveholders
unless “by capitulation or agreement [they were] to be returned to their owners.”106
Enslaved people who had made it out of Virginia’s jurisdiction, then, were
beyond the reach of local law, requiring local legislators to address questions of the reach
of slave property law. In 1781, for example, John Turberville, a drover, protested that
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one of his wagons and its “negro driver” were impressed by the Continental Army back
in 1778 to accompany a group of draftees to Pennsylvania. Arriving at Lancaster, the
enslaved man was “detained in the continental service” and never returned to Virginia.
With the slave beyond their jurisdictional reach, and Turberville unable to produce a
certificate from the Continental Army, the General Assembly denied the claim. They did
recommend that the Old Dominion’s representatives to the national Congress press for
compensation from the emerging federal state, but Virginia legislators would not be held
liable for slave property taken by an external authority.107 Slaves who successfully made
their escape to the British and were carried off at the cessation of hostilities were even
further beyond the reach of Virginia law. The best Virginians could hope for was that
their claims for restitution and compensation would be vigorously pressed by the
American delegates negotiating the Treaty of Paris, and this, as we have seen, was a
losing battle – the British never budged on the question of compensation for slaves
emancipated under wartime policy.108
External pressures on Virginia slavery certainly played a crucial role in
destabilizing the institution during the Revolution, but internal political and economic
changes also hinted at the possibility of an antislavery Old Dominion. Upon declaring
their independence in May 1776, Virginians set to work creating a new republican
political order and transforming the political basis of their state. Central to this new
republican vision was the abolition of primogeniture and the entail, the central pillars of
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the Virginia gentry. Echoing Adam Smith’s description of entails as “unnatural,”
Thomas Jefferson later famously argued that “the earth belongs in usufruct to the living;
that the dead have neither powers nor rights over it.”109 The bill Jefferson drafted to
abolish entails described “the perpetuation of property in certain families” as “contrary to
good policy” because it discouraged owners from “taking care [of] and improving” their
property. When the bill was enacted in October 1776, all entailed estates were converted
to fee simple tenure, allowing owners to divide and sell off their landed property. Any
enslaved people entailed to an estate were also converted to fee simple property,
increasing the salability of slaves.110 Intestate accounts still descended via the old law of
primogeniture until a 1785 statute guaranteed an equal division of estates among heirs.111
The laws of property that protected the political and economic power of Virginia’s
planter gentry were destroyed in the crucible of revolution.112
As we have seen, these political economic policies were heavily influenced by
earlier Patriot Whig ideals that, if paired with policies regulating slave trading and the
conditions of slave labor, could have real antislavery potential. To some Virginians, the
best way to guarantee their economic development was to gradually abolish the
institution of slavery outright. Jefferson, for example, included an abolition proposal in a
draft of the Virginia state constitution in June 1776, stating flatly “No person hereafter
coming into this country shall be held...in slavery under any pretext whatever.”113
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Though some Virginians clearly believed gradual abolition was in the best interest of
their newly independent state, a majority disagreed and Jefferson ultimately omitted his
own proposal from the final draft presented to the state convention in 1777. After
consulting with fellow Virginia framers Edmund Pendleton and George Wythe, Jefferson
decided it would be better to leave out “any intimation of a plan for a future & general
emancipation” from the document since “the public mind would not yet bear the
proposition,” though he hoped to raise the issue “by way of amendment” at some future
date. While Virginia’s founding fathers chose to leave gradual abolition out of the state’s
constitution, there was broad agreement about what such a policy would look like:
guarantee “the freedom of all born after a certain day” to prevent tampering with vested
property rights, and ensure the “deportation at a proper age” of all emancipated slaves –
Jefferson’s ideal republic was lily-white. Though Jefferson saw gradual emancipation as
the “foundation...for a government truly republican,” he, like Arthur Lee a decade earlier,
could only imagine abolition if directly linked to the expulsion of all Afro-Virginians.114
Abolition, then, was a political impossibility in revolutionary Virginia, and even
those who promoted it tied emancipation to racially exclusionary policies. Ending the
slave trade, however, was politically feasible. As had been the case for decades, many
Virginia elites saw the slave trade as a drain on their local economy that made
independent gentleman planters reliant on metropolitan creditors and merchants.
Economic catastrophe and the rising imperial crisis of the 1760s only exacerbated these
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issues. Once they declared their independence, then, abolition of the slave trade was high
on Virginia Patriots’ list of priorities. Support for a full slave trade ban was widespread
enough that a bill authored by Thomas Jefferson quickly passed into law in October
1778, stating “no slave or slaves shall hereafter be imported into this commonwealth by
sea or land, nor shall any slaves so imported be sold or bought by any person
whatsoever.” Fines for violation of this law were substantial – illegal importers would be
fined £1000, and purchasers £500. To encourage private citizens to assist in preventing
further slave importations, half of all fines would be paid out to informers. Any enslaved
people imported in violation of the act would be “upon such importation become free.”115
As had been the case throughout Virginia’s colonial history, local regulation of
slave importation had no direct impact on the legitimacy of property-in-man within the
newly independent state. Indeed, as numerous scholars have pointed out, the enslaved
population of the Old Dominion was already growing by natural increase by the time of
the revolution, and shutting down the slave trade increased the value of slaves on a
burgeoning resale market.116 Abolishing the slave trade, however, was no mean feat.
The state’s interest in preventing new slave imports overrode the individual private
property claims of slave traders and potential buyers. Imperial centralization had blunted
earlier attempts at regulation but now, freed from metropolitan control, Virginians finally
and definitively ended their official participation in the trans-Atlantic slave trade.
The question of slaves brought into the colony by slaveholders from other
American states, however, raised tricky questions about comity and forced Virginia
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legislators to carve out a number of exemptions to the importation ban. Slaveholders
who moved into Virginia and became citizens were allowed to bring slaves with them as
long as they took an oath not to import any new slaves from beyond American
jurisdictions, those “making a transient stay” could bring slaves with them “for necessary
attendance” during their sojourn, and Virginians who inherited slaves held in another
state exempted as well.117 Two years later, with the British army on the offensive in
South Carolina and Georgia, the General Assembly gave slaveholders from those
beleaguered states right of sojourn with their slave property for up to one year after the
“expulsion of the enemy...or the restoration of civil government” – slaves held beyond
this term would be freed.118 Virginians might be able to prevent slave importations from
beyond the United States, but the doctrine of comity required that they respect the
property rights of their fellow republican citizens.
Still, these statutes represent an unprecedented regulatory intrusion into the
property rights of slaveholders. All exemptions to the 1778 slave importation ban
required slaveholders to register their slaves with the state, and violations of the statutes
would void masters’ property rights and emancipate enslaved people. Indeed,
revolutionary Virginia saw the state emancipation of scores of enslaved people. In June,
1779, for example, an enslaved man named Kitt was freed for “meritorious service to the
commonwealth” in uncovering a counterfeiting ring. Kitt may have been freed, but his
former owner, Hinchia Mabry, had to be compensated for his property – Mabry was
awarded £1000 by the legislature. Aberdeen, an enslaved man who had “laboured a
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number of years in the public service at the lead mines,” was declared “free in as full and
ample a manner as if he had been born free” in October 1783.119
Though Virginia never officially enlisted enslaved people in its armed forces,
slaveholders sometimes freed individual slaves to enroll them as substitutes, and free
black Virginians were accepted into the military as early as 1775. Some enslaved people
attempted to pass as free and enroll in the militia, leading the legislature to require
evidence of freedom for black soldiers after 1777. As the need for manpower became
more pressing during the Chesapeake campaigns of 1779-1780, however, some Patriots,
James Madison prominent among them, called on the Old Dominion to free and arm
some of its slaves. One correspondant informed Madison that his plan was doomed to
failure – most Virginians considered “sacrificing the property of a part of the
community” to be “unjust.”120 With military victory achieved by 1782, some
slaveholders attempted to re-enslave men they had freed to serve as substitutes and “force
them to return to a state of servitude, contrary to the principles of justice.” To prevent
this, the legislature decreed that all enslaved people who had faithfully served out their
term of enlistment were “fully and compleatly emancipated, and shall be held and
deemed free.” The state Attorney General was empowered to initiate suits in forma
pauperis to guarantee the freedom of those improperly detained and assess damages
against slaveholders.121
Private manumissions also became more common during and after the revolution.
As had been the case since the 1690s, all manumissions had to be approved by the state,
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but with the governor and council in exile, responsibility for approving private
emancipations fell to the legislature. The case of John Barr and his slaves, illustrates the
difficulties this situation created. Barr was in ill health, and wanted to make sure that
Rachel, an enslaved woman, and her daughter, also named Rachel, were freed. But with
the old law restricting manumissions still in force and the governor “withdrawing from
his government,” he had no legal way to do so. Barr simply added a codicil to his will
abrogating all “right, title, or interest” to Rachel and her daughter, and set aside twentyfive acres of his estate for their support. When a dispute arose over the validity of this
emancipation clause, the matter ended up before the legislature in May 1777. The
General Assembly approved the will, granting both Rachels their freedom, but were also
anxious to limit the scope of their ruling. Approval of Barr’s codicil was not an
invitation to flood the legislature with manumission requests – the case was not to be
“drawn into precedent, except in cases where the circumstances may be precisely similar”
– but Virginia slaveholders continued to petition the assembly for emancipation of their
slaves.122
In October 1779, Susanna Riddle, Thomas Walker, and Lewis Dunn all petitioned
the Assembly for the manumission of their slaves – John Hope, known as Barber Caesar,
William Beck, a mixed-race slave, and Pegg were “declared to be free, and [to] enjoy all
such rights, privileges, and immunities, as free negroes or mulattoes by the laws of this
country do enjoy.” The following year, Henry Delony and Benjamin Bilberry
manumitted their slaves Ned and Kate.123 By 1784, the General Assembly construed
private manumission requests so broadly that Anne Rose and her daughter Margaret were
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freed by a clause in Walter Robertson’s will granting them “possession of all his real and
personal estate” for their “long and faithful service.” Though the document said nothing
about manumission, the legislature interpreted the will as “manifesting [Robertson’s]
intention that they should be no longer subject to bondage” – both mother and daughter
were freed and immediately inherited their former owner’s estate.124
By 1782, the General Assembly decided to do away with the costly and
cumbersome process of granting legislative approval for individual manumissions.
Private emancipations could now be conducted by any written instrument attested by two
witnesses or by declaration in open court. Any enslaved people freed in this manner
would “enjoy as full freedom” as if they had been emancipated by legislative decree. To
prevent slaveholders from abusing manumissions to rid themselves of the aged, the
infirm, or minors, the legislature required that former owners continue to support those
“not...of sound mind and body” and any freed people over forty-five or under the age of
consent. Manumission documents would be issued to the freed people and copies lodged
with the county clerk – slaveholders who neglected to provide their former slaves with
freedom papers would be fined £10, £5 of which went to the freed person. There were, to
be sure, limits to manumission. Any freed person traveling beyond their home county
without freedom papers could be jailed until their freedom could be confirmed, and those
unable to pay taxes could be bound out to repay their bill. Still, this made access to
manumission easier for those slaveholders who wished to divest themselves of their
human property.125 Nor did it, as some Virginians had hoped, require former slaves to
leave the state. Freed Afro-Virginians certainly faced a difficult life, hemmed in by racist
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legislation limiting their political and civic rights and relegated to the most menial
employments in an already-depressed economy, but they were recognized as legal
persons, not articles of property.
Revolutionary Virginia was, like its central figure, Thomas Jefferson, deeply
ambivalent toward human slavery. Some Virginians had been uneasy with the central
role of slavery in their local economy for decades, and the revolutionary infusion of
natural rights ideology and the chaos of war opened up new space for debate over the
future of the institution. The new state under construction in the Old Dominion eschewed
many of the old bases of great planter power – primogeniture, the entail, and the slave
trade – pointing toward a possible new future. Yet many of the same tendencies that
shaped this emerging debate over slavery limited the emancipatory potential of the
revolution in Virginia. Revolutionaries like Jefferson and Mason may have hoped to see
their new republic peopled by free yeoman farmers, and implemented many policies to
promote this outcome, but theirs was to be a white man’s republic. Their revolutionary
vision limited by generations of racial violence and the repression of free black
Virginians, they simply could not imagine enslaved people as citizens.
***
New Englanders, Edmund Burke noted in March of 1775, were particularly fond
of liberty. The great orator described “a love of freedom” as the “predominating feature”
of all the American colonies, but the New England colonies were “not only favourable to
liberty, but built upon it.” This was due, of course, partly to the peculiar religious culture
of early colonial New England. Puritanism was “the Protestantism of the Protestant
religion” – though all “dissenting interests” were rooted in “direct opposition to the
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ordinary powers of the world,” New Englanders grounded their local political and legal
cultures in “a strong claim to natural liberty.” The real source of New England’s love of
freedom, then, was not “so much to be sought in their religious tenets, as in their history.”
Unlike the Southern colonies, where “a vast multitude of slaves” made slaveholders
“proud and jealous of their freedom,” Massachusetts and her neighbors were “not only
devoted to liberty, but to liberty according to English ideas, and on English principles.”
Religion may have given a peculiar inflection to New England politics, but when
Bostonians rose in rebellion against what they perceived as unjust taxation and punitive
enslavement by the metropole, they drew on a long history of English resistance to
tyranny.126
White Bay colonists were not the only people to express this tendency toward
freedom, however, and enslaved and free blacks quickly seized the moment to press for
freedom and greater inclusion in revolutionary Massachusetts. As in Virginia, some
enslaved people saw the British as natural allies. In 1768, for example, Boston was
seized with panic when word of a planned rebellion, instigated by offers of freedom from
a British officer, swept the city.127 Rumors of slave revolts resurfaced again in 1772 and
1774, keeping revolutionary Bay Colonists on edge and wary of potential enemies within.
In the wake of the 1774 rebellion scare, Abigail Adams reported to her husband that
slaves had been in communication with Thomas Gage, the embattled royal governor and
military commander, expressing their willingness to “fight for him provided he would
arm them and engage to liberate them.” Unlike the Virginians, who doubled down on
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their coercive police law to prevent slaves from joining British forces, Adams seized the
moment to argue against the continuation of slavery. “I wish sincerely there was not a
Slave in the Province,” she argued. To Abigail Adams and many others in revolutionary
Massachusetts, slavery was an “iniquitous Scheme” – how could American Patriots
honestly claim to be on the side of liberty when they were “daily robbing and plundering
from those who have as good a right to freedom as we have.”128
In such a context, with talk of liberty and slavery thick in the air and the economic
future of the Bay Colony on the line, questions about the desirability of human slavery in
Massachusetts were unavoidable, and a number of prominent Patriots addressed them
head on. As Burke had noted, Puritanism played a critical role in shaping Massachusetts’
distinctive ideals of liberty, and religion continued to inform denunciations of slavery in
the Bay Colony. Nathaniel Niles, minister of North Church in Newburyport, linked
antislavery directly to Christian precepts. Drawing on a long tradition of dissenting
Protestant thought, Niles argued that true liberty consisted not in absolute individual
freedom or licentiousness, but in “such a system of laws, as effectually tends to the
greatest felicity of a state,” and, just as God was no respecter of persons, “there must be
no distinctions, made by the law, between persons of different characters and stations.”
“The omniscient God himself,” Niles argued, “esteems liberty a great blessing,” but
sinful man had perverted God’s plan by enslaving his fellow human beings. Americans
were faced with a clear choice: “either cease to enslave our fellow-men, or else let us
cease to complain of those that would enslave us. Let us either wash our hands from
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blood, or never hope to escape the avenger.”129 Linking the dominant political discourse
of civil liberty to religious ideals of human equality, Niles’ sermon illustrates how
antislavery became linked to revolutionary republican ideology in Massachusetts.
Criticism of slavery also emerged from the political rhetoric of natural rights so
prevalent among Massachusetts Patriots. James Otis argued in a 1764 pamphlet, The
Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved, that the natural rights of all mankind
precluded slavery. British taxation, he asserted, was illegitimate because Americans were
“by the law of nature free born, as indeed all men are, white or black.” Enslaved people
were “born with the same right to freedom, and the sweet enjoyments of liberty and life,
as their unrelenting task-masters.” It was a “manifest” truth that all colonists, “black and
white, ...are free born British subjects, and entitled to all the essential civil rights of
such.” Otis insisted that skin color was not a valid basis for exclusion from the
community of subjects. “Does it follow that it is right to enslave a man because he is
black? Will short curled hair, like wool, instead of Christian hair, as it is called by those
whose hearts are as hard as the nether millstone, help the argument? Can any logical
inference in favour of slavery, be drawn from a flat nose, a long or a short face?” To
Otis, racial difference could never outweigh the fundamental equality of all humans. The
belief in natural liberty that led the Massachusetts Patriot to decry taxation without
representation also informed his belief that “good, loyal and useful subjects, white and
black” anywhere in the empire should be accounted the equals of any other Briton.130
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Political and economic critiques of slavery informed by Massachusetts’ godly
republican heritage were honed even further as the imperial crisis deepened. In 1767, for
example, Congregational minister Nathaniel Appleton argued that slavery and the slave
trade were “contrary to humanity, christianity, the interest of the province, and of private
families.” Though Appleton made no specific proposals in his letters, he did call for “an
act of government to prevent the further importation of slaves.” The logic of his
argument pushed even farther, however, toward general emancipation. Reminding
readers that they were descended from “ancient Britons” who had “resolved from time to
time, that no inhabitant of their island shall be a slave,” Appleton called on the Assembly
to take the question of slavery “into their most serious consideration” and work toward
the “noble and christian...design” of abolition. Americans had the opportunity to be “true
sons of Liberty” by extending freedom “to all mankind that come among us.” Other
colonies might hesitate, but Massachusetts must act – the Bay Colony had been a city
upon a hill before. “Let us not wait for the example of any other of our sister colonies,”
Appleton argued. “It is praise-worthy to follow good examples: but much more so to set
them.”131 Other prominent Patriot leaders like John Adams and his cousin Samuel also
opposed slavery. John saw slavery as a source of potential social unrest and a drain on
the state economy.132 Samuel Adams once refused to accept a female slave offered to
him as a gift into his service unless she were freed.133 Leading figures in revolutionary
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Massachusetts, then, opposed slavery on a variety of grounds – the question was how
they could best go about eliminating it.
As in Virginia, revolutionary Bay Staters recognized that closing the slave trade
was critical to the safety and health of their commonwealth, and would be a first step
toward the ultimate abolition of the institution. In June 1767, for example, the Assembly
took two linked bills into consideration – one to revive the prohibitive import duty on
slaves, and another to “prevent Fraud in the Sale of Negroes.” Both bills passed the
House but Lieutenant Governor Hutchinson refused to sign them into law.134 In 1771, the
Assembly went even further, framing a law that would prevent future slave importations
from Africa – again, the bill passed in the legislature but was disallowed by the
governor.135 Subsequent attempts to formally abolish the slave trade also failed, and the
Bay State would not officially bar its citizens’ participation in the trade until 1788, but
these attempts at ending Massachusetts slaving illustrate that the necessary political will
already existed.
Whatever the letter of the law, Massachusetts residents largely stopped buying
newly imported slaves during the revolution. In the entire period under consideration,
Bay State citizens imported just over six hundred enslaved people, all of whom were
purchased between 1758 and 1763 – after this date there are no recorded slave imports to
Massachusetts.136 Bay state vessels and sailors, however, continued to be active in the
trans-Atlantic slave trade, making seventy-eight slaving voyages during the imperial
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crisis and revolution, and though slave trading voyages ceased between 1774 and 1782 as
a result of the Boston Port Act and the privations of war, they rebounded again in the
1780s and ‘90s.137 Massachusetts would not officially ban the slave trade until 1788,
when a number of free black residents were kidnapped and sold into slavery in
Martinique. Outraged by this violation of the rights of citizens, governor John Hancock
secured the return of these six black Bay Staters, and ushered a final slave trade
participation ban through the legislature.138 Once again, the rights of black citizens to
basic legal protections led the way toward state policies favoring freedom.
With the future of slavery in revolutionary Massachusetts uncertain, the value of
slave property began to plummet. In the mid-18th century, rewards offered for fugitive
slaves were typically between £5 and £20, but by the 1770s slaveholders offered very
little reward for the return of fugitives. In 1774, for example, one Bostonian offered only
four dollars for the return of an enslaved man, and in 1777 John Cobbett offered only
four pence for his enslaved man Felix.139 Though advertisements for slave sales
continued to appear on Massachusetts newspapers, slave prices on the open market also
dropped precipitously during the revolution. Revolutionary leader Joseph Warren, for
example, sold an enslaved boy for £30 in 1770 – five years later Bostonian Henry Carver
was lucky to get ten shillings for an enslaved teenager.140 Indeed, during the revolution
itself Massachusetts slaveholders, perhaps hoping to avoid the cost of raising enslaved
children, were simply giving slaves away. Boston newspapers carried advertisements for
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“a fine Negro child of a good healthy breed to be given away,” and one slaveholder even
offered to pay anyone who would take “A Negro child soon expected of a good breed”
off his hands.141 Like slave sales throughout the history of the institution, these clearly
ripped enslaved families apart, tearing even newborn infants from their mothers. They
are also, however, an indication of how uncertain slave property had become in the Bay
State – slaveholders were unwilling to make an investment in the upkeep of enslaved
children when there was little guarantee that they could reap a profit from their future
labor.
The importation of new slaves may have ended, and the value of slaver property
may have declined, but enslaved persons already within Massachusetts continued to be
classed as personal property. Tax codes passed each year between 1754 and 1776 rated
“Indian, negro, and mulatto servants proportionably as other personal estate.”142 This
definition, consistent with local taxation of slave property in practice since the 1690s,
suggests that Massachusetts slavery went without serious political challenge during the
imperial crisis. Yet, as we have seen, ideological and political factors led many Bay
staters to question the legitimacy of property-in-man, and local legislation began to chip
away at the security of slave property. A number of bills proposed during the imperial
crisis would have severely curtailed rights to slave property in Massachusetts. One act,
proposed in March 1767, would have outlawed slavery entirely, ending the
“unwarrantable and unusual Practice of Custom of inslaving Mankind” and shutting
down the slave trade. After three days of debate, the emancipation clauses of the bill
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were laid aside, while the slave trade ban passed the legislature only to be vetoed by
Lieutenant Governor Hutchinson.143 Later that same year, another proposed bill sought
to “prevent frauds in sales of negroes” – apparently free black Bay Colonists were being
kidnapped and sold into slavery, and the legislature now attempted to end this corrupt
practice.144 Revolutionary legislation may not have attacked slavery head on, but it did
chip away at its security.
The actions of enslaved and free black Bay Staters during the Revolutionary War
also made continued enslavement difficult to justify. Unlike in the Southern states,
where enslaved people deserted to the British en masse, in Massachusetts free and
enslaved blacks sided overwhelmingly with the American Patriots. Though the Bay State
barred all blacks from military service for a short period in the mid-18th century, people
of color were always fixtures in Massachusetts units. There were black minutemen
present at Lexington in 1775, black sailors from Marblehead helped shuttle cornered
Continental troops across the East River after the disastrous Battle of Brooklyn in 1776,
and a black Bay Stater manned the stroke oar as Washington crossed the Delaware in the
surprise attack on Trenton. Indeed, despite the Bay State’s ban on black enrollment,
enslaved and free people of color appeared in Massachusetts regiments throughout the
war. With a long history of basic civic inclusion behind them, and the struggle for
personal liberty advancing back home, black Bay Staters were willing to fight for the
political liberty of the American colonies.145
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Massachusetts’ enrollment of black troops in her own forces may also have
influenced treatment of black British soldiers. Unlike in Virginia, where black men taken
in arms were treated as rebellious slaves, black British troops taken by Bay State forces
were treated as prisoners of war and given treatment similar to any other redcoats. In
September 1775, for example, “two Negro men” were taken captive on board the
Hannibal, a British sloop, and carried back to Massachusetts, where they were advertised
for sale at Salem. The Assembly intervened, however, and forbid their sale, ruling that
“any Negroes...taken on the High Seas, and brought as prisoners into this State...shall not
be allowed to be sold, nor treated otherways than as prisoners are ordered to be
treated.”146 Not only had the Assembly voided the sale of these two specific captives,
they laid down a rule for the equal treatment of black British soldiers as prisoners of war.
Slave property, then, was under assault in revolutionary Massachusetts, and the
long local tradition of granting limited rights to enslaved people only intensified.
Informed by their long history of godly republicanism and rough egalitarianism, many
Massachusites of all political stripes believed that no person could own another as
property, and that the authority of masters must be bracketed by the rule of law. Though
they had precious little else in common, Patriots like Samuel Adams and James Otis
would likely have agreed with royal governor Thomas Hutchinson that slaveholders did
not have the power of life and death over enslaved people. “Slavery by the Provincial
laws gives no right to the life of the servant;” Hutchinson reported to metropolitan
planners in 1771, “and a slave here is considered as a servant would be who had bound
himself for a period of years exceeding the ordinary term of human life.”147 Under this
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definition, enslaved people would have access to a number of traditional English rights,
including protections for their persons, limitations on the physical authority of masters,
and recognition of legal personhood in courts of law. With the political climate tilting in
favor of liberty, and sympathetic allies in both the British and American camps,
Massachusetts slaves began to press ever more firmly for freedom by petitioning the
legislature and bringing freedom suits in the law courts.
Illustrating how a long history of relatively open access to the rights of subjects,
enslaved Bay Colonists regularly petitioned the colonial, and later state, assembly for a
general emancipation of all Massachusetts slaves. In January 1773, a number of enslaved
Bostonians asked the Governor Hutchinson and the Council, the last vestiges of civil
government in the revolutionary colony, to “take their unhappy state and condition
under...just consideration.” Displaying their clear grasp of contemporary debates over
slavery “on both sides of the water,” they argued that “multitudes” of Britons, many of
them “of great note and influence,” had begun to turn on the institution, and they
mobilized a number of their arguments in the petition. The basic problem, as enslaved
Bay colonists saw it, was that, as slaves, they were classed among “the beasts” – as
property – and deprived of all rights. A slave could not “possess and enjoy any thing –
no, not even life itself.” Defined as property, the enslaved Bostonians argued, “We have
no property! we have no wives! we have no children! we have no city! no country!” If
this was tragic for enslaved people, it was also a loss to the state. Freeing Massachusetts
slaves would add hundreds of loyal citizens “of good parts,...discreet, sober, honest and
industrious” to the commonwealth, all of whom would be more than willing “to bear a
part in the public charges” as free people. Abolition, then, could never be “productive of
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the least wrong or injury” to slaveholders, while to enslaved people it would be “as life
from the dead.” The fact that they could petition the Assembly at all must have given
enslaved Bay colonists hope – the petitioners were “very happy, that [they could] address
the great and general court of the province,” a right no Virginia slave could have dreamed
of.148
The following year, another group of enslaved settlers petitioned the royal
government once again, arguing that they had “in common with all other men a naturel
right to our freedoms without being depriv’d of them by our fellow men as we are a
freeborn Pepel and have never forfeited this Blessing by aney compact or agreement
whatever.” Drawing on one of the central tenets of the Anglophone antislavery
argument, they pointed out that their bondage was incompatible with membership in
corporate bodies of church and state. Their “deplorable situation” made them “incapable
of shewing [their] obedience to Almighty God” and prevented them from “perform[ing]
the duties of a husband to a wife or parent to his child.” Slavery also prevented enslaved
people from “reap[ing] an equal benefet from the laws of the Land.” All of this was
incompatible with the principles of a “free and christian Country” because it prevented
enslaved people from “fulfill[ing] our parte of duty” to church and state. Indeed, the
petitioners argued that Massachusetts law “doth not justifi but condemns Slavery.”
Again illustrating a clear understanding of contemporary debates over the institution, they
argued that even if the enslavement of persons carried into the colony was sanctioned by
law, “ther never was aney [law] to inslave our children for life when Born in a free
Countrey.” The petitioners called on the revolutionary legislature to pass an act “that we
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may obtain our Natural right our freedoms and our children be set at lebety at the yeare of
Twenty one.”149 As in 1773, however, no immediate action was taken.
In 1777, with an independent state government coming into existence and debates
over a new constitution for the Bay State at the forefront of local politics, enslaved and
free people of color sought to put universal emancipation on the political agenda. A
petition to the General Court signed by eight prominent free black Bostonians, including
Prince Hall, founder of the first black Masonic lodge in America, drew on revolutionary
natural rights ideology in condemning the existence of “a State of Slavery in the Bowels
of a free & christian Country.” Like earlier petitioners, Hall and his co-petitioners argued
that enslaved people “have in Common with all other men a Natural and Unalienable
Right to that freedom which the Grat Parent of the Unaverse hath Bestowed equalley on
all menkind.” Indeed, “A Life of Slavery” deprived enslaved people of “Every social
Priviledge, of Every thing Requiset to Render Life Tol[er]able” and was “worse then
Nonexistance.” Drawing parallels between their own fight for freedom and the struggle
for American liberty, the petitioners cited the “Lawdable Example” of colonial petitions
to Great Britain and lamented that “their Sucess hath ben but too similar” – just as King
George dismissed American grievances, American slaveholders refused to see the justice
in petitions for freedom. Indeed, the “Principle from which Amarica has acted” during
the revolution “Pleads Stronger than A thousand arguments” for emancipation. Like the
1774 petitioners, Hall and his co-signatories hoped that Massachusetts would restore
enslaved people “to the Enjoyments of that Which is the Naturel Right of all men” and
guarantee the freedom of enslaved children at age twenty-one. Only by ending slavery
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could American revolutionaries remove “the inconsistancey of acting themselves the part
which thay condemn and oppose in Others.”150 Again, the legislature took no direct
action but, as we shall see, the principles so forcefully expressed by enslaved and free
black petitioners played a critical role in shaping contemporary interpretations of
Massachusetts’ revolutionary constitution.
Throughout the revolution, the most successful challenges to slavery came from
the courts.151 Well before the institution of slavery was abolished through judicial decree
in the Quock Walker cases (1779-1783), individual slaves fought for and gained their
freedom by exploiting their unique access to Massachusetts courts. Numerous scholars
have argued that the revolutionary-era freedom suits were relatively inconsequential, and
focused primarily on the wrongful detention of individual slaves – they “did not fight to
end slavery for all, just for themselves.”152 While technically correct in a narrow sense,
these critics miss the extent to which these individual claims grew into an overwhelming
precedential basis for a broader emancipatory basis. Indeed, the strategies pursued by
black Bay Colonists and their antislavery allies line up almost perfectly with those later

150

Petition for Freedom to the Massachusetts Council and the House of Representatives, 13 January 1777,
in MHS Collections Online,
https://www.masshist.org/database/viewer.php?item_id=557&img_step=1&br=1&mode=transcript#page
1 (Accessed 7 October 2015).
151
On Massachusetts freedom suits generally, see Blanck, Tyrannicide, 34-37, 111-127; Joanne Pope
Melish, Disowning Slavery: Gradual Emancipation and “Race” in New England, 1780-1860 (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 95-96; A. Leon Higginbotham, In the Matter of Color: Race & the
American Legal Process: The Colonial Period (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 91-99.
Blanck, the most recent historian to devote any substantial attention to these cases, argues that “these
litigants did not fight to end slavery for all, just for themselves.” (35) While this interpretation may be
technically accurate, it misses the extent to which Massachusetts freedom suits, taken together,
contributed to a legal culture where property-in-man was deemed to be fundamentally illegitimate.
Indeed, as this analysis will illustrate, even these “narrow” freedom suits relied on the proposition that
the chattel principle was fundamentally illegitimate.
152
Emily Blanck, Tyrannicide, 35.

565

used by James Somerset and Granville Sharp – challenge the dominion of slaveholders as
an opening wedge for a full-on assault on property-in-man.
When abolition came in the Bay Colony, then, it came swiftly, driven by the
claims of enslaved men and women who knew precisely how to challenge their bondage
in sympathetic Massachusetts courts. This process was already underway well before
Thomas Lewis or James Somerset forced the issue back in England. Indeed, successful
freedom suits were already being brought in the mid-1760s, just as Charles Steuart and
the then-enslaved Somerset took up residence in the Bay Colony. John Adams later
recalled that the courts emancipated a number of slaves during the revolution – he “never
knew a Jury by verdict to determine a negro to be a slave – and they always found them
free.”153 As we shall see, Adams was fudging the facts somewhat – he had successfully
defended the rights of slaveholders in court on at least one occasion himself. Still, the
general thrust of his statement rings true. The remarkably broad access of enslaved
persons in Massachusetts to the basic rights of subjecthood, and their perseverance in
pressing for recognition of their liberty, resulted not simply in the emancipation of
individual slaves, but in the abolition of the institution of slavery.
As in England, cases concerning enslaved people hinged on questions of
slaveholders’ physical dominion. With one exception, all these cases were initiated by
trespass writs protesting the wrongful detention of an enslaved person and so, allegedly,
raised broader questions of slavery only tangentially. Slew v. Whipple, heard by the
Essex Superior Court in 1766, began when Jenny Slew brought a writ of trespass against
her master, John Whipple of Ipswich. Slew, a mixed-race woman, claimed that Whipple
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had “kept her in servitude as a Slave...and restrained her of her Liberty” since 1762
“without any lawful Authority or Right so to do.” She sought confirmation of her
freedom and £25 in damages. The choice of a trespass writ to initiate suit illustrates how
assumptions of self-ownership transformed trespass from a form of action used by
masters to gain compensation for a slaves’ lost labor into a weapon in the antislavery
arsenal. Slew used this form of action to accuse Whipple of wrongfully depriving her of
her rightful property in her own person, much as Granville Sharp and James Somerset
would use a habeas corpus writ back in England six years later. Whipple responded that
the entire suit was ridiculous, and moved for the abatement of Slew’s trespass writ.
There was “no such Person in Nature as Jenny Slew of Ipswich,” he argued – there was
only Jenny Slew article of property. Whipple claimed to be prepared to “verify” Slew’s
status, and offered as evidence the fact that “she had been severally Times married to
slaves.” Not only was Jenny Slew a slave, she was a married slave, and therefore could
make no legal claims in her own name under the law of coverture.154
When an inferior court jury upheld Whipple’s property right and dismissed
Slew’s suit, she appealed the decision to the Superior Court, illustrating once again the
legal rights enslaved people could invoke in Massachusetts courts. When the case moved
to trial, Benjamin Kent, counsel for Jenny Slew, began by sidestepping the general issue
of slavery’s legitimacy. Indeed, Kent conceded that “the Right of some Men to enslave
others” was “in some Places...established.” Slavery in Massachusetts was different,
however. Though masters might have some type of claim to their enslaved people, they
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could never have “a Right to [the] Life” of a slave, much as Lieutenant Governor
Hutchinson, sitting as a justice in the case, had argued a year earlier. Slavery of such a
sort might exist “in [the] West Indies to the shame of human Nature,” but Massachusetts
law conferred no such right. Besides, the whole issue of property ownership was moot.
Kent entered evidence that Jenny Slew was “commonly reputed to be the Child of Betty
Slew a white Woman by a Negro Man.” As the daughter of a free subject, Kent argued,
Slew could never be a slave. Besides, if Jenny Slew was a slave, the attorney asked,
where was the proof? In other similar cases, property claims to slaves had only been
admitted when a bill of sale could be produced – “Why did not they do so here?” Kent
asked. With evidence of free parentage, and without any proof that she was a slave, Jenny
Slew must be maintained in her liberty.155
Jeremiah Gridley, counsel for John Whipple, countered that the burden of proof
rest with the plaintiff – was not a plaintiff “who sues in Trespass for Goods...compelled
to prove his Possession, and that it was by force taken”? Slew could never provide such
proof, Gridley argued, because “She has never been in Possession of her Liberty, she has
been out of Possession of it for 50 years.” Gridley and Kent began their arguments from
entirely different bases – the former assumed property-in-man while the latter assumed
self-ownership. The entirety of the court’s decision has not survived, but statements by
Justices Peter Oliver and John Cushing illustrate how Massachusetts courts leaned in
favor of freedom. Oliver identified the central issue in the case as a “Contest between
Liberty and Property – both of great Consequence,” but when it came down two it
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“Liberty [was] of most importance of the two.” Cushing noted that the attorney general
had recently brought a trespass writ in a similar case, an action with which the justice
agreed because “if a Person is free he may bring Trespass at any Time.”156
The question, then, was whether Jenny Slew was free, and the fragmentary record
of the case hints at how Cushing framed his decision. First he invoked the idea of slave
or free status following the maternal line, “Partus sequitur ventrem” – if her mother was a
free white woman, then Slew could not have been born a slave. Though there was no
statutory basis for the practice in the Bay Colony, the widespread practice of partus
sequitur ventrem in the plantation colonies likely influenced the logic of status by birth in
Massachusetts as well.157 In this case, however, Cushing invoked the principle to argue
against enslavement. The fragmentary record of the case also notes that Cushing
declared that “Colour is a Presumption” in cases regarding slaves. Here, however, he
seems to have presumed something quite different than Virginia jurists. Race might
indeed carry a presumption of enslavement, even in Massachusetts, but it could never be
proof of enslavement in and of itself. As we have seen, and as Jenny Slew’s case
reinforces, there were large numbers of free people of color in the Bay Colony, and both
law and custom dictated that they have access to the protection of the common law
courts. The remarks of Lieutenant Governor Thomas Hutchinson, sitting as Chief
Justice, and Benjamin Lynde, Jr., the effective head of the Superior Court, do not survive,
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but given Hutchinson’s later comments about slaves being “considered as a servant”
under Massachusetts law, it is hard to imagine him breaking with Oliver and Cushing. In
the end, the highest court in the colony confirmed Jenny Slew’s freedom, and she was
awarded £4 in damages and nearly £10 in court costs.158
A similar case lodged two years later, however, resulted in a very different
decision. Amos Newport initiated suit against his master, Joseph Billing, for “Trespass
and false imprisonment,” just as had Jenny Slew, and again an inferior court ruled in
favor of a master’s property rights. Newport, however, appealed the decision, and the
case appeared before the Superior Court of Judicature in September 1768. Billing
responded to the charge as any slaveholder would – the case should be dismissed because
the “Plaintiff is [the] Defendants Property – his Negro Slave.” Unlike John Whipple,
however, Billing was able to produce a bill of sale recording his Newport’s purchase, and
witnesses attested to the document’s veracity. Simeon Strong, counsel for Billing, then
turned to proving the legality of slavery in the colony. First, he pointed to various “Acts
of Parliament that take Notice of slaves in [the] Plantations” to establish that the British
Empire allowed property-in-man. Even if the empire as a whole had not approved of the
chattel principle, however, the “Law of [the] Province” – like the “Tax Acts” defining
slaves as personalty or the old fundamental law of the Body of Liberties – recognized that
enslaved persons were a form of personal property. Covering all bases, Strong argued
that even in the absence of an explicit legal sanction for slavery, “Custom” and usage
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legitimated property-in-man. Slaves throughout the empire were treated as property –
why should Amos Newport be an exception?159
Unwilling to lay any argument aside, Strong also sought to explain how slavery
could exist in a legal regime based on the premise that “Every Man [has] a Right to
freedom that no Law or Usage can take away.” The only circumstance in which a
“Forfeiture of Liberty” might be legitimate was captivity in war, where captors gained “a
Right to destroy them” and therefore could “enslave them to repay the Expences of
defending ones self.” As we have seen, however, Strong’s position was out of step with
broader Anglophone interpretations of the law of nations and was clearly open to
challenge – what war could justify such terrible reparations? Strong closed his argument
by returning to foundation of all just law. In cases where there was any ambiguity, the
“Sense of the Nation” ought to guide the hand of justice, and the “Presumption” in
Massachusetts, at least according to Strong and Billing, was that “an African black is a
Slave.”160 With the weight of custom, common law, local statute, and imperial practice
behind him, Billing had good reason to be confident. And if all else failed, he held the
trump card – a recognized bill of sale.
Newport’s attorneys, James Putnam and Jonathan Sewall, faced the difficult task
of rebutting Strong’s comprehensive proslavery argument. Both conceded that the
conceptual foundation of slavery was “Conquest and Rights of War,” and that this
implied the “Power of Life and Death” over an enslaved person. The question was
whether this basis was applicable in Newport’s case. Echoing Richard Saltonstall’s
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position in Smith v. Keyser over a century earlier, Putnam argued that captivity could not
be the basis of Newport’s enslavement, asserting that slaves were “stolen in Affrica,” not
taken as war captives. Besides, to admit the legitimacy of war captivity opened up a
dangerous possibility – by this logic Africans had “The Same right...to enslave us.”
Sewall added that the entire concept of slavery was “Painful [to] Humanity, common
Justice, and eternal Morality.” With the foundation of slavery delegitimized, Putnam
asserted that Billing’s “only Proof” of Newport’s enslavement was that he was “A Negro,
black &c,” a claim the attorney refuted with references to Montesquieu’s natural rights
doctrines. Billing’s entire claim, Putnam and Sewall argued, was founded on a racist
presumption unsupported by natural law.161
What of the bill of sale, though? Surely this was sufficient proof of Newport’s
status. To counter this apparently implacable obstacle, Putnam and Sewall turned to
arguments that had been honed by over a century of antislavery legal argument. Citing
Lord Holt’s decisions in Chamberlain v. Harvey, Smith v. Gould, and Smith v. Brown &
Cooper, along with Mosaic law, the antislavery attorneys argued that “Common Law
[was] directly vs. this Principle” of property-in-man. The only form of bondage
recognized by law was “Villenage,” and even the most degraded villein or servant
retained access to the “Protection” of the law – if a master were to “Break his [slave’s]
Head...Indictment will lye.” Again echoing Lord Holt, Putnam held that Billing might
“have a right to [Newport’s] service, during life” but “not to [his] Life” itself. As Sewall
argued, David Ingersole, Newport’s former master, may have “had a Right to sell” him,
as demonstrated by the bill of sale, but this right could only be to his labor, not his
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person. Since Newport had not “forfeited his Liberty, by the Laws of this Country,” he
must be accounted a free man and receive compensation for his wrongful detention in
slavery. Despite their clear mobilization of many elements of the long English
antislavery argument, Putnam and Sewall could not carry the day. With a duly
recognized bill of sale presented in court, there was little they could do to secure
Newport’s freedom. Vested property rights could not be tampered with lightly, and the
court declared that “the said Amos [Newport] was not a freeman, as he alleged, but the
proper slave of the said Joseph [Billing].”162
Another case heard in 1768 saw an enslaved woman, Margaret, initiate a suit
against her master William Muzzy, a Lexington tanner, by writ of replevin rather than
trespass. By framing her suit in this way, Margaret, emphasized her claim to selfownership in ways that the trespass writs lodged by Jenny Slew and Amos Newport did
not. Replevin was a form of action requiring the return of specific properties – in this
case Margaret’s person – while proceedings to determine the parties’ legal rights to such
properties were determined by the court. An inferior court jury found in Margaret’s
favor, and, despite appeals that dragged on for nearly two years, the Superior Court twice
upheld their verdict.163 The writ Margaret and her attorneys chose to initiate suit with
may have been unique, but the logic behind their case fit squarely within the English
legal antislavery tradition and the long history of relatively open access to basic rights for
all persons in the Bay Colony.
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As the revolution wore on the pace of judicial emancipation only quickened. In
1769, an enslaved man named James gained his freedom after bringing a trespass against
his purported owner, Richard Lechmere. Caesar, an enslaved man owned by Elkanah
Watson of Plymouth, won his liberty in 1771. Counsel for Caesar argued that “Province
law doth not make any negroes slaves” – there was no positive law of slavery in the Bay
Colony – and even if it did, slavery was against the “Laws of God and reason” and
therefore “must be void.”164 Caesar Hendrick of Newburyport was freed by the Essex
County Inferior Court in October 1773. John Lowell, Caesar’s lawyer, used nearly every
antislavery argument presented over the last century and a half in framing his case. A
certificate of baptism was presented as support for the argument that Caesar was “a
Christian and if held in Slavery cannot perform his duties as one.” Lowell specifically
cited the Somerset decision and argued that “There must be express law” establishing
slavery, but Massachusetts law “establish[ed] Slavery only by implication if it does at
all.” Liberty was an essential natural right, Lowell argued, and “No human tribunal can
take away natural rights so fundamental.”165 Caleb Dodge gained his freedom the
following year when an Essex County jury found “no law of the province [could hold] a
man to service for life.”166 The recognition of black Massachusetts residents as legal
persons enabled them to press claims for individual and collective emancipation on the
revolutionary state, and made their continued definition as articles of property
increasingly problematic.
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When Massachusetts Patriots set about creating a constitution for their newly
independent commonwealth, then, they did so in a legal culture that was fundamentally
hostile to the concept of property-in-man. The first state constitution, drafted in 1778,
included no explicit mention of slavery at all, though Article V did exclude “Negroes,
Indians, and Mulattoes” from the suffrage. While there were numerous reasons for the
widespread opposition to the 1778 constitution, explicit condemnations of slavery are
conspicuous among them. A group of free blacks from Dartmouth argued that they could
not be required to pay taxes since they were barred from any “vote or influence in the
election of those that tax us.” The freemen of the town of Sutton complained that Article
V violated the “grand and Fundamental Maxims of Human Rights” by excluding
“Negroes...even though they are free and are men of Property,” adding to the “already
accumulated Load of guilt lying upon the Land in Supporting the Slave Trade.”
Westminster’s freemen argued that the clause “deprives a part of the humane Race of
their Natural Rights...[which] no power on Earth has a Just Right to Doe.” Partly as a
result of the response to these racially exclusionary suffrage requirements, the
Massachusetts state constitution of 1778 was overwhelmingly defeated.167
When John Adams penned the 1780 Massachusetts constitution, he would have
known that widespread disapproval of slavery had contributed to the defeat of the first
constitution two years earlier. Indeed, the very first clause of the document asserted the
fundamental equality of all humanity – “All men are born free & equal, & have certain
natural, essential, & unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of
enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and
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protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.”
Unlike the national Declaration of Independence, however, this ringing endorsement of
natural rights was linked directly to a legal culture that had largely delegitimized
property-in-man. The Massachusetts constitution of 1780 did not contain an explicit
emancipation clause – indeed, it contained no direct discussion of slavery or race at all –
but particularly in the wake of the Somerset decision, refusing to explicitly sanction the
chattel principle, in a jurisdiction where enslaved people already had access to basic
rights, ultimately had the same legal effect.168
Massachusetts jurists, then, already interpreted their state constitution as
incompatible with slavery before Quock Walker’s case began. Elizabeth Freeman was
emancipated in 1781 by an emancipatory reading of the 1780 constitution by the
courts.169 Commonwealth v. Jennison, finally decided by the Massachusetts Supreme
Court of Judicature in 1783, was simply the last nail in slavery’s coffin. Parallels
between the Quock Walker case and the Lewis and Somerset cases back in England are
striking. Walker ran off from his master, Nathaniel Jennison, in 1781, much as James
Somerset had run away from Charles Steuart. When Walker found refuge with John and
Seth Caldwell, the sons of his former owner, Jennison, like Steuart, sought bring the
restive slave under his dominion through brute force, beating him with the butt of a whip
and dragging him back into slavery. Just as Granville Sharp had done for Thomas Lewis,
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however, the Caldwells brought charges against Jennison for assault and battery, and just
as in England, the court allowed the charge – despite his status, Walker was under the
protection of Massachusetts courts. Jennison sought to defend himself by producing a
bill of sale and arguing that Walker was his “proper slave.” When the jury handed down
its verdict in June 1781, however, they disregarded the bill of sale entirely and simply
ruled that “the said Quork is a Freeman and not the proper Negro slave of the
Def[endan]t” – Walker was awarded £50 in damages for the assault.170 Their state
constitution may not have required it, but Massachusetts jurors interpreted their
fundamental law as incompatible with slavery. If Quock Walker was not a slave, he must
be protected by the law of the commonwealth.
The matter was not yet settled, however, and Jennison both appealed his
conviction and filed suit against the Caldwell brothers for trespass for causing Walker “to
absent himself” from Jennison’s service and employing him “for 6 weeks for their own
benefit.” Unlike Richard Stapylton, Charles Steuart, and countless other colonial
slaveholders who framed their claims to enslaved persons as articles of property,
Jennison, likely influenced by local legal mores himself, only sought compensation for
Walker’s lost labor, much as Lord Holt had suggested at the turn of the 18th century.
Perhaps this limited claim to Walker’s labor power and the long legal tradition of
granting compensation in such cases informed the jury’s decision in Jennison v.
Caldwell. Jennison won the lawsuit and was awarded £25 in damages. While the
decisions in Walker v. Jennison and Jennison v. Caldwell might appear contradictory, in
fact they dealt with two entirely separate issues – the first protected Quock Walker’s right
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to the safety and security of his own person while the second recognized Nathaniel
Jennison’s right to the labor of his black servant.171
The Caldwells and their attorneys, future state and national attorney general Levi
Lincoln and future governor Caleb Strong, were unwilling to let the issue lie, however,
and appealed the decision in Jennison v. Caldwell to the Supreme Judicial Court.
Lincoln’s brief for the appellate court illustrates how he used numerous elements of the
long Anglophone antislavery argument to invalidate not only Jennison’s property claims,
but also his claims to Walker’s labor. Jennison’s lawyers also trotted out long-held
proslavery legal arguments, however. William Sprague, counsel for Jennison, again
produced the original bill of sale for Walker’s purchase by James Caldwell back in 1754
and argued that, since the slave descended to Caldwell’s widow at his death, and then to
Nathaniel Jennison after his marriage to the widow Caldwell, the chain of property
ownership was both legal and uninterrupted. Besides, Sprague argued, Quock Walker
had made an oral agreement to serve Jennison and was thus “a servant by his own
consent.” The Caldwell brothers had knowingly enticed Walker away from his rightful
master, the very situation for which trespass writs for lost labor were created. Citing
biblical law and colonial statute, Sprague’s co-counsel added that “the custom and usage
of the country consider slavery as right” and “a respectable affair.” The state’s
constitution might say that all persons were born free and equal, but this could not
retroactively invalidate a vested property right – Walker was held as a slave long before
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the state constitution was ratified. To declare Walker free would cause many Bay Staters
to “lose their property, and be staved.”172
Lincoln countered by linking the 1780 constitution to the moral and legal
constitution of the people of Massachusetts. He began, as so many antislavery thinkers
did, from a presumption of fundamental human equality. All persons, Lincoln argued,
were “born in the same manner, our bones clothed with the same kind of flesh, [and] live
and die in the same manner.” Slavery, then, was “contrary to the law of nature” and any
statutes “against the laws of nature [were] void.”173 Lincoln then proceeded to refute
Jennison’s claims point by point. The “custom of the country” was not a sufficient
defense a “custom must be general...[and] undisputed,” and the question of slavery’s
legitimacy had “always been disputed in the Gen[era]l C[our]t and courts of justice – and
else where.” The “several laws of the State” that seemed to allow for slavery were “In
derogation of common law” and therefore must be “construed strickly.” Jennison’s bill
of sale, then, was of no moment – it was in direct conflict with a strict construction of
“The Constitution” of the commonwealth. Nor was Walker’s alleged consent to his
servitude a valid defense. Lincoln asserted that there was “No evidence of consent,” and
even if there were, since there was “no time agreed on” Walker’s servitude could be
“only during will which he may put an end to when he pleases.” Without a written
indenture specifying terms of service, Walker was at liberty to leave Jennison’s employ
whenever he wished.174
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The crux of Lincoln’s argument bore the clear imprint of Massachusetts’ long
corporate humanist heritage. “Quork is our brother,” Lincoln asserted, and “When one
fellow subject is restrained of his liberty, it is an attack on every subject – every one has a
right” to their own freedom and the protection of the laws. Indeed, the language of equal
subjecthood suffused the whole of Lincoln’s antislavery argument. Arguing that slavery
was illegitimate because it broke up black families, he asked rhetorically, “Is not their
child as dear to black subjects as to white”? To legitimize property-in-man would allow
“a subject of this free com[mon]wealth [to] be taken from his friends, father, mother,
sisters and brothers” and sold into the barbarous slavery of the West Indies. Driving his
point home, Lincoln turned to the Bay State’s long history of religious opposition to
slavery as well. In a ringing summation, he argued that, should they find in favor of
Jennison, the jurors would be held to account “at one common bar...[by] one common
judge... – by the Gospel, the perfect law of liberty.” Putting a religious spin on Somerset
principles, Lincoln set the universal “law of God” against the local and limited man-made
law of slavery. “If there is no law of man establishing of it,” he argued, slavery did not
exist and “there is no difficulty.” Even if there were positive laws recognizing slavery,
however, “the great difficulty is to determine which law you ought to obey,” and here
Lincoln saw no choice – “the worst that can happen to you for disobeying [man-made
law] is the destruction of the body, for [divine law], that of your own souls.” Persuaded
by Lincoln’s distillation of long-held antislavery principles, the jury found for the
Caldwells and invalidated Jennison’s claims to Walker’s person and labor.175
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Despite the jury’s decision, however, Jennison was unwilling to let Walker enjoy
his liberty peacefully. In April 1783, the Quock Walker cases came to a climax in
Commonwealth v. Jennison, the case that definitively invalidated the chattel principle in
the Bay State. Argued and decided by some the greatest legal minds of early republican
Massachusetts, including Chief Justice William Cushing, Attorney General Robert Treat
Paine, and , the case involved yet another assault by Nathaniel Jennison, who attacked
and beat Quock Walker with a large stick. The indictment was brought directly by the
commonwealth, not, as had been the case in all subsequent cases touching on slavery, by
a private citizen, indicating the commitment of early republican Massachusetts to
protecting the security of all persons. Jennison again plead not guilty on the grounds that
Walker was an article of property, and therefore he had every right “to bring [Walker]
home when he ran away; and...only took proper measures for that purpose.” Attorney
General Robert Treat Paine, presenting the state’s case, argued that natural rights, the
state constitution of 1780, and, introducing a new element to Walker’s tale, a previous
promise of manumission by the Caldwells together voided any property claim Jennison
may have had and brought Quock within the protection of the law.176
Given the dominant legal culture in revolutionary Massachusetts, the verdict was
all but a foregone conclusion. Drawing on long-held English antislavery principles,
Chief Justice William Cushing’s charge to the jury in Commonwealth v. Jennison reads
like a summation of the principles underpinning the long Anglophone antislavery
argument:
As to the doctrine of slavery...[it] has been heretofore countenanced by the
Province Laws formerly, but nowhere is it expressly enacted or established. It has
been a usage – a usage which took its origin from the practice of some of the
176
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European nations, and the regulations of British government respecting the then
Colonies... But whatever sentiments have formerly prevailed in this particular or
slid in upon the example of others, a different idea has taken place with the people
of America, more favorable to the natural rights of mankind, and to that natural,
innate desire of Liberty, with which Heaven (without regard to color, complexion,
or shape of...features) has inspired the human race. And upon this ground and
Our Constitution of Government, by which the people of this Commonwealth
have solemnly bound themselves, sets out with declaring that all men are born
free and equal – and that every subject is entitled to liberty, and to have it guarded
by the laws, as well as life and property – and in short is totally repugnant to the
idea of being born slaves. This being the case...the idea of slavery is inconsistent
with our own conduct and Constitution; and there can be no such thing as
perpetual servitude of a rational creature, unless his liberty is forfeited by some
criminal conduct or given up by personal consent or contract.177
In language strikingly similar to that of Lord Mansfield, Cushing had explained why
slavery was illegitimate in Massachusetts. Quock Walker was confirmed in his freedom,
and the institution of slavery was declared incompatible with the fundamental law of the
Bay State.
As we have seen, Cushing was far from the first Anglo-American to challenge the
institution of slavery, nor would he be the last. Just as slavery was demolished in
Massachusetts and the early national North, Southern defenders of property-in-man
turned aside the very real challenges to human bondage produced by the revolution,
laying the legal and political groundwork for the expansion of their increasingly peculiar
institution. Indeed slaveholders largely dominated the politics of the new nation –
gaining crucial concessions from the federal state and entrenching the institution behind
bulwarks of local positive law. Theirs were not the only voices present at the American
founding, however, and the power of antislavery arguments honed through centuries of
legal struggle also left their mark on the early republic. Armed with ideals that Henry
Parker, Morgan Godwyn, Lord Holt, and Samuel Sewall would have recognized, early
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national antislavery advocates prevented the expansion of slavery in the Old Northwest,
kept explicit protections for property-in-man out of their national charter, gradually
emancipated tens of thousands of enslaved persons throughout the North, abolished
American participation in the trans-Atlantic slave trade, and worked to ensure that all
persons came under the protection of the law. What Levi Lincoln had argued in Caldwell
v. Jennison was not yet wholly true, but many Americans worked to ensure that it would
be – “The air of America is too pure for a slave to breathe in.”178
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